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
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
1848



BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME II.

(NEW SERIES.)



BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY BENJAMIN H. GREENE,
124, WASHINGTON STREET.
1848.



CAMBRIDGE:
METCALF AND COMPANY,
PRINTERS TO THE UNIVERSITY.

Cont.
 Cont.
 1-4-1887

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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1848.

ART. I. — *Admonitions to Protestants*. Introduction. "*Quærite ergo primum regnum Dei, et justitiam ejus, et hæc omnia adjicientur vobis.*" — S. Matt. vi. 33.

Is it not strange, my brethren, that the great primary questions, whence we came, why we are here, and whither we go, — questions which we must answer, or have no rule of life, and be compelled to live as the beasts that perish, — should be regarded by large numbers of you, who believe yourselves to constitute the more advanced portion of mankind, as unsolved, if not, indeed, as unsolvable, problems? Is it reasonable to suppose the race has subsisted six thousand years, and, as many of you would fain persuade us, much longer, on this globe, with these problems unsolved? Is it true that no light has ever dawned on our origin and destiny, — that we are placed here with darkness behind us, darkness before us, and darkness over, around, and within us? If not, as it cannot be, how happens it that so many of you find your minds filled with doubt and anxiety, that you feel that nothing is settled, that all is loose and floating, and in the bitterness of your hearts, from the depths of despair, you are calling upon all nature, upon the heavens and the earth, the living and the dead, and some of you even upon hell itself, to disclose to you the secret of your origin and destiny, and to determine for you the rule of life and the purpose of existence?

My brethren, you need not seek far for the cause. It is nigh you, and plain before your eyes, if you will but open them. Your ministers, whom in an evil hour you preferred to the priests of the Most High God and the consecrated pastors of his people,

have misled you ; they have turned your faces away from God, and caused you to lose sight of the truth he has graciously revealed for the instruction and consolation of men. They have given you their words for his, the chaff for the wheat, a faint and mutilated shadow for the substance. By casting off authority, and substituting in its place what they term private judgment, which is necessarily followed by interminable disputes, innumerable sects, divisions, and contradictions, they have made, for you, what was clear and certain in the Word of God dark and doubtful, religion a weltering chaos of discordant elements, the noble science of theology an unmeaning jargon, and piety a reproach. Their utter inability to agree among themselves on a single positive doctrine, their variable and incoherent speech, their sectarian wrath and bigotry, fierce contentions, arrogant claims, pretended faith, yet obvious doubt, boasted interior illumination, yet undeniable and often deplorable ignorance, have disgusted men of sober practical sense who know no other teachers, sowed in their hearts the seeds of universal skepticism, and induced them to look upon all religion as a cheat, and all pretensions to divine revelation as ridiculous and absurd. It is thus they have darkened your minds and perverted your hearts, cast you down from the high heaven of God's grace, robbed you of the supernatural riches bestowed on you by your Heavenly Father, wounded you and left you half dead in the streets, as did the robbers the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho.

It is not presumed, my brethren, that your ministers in the outset intended to bring about the deplorable state of things of which they as well as you are the victims. Men rarely, if ever, will evil for the sake of evil ; they will it for the sake of the good they hope to obtain from it. Eve did not suffer herself to be seduced by the Serpent, for the sake of bringing sin and death into the world ; she did it that her eyes and those of her race might be opened, and that men might be as gods, knowing good and evil, that is, as God knows them, without being obliged to learn them from the law or command of a superior. Yet none the less did sin and death follow her act of disobedience, and become the painful heritage of all her posterity. " There is a way which seemeth just to a man ; but the ends thereof lead to death." Prov. xiv. 12. The early Protestant ministers, the Reformers as you call them, it is to be presumed, had no wish to introduce evil for the sake of evil ; they may have verily believed their movement compati-

ble with Christian faith and morals, and even that it was wise and necessary in order to preserve our holy religion in its purity, integrity, freedom, and vigor ; yet are they responsible for the fatal consequences of that unlawful movement. They might, and should, have foreseen them. They knew that they acted against legitimate authority, on their own private judgment ; they were distinctly warned of the unlawfulness of their act, and of the consequences which must inevitably follow, and with ordinary prudence they could not have failed to foresee them. The arguments which they were obliged to use, in order to defend their movement, their revolt from the Church and rejection of her teaching, are precisely, in principle, the arguments which a Voltaire uses against divine revelation, and a D'Holbach against the existence of a God ; while those by which they defended and must defend, if they defend it at all, their principle of private authority are precisely those by which the Rationalists undertake to establish the sufficiency of reason, and Transcendentalists, that human nature is the ground and measure of truth and goodness, as has been demonstrated to you, perhaps a hundred times over, by some of your own ministers themselves.

It is conceded that your ministers have written several able and learned works against unbelief, and in defence of religion ; but in these works they have only borrowed Catholic principles and arguments, conclusive when urged by us, but of no practical value when urged by them, because practically denied and refuted by their position outside of the Church, and by the other principles and arguments they must adopt and urge in their own defence. Actions speak louder than words. The rebel chief, in arms to overthrow his lawful sovereign, cannot preach loyalty with much effect. His practical disloyalty more than neutralizes his speculative loyalty. The practical rejection of Catholicity by your ministers necessarily does more to spread infidelity and licentiousness than any Catholic principles and arguments they may urge can do to arrest their fatal progress.

It is certain, and the experience of three hundred years has proved it, that Christianity is defensible only on Catholic ground, and every attempt to defend it on other grounds has failed. Philosophers have tried to defend it on philosophical grounds, but in doing so have only reduced it to a philosophy. Rationalists have attempted to do it on the ground of reason alone, and have obtained only the same result. Socialists and

progressists attempt to do it on humanitarian principles, and have only reduced it to a system of humanityism, which is pure egotism, pure socialism, pure pantheism, or pure atheism, according to the point of view from which it is considered. A religion which emanates from a supernatural source, and which is intended to be authoritative for man, cannot be defended on grounds which recognize no authority that does not emanate from man himself. That which is subject to man, controllable by his reason or will, is not authoritative for him, and, instead of giving the law to him, receives it from him. The very moment, then, that one of your ministers undertakes to defend Christianity, not as a philosophy, not as a system of rationalism or of socialism, but as a religion imposing the law on man, on both his reason and his will, which he must obey in thought, word, and deed, he must recognize and defend the principle of authority. It is so in the nature of things. But as a Protestant he must either deny this principle or condemn himself; for as a Protestant he is obliged to protest, not simply against this authority or that, but against authority itself. When he objects to the Church, it is not so much what she teaches, as her authority to teach. Many Protestants do not object at all to Catholic doctrines, if they may believe them for other than Catholic reasons. There are men in our own day who reject the Roman Catholic Church, and yet boast that they hold "all Roman doctrine." You all profess dogmas, when you profess to believe any thing at all, as difficult to reason as any of the Catholic Mysteries. You even contend for a church, a *catholic* church too, and find it very reasonable, in case it is an abstraction, an ideal thing, claiming and able to exercise no authority over the individual judgment and belief. When your ministers object to certain doctrines and practices of the Church, it is chiefly because they wish to break down her authority; not because the doctrines or practices themselves are felt to be intrinsically so very objectionable. It is clear, then, that it is to authority, in a word, to an authoritative religion, to what Christianity must be, if a religion at all, that your ministers as Protestants must object. It is equally clear, then, that whenever they undertake the defence of Christianity, and offer any thing solid in its defence, they must abandon the Protestant ground, and take the Catholic ground, the ground of authority. If we examine the defences they have written, those which have really contained something to the purpose, we shall find that they have uniformly done so.

But such defences from your ministers amount to nothing, because they practically, and, when defending their Protestantism, speculatively, deny the soundness of the principle on which they rest, and from which they derive all their force. It is therefore that, though they have written able and learned works on the evidences of Christianity, they have never been able to arrest for a moment the progress of their movement towards unbelief and immorality. In vain do you attempt to prevent the disciple from pushing the principles of the master to their last logical results. No form of Protestantism has ever been able to remain for any length of time what it was in the outset. The principles which the Reformers asserted against Rome were not slow to develop themselves in the very lifetime of the Reformers themselves. Both Luther and Calvin, as the movement went on, were carried farther than they originally intended to go, and were obliged to modify their views more than once. The last days of Luther were spent in battling against those who were for pushing his principles to a logical extreme, from which he recoiled. It is always, therefore, at a terrible disadvantage that the Protestant minister reasons against unbelievers. They can always reply,—“If you believe what you say against us, why are you Protestants? Why do you not follow it out, and return to the Church? If you hold that the grounds on which you separate from the Church are legitimate, why do you object to us for proceeding on them? If private judgment is authority for you, why is it not authority for us? If on its authority you may legitimately separate from the Catholic Church, why may not we on its authority legitimately separate from yours? If your principle is sound for you, it is as sound for us, and no principle is sound which may not without error be pushed to its last consequences. If the consequences are false, the principle is unsound.” This reply is conclusive. The Protestant never has rejoined and never can rejoin any thing solid against it.

But your ministers, my brethren, have not only not been able to offer on their own principles any solid defence of religion, but, by borrowing and misapplying our principles and arguments, they have made its defence, even by Catholics, much more difficult than it would otherwise have been. The evil they do by their writings against us is small in comparison with the evil they do by their writings in defence of Christianity. They are far more formidable as allies than as enemies. The weakest Christians are in general able to protect them-

selves against Satan when he appears to them in his own proper character, undisguised ; it is only when he comes to them in the guise of an angel of light that their danger is imminent. Evidences of Christianity by Protestant ministers are a byword among yourselves. There are few of you who do not feel that on Protestant principles they establish nothing. You see that from your stand-point they are inconclusive ; — why, then, you ask, not from ours ? why shall the same principles and arguments, which, urged by Protestants, are obviously inconclusive, be held to be conclusive when urged by Catholics ? The reason is not apparent to all ; and as you have in the outset a strong prejudice against us, and have settled it in your own minds that our Church is false, the principles and arguments your ministers borrow from us are regarded by you as inconclusive because you easily see that they are as strong for us as for religion itself. If they conclude any thing for your ministers, they conclude too much. You thus imbibe a strong prejudice against them, and will not give them their due weight when we urge them. The habit of rejecting them when urged by your own ministers leads you to reject them when urged by us. “ Our ministers,” you say, “ have said all that. Give us some reasons and arguments which they have not adduced.” This is not always easy to be done ; because those which they have adduced are ordinarily those which are nearest at hand, and such as you are least able to appreciate. Those which they have not urged are more recondite, require more research, and a patience of investigation, and habits of close and rigid reasoning, which are not to be expected from the majority of you. Your ministers have borrowed our readiest arguments, and by so doing have in some measure unfitted them for our use.

Your ministers have also thrown doubt and distrust on all Christian experience, and rendered appeals to it of little use. In vain we tell unbelievers of their need of religion, of their nothingness without it, and of the peace and ineffable repose of the believer, the consolations they will receive when once they believe, the joy and gladness which will crown their lives. Have not Protestant ministers told them and promised them the same things, and deceived them ? The alleged experience of Catholics in all ages and nations, which on every principle of moral evidence ought to count for something, excites in them only a smile of incredulity, or pity for our weakness. Do not Protestants tell the same story ? Why shall we trust

you rather than them ? They, we know, only deceive or delude ; and why not you ? Men have trusted your ministers and found themselves deceived, and now they will trust no one, not even the Almighty God himself. See what your ministers have done ! They have thrown so much false coin into circulation, that you will no longer believe that there is any circulating that is not false.

One thing is certain, my brethren, that your ministers have deceived you, and have in no instance kept their word to you. For what did you rashly consent to follow them ? What did they promise you ? Was it to lose all religious faith, to be plunged into the darkness and corruption of heathenism, to be reduced to the world of time and sense, and to despair of all but mere earthly goods, that you listened to them, and consented to follow their lead ? No, by no means. Nor was this what they promised you. They told you that the Church had lost her first love, that she had been unfaithful to her heavenly Spouse, that she was corrupt, rotten, and could not be touched without defilement. They called her Babylon, and conjured you by your love of the truth and purity of the Gospel to come out of her, to drink no more of the wine of her fornications, or partake of her sorceries. They promised, if you did, that you should have pure Christianity restored, a *reformed* church, reconstructed on the primitive model, into which nothing unholy or unclean should enter, in which the pure word of God should be preached, and the pure ordinances of God's house should be kept and observed. They promised you a revival in your midst of the work of the Lord, as it were a renewal of his covenant with men. The restored Gospel was to have free course and be glorified ; all the ends of the earth were to be converted ; and you were all to be of one mind and one heart, filled with love and peace, abounding in faith and in good works as its fruits. This is what they promised you, what you looked for, what you followed them for. Have they kept their word ? Have you obtained what they promised ?

My brethren, you have given your ministers full three hundred years to make good their promises, full three hundred years for their experiment ; surely a long time enough for them to succeed, if success were possible. Look around you. Where are you now ? Of all that was promised you, that you expected, what have you obtained ? You were promised a pure, holy, and living evangelical church ; have you obtained it ? Which of your thousand and one jarring sects is it ?

You were promised the pure, unadulterated word, the true and most holy faith once delivered to the saints ; which of your thousand and one contradictory creeds is it ? Are you agreed as to what are the true ordinances of God's house, what is their right administration ? Have you found peace and unity ? Have you found the necessary helps against temptations, and aids to virtue ? Alas ! my brethren, these questions must seem to you cruel mockery. You know, you deeply feel, that it is not so. You have gained nothing of what was promised you. You have spent your money for that which is not bread, and your labor for that which cannot satisfy you. You have wasted that portion of your Father's goods which you took with you when you left his house, travelled into a far country, and set up for yourselves. Your faith is gone, leaving you not even so much as a philosophy ; your hope is turned into disappointment ; your charity is become a weak and watery philanthropy ; and your zeal for God has lost itself in zeal for the world. You have no unity, no compactness ; your doctrines vary with each individual teacher, and, when nominally the same, scarcely any two can be found who hold them in the same sense ; your minds are perplexed, your hearts sad, your passions fierce and ungovernable ; and you no longer know what to believe or what to do. This is the way in which your ministers have rewarded your confidence, in which they have kept their promises !

In vain, my brethren, would you deny it. Look to the classic land of the Reformation, where Luther thundered his innovations, and Melancthon with gentler feelings polished and defended them. Where do you find your pure evangelism ? Is it in the all-absorbing Rationalism, Transcendentalism, or Humanityism, — impious *isms* more revolting to sober sense than the late Philosophism of France ? Look at Geneva, where Farel preached, and Calvin legislated. Do you recognize the pure word of God you were promised in the hardly baptized Deism discoursed from the very pulpit of Calvin, and which even Rousseau would have disdained ? Look at Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Scotland, England, and, alas ! you behold your beloved Protestantism sinking down, down to a lower deep, — into the bottomless abyss of nothingness. In this good city of Boston, the Geneva of America, once the paradise of Protestant ministers, where find you your *reformed* church, your pure evangelism ? Is it in the Melodeon and Ritchie Hall ? Cambridge, once your boast, has passed over

into Nihilism ; and Andover, raised up to atone for her defection, follows close upon her heels. Each day new reformers emerge with fierce tones, bold speech, and animated gestures, to accuse their predecessors of having stopped short of the mark. The vanguard of yesterday is the rearguard to-day. A novelty is hardly announced before it is antiquated ; there is no interval between birth and old age, the cradle and the grave. Each moment you find the old ground giving way under your feet, and yourselves obliged to spring for your lives for some new ground, which will give way in turn the next. Alas ! my brethren, you have nothing solid on which to stand, you have no fixed residence, no spot to call your own. Home and fire-side are not for you. Ever since, at the bidding of your ministers, you spurned the Church of God, and withheld your charity from her Spouse, you have been doomed, like the "Wandering Jew," to wander on, seeking rest and finding none, — to live that you might reap, not life's blessing, but life's curse.

You boast, indeed, of progress, — and progress you certainly have made ; but, my brethren, in what direction ? As Protestants, you have cast off authority, have asserted private judgment, and gained the right to select, teach, and govern your teachers, and this you call progress. The Unitarian rejects the mysteries of faith, makes his Redeemer a man, a creature, that is, no redeemer at all, and it is — *progress* ; the Universalist has cast off the fear of judgment and hell, asserted that after death it fares as well with the incorrigible sinner as with the saint, perhaps better, and it again is — *progress* ; the Liberal Christian discards all creeds and confessions, asserts, virtually at least, the indifference of truth and falsehood, and therefore of right and wrong, and behold ! what marvellous *progress* ! But see you not, my brethren, that your progress is a progress in casting off, in denying, in losing ? In what consists it but in a more and more complete rejection of the supernatural order, and in reducing yourselves nearer and nearer to natural indigence and nudity ? Your positive gain, admitting all that you even claim, consists solely in the increased facility of acquiring mere earthly goods. In politics, you have effected changes by which a mushroom moneyed aristocracy may supplant the old hereditary aristocracy ; in the industrial world, you have introduced steam-engines, steamboats, railways, spinning-jennies, power-looms, and an endless variety of labor-saving machinery, by which you seek to evade the original

sentence, that man should gain his bread by the sweat of his face ; but all, be it more or less, is progress only in relation to the goods of this world, and undeniably tends only to draw off the affections from God and heaven, from the spiritual and eternal, and to place them on the things of the earth, the sensual and the perishing.

Turn the matter over as you will, my brethren, this much is certain, your ministers have deceived you, and your grand Protestant experiment, as a religion, has proved a failure. It has established nothing ; but it has unloosed every thing, and made all in religion as variable and transitory as human passion and caprice. It is no contradiction of this that some few among you may still hold up your hands in horror at the audacity of the younger and more adventurous members of your party, and still cling with a death-grasp to some of the dogmas retained in name by the early Reformers. There is no party among you that believes in all things as Luther, as Calvin, as Zuinglius, as Cranmer, or as the Socini taught. There is not one of your sects that does not depart widely from the doctrines of its founder ; nay, there has been no founder of a sect among you that has steadily adhered from first to last to his own doctrine. So certain and so evident is this, that you erect variation in doctrine into a principle, and boldly defend, under the name of progress, the founder of a sect in departing more or less from himself, and his followers in departing from the formulas he sought to establish. Finding that nothing among you is fixed and permanent, you boldly contend that to be fixed and permanent is a demerit, and that the merit is in being movable and transient.

It is not denied, that many of you may still retain a vague notion that there is a real, substantial Christianity distinguishable from the Church, that faith and hope and charity may be possessed out of her communion, and that Rationalists, Transcendentalists, and Humanityists depart from the original principles of Protestantism, and may be rejected for Christian reasons, without any thing being implied in favor of Catholicity. But these sects tell you, and they tell you truly, that they have only developed Luther and Calvin, and maintain only what was really meant or logically implied in their movement ; and when you see that movement, in every land where it has been free to develop itself, resulting in the teachings and practices of those sects, you cannot reasonably doubt what they tell you. You must not imagine, my brethren, that you retain the Christian

faith, because you may still profess to believe some of the Christian dogmas. The test of one's orthodoxy is not in his professing to believe orthodox dogmas ; for to be an orthodox believer, we must not only believe the orthodox doctrine, but we must believe it for an orthodox reason. He who believes all the articles of the creed, if he believe them as a philosophy, is no Christian believer, and if for a Transcendental reason, he is nothing but a Transcendentalist. The character of our faith is determined by its *formal*, not its *material*, object. Hence there are individuals who profess to believe the whole material object of Catholic faith, who nevertheless have no Catholic faith, no Catholic thought, even ; because they do not believe it for a Catholic reason.

It does not therefore follow, my brethren, that those among you who may flatter themselves that they retain some portion of the Christian faith, because they profess some of its dogmas, are distinguishable at all generically from the non-evangelicals, as you call them, and avowed unbelievers. Evangelicals, non-evangelicals, and avowed unbelievers, all assert the same formal reason of belief, that is, belief on private judgment, or human authority, and are therefore radically indistinguishable. Out of the church which is commissioned by Almighty God to teach, you do not and cannot embrace Christian doctrine as Christian ; you do and can, unless an express revelation is made to you individually, embrace it only as a philosophy, or as a human opinion, because you have for embracing it only human motives ; and therefore in embracing it, even if you define it in the very terms of the Nicene creed, you are really unbelievers, just as much so as if you did not profess to believe it at all.

Have you not observed, my brethren, that a striking change has taken place in relation to the controversies which you formerly carried on among yourselves ? In former times there were among you fierce and obstinate dogmatic wars ; creed was arrayed against creed, and dogma against dogma. The Consubstantialist and the Sacramentarian stood mutually opposed, each hurling his anathemas directly in the face of the other ; the Trinitarian Protestant sought to establish his dogma *against* the Socinian, and the Socinian his *against* the Trinitarian ; the Calvinist insisted on his "*decretum horribile*" against the Arminian, and the Arminian on his free will and unlimited grace against the Calvinistic election and reprobation ; the professed believer attempted to defend revelation, and the un-

believer attempted its direct overthrow. There is little of all this among you now. The king of Prussia, by his royal edict, unites Lutherans and Calvinists in the same communion, permitting each party to retain its peculiar dogma, and the great body of both find it admirable. Schleiermacher professes to accept all the symbolical books of the Lutherans, and maintains in a grave discourse that one may have all that is essential in the religious belief and life, without believing even so much as the personality of God, or a future state of personal existence. The Neologists generally accept the old dogmata, and seek only to explain them. Unitarians are found who sing the Nicene creed as a part of their religious service. Your philosophers no longer directly oppose the faith ; they make a boast of accepting all Christian doctrines. All religious doctrines which have ever been believed, say they, are symbols, conceal great truths ; and they only seek to interpret the symbol, and to prove philosophically that which they suppose to be symbolized. Whence comes this significant change ? Why has your old internecine warfare been brought to a close ? Simply, my brethren, because the modern enemies of Christianity have discovered,—and this is a progress they have made,—that it makes nothing against them that the matter of the Christian faith is professedly believed, so long as it is believed only for a human reason ; and that there is no radical difference between men, so long as they really believe or disbelieve on the same ground, however diverse the matter they believe or disbelieve. The ground of belief with you all is undeniably human. You are, then, really, whatever some among you may sometimes persuade yourselves, all in the same category, unbelievers, deprived of all religion, reduced to the nakedness of nature. What you call your religion is no religion ; it is a human affair, and pertains only to the life of nature.

Here, then, you are, my brethren, after three hundred years of trial with an open field and fair play. You have had wealth, power, learning, talent, genius, and laborious application ; what you have not been able to do with the means at your disposal, and in the three hundred years you have had for your experiment, you must see it is in vain for you to hope to do hereafter. What men, out of the Church, taking the Bible and private judgment or a humanly constituted authority for their rule, can do, you have done. Greater or more learned men than you have had you cannot expect. New discoveries you cannot make ; and if you could, what in the mean time is

to become of the millions who live and die, before your new prophets arise, your new teachers come to disclose the true way of salvation? But you are making no new discoveries, nor advancing towards them; your new reformers only revive exploded theories, and reproduce what the old heretics or the old pagans had long ago tried and found worthless. Hope, then, nothing better from your Protestantism than you have already attained to. It is not in the nature of things that you should attain to any thing else. Every movement has its law of development, from which no human power can withdraw it. You see, and know, and feel, to what result the inevitable developments of Protestantism tend. Thither you must follow, or prove false to your own principles; and you are Protestants no further than you do so. A progressive religion, if the term may be used, must be ever changing its formulas, and they only truly adhere to it who change their formulas with it. It is the boast of Protestantism, that it is progressive. Luther, and Calvin, and Cranmer, and Socinus saw a portion of the truth, but they saw not the whole; and to be true to their spirit, we must not stop where they did, and refuse to accept the new light which dawns upon us. They did not break the fetters of Rome to forge new fetters of their own. No. Their movement was a movement in behalf of liberty. They emancipated the human mind, and conquered for it the power to advance; Protestantism is the religion of progress. So you hold it, my brethren, and, as such, you hold it up in contrast with the invariableness and immobility of Catholicity. Your great objection to us is, that we hold the mind to a fixed form of doctrine and worship, — chain men, as you express it, to a dead past, and will not suffer them to go forward to a living future. You, then, are Protestants only as you advance with the Protestant movement. You deny the legitimacy of that movement, condemn it and yourselves, whenever you linger behind with the old formulas it outgrows or casts off. It is, then, absolutely impossible for you, if faithful to your Protestantism, not to be reduced to nature, to this world alone, to satisfy yourselves as best you may with such goods as it offers. To look beyond it is for you an in consequence, a folly.

But, my brethren, you cannot be ignorant that it is not in human nature to be satisfied with the goods of this world. Universal experience proves that you may possess all this world can give, and yet look round and sigh for what you have not, and to be other than you are. Riches do not enrich.

Our views of what it is to be rich expand with our accumulations, and the distance between what we have and what we desire to have is ever widening. Wishes gratified give rise to new wishes ; for every desire satisfied, a dozen new and more inordinate desires spring up, and with loud clamor demand the means of satisfaction. Hence the richer we grow, the poorer do we become ; for poverty is always to be measured by the number of wants which we have and are unable to satisfy. Hence the wisdom of all ages admonishes us, if we would enrich a man, to diminish his desires, not to increase his possessions.

Pleasures, so called, are unable to please, and none enjoy so little as those who make it their sole business to enjoy. Appetite and passion strengthen by indulgence, and as they strengthen, the power to indulge them is impaired, and the capacity of their objects to please is lessened. The Epicurean philosophy is the saddest philosophy man has ever invented, and its votaries sooner than any others are forced to exclaim, from the depths of bitter experience, — *Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas!* The pursuit of knowledge is hardly better. The eye is not satisfied by seeing, nor the understanding by knowing. It is but little, at best, that we can know ; and the more we know, the less we seem to ourselves to know, and the more are we oppressed by what we know not. Ignorance may plume herself on her conquests, and in the foolish pride of her own heart imagine that no more worlds remain to be conquered ; but science knows no exultation, no self-complacency. It encounters in its progress only darkness and difficulty, doubt and perplexity. As we advance, we become a painful mystery unto ourselves ; the universe becomes to us “ a sealed book, written within and without, sealed with seven seals,” which no man can open ; and when we have reached the farthest limits of our power, we are forced to say, with the wisest son of Athens, “ All we know is, that we know nothing.” The chase after fame and worldly honors and distinctions is equally vain.

Nor do we, my brethren, find a more substantial good in those idols of the age, love and philanthropy. Love, abandoned to nature, and sought for its own sake, consumes itself in its own fire. It is capricious, morbid, a torment to him who harbours it, and an insurmountable obstacle to its own gratification. He cannot truly love who rests in love ; and he wants the qualities which command the love of others. Phi-

lanthropy can, at best, only weep over evils it cannot cure, and it is almost invariably doomed to aggravate the wrongs it would redress. It springs from nature, and is confined within her limits. It has, and can have, nothing to offer its objects but wealth, pleasure, knowledge, fame, honors, worldly goods, which yield, and can yield, no substantial good to their possessor, — nothing to slake his burning thirst, or to appease his gnawing hunger.

The experience of all ages proves beyond doubt or cavil, that man never suffices for himself, and never does, and never can, obtain any substantial good from the world in which he is placed. He has wants which transcend the universe, and which nothing created can satisfy. The fact itself, whatever explication of it you may adopt, is certain, undeniable. The goods of this world are goods, if ever goods at all, only when we do not seek them, when we do not desire them, but despise them, trample on them, and live not for them, but for some end above and beyond them. This may seem strange. It may seem strange that our good can never come from the world in which we are placed, that even the possession of the very objects towards which our nature itself points, and with all but irresistible force impels us, should bring us no satisfaction, and leave us poor and destitute ; but so it is, and we cannot make it otherwise.

Here, then, my brethren, are two great and undeniable facts. On Protestant principles, you are invariably reduced to depend on the goods of this world alone, and the goods of this world are no goods at all. If, then, you are right in your Protestantism, there is, and can be, no good for man. Is it so ? Has some evil being made us ? Is our existence a blunder ? Are we, my brethren, compelled by some irresistible necessity to spend our money for that which is not bread, and our labor for that which satisfieth not ? Are you prepared to maintain this ? Can you believe it ? Has our existence no purpose ? Is there no rule of life for us ? Is there no substantial good set before us ? Is there nothing fixed and eternal, which is not as the shadow that passes ? Must we all our days walk in a vain shadow ? If so, my brethren, our condition is most desperate ; man, with the rational soul, the thinking head, and feeling heart, is the most miserable of creatures. Better to have been a brute beast, better to have been a crawling worm, an insect of an hour, the veriest mote in the sunbeam, than a man.

If you are right, my brethren, you cannot defend even the low and worldly morality which, for decency's sake, if nothing else, the greater part of you profess. Your ministers preach to you love and philanthropy, and even dare to speak to you of love to God. Love to God ! if he has made us, placed us here without a purpose, to be the victims of an ignorance which is incurable, the sport of wild and ferocious passions which we cannot suppress or control, the prey of deep wants which are unappeasable, doomed to toil without object or recompense, to chase an empty shadow, and, exhausted, die ! For what shall we love him ? How can we love a being in whom there is not for right reason one amiable trait ? How, again, can you exercise love towards man ? Nature can love only what is naturally amiable. Your ministers strip man of all his grandeur and worth ; they make him mean and despicable ; and who can love him ? Who can make sacrifices for him ? Why shall we seek to do him good ? What good is there for him ? He has no good. He is born, propagates his species, dies, rots, and is no more for ever. Having reduced him below the beasts that perish, below the loathsome worm of the dust, what mockery to preach love to man, to bid us love our brother, to live and die for him ! If your ministers wish you to love man, they should show that he is worth loving ; and if they wish you to devote yourselves to his service, they must show that there is a good for him, what that good is, whence it comes, and how it can be secured. On their principles, philanthropy is a folly, and the only possible rule of life is cold and heartless selfishness. It would be right and prudent to reason with the wicked : —

“ The time of our life is short and tedious ; and in the end of a man there is no remedy ; and no man hath been known to have returned from hell. For we are born of nothing, and after this we shall be as if we had not been ; for the breath of our nostrils is smoke, and speech a spark to move our heart, which being put out, our body shall be ashes, and our spirit shall be poured abroad as soft air ; and our life shall pass away as the trace of a cloud, and shall be dispersed as a mist, which is driven away by the beams of the sun, and overpowered with the heat thereof ; and our name in time shall be forgotten, and no man shall have remembrance of our works. For our time is as the passing of a shadow ; and there is no going back of our end ; for it is fast sealed, and no man returneth. Come, therefore, and let us enjoy the good things which are

present, and let us speedily use the creatures as in youth. Let us fill ourselves with costly wines and ointments ; and let not the flower of time pass by us. Let us crown ourselves with roses before they be withered ; let no meadow escape our riot. Let none of us go without his part in luxury ; let us everywhere leave tokens of joy ; for this is our portion, and this our lot." — *Wisdom*, ii. 1 – 9.

This is as sad as sad can be ; and yet, on the principles of your ministers, nothing better remains for you. Pause, therefore, my brethren, and ask if it is through necessity that there is nothing better for you. Your ministers induced you to spurn the Church, and you have found yourselves deprived of all good, compelled to live and toil to no end. But the Church explains to you your origin and destiny ; she tells you that there is a good for you, a solid, a permanent, an infinite good, within your reach ; and that she, and she only, can direct you to it, and enable you, if you choose, to possess it. She tells you that God made you not for this world, and that he never intended you to find your good in those objects to which your nature inclines and impels you ; but he made you for a supernatural end, to seek and find your good in him, and in him only. She tells you that he alone can satisfy the soul, meet its deep wants, and fill it with peace and joy ; that when we seek him in the way and by the means which he has himself ordained, we are spiritually restored to our normal state, live our normal life, and all things fall into their proper places, and work together for our good. Therefore, in the words of her heavenly Spouse, she says, " Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." She presents herself, as you well know, as commissioned by God himself to direct you how to seek, how to live, and to enable you both to seek and to find. She promises you, in his name, that, if you follow her directions, you shall live, that your souls shall be filled, that they shall overflow with joy, that you shall eat the good things of the land, have in this world a hundred fold, and in the world to come life everlasting. This she tells you, this she promises to all who will love and obey her.

It is true, my brethren, you do not believe her ; that you refuse to listen to her sweet and consoling voice, that you scorn and detest her, and seek by all the means in your power to destroy her. You treat her as if she were your bitterest enemy, as if she were the very quintessence of evil, and you

had nothing to expect from her but the certain destruction of both soul and body in hell. But let her be what she may, you risk nothing in listening to her words, or even in believing what she says. Without her you have no good ; and they for whom there is no good have, and can have, nothing to lose. She cannot harm you ; and perhaps she may do you good ; for if what she says is true, there is a good for you. She says, she can do you good, and that without her there is no good for you. Your own experience confirms one half of what she says. You have tried all but her, and have failed. She is your only chance. It is for you, either the Church or no good. Without her you can have only unbelief, infidelity ; and infidelity leaves you to this world alone, from which no substantial good is obtainable. You run, then, no risk. If you miss, you are as well off as before, have lost nothing ; if you gain, you gain every thing. It may be that all she says is true. You cannot say to the contrary. You have no authority for denying or doubting her words. Then, without the Church, there is, as your experience proves, no possibility of good ; but with the Church, for aught you know, there is not only a possibility, but a certainty, of good. With her there is, if any difference, a chance of good ; without her, no chance. You cannot, then, in common prudence, my brethren, suffer your prejudices against her to prevent you from inquiring and listening to what she has to say for herself.

But the case for the Church is much stronger. There is a reasonable presumption in her favor. The Church has never deceived you. Your ministers have deceived you ; the philosophers, the politicians, the economists, the poets, have deceived you ; the world, your own senses, instincts, passions, reason, have deceived you ; all but the Church has deceived you. Did she not tell you they would deceive you ? Did she not solemnly forewarn you of the consequences of listening to them ? Did she deceive you in this ? Did she lie to you ? You were unruly sons, headstrong, self-willed ; you would have your own way ; you disregarded her admonitions, and would not obey her directions ; you would follow the insidious counsel of your young companions, which fell in with your own passions and inclinations. You now know, though you may be too proud to own it, that what she told you was true, and what they counselled you was false. She told you not to listen to them ; that what they promised, you would not obtain, or obtain but to your own hurt ; that they were prophets of

the delusion of their own hearts, that they would cause you to err, would involve you in total ruin ; for out of her, or away from her, there was no good for you, or for any one. Your ministers told you to heed her not, that her maternal words were lies ; that she was no true mother, that she was a sorceress and only wished to lure you to share her fornications. You now know her words were true, and that theirs were lies. If, then, they deceived you, if all but she has deceived you, and she never, you have not only no reason for doubting her words, but a strong reason for believing that she is no deceiver, and that all she says is true. The law of evidence is, to believe every witness when there is no reason for disbelieving him.

But, my brethren, the case may stand less favorable for you yet, if you remain without the Church. Certain it is you cannot say the Church is not what she professes to be. As far as you have had the means of testing her words, you have found them strictly and exactly true. They certainly, for aught you know, or can know, may be strictly and exactly true throughout. But if it be so, what then will be your condition ? Undoubtedly, the majority of you have no fear of judgment or hell. You look upon what the Church says of the last judgment, and the eternal punishment of the wicked, as an idle tale, or a bugbear to frighten the weak and timid. You have made great progress, and have advanced, it may be, as far as the mark left by old Lucretius ; still you must own that the Church possibly tells the truth, and that, in spite of all the mockeries of the licentious and profane, judgment and hell may turn out to be awful verities. You, with all your progress, have not been able to discover any thing to the contrary. You have never yet been able to adduce a single fact against the Church. Do your best, and you can bring against her nothing but your own private judgment, and she, at the very lowest, has her private judgment against you, — any day, and on any supposition you can make, the equal of yours, and therefore able to neutralize it. On any possible hypothesis, you have as good, as strong a reason for believing that what she teaches is true, as you have that what you oppose to her is true. Your private judgment is no better authority for disbelieving than her private judgment is for believing her. But if what she teaches turns out to be true, where are you ? You are then the enemies of God ; you have lost not only the life that now is, but that which is to come ; you have lost the beatific vision ; you will never see God ; you will be doomed

to suffer the tortures of hell for your sins, — tortures which, in the case of each single soul, will far outweigh all the actual or possible sufferings in time of the whole human race from the beginning to the consummation of the world. On any grounds you choose to put it, you must admit that you have as good authority for believing the Church to be the Church of God as you have for believing that she is not ; and if she is, there is no escape for you who reject her.

These, my brethren, are great and solemn considerations. You have no good out of the Church, that is certain ; without her you must lapse into absolute infidelity ; and with infidelity you have nothing left but the world, from which no good is derivable ; all out of the Church has deceived you ; but she, as far as your experience goes, has never deceived you ; it is possible she deceives you in nothing ; that she is the Church of God, and may raise you to God, and secure your eternal life ; if she is, there is a last judgment, there is an everlasting hell, and you, if you do not return to her, and submit yourselves to her, will fall under the eternal wrath and condemnation of God. What, in common prudence, then, is your duty ? Consider, if she is the true Church, the danger to which you are exposed, the loss you must incur, and, above all, the scandal you give. Consider that you, then, neither enter into the kingdom of heaven yourselves, nor suffer those to enter that would. Are you not bound, in common prudence, to sit down patiently and investigate the claims of the Church ? Are you not mad, if you do not ?

ART. II. — *A Reply to Dr. Milner's "End of Religious Controversy," so far as the Churches of the English Communion are concerned.* By S. F. JARVIS, D. D., LL. D. New York : D. Appleton & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 251.

MILNER's *End of Religious Controversy*, first published about thirty years since, is a well-known and highly esteemed work ; and after — and perhaps we should not make the exception — *The Sincere Christian*, by Bishop Hay, it is unquestionably the best work in our language on the points of our faith and practice controverted by Protestants, for general circulation and reading ; although, for our own reading, we prefer

the work by Father Edward Worsley, entitled "Protestancy without Principles, or Sectaries' Unhappy Fall from Infallibility to Fancy," a small quarto volume, printed at Antwerp, 1668, and of which we wish some of our enterprising publishers would bring out a new edition. But for the generality of readers, Milner's work is the most appropriate, instructive, and convincing. It is admirable for its lucid arrangement, the easy and natural manner in which the precise questions to be treated are placed before the reader, and for its condensation of matter. We are at a loss which most to admire, its solid learning, its rigid logic, or the candor and modesty of its temper and language. It is all it professes to be, — the end of religious controversy. It has never been answered, and never will be ; and no fair-minded person, willing to embrace the truth, though it conduct to that Church which he has hitherto despised, can read and understand it, and have any doubt remaining as to the fact that Catholicity is the religion, and the only religion, of God.

To this work Dr. Jarvis, a Protestant Episcopal minister of Connecticut, very well known in this section of the country, has, in the publication before us, attempted a reply. Dr. Jarvis, we are told, has an excellent library, and he enjoys, among people of his own persuasion, the reputation of a learned theologian, and of being profoundly versed in patristic lore. It is, we learn from his work, now twenty-five years since he first read Milner's work, and we are led to infer, though it is not expressly so stated, that his reply has the benefit of his reading and studies for that length of time. Certain it is, his work bears the marks of careful preparation, and appears to have received all the elaborate finish the author could give it. It evidently is the best he could do ; and we have no reason to suppose that it is not equal to any thing a minister of his own denomination could do. It may, then, not be uninteresting or unprofitable to our readers to learn what he has succeeded in doing.

They who have read Dr. Milner know that the excellent and learned Bishop wrote his work for candid and honest inquirers after the truth, for readers who were willing to seek, and who had actually begun to seek ; and that it is to such that it is specially adapted. His purpose is not controversy, but the end of controversy ; and he aims not simply to silence the logic of Protestants, but to meet their actual wants, and, by the grace of God, to convince their understandings and

convert their hearts. He writes as the pastor of souls, and not as the mere controversialist ; consequently, he consults not merely what can be legally demanded of him by the logical conditions of the argument, but also what is demanded by the peculiar intellectual state of his readers. He therefore goes over much ground which the Catholic controversialist is not bound to go over, and meets and removes objections which he was under no obligation, save by the law of Christian charity, even to entertain.

The only thing a Catholic, in his argument with Protestants, can be required to do, is, to prove that Almighty God has instituted and commissioned his Church to teach all nations, unto the consummation of the world, all things whatsoever our Lord commanded his Apostles. That once proved, there is, and can be, no further controversy. All there is, then, to do, is to hear and obey the Church. Particular objections to this or that doctrine or practice of the Church are of no moment, because overruled by her authority to teach, established, if established at all, on a higher principle of certainty than is, or can be, the principle of any objections which reason can urge or suggest against it. Nevertheless, Protestant ministers imagine various objections to the several doctrines taught by the Church, which they urge with great vehemence, and which create real difficulties in the minds of the Protestant people, and render it often desirable that special solutions of them should be given. Protestants, *in religious matters*, are poor reasoners, and in general require, for their practical conviction, not only to have a doctrine proved in its principle, but also in all its details, and not only that the truth be proved by one process, but its contradictory falsehood disproved by another. Hence our authors, aiming never at a barren victory, but always at practical instruction and conviction, often go beyond what can be legally demanded of them, and attempt by special replies to remove the particular difficulties Protestants suggest in the case of this or that particular doctrine. Dr. Milner has done this to a very considerable extent, and has thereby greatly enhanced the practical value of his work for the class of persons for whom he designed it.

But this labor of love, on the part of our controversialists, is not without a certain practical evil. In performing it, we in some degree descend from our high Catholic vantage-ground, and act on the principle of private judgment and private interpretation, and thus place our adversaries more

nearly on a footing of equality with us than they have any right to pretend to. We thus give them a chance to talk, and sometimes with the appearance of saying something. We enable them to continue the debate ; and there are many people in the world who will take it for granted, that, so long as they continue to talk, they are not refuted ; for there are many people who seem to hold that to refute a man is to shut his mouth as well as his reason ; as if a man never speaks without saying something, or saying only nonsense ! Nevertheless, so it is ; and hence Protestant controversialists always seize upon this supererogatory part of our work, where they can apparently meet us on equal ground, and attempt to show that their objections to particular doctrines and practices are solid, and that our special answers to them are not conclusive. This, in general terms, is precisely what Dr. Jarvis attempts in his Reply ; and under this point of view, he may be thought by those who already believe, or rather disbelieve, with him, to have said some few things not wholly irrelevant, — though, in fact, even under this point of view, he says nothing that amounts to any thing.

But with whatever success Dr. Jarvis should reply to Bishop Milner's special answers to objections to this or that doctrine, it would not affect one way or other the real question at issue. If it were conceded, that, independently of the authority of the Church, on the principle of private authority, or private interpretation of the Divine Traditions and of the Fathers, we cannot triumphantly prove that every Catholic doctrine taught by the Church to-day has been always and everywhere taught by her, it would amount to nothing. No Catholic believes any doctrine because, independently of the authority of the Church, he can prove it to be an apostolic doctrine ; and one of our strong arguments for the Church is precisely this, that, without her authority, there is no sufficient authority to determine what is apostolic doctrine. Surely it is not to refute us, to prove successfully what we ourselves assert and urge against our adversaries ! The Catholic rule is, to take the doctrine from the Church, not the Protestant rule, to take the Church from the doctrine. We prove the Church ; we show that she is divinely commissioned to teach ; and when we have done that, we have authorized belief in all she teaches. There our argument stops ; henceforth we listen and believe. If, in our ardent charity for souls, we sometimes show or attempt to show that there is a *corroborative historical*

aside from his purpose, and he would not have advanced a single step in his argument, even if he had succeeded in his denial of unwritten tradition. But he has not succeeded; nay, after going into a long and elaborate argument against unwritten tradition, he very frankly concedes it. Thus he says, p. 29,—“Now the Church of England, and the churches in communion with her, do not deny, certainly, what an Apostle has asserted, *that the written gospels do not contain all that Jesus did or said*. Nor do they deny that the Apostles, in proclaiming the Gospel and establishing the Church, *did and said many things which could not properly enter into the apostolic writings* which have been transmitted to us. Let it be proved, then, that any doctrine or practice proceeded from Christ or his Apostles, and we receive and embrace it. ‘The question is not,’ as Bellarmine well observes, ‘how great is the force of divine and [or] apostolical traditions, but whether any tradition [*aliqua traditio*] be truly divine or apostolical!’” p. 29. This, if it mean any thing, means that “the churches of the English communion” acknowledge both the fact of unwritten traditions and the obligation to receive and embrace them, if *proved* to be really from Christ or his Apostles, which is all that the Catholic says; for no Catholic holds that he is bound to believe any thing as from our Lord and his Apostles not proved by *infallible* authority to be from them.

Dr. Jarvis, after this, is precluded from restricting the rule to the written word alone, and must say with the Catholic Bishop, “the word of God at large, written or unwritten.” Thus far, instead of refuting the Catholic rule, he concedes it, and asserts its soundness. The only point, as we have already said, for him to deny, if he means to controvert the Catholic rule, is, that the rule of faith is the word “as understood and explained by the Catholic Church.” Does he deny this? Not at all. He concedes it, and denies, though he also asserts, the Protestant rule of private judgment; for he maintains expressly that the Church is the judge of controversies of faith, according to Art. XX. of the Thirty-nine Articles of his society, and that the Scriptures are to be interpreted according to tradition, or “the consentient testimony” of antiquity, or rather, of all ages. The last, if it mean any thing, denies private judgment; the first necessarily implies that the word is to be received as understood and explained by the Church. After all his flourish, to borrow his own phraseology, he denies the Protestant rule, and concedes the Catho-

which can properly be debated between them and us are questions which come within the province of reason. These are, Has Almighty God instituted a Church commissioned to teach? If so, which is it? Here is all that is really in issue between the parties. The commission is the divine warrant of infallibility in teaching, because Almighty God cannot authorize the teaching of a lie; and the Church commissioned is divine authority for believing whatever she teaches or commands in the name of God. Then to know what she so teaches and commands now, and always has so taught and commanded, we have only to ask her authorized teachers, and listen to what they say. The Catholic, then, has simply two points to make out, namely, that God has instituted such a Church as supposed, and that his Church is the one; Protestants, in general, have one of two points to make out, either that God has instituted no such Church, or, if he has, that it is not the Roman Catholic, but theirs, or some one of theirs.

But there is in the outset a presumption in favor of the Catholic, and against Protestants. Protestants originally were subjects of the Roman Catholic Church, which claimed and was acknowledged to be the Church commissioned by Almighty God to teach. She was in possession, and to be presumed to be lawfully in possession, as such Church. Protestants were therefore bound to show good and valid reasons for protesting against her, or for throwing off her authority; and till they did so, she was under no obligation to produce her titles, or to adduce evidence to sustain them. The burden of proof was on them. The two points she has in the argument to make out were already made out, at least so far as Protestants were concerned, if they failed to adduce good and valid reasons for contesting her claims, or for the points necessary for them to make out in their own justification. Thus, though the refutation of Catholicity would not be necessarily the defence of Protestantism,—if Protestantism is anything more than a protest against the Church,—the failure of Protestants to establish their claims would be their condemnation as rebels. Protestants, then, must set forth what, if sustained, will completely vindicate them, clear them of the charge of rebellion against their legitimate sovereign, before the Church is under any obligation to say one single word in her own defence. This is the exact state of the question between us and Protestants, and the precise view to be taken of the logical obligations of the two parties.

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without the Church there is no such rule or method. Hence the *necessity* and the *fact* of the Church. To refute this argument, Dr. Jarvis, since he concedes the necessity of faith, must prove either that faith is possible without the rule or method asserted, or that there is some such rule independent of the Church. Has he done either? We answer, that he can hardly be said to have even seriously attempted to do the one or the other.

In illustrating and maintaining his argument, which is conducted in a logical, though popular form, Dr. Milner discusses and refutes the several rules of faith contended for by Protestants, and arrives at the Catholic rule, which he states to be "The word of God at large, whether written in the Bible or handed down from the Apostles in continued succession by the Catholic Church, and as understood and explained *by that Church*."* This definition of the Catholic rule is intended to include the *whole* word of God as taught or delivered by the Apostles, on the one hand, and to exclude all revelations, if such there are, which have been made to individuals subsequently to the Apostles, on the other; and, furthermore, to include that word *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. The rule, as defined, does not assert whether the word is written or unwritten, but simply covers the whole word, whether written or unwritten, or whether in part one and in part the other. This is a question it does not determine, and which is not to be determined before determining the Church; for it is obviously a question to be determined by the rule, and not before the rule itself is determined. Unquestionably the whole word of God delivered by the Apostles is to be received, whether written or unwritten, and Dr. Jarvis concedes it more than once. Furthermore, if the whole word of God, as defined, is to be believed *as understood and explained by the Church*, all she understands and explains to be the word of God, whether written or unwritten, must be received and believed as his word. Consequently, the only point in this rule to which Dr. Jarvis can legitimately object is the definition of the rule of faith to be "the word of God as *understood and explained by the Catholic Church*."

But, strange to say, this is precisely the point to which he does not formally object. He raises a question not raised in the definition of the rule, namely, Whether the Church can

* End of Controversy, Letter VI.

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written — delivered by the Apostles, as understood and explained by the Catholic Church, or the Bible as understood by each particular reader or hearer of it.

Dr. Jarvis undertakes to prove, and under the head of “the rule of faith” the main thing he attempts to prove is, that nothing can enter into the rule of faith not contained in the written word ; but this is nothing to the purpose ; for even if it be so, it does not follow that the Protestant rule is true, or the Catholic false. To assert that the rule of faith is the word of God contained in the written word only is one thing ; to assert that it is solely the word of God as contained in the Bible, and as interpreted by each particular reader or hearer of it, — the proposition Bishop Milner denies, — is another and a very different thing ; for should it be conceded that the whole word was written, and nothing can be received as of faith not recorded in the Bible, it might still be true that the rule of faith is what Dr. Milner asserts, namely, the word of God at large, — that is, the whole word delivered by the Apostles, — *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church* ; which is the proposition of the Bishop that Dr. Jarvis is to disprove.

Before determining the authority which is to determine what is the word of God, the question of written or unwritten tradition can be raised only as an historical question, or for the purposes of an *argumentum ad hominem*. If it be historically true that unwritten tradition has in all ages been contended for by the generality of Christians ; if it be true that it is contended for by Fathers and Doctors held to be authoritative by Protestants ; or if Protestants themselves profess to hold as revealed truth doctrines which are not contained in the Scriptures, or not to be obtained from them without the aid of unwritten tradition, and yet assert that the Bible alone is the rule, then we may urge the fact as a conclusive argument against their rule ; for if there be unwritten tradition, they are certainly wrong ; or if it is shown that they must admit it or abandon their doctrine, they are refuted on their own principles. It is only in this sense that we understand Dr. Milner to urge unwritten tradition. If he urges it successfully, he overthrows Protestantism ; if unsuccessfully, he does not thereby render Catholicity false or Protestantism true ; and all that can be said is, that he has used an unsound argument against Protestants ; which would, indeed, affect his character as a polemic, but not at all the real points in issue. The whole discussion into which Dr. Jarvis enters was therefore

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lic, and of course gives up the whole argument to the Catholic as to the necessity and fact of the Church,—the first point the Catholic had to make out.

It being now proved, or at least conceded, that there is a Catholic Church, and that the rule of faith is the word as understood and explained by this Church, the next question in order is, Which is it,—the church in communion with the see of Rome, or “the churches of the English communion”? But Dr. Jarvis is not yet prepared to broach that question. He has other work to perform first. He is placed in a delicate position, which may be expressed by *Protestant-Catholic*, and *Catholic-Protestant*. He must be Catholic enough to condemn Puritanism and dissent from Anglicanism; and Protestant enough to condemn *Romanism*. In other words, he is an *Anglo-Catholic*, which means a man who asserts one set of principles against us, and the contradictory set against Puritans, Socinians, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, &c. So, though he has conceded the Catholic rule in principle, and given up the Protestant rule of private judgment, we must not be surprised to find him going into a long, elaborate, and learned defence of the Protestant rule, and also indulging in very liberal abuse of us for asserting ours.

After having given up the Protestant doctrine as to the unwritten word, he must, in order not to be too Catholic, reassert it, deny all unwritten tradition of doctrine, and insist on the sufficiency of the Scriptures. But the Scriptures speak of “traditions.” Very true; but *tradition* means “handed over,” and may apply to the written word itself, which the Apostles handed over to their successors. But St. Paul speaks of traditions, “by word or our Epistle.” True, very true; but that which was unwritten at the time St. Paul afterwards wrote. The proof? “*We say*, and that very plainly and openly, that it is an arrogant assumption of the very point at issue, to assert that he meant unwritten tradition of his *doctrine*. *We say*, that, in the fourteen epistles which bear his name, he did record the doctrine which he as a divinely inspired Apostle thought it necessary to *deliver* in addition to the already written doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, as received by him. St. Paul’s traditions of *doctrines* were *written* traditions.”—p. 32. Brave assertions, no doubt; but the proof? “His epistles to the Thessalonians were among the earliest, and are comparatively short. Who will undertake to prove that doctrines, not recorded in them, were not afterwards

recorded in his other Epistles ?" — Ib. But, with your permission, this is not to the purpose. You assert that "St. Paul's traditions of doctrines were *written* traditions"; and yet when the Apostle exhorted the Thessalonians to stand firm, and to hold them (2 Thess. ii. 14), they were undeniably, in part, *unwritten*; it is, therefore, for you, who assert that they were *all* subsequently written, to prove it. The fact that they might have been is no proof that they were. Besides, you have conceded "that the Apostles, in proclaiming the Gospel, and establishing the Church, did and *said* many things which *could not properly enter* into the apostolic writings which have been transmitted to us."

But Dr. Jarvis attempts to save himself by a *distinction*. He distinguishes between *doctrines* and *precepts*, and contends that the unwritten traditions are traditions not of doctrines, but of *precepts*, though, as we understand him, of *divine* precepts, — precepts which the Apostles received from our Lord himself, or from the dictation of the Holy Ghost. That is, they are traditions of things to be done, not of doctrines to be believed. The distinction shows, no doubt, the master. But is not faith itself a precept, in so much as it is commanded, and as in believing we are active, that is, *do* something? Again, is not a precept something *taught* as well as commanded, and therefore a *doctrine*? And must we not *believe* it from God, in order that, in obeying it, we may be obeying God? Moreover, are the divine precepts less a part of the word of God than the divine mysteries? And is not a rule of faith which excludes a portion of the divine precepts, or even *ordinances*, — to adopt another term insisted on by Dr. Jarvis, — just as much a false rule as one which excludes a portion of the dogmas? The distinction, therefore, between doctrines and precepts, on which the author lays so much stress, though valid enough for some purposes, can avail him nothing for the purpose for which he makes it. The precepts are the law of God, what the law practically ordains; and could any body regard a tradition of the word of God as complete, which only partially handed down the *law* of God?

Nevertheless, we must expect Dr. Jarvis to hold on to his Protestantism, at least for some few pages further. Notwithstanding his concessions, he asserts (p. 37), that "the Bible, the written word of God, *in its true intent and meaning*, is the only rule of that faith which is necessary to salvation." But how does he prove this? He has already admitted that

there is a portion of the word not recorded in the Bible, and whether he call it doctrine, or precept, or ordinance, how does he know that it is not necessary to salvation? He cites, indeed, the English Synods; but till he has proved that they were commissioned by Almighty God to teach, they are authority neither for him nor for us. And yet we can find no other proof of his assertion of the sufficiency of the Scriptures. But this is a serious question. What is the faith necessary to salvation must be determined by divine authority, and therefore, if what is contained in the Scriptures is sufficient, we must have divine authority for believing it. But, unhappily for the Protestant minister, he has no such authority; for the Holy Scriptures, as is well known, nowhere assert their own sufficiency. This, of itself, is decisive against Protestantism.

In arguing against the Protestant rule, Dr. Milner presses home the inability of the Protestant to settle the canon, and to be certain that he has an authentic copy of the original Hebrew and Greek autographs, — that his translation is faithful, — and that he seizes the true sense. Dr. Jarvis, still in his Protestant vein, undertakes at considerable length to dispose of this formidable objection. Let us see how he succeeds.

1. The Protestant cannot proceed a step, even if the sufficiency of the Scriptures be conceded, till he has settled the canon, that is, determined what books are authoritative. Dr. Milner tells his Protestant opponents that they are unable to do this. Dr. Jarvis *says* Protestants can do this as well as we can; but he fails to show how. He, however, proceeds himself to settle the canon by a very short and simple process. The Catholic canon and the Protestant agree, except that the former includes seven books and certain parts of Esther and Daniel excluded by the latter. “The question, then, as to the canonical Scriptures, or Scriptures to be adduced as a rule of faith, is clearly reduced to this: Whether the seven books named, and the parts of Esther and Daniel as contained in the Septuagint and the Old Latin Vulgate, are, or are not, canonical.” — pp. 44, 45. These books were not in the Jewish canon, were not received by some early Christians, were thought lightly of by St. Jerome, and therefore are not canonical. Therefore the Protestant canon is the true canon, and the Catholic, so far as it differs from the Protestant, false. But, waiving the argument against the books in our canon not in the Protestant, which, it were easy to show, is of no weight, on what authority does Dr. Jarvis assert the canonicity

of those books with regard to which there is no dispute between Catholics and Protestants, that is, of the books which Protestants hold to be canonical? On our authority? Nay, because he does not admit that authority, and because, if admitted, it is as good for those rejected as for those retained. On what authority, then? On the authority of the primitive Church? By what authority do you determine what was the canon of the primitive Church? Your own? That is, no doubt, very respectable, but hardly sufficient for an act of faith; at best, it cannot be more than human, and therefore not above the authority of the Holy Council of Trent, at worst.

2. But Dr. Milner continues: Supposing you have settled the canon of the Scriptures, how do you know that the copies of them translated and printed in your Bibles are authentic? Here is a further difficulty; for even if you have the true canon, but a corrupt text, it avails you nothing. What does Dr. Jarvis answer to this? 1. That Dr. Milner should have used the word *genuine* instead of *authentic*. [Doubtful.] 2. That various learned men, though they have detected thousands of various readings, are of opinion that the received Hebrew and Greek text is substantially correct. 3. Conceding that the text of the Psalter in the Book of Common Prayer is not pure; and 4. Entering into a long and learned dissertation to prove that the text of the New Testament, in one instance at least, is grossly corrupt, and contains what was originally only a marginal gloss! — pp. 52–65. This looks to us more like assigning reasons for doubting than for crediting the accuracy of the text.

3. But, Dr. Milner goes on, admitting the canon, and the genuineness of the text, how can you be sure that yours is a faithful translation? The generality of those who read the Bible must read it in a translation, the faithfulness of which they have themselves no means of ascertaining; and yet, if they are to take their faith from the Bible alone, they cannot be certain of their faith, unless they are certain of the translation in which they read or hear it read. What has Dr. Jarvis to say to this? So far as we can understand him, he answers Dr. Milner's question, 1. By abusing and misrepresenting the Holy Council of Trent; 2. Berating the Latin Vulgate; 3. Excusing one error in the Protestant English translation, on the ground of a various reading; 4. Trying in vain to defend another; 5. Asserting that the Protestant version, take it all in all, is a very excellent translation; 6. Placing in parallel columns

an extract from our English version and one from the Protestant, and calling on "plain, unlettered" men to decide between them; 7. Abusing ours for coming through a *Latinized* medium, and for retaining the word *Cephas*, instead of translating it *Peter*, in a passage in which it is not certain that Peter was the person meant; and 8. By leaving a strong impression on the reader that translations can never be worthy of full confidence. — pp. 65 – 70.

4. But, Dr. Milner asks again, — "Admitting that your Bible is canonical, authentic, faithful, what security have you that you understand it rightly?" Dr. Jarvis is bound to answer this question, for he says, as we have seen, that "the Bible, the written word of God, *in its true intent and meaning*, is the *only* rule of that faith which is necessary to salvation." Besides, what we are to believe is unquestionably the word of God, and the Bible is, and can be, the word of God only in the exact sense intended by its divine Author. If we have no infallible certainty that we have that sense, we cannot have faith; for faith must exclude doubt, and where there is not infallible certainty, where there is a liability to error, doubt is not excluded. Now what certainty has the Protestant, or can he have, that he understands the words of the Bible in the very sense intended by the Holy Ghost? Here we are at some loss to make out what the author really answers. His vituperation of Dr. Milner and the Catholic Church is intelligible enough; but when he comes to the direct answer to the question, he grows dark and profound. He seems himself to feel that there is a difficulty in the case. If, he says, the noble design once entertained by the English Reformers had been carried out, — our Lord himself not having made any provision for the right understanding of his word, we must suppose, — there *would* have been a way, he is sure. The child would have been baptized, early taught the creeds, [what vouches for the creeds?] catechised, in due time confirmed, and then would every day of his life have heard four chapters in the Bible read by a learned priest, and "with that just emphasis and intonation, that the very reading would have conveyed to him the true sense of God's holy word." — p. 74. This *would have been*; but, alas! Catholics and Puritans marred the "noble design," and so it *is not*, and *has not been*. Very unkind on the part of Catholics and Puritans, and very unfortunate for the "churches of the English communion," certainly. If the "noble design" had been carried out, the Protes-

tants would have an authoritative interpreter of the word in the "just emphasis and intonation" of the reader! But who would have gone guaranty for the "emphasis and intonation"? The fact that the priest knew Hebrew and Greek? Alas! we have known men who knew both Hebrew and Greek who had a shocking bad emphasis and intonation, and we presume Dr. Jarvis has known some eminent Hebrew and Greek scholars who were, in his estimation, very bad Biblical interpreters, whether by reading or otherwise.

Dr. Jarvis frankly concedes, that, as matters now stand, the method of arriving at the true sense of the word of God in his communion is not perfect. He says, "*Even in the present weak and imperfect state* of our communion, longing as we do for a more devout and general fulfilment of the Church's purposes, I will be bold to say, that no one who clearly understands our system, and *follows it in his daily practice*, can be carried about by *every* wind of doctrine and the cunning craftiness of men, whereby they lie in wait to deceive." — p. 75. Here the *weak* and *imperfect* state of the author's communion is taken as a settled fact, and also, that the perfection of the Church is a thing *in futuro*, perhaps, but certainly not in the present. True, after this admission, the author takes courage, grows bold, and asserts — what? "That no one who understands our system," — but who understands it? — "No one who understands our system," — very well, — "and follows it in his daily practice," — that is, understands and *adheres* to it, — "will be carried about by every wind of doctrine." Certainly not; a man who understands and sticks to Episcopalianism is not an Anabaptist, a Quaker, or a Mormon; but is it certain that he understands and adheres to the word of God? How know you that? How be certain of that?

"Thanks be to God, we have a prayer-book, which the most ignorant of our laity can understand, and which embodies in a devotional form the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures." — p. 74. That the most ignorant of your laity, or even the most learned, can understand your prayer-book, may be questioned; but be it so; how are they to know, that, by understanding it, they rightly understand the Scriptures? Because I understand an Episcopal prayer-book, is it certain that I rightly understand the word of God?

But it "embodies the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures." If you say that, you abandon the Protestant rule, and imply the Catholic. But let that pass. How are your most

ignorant laity, or even your most learned laity, to know that your prayer-book embodies in a devotional form the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures? Rely on their ministers? But that were "blind submission," to which (p. 75) you object, and which you regard as the condemnation of Dr. Milner's system. How, indeed, are even your ministers to know the fact themselves? What is the guaranty, even to your ministers, that they do not themselves mistake the Catholic interpretation? Moreover, what authority have they for saying that the interpretation, even if the Catholic interpretation, is the true sense of God's word, since you deny the infallibility of even the Catholic Church, adduce Catholic testimony only as *human* testimony (p. 37), and say that "all attempts to enforce the decision of a present *infallible* interpreter end only in spiritual despotism"? (p. 75.) If there is no *present* infallible interpreter, there can be no present infallible interpretation, and no infallible assurance that any ancient interpretation is infallible; and then no assurance, sufficient for faith, even if we understand your prayer-book, that we rightly understand the Scriptures.

Dr. Jarvis appeals to what he calls *traditive interpretation*, to the traditions, the "consentient testimony of all ages"; but appeals to them as helps only to private judgment. They are to be collected and ascertained by private judgment, not defined and declared, as the Catholic holds, by authority; and when collected and ascertained, private judgment is at liberty to accept, modify, or reject, as seems to it good. But private judgment may err in determining what is the tradition of all ages, what is the consentient testimony of the Fathers; it may gravely mistake as to the traditive interpretation itself; it may also err gravely in the use it makes of it; and therefore, with all the helps it gets from it, be still liable to err in the interpretation of the Scriptures. How, then, is the Protestant to be certain that he rightly understands the word of God, has seized "its true intent and meaning," — and not merely the plain, unlettered Protestant, but even the most gifted and learned? Our author is silent, — nay, not quite! "The *well-taught Christian* [who has taught him, and taught him well?] will apply to him who is set over him in the Lord to resolve his doubts." (p. 75.) That is, he must apply to his pastor, — a plain surrender of the Protestant rule, and, in principle, an equally plain assertion of the Catholic. But who is guaranty for the pastor, if there be no infallible church who teaches him, sends

him, and teaches through him? "There is no more uncertainty in our communion than there has ever been in the Catholic Church." — *Ib.* That is assumption; but at any rate, then, there *is* uncertainty in your communion; how, then, in your communion, be sure that you rightly understand the word of God? "All attempts to enforce the decision of a present *infallible* interpreter end only in spiritual despotism." — *Ib.* We distinguish; the decision of a pretended infallible interpreter, or of an interpreter who is not infallible, we concede it; of an interpreter who is really infallible, we deny it; for submission to truth is spiritual freedom, and the decisions of an infallible interpreter *are* truth. But in saying this, Dr. Jarvis evidently concedes that his communion is not, *at present*, infallible, and then not authorized by Almighty God to teach. "The fires of the Inquisition have made *hypocrites*, not *converts*." — *Ib.* The author's mind must be running on the English Court of High Commission, and we are happy to think his Anglicanism a little modified from what it was under Elizabeth and James.

It is clear, from Dr. Jarvis's own statements and concessions, that he is aware of no method by which, on Protestant principles, either ministers or people can be sure that they rightly understand the word of God, that they seize its true intent and meaning, and hold it in the sense intended by the Holy Ghost. But with any uncertainty on this point, they cannot have faith; for faith and uncertainty cannot coexist in the same mind, on the same subject, as is evident from the force of the terms themselves. But faith is possible, and, if not possible without the Church, then the Church must be, and is. The Reply is constantly recurring to the Church. The author speaks of the *well-taught* Christian; but there cannot be well-taught Christians, unless there be some one competent to teach them. He fails, therefore, to defend his Protestantism, and, as we have seen, concedes in principle the Catholic rule, namely: The word of God at large, written or unwritten, *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. He then concedes that there is a Catholic Church, whose function it is to teach, understand, and explain the word. Then the first point in the Catholic argument, and which Dr. Milner undertakes to establish, is conceded. Thus far the Reply makes out nothing against Dr. Milner, but, as far as it goes, either concedes or defends all he contends for.

We may pass now to the second question in order, namely,

Which is the Catholic Church, — the church in communion with the See of Rome, or “the churches of the English communion”? There is a Catholic church essential to the rule of faith. This is now certain, so far as regards the argument between Dr. Milner and Dr. Jarvis. This church is none of the minor Protestant sects, by the concession of Dr. Jarvis, and therefore, in an argument with him, they may be thrown out of the question. The controversy, so far as he is concerned, turns, and he wishes it to turn, between the *Roman Catholic Church* and “the churches of the English communion”; for it is, as he tells us in his title-page, only so far as “the churches of the English communion are concerned” that he undertakes to reply to Dr. Milner. Dr. Milner, under this head, maintains that those churches are not the Catholic Church, and that the Roman is; Dr. Jarvis, to refute him, must refute these two propositions. Dr. Milner, if he refutes the pretensions of the Anglican communion, can, against Anglicans, at once, without further argument, conclude his second proposition, that the church in communion with Rome is the Catholic Church; or, if he establishes by direct proofs that this church is the Catholic Church, he can conclude at once against *all* others. Dr. Jarvis, however, does not prove his own church, even if he uncatholicizes the Roman, and must either disprove the pretensions of all pretended ecclesiastical bodies but his own, or prove his own by direct affirmative proofs. Let us see, not whether Dr. Milner has succeeded, for that is not the question, but whether Dr. Jarvis has succeeded in maintaining against him the catholicity of “the churches of the English communion.”

Dr. Jarvis begins by accusing Dr. Milner of having in the outset assumed the point in dispute, by speaking of his church as the *Catholic Church*. In this Dr. Jarvis is wrong, and all he says about Bishop Milner’s “chicanery,” and “quibbling,” and using words in “a double sense,” is irrelevant and unjust. Dr. Milner calls his church *Catholic* from the outset, it is true; but he builds no argument on the name, and in his second part he undertakes to prove that it is what he calls it. The church in communion with the See of Rome, whether in fact the Catholic Church or not, is legitimately so called. Catholic is its official name; the name by which it has always designated itself, and been designated by others. It is its historical name, its proper name, by which it is distinguished in history, and in the common speech of mankind. It is a name

exclusively appropriated to it. No church or ecclesiastical body not in communion with the See of Rome has ever been known and distinguished among men by the name of Catholic. All other churches, or bodies, are known and distinguished in common speech, by the common sense of mankind, and we believe, even by themselves, by some other appellation. She alone bears it, and she has as good a right, when speaking of herself, to call herself by the name Catholic, as Dr. Jarvis has to call himself *Samuel Farmer* Jarvis. If the name is an argument in her favor, that is not her fault. She is not obliged to change her name, because others change their faith and communion.

Dr. Jarvis wishes, we are aware, that "the churches of the English communion" should be called *Catholic*; but those churches have never officially called themselves so. The Anglican Church is officially "the Church of England," and the queen of England, who is its supreme governor, or governess, in her coronation oath, did not swear to protect and defend "the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church," but the "Protestant religion," as established in her realms. The official name of Dr. Jarvis's own society is, "The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America"; and when he himself, in its General Convention, at Philadelphia, in 1844, introduced a resolution changing its name to "Catholic," or "*reformed* Catholic," the Convention voted it down, and by doing so, voted that his church is not *Catholic*; for it is notorious that they hold it to be *reformed*. This of itself is decisive against the catholicity of the *Protestant* Episcopal Church. Dr. Jarvis, in asking us to call ourselves *Romanists*, and him and his friends Catholics, or *Anglo-Catholics*, is not modest. He asks that we should give up the name by which the whole world knows us, and call him and his friends by a name which they have solemnly voted they will not have. We cannot be so discourteous as to call them by what in their case would be a nickname. The "churches of the English communion" call themselves Protestant; they fraternize with Protestants; they regard themselves as the bulwarks of the Protestant religion; and Protestants we shall call them, whenever we wish to distinguish them from those whom all ages have designated by the name of Catholic.

Unquestionably the name we bear is a strong presumption in our favor. The body which has always maintained the name and style of a given corporation is *primâ facie* it; and any

body claiming to be it, which does not use, and which has never been known to use, its name and style, is, *primâ facie*, not it. If this is in our favor, and against Protestant Episcopalians, whose fault is it? Is Dr. Jarvis so very modest as to ask us to give up the name and style we have always borne and used, so as to place ourselves on an equal footing with himself? If so, we may, indeed, admire his modesty, but cannot consent to gratify him. He must oust us from our possession, which we have held from time immemorial, before we yield one iota to oblige even him. Whatever advantage the name *Catholic* gives us is rightfully ours; and we cannot surrender it, without being false to God and unjust to our neighbour. Whatever disadvantage "the churches of the English communion" may labor under in consequence of not having, and never having had, the name and style of the *Church of God*, they must submit to it; we forewarn them that we will not do so much as the lifting of a single hair to relieve them. So it is useless to talk about the name. They are named; and, do their best, they will never be able to make the name *Catholic* stick to them. There is often common sense in names.

"We will not, and cannot," says Dr. Jarvis, (p. 117,) "be drawn from our vantage-ground by the wily manoeuvres of Dr. Milner. He knew, and his brethren now cannot but know, that there is no debate between us on the terms of the ancient creeds. The Seventh Article of the Synod of London, in 1552—the same with the Eighth Article of 1662—says, 'The three creeds—Nicene Creed, Athanasius's Creed, and the Apostles' Creed—ought thorowly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Scripture.' Thus far, therefore, our faith is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the first four General Councils. From this vantage-ground, I repeat, we cannot and will not be driven; and it is an unfair use of terms, to deny us the name of *Catholic*, or to represent the debate between the English and Roman Communions as if *we* were the *heretics*, and they the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church."

Here we see that Dr. Jarvis claims to stand on a vantage-ground. He asserts that his faith is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council. But what is the proof? "We believe the ancient creeds." But that is a point to be proved, not taken for granted. If you believe the creeds in the sense and for the reason the Catholic Church did at the end of the Fourth General Council, you do, so far as her

faith at the time was embodied in them ; but that you do so believe them is not evident from the fact that you *profess* to receive and believe them ; because you may believe them in some other sense, or for some other reason, than hers. You must prove that you hold them in a Catholic sense, and for a Catholic reason, before you can pretend to stand on the vantage-ground you boast.

To believe the ancient creeds, it is necessary, as is evident from their face, to believe the Holy Catholic Church, as we have also proved, by proving that the rule of faith is the word of God *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. In the act of faith, then, there must always be belief of the Church. Now, if we turn to the article of the Synod of London cited above, we find that the reason assigned for believing the ancient creeds is, not that they are the creeds of the Catholic Church, — the word of God as understood and explained by her, — but that “they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.” In believing them for this reason, there is no belief of the Catholic Church, expressed or implied, but a virtual denial of the Church. If the reason for believing is the most certain warrant of Scripture, the want of such warrant, even if we had the Catholic Church teaching, would be good reason for *not* believing, and therefore the Church teaching counts for nothing. The Doctor's vantage-ground, therefore, evidently slides from under him.

Moreover, the ancient creeds, at the time mentioned, were held as *creeds*, and no debate whether they were or were not provable by “most certain warrants of Holy Scripture” was allowed, *because the Church had spoken, and concluded debate*. Her authority was held to be final, and no one was at liberty to reject it, on Scriptural or any other grounds ; and every one was bound to believe it under pain of anathema. Is Dr. Jarvis free to open the debate ? If he is, he denies the authority of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council, and his faith is not hers. Is he not free ? What binds him ? The ancient Church ? No ; for it is not on her authority he takes the creeds, but on the alleged fact that “they may be proved by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture.” What, then, binds him ? The authority of the Synod of London, which asserts that fact ? If so, he makes the Synod authoritative, and, therefore, must prove it is the Catholic Church that speaks in it, before he can allege it, or allege, that, in believing on its authority the ancient creeds, his faith

is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council. He must, then, prove his church to be the Catholic Church, before he can claim the vantage-ground of which he speaks.

Finally, no man believes the ancient creeds who does not believe the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. But no man who rejects the authority of that Church, separates himself from her communion, and believes a communion which is not hers to be the Catholic communion, does believe her. Consequently, before Dr. Jarvis can be at liberty to affirm that his faith is that of the Catholic Church at the epoch designated, he must prove the Catholicity of his own communion, and that, in believing it, he believes the Catholic Church of the ancient creeds. These considerations may not, indeed, drive the Doctor from his boasted vantage-ground, but they show, at least, that he does not occupy it.

Dr. Jarvis is not at liberty to pursue the line of argument which he sees would be very convenient for him. He wishes to be allowed to assume, since he professes to believe the creeds, that his faith is that of the Catholic Church in the early ages, from that to conclude his orthodoxy, and then from his orthodoxy to conclude his church. But this will not do. The Church cannot be concluded from the faith; for, without the Church, we have no authority by which to determine what is the faith, whether the ancient or modern faith,—to distinguish, where there is and can be no difference. The Doctor misconceives the question at issue. He labors under the hallucination, that Catholics yield him the early ages of the Church, and that the controversy begins only at the end of the Fourth General Council,—that his faith is admitted to be that of the Catholic Church at that epoch, and that it is contended that he is wanting only in regard to certain matters not expressed in the creeds, and which he alleges are subsequent *additions*, but which Mr. Newman calls *developments*, and he cites Mr. Newman's Essay in proof of it. But the work he cites was written, not by a Catholic, but by a member of the communion to which he himself professes to belong, and its doctrine is not Catholic doctrine. Dr. Jarvis may be assured that Catholics yield him not one iota of antiquity, and no more grant that his faith is that of the Church in primitive than in modern times. His vantage-ground is purely imaginary. We hold ourselves bound by the primitive creed, without alteration, addition, or diminution, save its further explication for the con-

demnation of new errors which from time to time arise. We recognize no *ancient*, no *modern* creed ; for the creed of the Church is always, and everywhere, the same and invariable, — never young, never old. The question is simply, What *was* the creed, or doctrine, of the Church in primitive times ? Settle that question, and you unchurch every pretended church which has deviated, or which deviates from it. But that is not a question for private judgment, to settle by private interpretation of the three creeds enumerated and the early Fathers ; but a question for authority, the authority which proposes and defines the faith, — that is, the Catholic Church herself. Evidently, then, the question, Which is the Catholic Church ? must precede the question, Which is, or who has, the Catholic faith ? If Dr. Jarvis had just simply considered that the doctrine is to be taken from the teacher, not the teacher from the doctrine, he could hardly have fallen into the gross blunder of attempting to establish his orthodoxy without the Church, and then the Church by his orthodoxy. In homely language, he puts the cart before the horse.

The question now returns, Which is the Catholic Church ? And this question must be answered without any appeal to the faith, which we can know only by the Church. The controversy into which Dr. Jarvis seeks to lead us is wholly irrelevant, and could settle nothing for him or for us. Which is the Catholic Church ? There is a Catholic Church, — that is settled ; and, between Dr. Jarvis and Dr. Milner, it must be either the church in communion with Rome, or the churches of the English communion. Which of these is it ?

Were we arguing the question, we should plant ourselves on the fact of prior possession, on the presumptions in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, and there stand, till the Protestant Episcopal Doctor had set forth good and valid reasons for ousting us. But we are not arguing the question ; we are only examining Dr. Jarvis's Reply to Dr. Milner. Dr. Milner undertakes both to prove his own church, and to disprove the pretensions of his opponents. There are certain marks of the true church in the Nicene Creed, and which, at least, all who admit the authority of that creed must accept. Dr. Jarvis finds no fault with them, but, so far as we can understand him, acknowledges them to be the true marks of the true Catholic Church. These marks are, Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity ; — “ *Credo Unam Sanctam Ecclesiam, Catholicam et Apostolicam.*” The church which possesses all

these marks is the true Catholic Church ; any body, or association, calling itself *the Church*, that wants *any one* of these, is a false church, and to be rejected. Dr. Milner shows that the Roman Catholic Church possesses all these marks, and that no other so-called church does ; at least, he attempts to show this. Dr. Jarvis, to refute him, must show that they are all possessed by the churches of the English communion ; and, if he fail to do so, he must concede that Dr. Milner is right, and that the *Roman* is the *Catholic* Church. Does he succeed or fail ? Let us hear him.

“ Since the Fourth General Council, the state of the Church has been very materially altered. They who equally maintain the great principles of the ancient creeds are now *ripen* into *separate* communions. The question is, not whether there *ought to be unity*, but who has *violated* unity. The question is, not whether *holiness* should be the badge of our Christian profession, but which of the contending parties is the *least unholy*. Our object is, to *gather* together in one the *scattered* and *divided* members of Christ's fold ; to *perfect* holiness on earth, that we may enjoy it in heaven ; to *render* the Church truly Catholic, *as it once was* ; and, for that purpose, to *restore* the blessed communion of the apostolic fellowship.” — p. 117. This evidently implies that Dr. Jarvis considers the Church now existing to be destitute of these four marks, and supposes the question to be, not who possesses or does not possess them, but through whose fault have they been lost.

But the question he would raise cannot be entertained, because it presupposes the Church to have ceased to exist. The Catholic Church, without the four marks enumerated, is not conceivable. The Doctor, therefore, cannot go into any inquiry by whose fault the true Church has lost them, for she cannot lose them. If the view he takes were admitted, we should be obliged to say, the Church, the true Church, we are in pursuit of, does not exist. This is implied in the Doctor's carefully chosen language. *Unity*, he tells us, has been violated, — the members of Christ's fold *scattered* and *divided* ; we are to inquire, not what church is *holy*, but which “ is the *least unholy* ” ; and the purpose of the churches of his communion is, to *recover* unity, to “ *perfect* holiness,” to *render* the Church truly Catholic, and to *restore* the Apostolic communion ; — all expressions which necessarily imply that he holds that there is at present no church existing which is One, Holy, Catholic,

and Apostolic ; for, otherwise, he would not be seeking to revive, restore, or to manufacture such a church.

But there is a Catholic Church to-day, as we have seen. Therefore Dr. Jarvis cannot affirm any thing which denies it. What he affirms, then, cannot be predicated of the *Catholic Church*. But it may apply, and he must hold that it does apply, to "the churches of the English communion" ; for, if he held otherwise, he could not assert what he does. Therefore it is a full admission on his part that the churches of that communion want the marks of Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity. Then, by his own admission, they are not the Catholic Church ; and therefore the Roman Catholic Church is the Catholic Church. Thus both points Dr. Milner undertook to make out are conceded, and the argument, so far as Dr. Jarvis is concerned, is closed. Will not Dr. Jarvis write another Reply ?

We could easily obtain the same conclusion by a dozen different processes, each of which Dr. Jarvis would be obliged to admit to be legitimate ; but we refer our readers to Milner's *End of Religious Controversy* itself, in which they will find all that needs to be said, and far better said than we could say it. Having established, so far as required for our present purpose, the two points which, in the argument, the Catholic has to make out,—or having shown that Dr. Jarvis has not invalidated them, but is really obliged to concede them, and virtually does concede them,—our work is done. We will not follow him into his long discussion concerning particular doctrines, for we never will consent to be drawn by Protestants into any discussion of the sort. If the Catholic Church is the Church of God, all she teaches is true, all she does as the Church is right and holy ; and if it is not acceptable to you, that is your fault, not hers. The question, whether she be the Church of God,—the question as it relates to the motives of credibility, to the grounds for believing her to be the Church of God, commissioned by God himself to teach all nations, all things whatsoever our Lord hath commanded,—we are ready and willing to discuss with Protestants ; for this is a question which is to be settled by the authority of reason, speculative and practical, common to them and to us ; but all beyond is the province of authority, and not debatable.

Dr. Jarvis has taken up nearly forty pages of his work with an attempt to convict Bishop Milner of quoting unfairly and mistranslating his authorities. We have examined that part of his

work, and, setting aside his comments, — which are not to be relied on, — we think the authorities, as he cites them, are much stronger in favor of the Catholic, than as cited by Dr. Milner himself. He has not, so far as we can see, convicted the Bishop of unfairness in a single particular, unless it be unfair to cite an author on one subject, without also citing what he says on some other subject not connected with it. As for mistranslation, if by mistranslation is meant a translation which perverts the sense of the author, he has not, even on his own showing, succeeded in convicting the Bishop of a single instance. We have no space to enter into the discussion, which could, moreover, answer no purpose but that of giving us a chance to display our own patristic learning. But we keep our learning for use, not display, and therefore pass over what Dr. Jarvis says on this point. We have no apprehensions for the reputation of Dr. Milner. A charge of unfairness or of ignorance against him, from Dr. Jarvis, does not move us, nor does it tempt us to a retort. Dr. Milner is beyond the reach of praise or blame, and it is a matter of exceedingly small moment to him or to his brethren, what Dr. Jarvis may think of his scholarship. He cared, when living, little for human approbation or censure. He devoted his eminent abilities, solid learning, and enlightened zeal, to the service of God, who is able to protect him and his reputation. Few men who have written in our language have more effectually served the cause of truth and virtue. He was a man without pretension, without show or parade, free from all arrogance and from all pedantry. It was glory enough for any one man to be the author of the *End of Religious Controversy*, — a work to which thousands owe, and tens of thousands will owe, under God, their happy conversion from Protestant error to Catholic truth. Happy was he in being permitted to write it, and honored is he in falling under the displeasure, and being the object of the vituperation, of Samuel Farmer Jarvis, D. D., LL. D., &c.

But enough. We are not disposed to complain of Dr. Jarvis's want of candor, fairness, and justice ; for he is a Protestant minister, and men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles. He has probably done as well, being what he was, as he was able ; and not without the grace of God can he be other than he is. We close by a single suggestion, which we beg him to weigh well. His embarrassments evidently arise, not from any objections he has to the Church, but from the fact that he cannot become a Catholic without ceasing to

be an Anglican. He sees clearly enough that Anglicanism is not the Church of God, — that it wants every mark of the true Church. But what shall he do? Shall he say it is no church at all, nothing but a human establishment, and no part of the Church of God? So he must say, if he admits that the Catholic Church still subsists in her normal state. But then all who adhere to his communion are schismatics, heretics, fighting against God, and blaspheming his Spouse. Can he say this? In reply, we ask him, Which is the more difficult to believe, that a little handful of Anglicans, in a corner of the world, during three hundred years have been heretics, or to believe that the whole Christian world for one thousand years, and by far the larger part of all who bear the Christian name for thirteen hundred years, have been involved in frightful errors, sunk in gross superstition and idolatry, — that the Church no longer has a normal existence, that she has failed, and that Almighty God has broken his word?

ART. III. — *Pauline Seward: A Tale of Real Life.* By JOHN D. BRYANT. Baltimore: J. Murphy. 1847. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE gave a brief notice of this work in our Review for April last, and an explanation of that notice in the number following; but as neither the notice nor the explanation appears to have satisfied the author, and as it affords us an occasion for throwing out some additional hints on novel-writing and novel-reading, we venture to approach it again; and, this time, we hope, whether we succeed in pleasing its author or not, that we shall succeed in convincing our readers that we have not rashly or wantonly censured it.

Our brief notice appeared in an article entitled *Recent Publications*, and it must be obvious to all who have done us the honor to read that article, that *Pauline Seward*, and the other works named at its head, were made merely an occasion for offering some comments on certain dangerous tendencies in a portion of our Catholic community. Nothing was farther from the intention of the writer than to make those works the principal subject of his strictures; and nothing he said should, or, in fairness, can be, understood as intended to apply to them,

except what is *expressly* so applied. They were introduced because they were to be noticed, and because they afforded an easy transition to the spirit and tendency on which the writer proposed to remark. When they had served that purpose, they were dismissed, save so far as they encouraged, or did nothing to counteract, what was looked upon as censurable. Undoubtedly, in the article itself, there are many strictures which would be far from just, if applied to *Pauline Seward*, or to any one of the other publications unfavorably noticed; but we did not so apply them, and, if the authors have done so, it is their fault, not ours. Authors are bound to be just, as well as reviewers.

It is true, we assume, throughout our article, that *Pauline Seward*, and the other works censured, spring from and conform to the spirit and tendency of the age and country; but we have no reason to suppose that the authors themselves dispute this, or regard it as a reproach. Mr. Bryant publicly advocates religious novels, on the very ground that "the spirit of the age demands them"; that is, as we understand him, on the ground that they are in harmony with that spirit. No well-instructed Catholic can read the works referred to, without feeling and recognizing the truth of our assumption. But it was precisely to this we chiefly objected. We contended, that Catholic works, instead of being inspired by and conforming to the age and country, as distinguishable from the Church, must be written in the true Catholic spirit, which is always a spirit of uncompromising hostility to every spirit but itself. We were certainly wrong in our strictures, if the standard for a Catholic writer is to be taken from the dominant ideas and sentiments of his age and country; but if it is to be taken from the Church, we were certainly right, — unless we mistook the character of the works censured; — and the authors, in complaining of us, do but condemn themselves.

When it was our misfortune and our shame to be in the ranks of Protestants, and to advocate, as we did, in season and out of season, for some twenty years, the modern doctrine of progress, we held that the standard to which one is to conform is always to be taken from the spirit and tendency of each successive age, as modified by one's own particular nation. This spirit and tendency are never stationary, but always moving onwards to some point not yet reached. Hence, we professed always to be of the "movement party." With it were all our sympathies; in it were all our hopes.

What tended to aid it onward, we for that reason approved ; what tended to arrest or retard it, we for that reason condemned, and resisted as well as we could. But when Almighty God, in his great mercy, was pleased to open our eyes to behold the beauty and loveliness of his immaculate Spouse, and through his unbounded grace, without any merits of our own, to permit us to be enrolled among his children, we were taught, that, instead of taking our standard from the spirit and tendency of the age, we must take it from the Church herself. The Church is invariable and permanent,—speaking always and everywhere the same language, and breathing the same spirit,—representing, on the movable and ever-changing scene of the world, the authority of the immovable, immutable, and eternal God. Whatever is variable, mutable, changing from people to people, and from age to age, is not of her, is in fact opposed to her, and to be resisted. So we were taught ; and, being so taught, we could not understand any concord or alliance between the Church and the spirit and tendency of the age or country, regarded as external to her ; and we therefore felt, that, if we would be a Catholic, we must not only not conform to them, but resist them, and wage with them a stern and uncompromising war.

Before our conversion, we had studied both history and philosophy, especially the philosophy of history, civil and ecclesiastical ; and we had been accustomed always to take sides with heretics against the Church, for we found them invariably the movement party of their age and country. Heresies, we said, originate in the spirit and tendency of their epoch, and in the effort to develop the Church, and carry her, in her doctrines and practice, along with them. We have seen no reason to reject or modify this view, which, moreover, the modern philosophers of Germany and France have clearly demonstrated and firmly established. The heresiarch does not set out with the deliberate intention of founding a heresy. No man ever rises up, and, with deliberate forethought, says, —“ Go to, now, let us devise and found a heresy.” The heresiarch is the man of his times, — *of*, not *for*, his times, — and is the one who, better than any other, embodies or impersonates their dominant ideas and sentiments. He begins by taking his standard of truth from the ideas and sentiments which he finds generally received, and with which he is filled to overflowing ; these, he says, are true, and therefore the Church, if true, must agree with them. He then proceeds to develop the Church, —

to explain her doctrines and practice in their sense. But the Church cannot accept his explanations ; she condemns them, and commands him to disavow them ; but he, through pride and obstinacy, refuses, goes out from her communion, and sets up for himself. Here is the history of the rise of every heresy. Study any age or nation, and you will find its peculiar heresy to have originated in the attempt to conform the Church to its dominant ideas and sentiments, or to incorporate them into her teaching and practice. This is evident from the history of Gnosticism, Manichæism, Arianism, Protestantism, or any other heresy you may select. What is Lamennaisism but the attempt to develop the Church, in the sense of the dominant socialism of the day ? What is Hermesianism but an attempt to do the same, in the sense of the dominant philosophy of our times, especially in Germany ? Every age, every nation, necessarily seeks by all its force to develop Christianity, in the sense of its own dominant ideas and sentiments ; and, in every age and nation, the Church is obliged to be on her guard against it. And it is only by her constant vigilance, and her stern and uncompromising resistance to it, that she preserves the original deposit of faith, and transmits it from people to people, and from age to age, untarnished, unaltered, without addition and without diminution.

If we are right in this, — and what Catholic will say we are not ? — the genuine Catholic studies always and everywhere, not to conform his Church to his age and country, but them to her. In them are always the seminal principles of heresy, which only wait the fitting opportunity to germinate and bear their poisonous fruit ; in her alone is the true Catholic spirit, which, developed, ripens into the saint. The only conformity the Church can practise is that of shaping her practical measures so as, amid all the changes around her, to maintain her own independence, freedom, and vigor of action, and so as the most effectually to resist and overcome their evil influence. We are not so simple as to suppose, that, in saying this, we are saying any thing new or wonderful, or any thing which every Catholic does not know, at least as well as we ; but we do suppose that we are stating an important truth, one not to be disregarded without incalculable evil, and which the whole force of every age and nation tends directly to make us disregard, or at least to misapprehend ; therefore, a truth which needs to be constantly repeated, and guarded with the most jealous eye by all the faithful. Nothing can be more hurtful to

service of God, and made to contribute to a religious end. They appear to overlook the essential incongruity between nature and grace, and to be unaware that the affection of sentiment and imagination by natural causes is wholly repugnant to that supernatural affection which alone is religious, and that, just so much as we have of the one affection, just so little must we have of the other. They appear to think that nature and grace are both of the same order, that they may be yoked together and draw peaceably to the same end. But this is only another phase of that spirit of secular conformity to which we have already called attention, or rather, it is the very principle and root of that conformity, which the Church cannot countenance, and which she does and must everywhere anathematize and resist.

Religion has always and everywhere three deadly enemies to combat, — the world, the flesh, and the devil. With these she must wage war to the knife in what is great and in what is little. Their spirit, wherever and in whatever guise it may appear, is opposed to her. But the natural in man, since the fall, inclines always to them. By the fall it has been turned away from God, and inclined to evil. Hence it is, that religion always, and in all things, is obliged to resist nature, for the world and the devil tempt and injure us only in and through it. She is never that to which nature inclines, but is always that from which it is averse, and which it resists. Between it and her there is and can be no alliance, no peace, no truce. It is only in so far as she transforms it, lifts it into the supernatural, and as it is held there by the power of Almighty God, that she can employ nature, or that it can serve her. She can never use it as nature, never trust it to itself, never let it have its own head in any thing. She must be not only supreme, but exclusive, or she cannot be at all. She can form no copartnership, even though placed at the head of the concern. Hence the stern and rigid rule of life enjoined by our Lord, and which all who would be his disciples must follow. We are to deny ourselves, to crucify, annihilate nature, to live never, in no thing whatever, our own life, — that is, the life of nature, — but always, and in all, the new, the divine life of Christ our Saviour, who is our true life, the only life we can live whose end is not death. To this rule there is no limitation, no exception. “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall

far conformed to the fashion of the day as to borrow from it the form of his work. There are works which are sometimes, though not properly, called *novels*, to which we do not object, nay, which we prize very highly. An author is not censurable for choosing the form of a fictitious narrative, and he may often do so with great propriety and effect. But the "novel of instruction," as it is called, designed to set forth a particular doctrine, system, or theory, whether sacred or profane, in an artistic point of view, is, in our judgment, always objectionable. The form of the novel is never proper in those works which are addressed specially to the understanding, and is allowable only in those designed rather to move and please than to enlighten and convince. The novel must always have a story, a plot of some sort, from which its interest arises, and in which it centres. But the interest of a story is diverse from the interest excited by a logical discussion, and not compatible with it. The one demands action, movement, is impatient of delay, and hurries on to the end; the other demands quiet, repose, and suffers only the intellect to be active. It is impossible to combine them both in one and the same piece so as to produce unity of effect.

Especially is this true of what are called *religious novels*. The aim of these novels is to combine a story of profane love with an argument for religion. But the distance between the interest of such a story and that of a theological discussion is much greater than the distance between it and that of any secular or profane discussion. No two interests are more widely separated, or less capable of coalescing, than the interest of profane love and that of religion. Persons in love, or taken up with love-*tales*, are in the worst possible disposition to listen to an argument for religion, or to appreciate the sublime and beautiful truths of the Gospel. Love is a partial frenzy, and lovers are always only just this side of madness. Reason is silenced, and passion is mistress. The only religion lovers can understand or relish is the religion of the natural sentiments and affections, that is to say, no religion at all. Nothing is more absurd than for a novelist to mingle in his work a story of profane love and a story of religious conversion, two things which will no more mix than oil and water.

Every subject should be allowed to speak in its own natural language. The natural language of the understanding, and therefore of all works primarily intended for it, is prose. The novel, though unrhymed, is not properly a prose compo-

sition ; it belongs, according to the critics, to the department of poetry, and should, therefore, conform to the essential laws of poetry. The primary object of poetry is, not to instruct, but to move and please. It addresses the sentiments, affections, imagination, rather than the understanding. Whenever the author reverses this, and seeks, under the poetical form, first of all to instruct, to bring out a theory, or to defend a doctrine, he ceases to be the genuine poet, and becomes the doctor or philosopher, and fails to preserve the requisite congruity between the matter and the form of his work. Most readers, we apprehend, find even Dryden's *Hind and Panther* a heavy book, notwithstanding its brilliant imagination, keen wit, various learning, sound and deep theology. No one can read *The Disowned*, *Paul Clifford*, *Rienzi*, or *The Last of the Barons*, by Bulwer, without feeling the author's moralizing and philosophizing an annoyance, however much he may admire them in themselves considered. They retard the action of the piece, and are usually skipped by the reader. An author may introduce variety, even diversity, in the same piece, but never at random. He has no room for caprice. The diverse elements he addresses must be of the same general group, and capable of coalescing and conspiring to unity of effect. He must follow the law and adhere to the relations which Nature herself establishes.

Let it not be supposed, that, in objecting to the heterogeneous compound of profane love and theology in the same piece, or to the "novel of instruction," that we are contending that all works should be grave and didactic. Poetry has its place as well as prose. The Holy Ghost has not disdained to address us in the language of poetry, and the Church adopts it when she chants the praises of the Most High. Æsthetic works may be as desirable and as profitable as logical works. There is no essential element of human nature that needs to be neglected, or that may not be legitimately addressed. On this point we have no quarrel with novelists or poets. That all the elements of our nature may be turned to a religious account, and made to work in the service of God, is no doubt true ; and here we agree perfectly with the *religious* novelist. His aim is to enlist our whole æsthetic nature in the service of religion. This is a just and noble aim ; and, so far as he gives us works which realize it, we applaud him and commend them.

But here is the point on which we are liable to err, and on

which all our religious novelists, properly so called, do err, and fatally err. Let us see if we can understand the matter. The novel belongs to the sphere of art, and is subject to the laws of art ; the religious novel, to that of religious art, and is subject, not only to the laws of art, but also to those of religion. It is the subjection of art to religion that makes it religious art. It is very possible to intend to be, and to fancy we are, in the sphere of religious art, when, in point of fact, we are only in that of secular art. We must have a clear view of the radical distinction between the two classes of art, or we shall not be able to say in all cases which is which. What, then, is the radical distinction between religious art and secular art ? Both are æsthetic, both have for their primary object to move and please, and both move and please substantially the same elements of human nature. So far they agree ; wherein do they differ ? They differ precisely in that in which what is religious differs from what is secular. The principle of the secular is the natural, and that of the religious is the supernatural. The two species of art, then, differ in this, that in secular art, the principle of the effect, or that which moves and pleases, is the expression of the natural ; in religious art, it is the expression of the supernatural or divine.

Secular art embodies only the natural, and it moves and pleases the sentiments and imagination by representations of the objects to which they are naturally inclined, or which are naturally fitted to excite and gratify them ; its tendency is, to exalt and endear the natural, — to render our natural life more attractive and intense. Religious art moves and pleases the sentiments and imagination by representations of a beauty and worth which is superhuman, above nature ; and its tendency is, to lift them out of the natural order, to exalt us to a higher than our natural life, and to render more easy and intense the supernatural life of religion. When the effect produced proceeds from the representation of nature, it is not religious, and the piece does not belong to religious art, although the artist may have aimed to serve religion ; because the natural or the human never by a natural cause does or can slide into the religious.* Religion is never a development of nature, or the

* Our readers must not suppose that we mean to deny to the religious artist the *use* of natural objects. He is at liberty to range through the whole of nature, and we are aware of nothing in nature that he may not lawfully use. All we contend is, that he cannot use natural objects as nature, and that they serve his purpose only as he supernaturalizes them, by informing them with his own supernatural life.

natural exercise or affection of the human. It is always supernatural and divine. Pelagianism is a heresy. No motion or affection of sentiment, imagination, reason, or will, not from a supernatural principle as well as for a supernatural end, is a religious motion or affection ; otherwise, the infused habit of grace would not be necessary to the religious life. The religious act is done not only *for* God, but *from* God. By his infused grace, God is in the actor, as the principle from which he acts, no less than before him, as the end to and for which he acts. It is in this we find the distinction between the religious life and the secular or natural life, — the life we live by nature. No life lived from nature is religious in the Catholic sense ; for God, not as author of nature, but as author of grace, is the beginning and end of religion, and in it we live from him, through him, for him, and to him, to whom belongs all the glory.

This being true of religion, it must be true also of art, in so far as it is religious. Art is the expression of the interior life of the artist. In his works the artist projects himself. The beauty he expresses or embodies in them he has first taken in and made integral in his own life, and in them he is simply attempting to realize without what he has already realized within. Such his life, such his art. Hence the reason why there is no Protestant religious art to which we can award the palm of excellence. Protestants are not deficient in natural endowments ; they do not want opportunity, instruction, or application, nor even the power to perceive and appreciate natural beauty ; but they cannot be artists of a high order, because they have not the true and beautiful in their own life. Their life partakes of the defects and deformities of their religion. It has no unity, no wholeness, no harmony ; it is broken, incomplete, discordant, cold and weak, pale and sickly ; and so is and must needs be their art. They may feebly imitate, faintly copy, but can produce no masterpiece. No man can express what is not in him. The artist must first incorporate into his own life that which he would embody in his art. Every painter, whatever else he paints, paints himself, as every writer, whatever else he writes, writes himself. The art does not make the life, but the life the art. The vast treasures of Catholic art, which the ages have accumulated, in so far as truly Catholic, are only the expression of the interior divine life of the Church, which her children live by their communion with her, and which was as perfect

before the expression as afterwards. Religion preceded the Gregorian and produced it ; the Church preceded St. Peter's and built it. The Church has produced and fostered art, but not for the sake of art, nor yet, as some would persuade us, for the sake of pressing the senses, sentiments, and imagination into her service, but for the sake of communicating, through every possible avenue, her own supernatural life. The life was in her ; she would communicate it, and she embodied it in the chant, the cathedral, the picture, the statue, the hymn. Men beheld, and were ravished.

Religious art, it follows, must be the expression of the religious life, and the principle of the life it quickens or fosters must be the same with the principle of the life it expresses. As, in secular art, the artist expresses or embodies the life of nature, so, in religious art, the artist expresses or embodies the supernatural life of God. This supernatural life, thus expressed, tends to quicken or strengthen, in those who contemplate the expression, a life like itself, proceeding from the same principle and tending to the same end ; and it is in this way, and in this alone, that art serves the cause of religion. But the artist can express no life which he has not ; if he lives not the life of religion, his art, whatever its theme, or whatever the end he had in view, will remain secular art, and tend only to nourish the life of nature. The theme does not determine the quality of the art. Sacred words may be set to profane airs ; masses may be sung which recall the opera ; there are Madonnas which might have been portraits of the artist's mistress ; and we have seen prints from Paris intended to be pious, in which we detect only a human life, and which have little power to kindle devotion. No matter with what skill and genius the artist works, no matter for what purpose, no matter what subject he selects, his work is religious only as it conforms to the conditions of religious life, proceeds from and expresses the supernatural principle of that life.

It is here that religious artists in general, and religious novelists in particular, seem to us to err. We restrict our remarks to the latter. Religious novelists seem to us to suppose that it is lawful to apply to nature its natural stimulants, if the purpose of the artist be to aid religion, or if, at the same time that he offers them these natural stimulants, he presents the understanding some grand and solid arguments for the Church ; to proceed on the assumption, that nature, as nature, nature without elevation or transformation by grace, may be pressed into the

service of God, and made to contribute to a religious end. They appear to overlook the essential incongruity between nature and grace, and to be unaware that the affection of sentiment and imagination by natural causes is wholly repugnant to that supernatural affection which alone is religious, and that, just so much as we have of the one affection, just so little must we have of the other. They appear to think that nature and grace are both of the same order, that they may be yoked together and draw peaceably to the same end. But this is only another phase of that spirit of secular conformity to which we have already called attention, or rather, it is the very principle and root of that conformity, which the Church cannot countenance, and which she does and must everywhere anathematize and resist.

Religion has always and everywhere three deadly enemies to combat,—the world, the flesh, and the devil. With these she must wage war to the knife in what is great and in what is little. Their spirit, wherever and in whatever guise it may appear, is opposed to her. But the natural in man, since the fall, inclines always to them. By the fall it has been turned away from God, and inclined to evil. Hence it is, that religion always, and in all things, is obliged to resist nature, for the world and the devil tempt and injure us only in and through it. She is never that to which nature inclines, but is always that from which it is averse, and which it resists. Between it and her there is and can be no alliance, no peace, no truce. It is only in so far as she transforms it, lifts it into the supernatural, and as it is held there by the power of Almighty God, that she can employ nature, or that it can serve her. She can never use it as nature, never trust it to itself, never let it have its own head in any thing. She must be not only supreme, but exclusive, or she cannot be at all. She can form no copartnership, even though placed at the head of the concern. Hence the stern and rigid rule of life enjoined by our Lord, and which all who would be his disciples must follow. We are to deny ourselves, to crucify, annihilate nature, to live never, in no thing whatever, our own life,—that is, the life of nature,—but always, and in all, the new, the divine life of Christ our Saviour, who is our true life, the only life we can live whose end is not death. To this rule there is no limitation, no exception. “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall

lose it ; and he that shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." — St. Matt. xvi. 24, 25.

In this we cannot be wrong. The aim of the Church is, to liberate us from nature, and to subject us to grace, which is true freedom. "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed." — St. John viii. 36. The saints are those in whom this freedom has been consummated. They are they who have crucified nature, heroically resisted and overcome it ; they who have trampled on it, denied themselves all the consolations, pleasures, and delights which proceed from it, or from its natural exercise. They have scorned and treated as evil all its delectations ; they have allowed themselves no consolations, no delights, no enjoyments but those derived from divine grace, and have persevered unto the end in trampling on the life of nature, and in living only the supernatural life of God. They have loved God, not only supremely, — "above all things," — but exclusively, — "with the whole heart and soul." We know they have been right, for the Church declares it in the act of their canonization ; we know that there is no attaining to Christian perfection but in following their example. Art is Christian only as it has the same aim, only as it triumphs over nature, and tends exclusively to liberate us from nature, and to raise us above it. In so far, then, as it appeals to nature, proceeds itself from nature as its principle, and produces by its representations of nature natural affections, it is not only not religious, but actually irreligious, tending to make us more enamoured of our natural life, and therefore more averse to the religious life.

This may strike hard at all profane art, and imply that it is not only not useful, but actually hurtful, to religion ; but if so, we cannot help it. It is not we who make all secular influences, as such, prejudicial to religion ; and we could not alter the fact, were we to contend to the contrary. Our life here has but one purpose, — to gain heaven. This is undeniable. We can, then, lawfully live only for heaven. We cannot live for this and for something else, too. This is not merely the *principal*, but it is the *only* end of our present existence. Is not this what we teach our children in the catechism ? "Ques. Who made you ? *Ans.* GOD. Ques. Why did he make you ? *Ans.* That I might know him, love him, and serve him in this world, and be happy with him for ever in the next." Here is the end, the only end, for which God made us. Words cannot alter it. The fact is so, and so it

will and must be. We may, if we choose, neglect this end, and live and labor for some other end ; but we have no right to do so, and cannot without acting contrary to the will of God, disobeying his commands, and falling under his displeasure, his wrath, and condemnation. But this end, we know, is gained, not by following nature, but by resisting and crucifying it, — resolutely, heroically, by divine grace, refusing to live its life, or to derive any pleasure from it. As our end is one and supernatural, and to be gained only by supernatural means, where is the need of what is profane, and what other than a hurtful purpose, as far as it goes, can it be expected to serve ? “ Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things ; *but one thing is necessary.* ” — St. Luke x. 41.

If heaven were the development of our natural life, or if it were to be gained by the natural cultivation of our natural powers, the case would be different. Then secular art and literature might not only not injure us, but even be serviceable to us ; we could then join with M. Audin in his glorification of the *Renaissance*, agree throughout with Digby in his *Ages of Faith*, and even find something to sympathize with in the sentimentalizing about Catholic art of Puseyites, and Anglican Ecclesiologists, who seem to suppose that they approach the faith in proportion as they restore to their ministers orthodox vestments, and provide them with a table fashioned after an altar. But no natural cultivation of our natural powers, scientific or æsthetic, advances us a single step towards heaven. To be able to admire Catholic architecture and music, or even to delight in our ascetic literature, is no necessary indication of Catholicity. The Unitarian does not make his meeting-house a church by inserting triplet windows, and surmounting it with a cross ; nor evince, by so doing, that he is approaching that “ faith without which it is impossible to please God.” The unlettered rustic, or the rude savage, is as near heaven as the erudite scholar, the profound philosopher, or the accomplished artist. Indeed, mere human culture, without grace, only removes one the farther from God, and increases his difficulty of fulfilling the great and only purpose of his existence here. “ Amen, I say unto you, unless you be converted, and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” — St. Matt. xviii. 3. “ For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will reject. Where is the wise ? Where is the scribe ?

Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For, seeing, that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe." — 1 Cor. i. 19 – 21. "And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not in the loftiness of speech or of wisdom, declaring to you the testimony of Christ; for I judged not myself to know any thing among you but Jesus Christ and him crucified. And I was with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling; and my speech, and my preaching, was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power; that your faith might not stand on the wisdom of man, but on the power of God. Howbeit, we speak wisdom among the perfect; yet not the wisdom of this world, neither of the princes of this world, who are destroyed." — *Ib.* ii. 1 – 6. They who are foremost in natural science, wisdom, and refinement are usually the last to discover and yield to true religion. They seek afar for what is nigh them, and where the good they seek is not to be found. The way of the Gospel is too simple and easy for them, and they scorn it. What they seek for, and rarely find, God reveals to the simple. "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones." — St. Matt. xi. 25. In giving us heaven, if we are so happy as to merit it, God does not reward what we are, become, or do by nature; he rewards in us simply his own supernatural gifts, — crowns his own grace: — "*Ergo coronat te, quia dona sua coronat, non merita tua.*"* Grace is all; nature, or its natural cultivation, which is a purely human work, is nothing. We live, therefore, for heaven, only as we live the life of grace; then there is no legitimate life for us but the life of grace; for to live for heaven is the only legitimate purpose of our existence here. All, then, not of grace is not only not to be sought, but is hostile to us, is a clog, a hindrance, to our spiritual progress. Have not the saints told us so? Is not this wherefore they turn their backs on nature, and trample on its pleasures? And has not the Church sanctioned both their words and their deeds by canonizing them, and proposing them to our love and veneration?

Doubtless, some will say, to evade the force of this, which is so clearly warranted by the lives of the saints, that all Chris-

* S. Aug. *Enarrat. in Psalm.* cii. n. 7.

tians are not saints, and that we cannot expect all to become so. This, unhappily, is too true ; but it is no reason why we should not labor to induce all to strive to attain to the full measure of heroic sanctity we love and venerate in the saints. The smaller the number aiming at Christian perfection, the smaller the number that will reach it ; and we who come short of it in our aims have but too much reason to fear that we shall come short of heaven in our attainments. All may attain to perfection, if they choose. Nothing hinders us but our love of the world, our attachment to creatures, our unwillingness to give up all we have and are for God, who gave up his own life for us. If we fall below the true standard of perfection, it is solely because we do not choose to reach it, — because we content ourselves with imperfection, and do not do as well as we might, and as the Church wishes and exhorts us to do. Our sole business here is, to strive after Christian perfection ; and we have, if we do not refuse it, the assistance of the infinite God to gain it. Never should Christians aim at less. Never should we, who write for the faithful, propose less. Nor should we, who are not in religion, suppose that imperfection is more commendable in us than in those who are ; perfection is for us as well as for them, and the law of its attainment is the same in both. Whether, therefore, we live in the world or out of it, we must be careful not to live the life of the world, — make it our constant study, grace assisting, to deny ourselves, to crucify nature, to despise alike its pains and its delectations, and to live, not only chiefly, but exclusively, the supernatural life of God. All that is not for this supernatural life is against it. “He that is not with me,” says our Lord, “is against me.” — St. Matt. xii. 30.

We have now an infallible rule for judging all artistic productions, to whatever species of art they belong, whether to architecture, music, painting, sculpture, poetry, or eloquence. All that is profane, or not religious, is hurtful in a greater or less degree ; and none is religious, save in so far as it embodies the supernatural life of religion, as the principle of the interest it excites or of the gratification it affords. With this rule before us, it is easy to determine the worth of *Pauline Seward*, now in hand. If it comes within the sphere of Christian art, we have no grave objections to urge ; if it remains, notwithstanding the purpose of the author, within the sphere of profane art, we must, if we value religion, renounce it. The author may be saved, so as by fire, but his works must be consumed. In

order to judge *Pauline Seward* properly, we must eliminate the argumentative and didactic portion, and consider only the æsthetic portion; because it is obvious, at a glance, that its interest does not arise from the logical discussion carried on, nor from the formal instruction on faith and theology conveyed. The author evidently does not rely on these for the interest of his work; for if he did, he would not have adopted the form of the novel. He has introduced the other matter, because he felt, that, if he had confined himself to these, and written merely a grave and formal argument for Catholicity, or against Protestantism, it would have wanted the interest necessary to make it generally read. These are not inserted to relieve the story, but the story is introduced to relieve these. The æsthetic portion is, therefore, unquestionably, that which is relied on as the principle of its interest, and the author's study has evidently been so to blend the æsthetic with the logical and didactic, that the reader shall not be able to secure the pleasure afforded by the one, without taking in the instruction afforded by the other.

As to the quality of the æsthetic interest and gratification of the work, there really can be but one opinion with those who take the trouble to analyze it. We are unable to find, in this respect, any essential difference between *Pauline Seward* and the common run of profane novels. Undoubtedly, it stops short of the extreme to which some of them go; but the difference is solely one of degree, not one of kind. We readily admit that we can find in Bulwer, James, Dickens, and others, many things offensive to faith and morals, which we do not find in Mr. Bryant; but we find nothing in his novel, so far as it is not grave and didactic, which we do not, in principle at least, find in them. Indeed, it must needs be so, from the very principle on which the writer consciously proceeds in its composition. He finds the public enamoured of novel-reading, that novels are the works in the greatest demand, and in which interest is most generally taken. He seeks to seize upon this very interest, and to turn it to a religious account. "If I write," we may imagine him to say to himself, "a purely religious work, which shall have only a religious interest, nobody will read it, and nobody will profit by it; I must, therefore, consult the public taste, and afford the public the sort of interest and gratification it demands; only I will seek to moderate the degree, and, at the same time, make my novel the vehicle of some useful, moral, and religious instruction." The

work is, by its very design, an attempt to yoke together nature and grace, to make them draw together in the same team. But "thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together." — Deut. xxii. 10. What is here forbidden is, in its mystical sense, precisely what the author has proposed to do. If he proposed to combine the interest of the ordinary novel with religious instruction, it was not possible for him to execute his design without making his novel, in so far as a novel, the same in kind with the profane novels of the day.

If we descend to details, we shall find that he has so made it. The scene is laid, and the characters are drawn, with obvious reference to the ordinary *novel* interest they may excite, and the natural gratification they may afford. If not, why is the scene laid in Mordant Hall, amid regal magnificence, and all the paraphernalia of wealth and fashion? Why so much attention bestowed on the rank and worldly position of the chief actors, — so much care taken to endow those we are to like with all the personal beauty and natural attractions, and to furnish them with all the worldly advantages and accomplishments, which the author's experience or imagination could suggest? Why, but because the author is aware that the great mass of his readers are fond of the world, hankering after wealth and fashion and worldly distinctions, and are gratified to be permitted to feast upon them, if only in imagination? Suppose the scene had been laid in some poor man's hut, and the characters introduced to have been only very ordinary characters, in whom the reader could find only a spiritual or religious pleasure, — would not the quality of the interest of the work have been wholly changed? The reader is deeply interested in Pauline, but how much of that interest is personal, and would be lost, if, without any change in her spiritual character, all else were changed? Suppose her deprived of her personal attractions, her marvellous beauty, her extraordinary understanding, and polite accomplishments, her exquisite taste and manners, and to be some poor, ill-bred, ill-favored, weather-beaten, hard-working rustic, knowing nothing of the great world, and familiar only with her ewes and lambs, poultry-yard or potato-patch, destitute of every particle of romance, ignorant as the child unborn of the fact that she has nerves, or that it is a lady-like quality to swoon or faint at every mishap or sudden emotion, too constantly employed in providing for the stern necessities of existence, to be poetic or sentimental, — suppose her this, and suppose the question of her

soul's salvation one day arises in her mind, and she undertakes to find out the true Church of God, and to comply with the demands of her Saviour, would not the interest excited by the story of her conversion, though not less to a right-minded person, be of an entirely different order from that which we now feel in the conversion of the marvellous daughter of the lordly Calvin Seward?

The episode of "Little Marie" has much sweetness and tenderness. No one will dispute that "Little Marie" is a sweet and interesting child, and none the less so for her striking family resemblance to Oliver Twist and Bulwer's Fanny, half-sister to Alice; but how much of the interest she excites is religious? how much purely natural? Give her the same spiritual character she now has, but let her be without her natural sprightliness and beauty, and let it really be understood from the first that she is some pauper's daughter, just run away from the workhouse, and how much of the interest we now take in her would remain? We know, as soon as she is introduced, that she is the child of distinguished parents, that she has had a beautiful and accomplished mother, that some terrible reverse has happened to her, that a mystery hangs over her, and perhaps connected with her is a story of dark and powerful crime. All this every novel-reader foresees, and is certain of the moment she seeks refuge from the October snow-storm in Philadelphia, on the steps of Mordant Hall. We detect nothing of purely religious interest in all this.

The conversion of Pauline is an affair in which the reader takes some interest, but it is rather the interest of curiosity, and of simple humanity, than of religion. We see the girl is troubled in her mind, and we are afflicted that any sorrow should corrode the heart of so sweet and beautiful a creature; she is engaged in solving an intellectual problem, and we wish her to succeed; we are aware, that, if she becomes a Catholic, as we know beforehand she will, it will affect her worldly position, and we are curious to see how she will behave herself, how she will bear the loss of her former friends and associates; but we are made to feel little or no interest in regard to the danger she is in of losing her soul while out of the Church, or the infinite blessing she will receive by being converted and persevering in the love of God to the end. Her conversion is so managed as to make the reader half feel that it is the Church who needs her, not she who needs the Church.

Eugene Neville's conversion interests us chiefly by its relation to the

tion to his union with Pauline ; and when both are happily converted, we feel much more impressed with the fact that two lovers may now marry and enter into domestic bliss, than that two souls are snatched from perdition. The story of Charles Neville, full of dark interest, is, as to its substance, virtually what one may read in almost any novel or magazine he takes up at random. It is the story of an ill-assorted marriage ; cruelty, crime, abandonment, on the part of the husband, — patience, suffering, destitution, and death of the angel wife, leaving a poor orphan child to be sent to the almshouse.

The author dwells too much on the worldly sacrifices which one makes for religion. His heroine says she does not count them, but we see that she does. He appears to think it a great thing that she found courage to stammer out an avowal of her faith in presence of her lover, who detested it. We have heard of Christians, — men, women, and even children, — who avowed their faith, without stammering too, when they knew by avowing it they would be immediately put to the most excruciating tortures and death. What is it to lose wealth, social position, father, and lover, even to beg, to starve, and to die in the street for religion ? Does not one thus gain God for father, Jesus Christ for lover, and heaven for an everlasting home ? If we are Christians, why do we keep up such a mighty pother about the petty vexations and inconveniences we may be called for a moment to endure here ? The terrible struggle through which the author carries Pauline may be very natural, but why make so much of it ? Why not fix the attention on the grace which sustains, and the heaven which rewards, rather than on the pains that rebellious nature may suffer in being reduced to subjection, or, more properly, in having its head crushed ? Why not leave morbid anatomy to the physicians and surgeons ?

Poor Pauline's father is terribly angry when he finds she has become a Catholic, and disowns her as his daughter. No doubt of it ; what better could be expected of the Presbyterian worldling, who cared for nothing but his social position and importance, and the worldly rank and influence of his daughter ? But why represent Pauline as ready to fall on her knees and ask his forgiveness ? What in the world had the poor girl done that needed his forgiveness ? Was it becoming a Catholic, professing her faith openly, or being unwilling to wed a man who despised the Church of God ? We see nothing for which she needed to ask pardon, except for having

even debated the question whether she should or should not consent to marry Eugene, and intimating that she might, if he would engage to respect her religion. For this she did need to ask pardon, not of her father, but of God. Every Catholic, man or woman, should regard marrying out of the Church as a thing not even to be thought of. Does the good Catholic ever debate a moment whether he will or will not do what the Church abhors?

The author has interwoven with the story of Pauline's conversion several love-stories, from which a considerable portion of the interest of his book arises. In these, it is due to him to say, that he has kept within the limits of conventional morality, and would not deserve any special censure for them, if profane love could ever be a proper subject for a popular work. He has observed a certain moderation, we own, in treating this dangerous topic, but the love of which he treats is in kind precisely that which makes up the common staple of profane novels, — the same that one finds in Bulwer, James, Dickens, or any popular novelist of the day, — and it is idle to object to the extent to which others may push a principle which we hold in common with them. The evil is not simply in more or less, but it is in introducing profane love at all, as a source of interest, in a work intended for general reading. No Catholic father is delighted to see his sons or his daughters reading stories of love and marriage; the ideas and fancies such stories rarely fail to suggest are sure to come soon enough without the aid of books. We do not recollect a story of profane love, after the fashion of modern novels, written by one of the saints, nor a spiritual writer who recommends the reading of such stories as aids to devotion, or as helps against temptations. "It is necessary," says St. Liguori, whose authority we must think is not inferior to that of the author of *Pauline Seward*, "to abstain from reading bad books, and not only from those which are positively obscene, but also *from those which treat of profane love*, such as certain poems, *Ariosto Pastor Fido*, and all such works. O fathers! be careful not to allow your children to read romances. These sometimes do more harm than even obscene books; they infuse into young persons certain malignant affections which destroy devotion, and afterwards impel them to give themselves up to sin. 'Vain reading,' says St. Bonaventura, 'begets vain thoughts and extinguishes devotion.' Make your children read spiritual books, ecclesiastical histories, and the

lives of the saints. And, I repeat it, do not allow your daughters to be taught letters by a man, though he be a St. Paul, or a St. Francis of Assisium. The saints are in heaven." *

What a saint forbids fathers to allow their children to read, and what, if read, tends to extinguish devotion, no Catholic should ever permit himself to write. There are subjects which, if treated at all, must be treated only professionally and for the professional. The very fact, that love is a subject that awakes so general an interest in the great majority of readers, and is so easily made available by an author to carry off a very dull book, is itself a sufficient reason why it should never be made in any degree the subject of popular literature. It is strange that any person, instructed at all in religion, and not altogether ignorant of human nature, should for a moment think to the contrary ; and how our pious authors can reconcile it to their consciences to send out works which cannot fail to deepen the malignancy of religion's most unmanageable and deadliest foe is what we are not able to understand. No matter how small the flame, how skilfully or delicately we apply it to a heap of tow, the tow will be fired and consumed. As a father, as an humble Catholic, we entreat our authors to choose some other subject than that of profane love on which to write.

These remarks are sufficient to justify our former unfavorable judgment of *Pauline Seward* as a Catholic novel. But even the graver portions of the work are not free from faults of a very serious character. The author, in his second volume, chapter xix., expressly, or by necessary implication, maintains that the Church has received no promise of impeccability, — that, acting as the Church, she can do wrong, has done wrong, and extensively adopted measures which involve a false and even an abominable principle in morals ; and he defends her by appealing from what she once was to what she now is, and offers the circumstances and intelligence of the age, especially in this favored country, as a guaranty against her future misbehaviour. We can conceive nothing more anti-Catholic than this. It involves a denial of the infallibility of the Church as a teacher of morals ; it denies her sanctity, asserts her reformability, and finally raises the age and country, in point of morals, above her, and makes them, instead of her,

* *Instructions on the Commandments and Sacraments.* Boston : Thomas Sweeney. 1847. pp. 152, 153.

our reliance for the maintenance of justice. If this does not surrender the whole argument, and make it both impious and absurd to attempt to defend her as the Church of God, we know not the meaning of our mother tongue.

We are far from supposing the author was aware that he was saying all this ; we freely acquit the young gentleman of all anti-Catholic intentions ; but this, though every thing for him, is nothing for his book. In judging him, we must judge him according to his intentions ; but in judging his book, we must judge it according to the obvious and natural sense of its language. It is true, his language is loose, and, in some cases, we may charitably suppose the author does not mean all that he says ; but, though we understand very well the meaning and duty of charity when judging of persons, we do not understand them in relation to books. A newspaper editor or a reviewer, obliged to publish at stated periods, often compelled to write in haste, and to publish his article before giving it its last finish, may rightfully demand a charitable construction of his language, and that the reader give it an orthodox meaning whenever it is by any means possible, without absolute violence, to do so. But authors can claim no such charitable construction. Every man who can take his own time to publish, who is under no obligation to hasten his publication, must submit to the law of rigid justice, and has no right to feel aggrieved, if, under that law, his works are condemned. Who compelled him to send out his work in a crude and unfinished state ?

We do not expect every man who writes to be perfectly master of the whole field of Catholic theology ; but we do ask of every author, whatever the subject of his book, to study to know enough of it not to run athwart sound doctrine. There is scarcely a popular book or pamphlet that reaches us, which does not contain propositions heretical, smacking of heresy, erroneous, rash, or offensive to pious ears. Men and women, with a little knowledge, and much zeal, full of notions caught up from the age and country, sit down and dash off a novel, a pamphlet, or an oration, and send it out as Catholic, when the best we can say of it is, that it is "neither fish, flesh, nor fowl, nor yet good red herring." But we will not dwell on the evil of such works. No one has a natural right to attempt to edify the faithful from the press, any more than he has from the pulpit. We have no right to publish on religion without permission ; and if the Church, through her

proper officers, grants us the permission, and allows us the great honor of laboring, in however humble a capacity, in her sacred cause, both duty and gratitude should lead us to do our best, and, above all, to abstain from saying aught displeasing to her, or embarrassing to any of her real friends. If we do not know Catholic faith and theology well enough not to compromise either, our business is to hold our peace, — the Church will not suffer from our silence, — nor shall we endanger our salvation by not speaking.

Mr. Bryant is not worse than many others ; he is far better than some. It was never our intention to single him out from his class, as especially deserving of censure. We, in the main, think very well of him. He has fair talents, respectable learning, honest intentions, and a commendable zeal. But, as with ourselves, he did not tarry long enough at Jericho. His errors seem to us to arise from his having forgot, when he was about to put on Catholicity, to put off Protestantism ; and in his consulting the effect his work might have in enlisting the attention of here and there a Protestant, rather than its probable influence on our own Catholic youth, who, after all, will be its principal readers. The conversion of a Protestant is a great thing, but is gained too dearly if at the expense of a dozen Catholics. We may be wrong, but we adopt as our rule, to consider first of all the effect our writings will have on the faithful themselves, and, after that, the effect they may have on others. We all know that the work of converting those without is not, in this country, perhaps not in any country, the only spiritual work of mercy there is for Catholics to do. The conversion of a bad Catholic is as great a work, and one which causes as much joy in heaven, as the conversion of an infidel or a heretic ; and the preservation of our Catholic youth is as important as the gathering in of those without. As yet, we know, or may know, that, numerous as are the conversions from without, they at least no more than compensate for our losses. We are, then, it seems to us, to estimate works principally by their influence in making our youth abhor heresy and unbelief, love and practise their religion, and look with horror on the bare thought of forsaking it.

The principles we have laid down, and the remarks we have made on *Pauline Seward*, sufficiently indicate what a Catholic should think of *novel-writing* and also of *novel-reading*. If no dangerous topic is made the subject of its interest, if it be the expression of the religious life of the author, if it make

the supernatural its principle and end, the work, though in the form of a novel or fictitious narrative, may be written and read without detriment, nay, with profit, to religion, and that, too, even when its subject is not expressly a sacred subject, and nothing is said directly of or for faith or piety. But all other novels, even though professedly religious, we must regard as dangerous; and the fewer we have of them, and the less they are read, the better. Instruction on other topics than religion proper, they who live in the world undoubtedly need, and should have; but a profane art is not needed, and we see not how one who is Catholic to the core can aid in its production.

ART. IV. — *Organization of Labor and Association.* By MATH. BRIANCOURT. Translated by FRANCIS GEO. SHAW. New York: Wm. H. Graham. 1847. 16mo. pp. 103.

UNLESS the estimable and accomplished translator has greatly improved upon his author, M. Briancourt is one of the most agreeable writers attached to the school of Association with whom we are acquainted. He appears to be sincere, earnest, gentle, and philanthropic; and he writes with ability, ease, vivacity, and grace. His pages have, comparatively, little of that barbarous terminology which renders the writers of the Associationists, in general, so forbidding to all but adepts. If we had the least conceivable sympathy with his doctrines and schemes, we could read him with pleasure, and, at times, with admiration; and we cannot but regard his little work as the best summary of the plans and hopes of his school which has as yet appeared.

But the more able, skillful, and fascinating is the writer, the more dangerous and carefully to be eschewed are his writings, if devoted to the propagation of false and mischievous theories. Error, though reason be free to combat it, is never harmless, any more than poison, because its antidote may be known and at hand. It may, upon the whole, be more prudent to allow it free course, than, by attempting its suppression by force, to run the risk of also suppressing the truth; but however that may or may not be, the publication of error is

always an evil which no freedom of its contradictory truth can ever wholly prevent or overcome. No man ever puts forth a system of unmingled falsehood ; and the currency his error gains is always by virtue of the truth he mixes with it, and which he misinterprets and misapplies. To unravel his web of sophistry, to pick out his tangled yarn, or separate what is true from what is false, is a task of no small difficulty, and requires a patience of investigation, habits of nice discrimination and of close and rigid reasoning, which can be expected only from the gifted and thoroughly disciplined few, and rarely even from these. An error may be stated in a few words, in a popular form, and clothed with a brilliant and captivating dress, which, nevertheless, is not to be refuted, nor its truth, which gives it currency, separated from the falsehood which renders it mischievous, without long, elaborate, and abstruse reasoning, subtle distinctions, and exact definitions, beyond the capacity of the generality, usually held by them in detestation, and of which they are always impatient. But even if the refutation could be presented in a popular form, the majority of those who have embraced the error would not profit by it. Having adopted the error and committed themselves to it, they are unwilling to listen to any thing which may be urged against it, lest perchance it may disturb the tranquillity of their conviction, mortify their pride, or affect unfavorably their reputation. Hence it is that nothing is more difficult than to recall or repress an error once fairly in circulation. Hence it is that we can never allow ourselves to commend a work, however kindly disposed we may be towards its author, which, in our judgment, or according to the rule of judgment we are bound to follow, teaches a false doctrine or proposes a visionary scheme. The reading of such works, when not absolutely hurtful, is unprofitable, and no man can justify it, unless it be to refute them, and guard the public against their dangerous tendencies. The Associationists, then, must not be surprised, if we notice Mr. Briancourt's work only to censure it.

That Mr. Briancourt's doctrine is unsound, no argument is needed to prove. No man, who proposes a doctrine which reverses all that has hitherto been regarded as settled, is ever entitled even to a hearing. He who, on his own authority, gives the lie to all men, of all ages and nations, gives to every man the best of all possible human reasons for giving the lie to him. If reason is to be trusted, the reason of all ages and nations overrides his ; if it is not to be trusted, he has no authority for

what he proposes. He places himself in an awkward position, who, asserting the authority of reason, yet opposes his own reason to the reason of all men. He must be a bold man, a man of unbounded self-confidence, the very sublime of egotists, who dares pretend, that, on his reason alone, the whole world may be rationally convicted of having blundered. They have all the attributes he can claim ; why, then, assume that they have all blundered, and that he alone has hit upon the truth ? Truth is revealed to the humble and childlike, not to the proud and arrogant ; and who is prouder or more arrogant than he who claims to be superior to all men, to be the only man of his race who has perceived what is true and good ?

Discoveries, like the one Fourier professes to have made, are not in the order of human experience. There is nothing to be found in the experience of the race analogous to them. Discoveries, which reverse what the race had hitherto regarded as the settled order, have never yet, so far as history goes, been made in any department of life, — in religion, in morals, in politics, or in social and industrial arrangements. Every man, who has come forward with any such pretended discovery, has failed to gain a verdict in his favor, and in the judgment of mankind has been finally condemned either as deceiving or as deceived, or both at once. M. Charles Fourier, a man, if you will, of an extraordinary intellect, and of philanthropic aims, — although, we confess, we find in his writings only wild extravagance, and a pride, an egotism, which amount very nearly, if not quite, to insanity, — professes, not, indeed, to have *invented*, but to have *discovered*, the law of a new social and industrial world. This law he professes to have drawn out and scientifically established in all its ramifications ; and he and his followers propose to reorganize society and industry according to its provisions. Similar pretensions have often been made, now in one department of life, now in another ; but has one of them ever succeeded ? Is there one of them that has not been finally adjudged, at best, to be only visionary ? Is there on record a single instance of a fundamental reorganization of society, industry, or even of government, that has ever been effected ? Have not all who have labored for such reorganization been opposed by their age and nation ? And can the Associationists name an instance in which posterity has reversed the judgment of contemporaries ? They cannot do it. We are aware of the instances they will cite ; but not one of

them is to the purpose. Why, then, suppose the whole order of human experience is reversed, or departed from, in the case of M. Charles Fourier? The fact is, *fundamental* changes in the religious, moral, social, political, or industrial order of mankind — changes which throw off the old order, and establish a new *order* in their place — never have been, and, it requires no great depth of philosophy to be able to say, never can be, effected, unless by the intervention of a supernatural cause. When attempted, they may go so far as to break up the old order, never so far as to introduce and establish a new order. Man can be a destroyer; he can never be a CREATOR.

But these considerations, however conclusive in themselves, will not, we are aware, have much weight with the Associationists. The Associationists are accustomed to other principles of reasoning; they have, underlying their speculations, a philosophy of man and society which creates in their minds a presumption in favor of Fourierism. With them, it is an argument in favor of a proposition, that it is novel; and an argument against it, that it is ancient. Nothing seems to them more reasonable beforehand, or more in accordance with what the order of human experience authorizes them to expect, than that such a discovery as Fourier's should be made, and that the changes he proposes should be practicable. It is useless, so far as they are concerned, to controvert them on this point, — and if we would reach them, with the hope of doing them any good, we must enter with them into an examination of their doctrine or scheme, upon its merits. This we willingly attempt; for several of the more distinguished Associationists in this country have been our intimate personal friends, and we regard them as sincere, and as honestly desirous of doing all in their power for the benefit of their fellow-men. We believe they are men who have a certain loyalty, and who have no bigoted attachment to this or that method of serving mankind; but are willing to change the method they now insist upon for another, the moment they see a good reason for doing so. We do not believe them unwilling to look upon the question as still an open question, or that they have much of that foolish pride which binds persons to a cause simply for the reason that they stand committed to it before the public. We propose, therefore, in what follows, to enter somewhat into the merits of their doctrine and schemes; and, as what we shall say is said in good faith, we trust they will receive it in good faith, and frankly accept it, or show us good reasons for rejecting it.

We begin by asking, What is the end the Associationists propose, or what is it they seek to effect? The means we understand very well; they are, the organization of labor and association, according to a given plan. But before we can decide on the means, we must understand the end proposed, so as to be able to determine whether the end is desirable, a good end. After that, we may proceed to determine whether the means are adequate, whether, by adopting them, we can, in all reasonable probability, secure the end. Unless we know what is the end proposed, and know whether it be good or not good, we walk by conjecture, not by science. But the Associationists propose their doctrine, not as a theory, or as a system of belief, but as a *science*. They must, then, in the outset, show us clearly the end proposed, and establish, not conjecturally, not hypothetically, but *scientifically*, that the end is good, and, therefore, one which it is lawful to seek.

1. What, then, is the specific end they propose? We do not find in their writings as clear, distinct, and specific an answer to this question as is desirable. They answer generally, not specifically. Their answer, as we collect it, is, — “The end we propose is, to remove the obstacles which now hinder the fulfilment, and to gather round man the circumstances which will enable him to fulfil, his destiny on this globe; or, in a word, to enable man to fulfil the purpose of his present existence.” Thus stated, we of course have no objection to the end proposed. The good of a being is its destiny, or the end for which it exists; and to seek to enable a being to fulfil its destiny, or gain that end, is to seek its good. So the end for which man exists in this world is his good in relation to his existence here; and to labor to enable him to gain that end is to labor for his good, and his only good here. Thus far, we have, and can have, no quarrel with the Associationists.

But a general answer to a specific question is no answer at all; for the general has formal existence only in the special. We must, therefore, ask again, What is the *specific* end proposed? To answer, To remove evil, and to secure good, is not enough; for the question remains, What *is* evil? what *is* good? Evil, you say, is that which prevents, or in some way hinders, or retards, the fulfilment of one's destiny. Very true; but what is it that does that? This is the question we want answered. We find in the writings of the Associationists graphic descriptions of the actual state of society, — what they call *civilization*, — and brilliant pictures of the life men

will live in *Harmony*, or the new world they propose ; and it is from these we must collect what, in their view, is evil, or opposed to man's destiny on this globe, and what they suppose is good, that is, the fulfilment, or favorable to its fulfilment. In regard to the latter, we find the chief place assigned to wealth and luxury, two things which Fourier asserts positively, again and again, are absolutely indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny ; in regard to the former, we find enumerated, among the evils of civilization, the *poverty* of the great mass of the people, and *unattractive* labor. It is fair, then, to say, that poverty and unattractive labor are *evils*, in the judgment of the Associationists. Labor itself they cannot regard as evil, because they propose to continue it in their new world. The evil, then, is in its unattractiveness, — that is, in our being bound or forced to labor against our inclinations, or to do that to which we are more or less averse. But this can be evil only on condition that it is an evil to be under the necessity of acting against our inclinations. If this be accepted, good is in being free to follow our inclinations ; evil in being compelled or bound to act against them. On what authority does this principle rest ?

Moreover, is it certain that poverty, in itself considered, is evil, or opposed to our destiny ? Where is the proof ? Wealth and poverty are both relative terms, unless the term poverty be restricted to those who have not even so much as their will which is their own, and then we should be obliged to predicate wealth of all who possess something, however little. But the Associationists do not so restrict the sense of the word, for they include in the number of the poor people who have something of their own, at least their will and bodily activity. What, then, is the real distinction between wealth and poverty ? Where draw the line, so that the rich shall all be on one side, and all the poor on the other ? John Jacob Astor is said, when told of a man who had just retired from business with half a million, to have remarked, that he had no doubt but the poor man might be just as happy as if he were rich ! To John Jacob Astor, the man worth half a million was a poor man ; to most men, he would be a rich man. One man counts himself poor, in the possession of thousands ; another feels himself rich, if he have a coarse serge robe, a crust of bread, and water from the spring. Which of the two is the rich, which the poor man ? If the Italian *lazzaroni*, the scandal of thrifty Englishmen and Yankees, have

what contents them, or are contented with what suffices for the present moment, unsolicitous for the next, wherein are they poorer than our "merchant princes," who have a multitude of wants they cannot satisfy? and wherein would you enrich them, by increasing their possessions, if you increased their wants in the same ratio?

But pass over this difficulty. Suppose you have some invariable standard by which to determine who are the poor and who are the rich; whence does it follow that poverty is in itself an evil? Many emperors, kings, princes, nobles, and innumerable saints, have voluntarily abandoned wealth, and chosen poverty, even made a solemn vow never to have any thing to call their own. Is it certain that these have acted a foolish part, abandoned good, and inflicted evil on themselves? If not, how can you say poverty is in itself an evil? Do you say, poverty breeds discontent, and leads to vice and crime? Is that true? Does it do so in all men who are poor? Did it do so in St. Anthony, St. Francis of Assisium, St. John of God, St. Thomas of Villanova, St. Philip Neri, and thousands of others we could mention, who observed evangelical poverty to the letter? Are all the poor discontented, vicious, and criminal? No man dares say it. Then what you allege is not a necessary result of poverty, and must have its efficient cause elsewhere, in the person, or in some circumstance not dependent on wealth or poverty. In the world's history, poverty, vice, and misery are far from being inseparable companions; and so are wealth, virtue, and happiness. Was wealth a good to the rich man mentioned in the Gospel? Was poverty an evil to the poor man that lay at his gate full of sores, begging to be fed with the crumbs that fell from his table?

We might go through the whole list of physical evils drawn up by the Associationists, and ask, in relation to each, so far as it is physical, the same or similar questions. Whence, then, the certainty that what they propose to remove, as evil, is evil? Whence, then, the proof that the end they propose is a good end? Suppose — and the case is supposable — that what are called physical evils are dispensed by a merciful Providence, designed to be invaluable blessings, and are such to all who receive and bear them with the proper dispositions; could we then pronounce them evils? Would it not follow, that in themselves they may be indifferent, and that the good or the evil results from the disposition with which they are received

and borne ? Now this may be the fact. If it is, then the good or the evil depends on ourselves, and we may make them either blessings or curses, as we choose. Then to remove evil would not necessarily be to remove them, but to cure that moral state which makes a bad, instead of a good, use of them.

It is easy to declaim, but it is important that we declaim wisely ; and to be able to declaim wisely, we must know what to declaim against. It is easy to harrow up the feelings by eloquent descriptions of physical sufferings, and no doubt physical sufferings are often an evil of no small magnitude ; but this is nothing to the purpose. Is the evil in the physical suffering itself, or in the moral state of him who causes or suffers it ? Suppose we transport ourselves to the early ages of our era, and take our stand in proud, haughty, imperial, and pagan Rome ; suppose we assist at the trial, tortures, and martyrdom of the persecuted Christians, behold them cast to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre, see them broiling slowly on gridirons, their flesh torn off with pincers, or their living bodies stuck full of splinters besmeared with pitch, lighted, and ranged along the streets of the city by night, as so many lamps. Here is physical pain. Ingenuity, aided by diabolical malice, has done its best to refine upon torture, to produce the greatest amount possible of physical suffering. Yet what is it that excites our horror ? This pain beyond conception of the Christian martyrs ? Not at all. We glory in it ; we bless God for it ; and so do the sufferers themselves. They *choose* it, voluntarily submit to it, and joy in the midst of it, and would not have it less for all the world. There is no joy on earth so sweet, so great, so ecstatic, as that of the martyr. The horror we feel is not at the physical suffering, but at the malice which inflicts it, — not at the fact that the martyrs are enabled heroically to win their crowns, but at the refined cruelty which delights to torture them. It is very possible, then, to conceive the most exquisite physical sufferings, the most excruciating tortures, and the most cruel death, as even a great and invaluable good to those who suffer them. Their presence, then, is not necessarily an evil to the sufferer, and consequently exemption from them not necessarily a good. For the same reason, it does not necessarily follow that the wealth, and luxury, and other things you propose, are necessarily in themselves at all desirable. You must go farther ; and before attempting to decide what is good or what is evil, tell us **WHAT IS THE DESTINY OF MAN** ; for it is only in re-

lation to his destiny, that we can pronounce this or that good or evil. "Am I not a happy man?" said Cræsus to Solon, after showing him his treasures. "Whether a man is happy or not," replied the Athenian sage, "is not to be known before his death."

What, then, according to the Associationists, is the destiny of man, his *final* cause, or the end for which he exists? They have much to say of man's destiny; but we do not find, in those of their writings which we have consulted, any very satisfactory or even intelligible answer to this question. We are told, at one time, that man's destiny is, to live in harmony,—that is, in association as they propose to organize it. But this is no answer; for it only asserts, in other words, that man is able or fitted by nature to adopt the means of fulfilling his destiny. Besides, it defines the destiny of the race rather than the destiny of the individuals, without which the race is only an abstraction. At other times, we are told that man's destiny is, to harmonize the globe which he inhabits with itself, to harmonize it with the sidereal heavens, and the sidereal heavens with the universe, so that all discord shall cease, and there shall be universal harmony; that is, man's destiny is, to complete the works of the Creator, and give them their last finish. The final cause of man is, then, to assist the Creator in completing the work of creation, that is, that he may constitute a portion of the First Cause! This, however, we understand to be only a fanciful speculation, for which the school, as it exists in this country, does not hold itself responsible.

The more modest of the members leave these lofty speculations by the way, and tell us that their object, and their sole object is, by the organization of labor and association, to enable man to fulfil his destiny on earth. But what is this destiny? We can find no specific answer. But they lay down, as their grand principle, **ATTRACTIONS PROPORTIONAL TO DESTINY**. According to them, we may, therefore, conclude man's destiny in this world is that towards which he is attracted by his nature, or which is indicated by his natural inclinations and tendencies. If we understand them, they undertake to give the law of attaining our destiny, rather than any clear statement of what is that destiny itself. But as the attractions are natural, and as they are the index to the end, and the law of its attainment, the end must itself be natural. If, then, we assert that they hold, that, when man has developed and satisfied in harmony his primitive or fundamental passions,

or *stimulants*, as M. Briancourt calls them, he has fulfilled his destiny in this world, we may presume that they will readily admit our assertion to be correct. Then the destiny of man in this world is, the harmonious or orderly development and satisfaction of his whole nature. We will strike out from this "the development of his nature," because development can never be an end, since, by its nature, it is necessarily only the means or process of gaining the end. Then the answer will be, simply, Man's destiny on earth is, to satisfy his nature ; that is, to obtain and possess, in all their variety and fulness, the natural objects indicated by his nature, and towards which he is naturally stimulated. This is nothing but our old acquaintance, the Epicurean philosophy, decked out in the latest Parisian mode. We can now *east* ourselves, and take a fresh departure.

But, to be just to the Associationists, we must observe, that they understand by *nature*, not merely our sensual inclinations and tendencies, but also our intellectual, social, domestic, and æsthetic passions or tendencies. Moreover, they do not teach, that, in gaining the end to which we are attracted, we are to follow blindly our natural inclinations and tendencies, or that we are necessitated by them. They are the index and the law, and we have reason and free will, as instruments by which to follow the law and secure the end. Nor do they teach that it will do to follow without restraint all our inclinations and tendencies *as they are actually developed under civilization* ; for they are now developed disproportionately, in violation of harmony, and it may require several generations in association before it will do to give them all their full liberty ; nevertheless, the end is in the natural order, and is the orderly satisfaction of nature by natural objects.

But on what authority rests this assumption, that our destiny as human beings in this world is the natural satisfaction of our nature ? We do not find this proved in any of the writings of the Associationists which have fallen under our notice. M. Briancourt asserts it, in asserting the central principle of the school, — "Attractions proportional to destiny" ; and he no doubt supposes that he proves it, in proving this principle, the grand discovery of Fourier ; but we do not find that this principle itself is proved, at least, in the case of human beings, the only order of beings concerned in the inquiry. The school may have proved it of minerals, vegetables, and the different orders of the animal kingdom ; but that is nothing to

their purpose ; for we cannot conclude the attributes and destiny of one genus from those of another. Because this or that is true of a pig, for instance, we cannot say, it is *therefore* true of man ; nor that the fact that it is true of the pig affords even a presumption that it is true of man ; for man is essentially different from the pig. To say, because it is true of other genera, that attractions are proportional to destiny, it must be true of human beings, is either a plain *non-sequitur*, or the denial that there is any essential difference between man and them. If there is no essential difference between man and a mineral, a vegetable, a pig, we concede your conclusion ; if there is, we deny it. But the former we are loath to admit ; and although our modern philosophers have done their best towards making it at least practically true, we must as yet hold on to the old doctrine that man is generically distinguished from all other orders of creatures, although he may have many attributes in common with them all.

If, as we presume it will be conceded, man is essentially distinguishable from the animal world, if he forms a genus of his own, nothing can be concluded of him, in so far as he is peculiarly man, from any other order ; consequently, whatever is affirmed of him must be specifically proved of him. It may be, that all other orders of creatures on this globe have a natural destiny, and yet the Creator have appointed him to a supernatural destiny. It may be, as the Church teaches, and the Christian believes, that the end for which God designed and made him is not that to which he is directed and drawn by his nature, even in its purity and integrity, but an end to which, since the fall, his nature is even averse, and which can be gained only by denying and crucifying his natural inclinations and tendencies. This may be, — that is, it is conceivable ; and if true, it will not do to say, *a priori*, of man, that attractions are proportional to destiny, or that they at all indicate either it or the law of its attainment. Now it is possible that this constitutes, in part, the essential difference between man and animals. If so, the whole doctrine of the Associationists falls to the ground.

The Associationists must not misapprehend the question we raise. We are travelling no more than they out of life in this world. We understand them to confine their view to man's destiny here on this globe ; we are not, at this moment, extending ours beyond it. We agree perfectly with them, in what we presume to be their principle, namely, that there is no contradiction

to the means proposed to enable us to fulfil it. The school adopts, as we have seen, as its fundamental principle, "Attractions proportional to destiny." Hence, by ascertaining and providing for the attractions, they determine and provide for the destiny. On this principle rests their whole fabric of Association. If this be true, their Association may or may not be adequate; but if not true, the whole scheme is evidently altogether inadequate, because natural attractions can be proportional only to a natural end, never to a supernatural end. This is conclusive against the scheme, till its advocates are able, by a supernatural authority, to prove that our destiny in this world is a natural destiny; for it requires no argument to prove that Association, organized with express reference to a *natural* destiny, must be unavailing — if nothing worse — for a *supernatural* destiny.

But even if the end of man in this world were the satisfaction of his nature, the means proposed would be inadequate. The assumption of the Associationists is, that our nature can be satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which it directs and draws us. But this is not true, as we have shown in a foregoing article in the present number of our Review, pp. 13–15. The arguments on which the Associationists rely to prove the contrary are inconclusive, because they are all arguments from one genus to another. When the premises and conclusion are not in the same genus, nothing is concluded. It may be true, as M. Briancourt proves, that, if a pig gets what his nature seeks, he will be satisfied, stop squealing, and lie down and sleep, till renewed appetite awakes him; and the same would, no doubt, be true of man, if man were a pig, and might become true of him, if he, by some Circean art, could be transformed into a pig. But it so happens that man is not a pig, and cannot, if he is to retain his essential nature as man, be changed into one. We cannot predicate indifferently of the two. Man is never satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which he is naturally drawn. All experience proves it; the experience of each particular man proves it; else wherefore this deep wail from the heart of every one who lives simply the life of nature, this outbreak of despair, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas*? Build man the most splendid palace; lavish on it all the decorations of the most perfect art; furnish it with the most exquisite and most expensive taste; lodge him in it on the soft, voluptuous couch; spread his table with the most delicate viands and the rarest

they do not, and cannot, even pretend to have infallible authority.

The Associationists tell us that they have proved their doctrine by analysis of human nature, and that therefore it is science. But proved what? Conceding them all they can pretend to have proved by analysis, it is only that the primitive passions or stimulants they assert are psychologically true, — from which, at best, they can conclude only what *would be* man's destiny, in case his destiny were natural; but that it is natural, the precise point to be proved, they have not proved, for it can never be concluded from nature. Nature can guide us only on the assumption that the end is natural. When the question comes up, Is the purpose of our existence natural, or supernatural? nature has nothing to say one way or the other. This is a question which science can never answer; for science can never travel out of nature. It is idle, then, for the Associationists to tell us their doctrine is scientifically established. Whether the end for which Almighty God placed us here is natural or supernatural it is impossible to know without a supernatural revelation, and to a supernatural revelation, declaring our destiny here to be natural, the Associationists do not pretend.

These remarks show clearly enough that the Associationists are unable to answer the first question in order, namely, What is man's destiny on this globe? Then they are unable to legitimate the end they propose; then unable to say, that what they call good is good, or what they call evil is evil; and then, finally, whether, even by complete success, they would or would not benefit their fellow-men. This deserves their serious consideration. If, as we have said, what the Church teaches and the Christian believes is true, they are certainly wrong as to man's destiny here, as well as hereafter. It will not do for them to reply, that they do not believe the Church, and that her authority is not sufficiently proved to them; because they must be able to assert their system as a science, or they have no right to assert it at all. They must, then, disprove the teaching of the Church. So long as there is a possibility that the teaching of the Church may turn out to be true, they cannot assert their own doctrine; for, in the nature of the case, they can conclude its truth only from the destruction of the negative.

2. This uncertainty as to man's destiny here, which the Associationists do not and cannot remove, attaches, of course,

to the means proposed to enable us to fulfil it. The school adopts, as we have seen, as its fundamental principle, "Attractions proportional to destiny." Hence, by ascertaining and providing for the attractions, they determine and provide for the destiny. On this principle rests their whole fabric of Association. If this be true, their Association may or may not be adequate ; but if not true, the whole scheme is evidently altogether inadequate, because natural attractions can be proportional only to a natural end, never to a supernatural end. This is conclusive against the scheme, till its advocates are able, by a supernatural authority, to prove that our destiny in this world is a natural destiny ; for it requires no argument to prove that Association, organized with express reference to a natural destiny, must be unavailing — if nothing worse — for a supernatural destiny.

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fruits ; refresh him with the most costly wines ; regale him with the richest music ; rain down upon him the most fragrant odors ; ravish him with beauty ; gratify every sense, every taste, every wish, as soon as formed ; and the poor wretch will sigh for he knows not what, and behold with envy even the ragged beggar feeding on offal. No variety, no change, no art, can satisfy him. All that nature or art can offer palls upon his senses and his heart, — is to him poor, mean, and despicable. There arise in him wants which are too vast for nature, which swell out beyond the bounds of the universe, and cannot, and will not, be satisfied with any thing less than the infinite and eternal God. Never yet did nature suffice for man, and it never will.

This great and solemn fact, which it is vain to attempt to deny, — a fact deep graven on all hearts that have experience, that have lived the natural life, — should lead thoughtful men to ask, — nay, it does lead thoughtful men to ask, — if, after all, it be not a mistake to attempt to satisfy ourselves with the vain and perishing things of this world ; if the inability to find our satisfaction in nature be not a strong presumption that our Creator did not design us for a natural destiny ; if, in fact, he did not intend us for an end above nature ; and therefore, that our precise error is in seeking a natural destiny in opposition to his design, in neglecting our true destiny for a false destiny, that is, neglecting true good and pursuing real evil. We should suppose that this universal experience of all men would have created, at least, a doubt, in the minds of our friends, as to the soundness of their assumption of the natural as the true destiny of man on this globe.

The Associationists, doubtless, will reply, that they do not mean to deny the supernatural destiny ; that they leave to man all the satisfactions of religion ; that there is no incompatibility between the supernatural life of the Christian and the natural life of *harmony*. But in this they are mistaken. The principle, the means, and the end of their life are natural ; but the principle, the means, and the end of the other are supernatural, and no man can possibly live both lives at once. This is what our Lord meant, when he said, “ You cannot serve God and mammon. No man can serve two masters.” When you propose nature as the end, and organize Association expressly in reference to it, you do not leave man free to propose God as his end, and to live solely the supernatural life. Moreover, you exclude religion from the Association. You recognize nothing that has the least resemblance to religion. It has with

you no substantive existence ; for, as M. Briancourt defines it, it is nothing but the reflection in their harmonic relations of all the primitive stimulants, as light, which is itself no color, is the reflection of all the primitive colors in perfect harmony.

Furthermore, the Associationists cannot admit the necessity of religion without abandoning their system. Their system is founded on the principle, that attractions are proportional to destiny ; and if what pertains to the natural order is inadequate to satisfy nature, their system is false. The admission of the necessity of any thing transcending nature as a principle, a means, or an end, would be the denial of the sufficiency of nature ; therefore, that attractions are proportional to destiny ; therefore, the denial of the whole scheme of Association. The Associationists are not at liberty, when we have shown them from experience that nature does not suffice for nature, to defend themselves by saying, Then bring in the supernatural ; for they are not at liberty to abandon the essential principle of their system, and still continue to assert it.

And, finally, if the system is insufficient in itself, if under it, as under civilization, our destiny is not attainable without the supernatural, the system is useless, for the supernatural alone is sufficient. The man who lives the supernatural life of the Christian has God, and therefore all. He despises the life your Association proposes. Your wealth and luxury, your palace and grounds, your flower-gardens and ball-rooms, your song and dance, your statues and pictures, your scientific reunions, and your "Æsthetic Teas," are to him vanity, yea, less than vanity, and nothing. He holds them in utter contempt, and tramples them beneath his feet, and weeps tears of pity and tender compassion over those poor creatures who can esteem them. The epicurean and the saint, though for different reasons, both exclaim of all the world can give, *Vanity of vanities, all is vanity !* The former, because he has grown weary of it, and found it impotent to fill up the vacuum in his heart ; the latter, because he is full without it, because he has no need of it, because it can offer him nothing, and serves only to distract him from God, and hinder his divine life.

But we have objections to the adequacy of the means proposed, of a kind which will have more weight with our friends, the Associationists. The means proposed are intended, besides other things, to remove the evils of poverty, that is, the moral evils occasioned in the community by poverty ; for of the

physical evils we say nothing. There is no question but poverty occasions discontent, envy, and repining, and these again lead to crimes against both person and property. But it occasions these evils only when it is contrasted with wealth. There is no more discontent, envy, or repining, where all are alike poor, than where all are alike rich. The hovel is a hovel only as contrasted with the palace which rises by its side and overtops it. The remedy here is either internal or external. The internal is moral, religious, which raises the poor to the supernatural life, gives them all the most favored have or can have, and leads them to look upon all the distinctions of rank and wealth as of no value, and to trample the world beneath their feet. He who asks nothing from the world envies never those who possess it, and repines never that he is poor. This remedy is the one the Church approves, and labors always to apply ; and it checks alike the envy and repining of the poor, and the pride and insolence of the rich, enabling both to live together in mutual peace and charity, — in harmony. But this remedy the Associationists reject, even with scorn. They propose an external remedy. But the external remedy can be a remedy only so far as it removes the occasion ; and to do that it must establish an equality of fortunes, or at least, so arrange matters that wealth and poverty shall never be in juxtaposition, or seen in contrast.

But if we consult the plan of the Associationists, we shall see that they propose nothing of the kind. They recognize property and inequality of property in like manner as they are recognized in our present social order ; and, what is still more to the purpose, they bring together the extremes of wealth and poverty in the same phalanx, and lodge them in the same phalanstery, so that one cannot go in or go out, rise up or sit down, without having the violent contrast forced upon his attention, to exalt his pride or madden his envy. That is, they propose to cure the evil by increasing what they regard as its cause !

It is of no avail to allege that none in Association will be very poor, that there will be none who cannot by their own labor procure all the necessities and chief comforts of life ; for the evil in question does not arise from the consideration that I have *little*, but that my neighbour has *more*. So long as in your Association one has *more* than another, you have not removed the occasion of the evil you deplore. No matter, if my plain apartments are sufficient for my protection, when

only a little lathing and plaster divide them from the gay and elegant and luxuriously furnished apartments of my neighbours ; no matter that my one dish suffices for my physical necessities, so long as, in the room next to mine, my neighbour — a stupid fellow, I may think, not half as good as I — sits down to his dinner of twenty dishes. Since all these violent contrasts, all the distinctions of wealth, exist in the Association, and are perpetually under the eye, in the face and nose, of every one, meeting him at every turn he takes, the occasion of the evils exists there in even a greater and a more offensive degree than it does in the present social state ; and as long as you do not by the Association remove the occasion, how can you say that by it you cure the evil ? Do not refer us to moral influences which may be operative, for that is to abandon your system, and fall back on that which you condemn and anathematize. Your system is, to correct the internal by the judicious organization of the external ; and if you are obliged to appeal from the external to the internal, to supply the defects of the organization, you acknowledge what we are endeavouring to prove, namely, the inadequacy of your means.

Again ; the mother evil of our present industrial system, according to the Associationists, is COMPETITION. Indeed, to read their writings, one is inclined to believe that they regard competition in business as the cause of nearly all the ills that flesh is heir to. Their grand argument for Association is, that it will entirely do away with competition and its attendant evils. Whether their view of competition is correct or the reverse is not now the question. The question is, Does Association, on their plan, remove it, or, what is the same thing, afford no motive or scope for it ? If not, their means are inadequate. Competition results from the inequality of fortunes, the freedom and the desire to accumulate. Where these three causes coexist, competition is possible and inevitable. Association, then, to remove competition, must take away these causes, at least some one of them. The desire to accumulate can be suppressed by external means only by an organization in which wealth can secure, or aid in securing, to its possessor no personal or social advantage, or what is regarded as an advantage by him or by others. This can never be the case where wealth and luxury are held to be important, essential to the fulfilment of one's destiny, and where the proprietor has the free use of his property. Grant, then, the desire, and allow the freedom, to accumulate, and you have competition, because property is in its nature exclusive.

Now all these conditions of competition must coexist in Association, because the Association is based on individual and not common property. There is inequality of property, and of course the distinctions which always do and always must accompany it. There is freedom to possess and use, and there is freedom to acquire, to hoard, or to display. There are objects forbidden to the poor, and accessible only to the rich. There are, then, all the motives to accumulate, and the same opportunity to acquire individual property, and to purchase pleasures or distinctions by it, which are furnished by existing industrial arrangements. What, then, is to hinder competition in the bosom of the phalanx itself?

But pass over this, and consider the phalanx as a copartnership, or a huge business firm. There must be buying and selling between it and other firms; for we do not understand the Associationists to propose to stop all exchange, all trade and commerce. What, then, is to hinder competition between phalanx and phalanx, any more than now between one business firm and another? Is competition between firms less injurious than between individuals? — between large firms than between small ones? Indeed, is it not notorious that the rivalry of large bodies is more unprincipled, altogether less scrupulous, than that of individuals? Who needs to be told that a man, sheltering himself under the shield of a corporation, will do, without scruple, what he would recoil from doing in his individual capacity? What, then, under your system, is to prevent perhaps the most ruinous competition the world has ever witnessed? Phalanx may seek to circumvent phalanx in business, and every few days we may hear the crash of one or another, each burying eighteen hundred or two thousand people under its ruins! There is nothing in your system, so far as we can see, to prevent this disastrous result. Men in the Association have the same passions as out of it, and these passions will operate in the same way, if they have the liberty and the occasion.

We are aware that the Associationists suppose that they will keep down the spirit of rivalry by the various intellectual, social, domestic, and æsthetic influences which they expect to be operative in Association. But they recognize the spirit of rivalry, or competition. Let this be remembered. True, they count on turning it into other channels. Thus, by making shoeblacks the Legion of Honor, they fancy that the ambition will be to be shoeblacks; just as if the cross of honor

will not cease to be an object of ambition the moment it is conferred on the shoeblack ! The cross of honor is valued because it is bestowed as the reward of honorable or heroic deeds. It does not confer the honor, it signalizes it ; and never will men become shoeblacks for the sake of it. It is impossible, by any artificial methods, to raise menial arts to the rank of the liberal ; or menial services to the rank of the heroic, by conferring on them the insignia of the heroic. If you want the liberal and refined to be willing to perform the most menial and disgusting duties, you must propose the Cross of Christ, not the Cross of the Legion of Honor ; the crown of immortal life, not the crown of laurel.

The Associationists, whatever influences or arrangements they may depend upon, must allow the individual the dominion of himself, and the freedom to follow the bent of his genius. They must allow the former, or they reduce man to complete slavery, and make the phalanx the grave of the individual ; and the latter, or deny their grand principle of attractions proportional to destiny, and also their other principle of attractive labor, since no labor or employment against one's natural bent is or can be attractive. They do allow the first, otherwise individual property would be a mockery ; they allow the second, otherwise their distribution of the phalanx into groups and series would be an absurdity. Allow a man freedom to follow his natural bent, that is, the passion or group of passions which are naturally predominant in him, and that passion or group will grow by indulgence, and soon gain the complete mastery over all the rest, and subordinate them to itself. Besides, the whole tendency of the Association is to this result. Its grand principle is, to follow the natural order and the natural attraction. The harmonious development our friends speak of is not a precisely similar development in every individual, but the harmonious development of each individual in accordance with his naturally predominant tendency or tendencies. To understand it in any other sense would be to make them inconsistent with themselves. Consequently, whatever influences they may bring to bear on the individual, they must tend to harmonize all in him with his naturally predominant passion. If, then, we suppose one whose strong natural tendency is to acquire property, his whole nature will be subordinated to this tendency, and he will follow it to the full extent of his freedom and capacity. If we suppose two such, we have competition.

As for social influences, these, in a community which starts with the assumption that wealth and luxury are absolutely indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny, will not be likely to check or discourage the efforts without which wealth and luxury are not to be had. The domestic influences will be no less favorable to the accumulation of wealth than now; for the father bequeaths his property to his children, and where there are inequalities of fortune, wealth will confer distinction. The æsthetic influences are of no account for good. All the world are not artists, and it is by no means certain that every phalanx will be a school of art; and if it should be, it must be borne in mind that its art will be purely secular, and purely secular art leads to nothing better than effeminacy and licentiousness. It would, then, check the tendency to accumulate, if at all, only by producing no less an evil of another sort. It would be well for modern rhapsodists to recollect that the artistic epoch — we speak not of religious art — follows, but has never yet been known to precede or accompany, an heroic epoch. It marks a decline, and usually is or ushers in an age of corruption. The shrine of natural beauty stands always in the vestibule of the temple of Venus, when not in the temple itself. Avarice, again, is no unnatural pendant to voluptuousness. We place no confidence, therefore, in your æsthetic influences, even to restrain competition, — especially, since wealth will be needed as the minister of voluptuousness.

It is unnecessary to pursue further this branch of the subject. All our primitive tendencies are exclusive, and mutually repellant. They almost always exist in excess, and every one of them grows by indulgence. Philosophy and experience alike testify that their harmonious action is never possible, unless by their subjection to reason. But this subjection is contrary to the principles of the Associationists; for they allow us reason and free will, not to control our passions and keep them in subjection to the law, but as their servants or instruments. The passions give the law; reason and free will provide for its fulfilment. Consequently, the harmony of the passions is impossible, on the principles of the Associationists; and without such harmony, their means are obviously inadequate.

3. Whoever reads the works of the Associationists must perceive that they place great reliance for the success of their scheme on the mutual love and good-will of the members of the phalanx. There is to be there no pride of birth, no

haughtiness of rank, no insolence of wealth. Gentlemen and simplemen, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, are all to meet as brothers ; and no bickerings, no jars, no envyings, no jealousies, no aversions, rancors, or heartburnings, are ever to find admittance into the *harmonic* paradise. No serpent will ever find his way into the new garden of Eden. Every one will be courteous, affable, gentle, affectionate, forbearing, and eager to oblige ; and men will say, " See how these phalansterians love one another ! " Undoubtedly, without this, the Association will be torn by internal dissensions, and soon prove only a monument to the folly of its founders.

But by what right do Associationists count on this universal and never-failing mutual love and good-will ? They propose no radical change and no supernatural elevation of human nature. Men enter Association with all the essential passions, and with all the diversity of character, taste, and temperament which they now have, and must exhibit in Association the same phenomena as out of it, so far as the occasion is not removed. There is no removal of the occasion ; and there must be, as we have shown, just as much occasion for the exercise of all the bitter and mischievous passions of our nature in Association as in the present order ? Whence, then, is to come this anticipated result, so widely different from our present experience ? From the moral causes operative there ? What are they ? Nay, you cannot appeal to moral causes, for your system is to reach and modify the moral through the physical.

But pass over this. How is the degree of love necessary to set the machinery of Association in operation to be obtained prior to Association itself ? It requires a greater degree of love to introduce than it does to preserve after introduction. If any thing is certain in philosophy, it is that the effect cannot exceed the cause. Hence, universal experience proves that the founders of human institutions are always superior to those who are formed under those institutions. The progress under human institutions is always downwards ; the purest and noblest characters formed under them are the earliest. Man is always superior to his productions, and these are superior to *their* productions. Reverberations grow fainter and fainter in the distance. Mark the difference between the men who made our Revolution and the men of to-day. Between George Washington and James K. Polk there is a distance ; and there would have been a greater distance still, if it

had not been for the continued operation of causes not introduced or essentially affected by our Revolution. Certainly, then, no more love can be in the Association than there is in the cause introducing Association. Then the Associationists must get, under civilization, without Association, all the love they can have with and under it. But if we can have the love without Association, then there is no need of Association ; if not, Association is impracticable. Here is a conclusive argument, not only against Association, but against every scheme for effecting the real progress of man or society *by virtue of a purely human principle*. Proceeding on a purely human principle, man, it is easy to demonstrate, can no more be a *reformer* than an *institutor*, — that is, he can neither by way of reform, nor by way of institution, introduce or establish any thing superior to what he finds existing, or which, in fact, does not fall below it. His boasted improvements are such only in relation to the order he introduces, and consist solely in getting more and more rid of the contradictions to it retained at first from the preëxisting order. The departure on a human principle from the existing order is always a step towards something inferior or less perfect. Man can fall from the civilized state to the savage ; he never rises spontaneously from the savage state to the civilized ; and for the very good reason, that in the moral, no more than in the physical world, can the stream rise higher than the fountain.

Moreover, the love itself, which our Associationists rely upon, can never be adequate to their purpose. It is, at best, only human love, the natural *sentiment* of philanthropy. This answers very well, when the work to be done is simply to propose grand schemes, make brilliant and eloquent speeches, or when there are no disagreeable duties to be performed, no violent natural repugnances to be overcome ; but it fails in the hour of severe trial. Your philanthropist starts with generous impulses, with a glowing enthusiasm ; and so long as there are no great discouragements, no disgusting offices in his way, and he has even a small number of admiring friends to stimulate his zeal, applaud his eloquence, flatter his pride, and soothe him for the rebuffs he meets from the world, he may keep on his course, and continue his task. But let him find himself entirely alone, let him have no little public of his own, which is all the world to him, let him be thwarted on every point, let him be obliged to work in secret, unseen by all but the All-seeing Eye, encounter from men nothing but contradic-

tion, contempt, and ingratitude, and he will soon begin to say to himself, Why suffer and endure so much for the unworthy? He who loves man for man's sake loves only a creature, a being of imperfect worth, of no more worth than himself, perhaps not so much; and why shall he love him more than himself, and sacrifice himself for him? The highest stretch of human love is, to love our neighbour *as* we love ourselves; and we do injustice to ourselves, when we love them more than we do ourselves.

Nay, philanthropy itself is a sort of selfishness. It is a sentiment, not a principle. Its real motive is not another's good, but its own satisfaction according to its nature. It seeks the good of others, because the good of others is the means of its own satisfaction, and is as really selfish in its principle as any other of our sentiments; for there is a broad distinction between the *sentiment* of philanthropy, and the *duty* of doing good to others, — between seeking the good of others from sentiment, and seeking it in obedience to a law which binds the conscience. The measure of the capacity of philanthropy, as a sentiment, is the amount of satisfaction it can bring to the possessor. So long as, upon the whole, he finds it more delightful to play the philanthropist than the miser, for instance, he will do it, but no longer. Hence, philanthropy must always decrease just in proportion to the increase of the repugnances it must encounter, and fail us just at the moment when it is most needed, and always in proportion as it is needed. It follows the law so observable in all human society, and helps most when and where its help is least needed. Here is the condemnation of every scheme, however plausible it may look, that in any degree depends on philanthropy for its success.

The principle the Associationists want for their success is not philanthropy, — the love of man for man's sake, — but divine charity, not to be had and preserved out of the Catholic Church. Charity is, in relation to its subject, a supernaturally infused virtue; in relation to its object, the supreme and exclusive love of God for his own sake, and man for the sake of God. He who has it is proof against all trials; for his love does not depend on man, who so often proves himself totally unamiable and unworthy, but on God, who is always and everywhere infinitely amiable and deserving of all love. He visits the sick, the prisoner, the poor, for it is God whom he visits; he clasps with tenderness the leprous to his bosom,

and kisses his sores, for it is God he embraces and whose dear wounds he kisses. The most painful and disgusting offices are sweet and easy, because he performs them for God, who is love, and whose love inflames his heart. Wherever there is a service to be rendered to one of God's little ones, he runs with eagerness to do it ; for it is a service to be rendered to God himself. "Charity never faileth." It is proof against all natural repugnances ; it overcomes earth and hell ; and brings God down to tabernacle with men. Dear to it is this poor beggar, for it sees in him only our Lord who had "not where to lay his head" ; dear are the sorrowing and the afflicted, for it sees in them Him who was "a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity" ; dear are these poor outcasts, for in them it beholds Him who was "scorned and rejected of men" ; dear are the wronged, the oppressed, the down-trodden, for in them it beholds the Innocent One nailed to the Cross, and dying to atone for human wickedness. And it joys to succour them all ; for in so doing, it makes reparation to God for the poverty, sufferings, wrongs, contempt, and ignominious death which he endured for our sakes ; for it is his poverty it relieves in relieving the poor, his hunger it feeds in feeding the hungry, his nakedness it clothes in throwing its robe over the naked, his afflictions it consoles in consoling the sorrowing, his wounds into which it pours oil and wine and which it binds up. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me." All is done to and for God, whom it loves more than men, more than life, and more than heaven itself, if to love him and heaven were not one and the same thing. This is the principle you need ; with this principle, you have God with you and for you, and failure is impossible. But with this principle, Association is, at best, a matter of indifference ; for this is sufficient of itself at all times, under any and every form of political, social, or industrial organization. He who has God can have nothing more.

But our gravest objection to Associationism is, that it implicates the justice of Almighty God. The Associationists tell us that their plan is indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe. By man they must mean men, or else they are talking of an abstraction. The species has actual existence only in individuals, and the question relates only to actual existences. It is absurd to suppose that God cares for species, and not for individuals,—for the ideal, and not for the

actual, — for the abstract, and not for the concrete. When, therefore, the organization of Labor and Association are proposed as indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny, — when its friends tell us, as they do, that all the past has been only a preamble to it, a necessary preparation for it, they tell us in effect that no human being has, as yet, had within his reach the means of fulfilling his destiny. But it will not do to say this. God can create no being, and appoint him to a certain end, that is, make it his duty to gain that end, and not provide him with sufficient means of gaining it, if he chooses to avail himself of them, without contradicting his own justice, and thereby proving himself unjust. If there is a single individual of our race that fails to attain his destiny, either here or hereafter, through defect of means, not through his own fault, the blame is chargeable upon the Creator. But God is infinitely just, and we cannot accuse him of injustice without blasphemy. Then the means of fulfilling his destiny, whether here or hereafter, must *always* be within the reach of every man ; and if any one fails to fulfil it, he has no one to blame but himself. Then Association never has been, is not, and never can be, necessary for the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe, or elsewhere ; for man, every man, can fulfil his destiny, if he chooses, without it.

These are some few of the objections which seem to us conclusive against the views and schemes of the Associationists. They by no means exhaust our list of objections ; but we stop with them, because we regard them as amply sufficient of themselves. But let not the Associationists imagine, for a moment, because we refuse to go with them, that we are better satisfied with the present condition of our fellow-men than they are, or that we any more despair of its amelioration than they do. When we deserted the movement party and took refuge in the Church, it was not because we had become indifferent to human suffering, or because we despaired of solacing it. Never did the young enthusiast, the fierce declaimer, the bold radical, feel more alive to every form of human suffering, or entertain a stronger hope of relieving it, than we did, when our kind Mother was pleased to receive us and own us as one of her children. It is true, we did not embrace the Church for the reason that she is a social reformer, for the reason that we believed her capable of effecting the good we had attempted, or which our friends were attempting without her. In view of what she promises her faithful and obedient children, all

that we or they contemplated is not worth a moment's consideration. Nevertheless, she furnishes in abundance all the means necessary to remove all real evils, and to secure every possible good.

Let not the Associationists misapprehend us. We do not ask them to embrace the Church simply because she is the proper agent for acquiring the good they seek for their fellow-men; for we wish them to embrace her from higher and worthier motives. For ourselves, we have been, and are even now, loath to dwell on what the Church can do for us in this life, lest we should be interpreted as assigning false motives for yielding her the homage which is her due. We are unwilling to pursue a line of argument, which, however proper it may be in itself, ignorance or malice may torture even into the appearance of placing time before eternity, society before heaven, or man before or in competition with God. The Church must be embraced for a heavenly motive, or no advantage inures to us from embracing her. She is here to prepare us for heaven, and heaven is the only end that we can legitimately seek. The good she effects for this world is incidental, and should never be made the motive for becoming or remaining a Catholic. But, bearing this always in mind, we may without impropriety show that she can do enough for us even in this world to satisfy all reasonable men.

Some of the Associationists are already looking towards the Church, apparently despairing of success in their enterprise without her; but they are looking to her, we fear, rather with the wish to obtain her sanction for their plan, and her assistance to carry it out, than with any sincere disposition to submit themselves to her direction and discipline. If she will accept Fourierism, they are ready to accept her. But she will make no such agreement with them. She will be all, or she will be nothing. They must accept her unconditionally, or she will not accept them. She has her own method, and will not learn of them; they must learn of her.

But is her method adequate? Let us see. The men who have manifested, under their highest forms, the virtues which are required to remove all real evils and to procure every true good of which men in this world are capable, are undeniably to be found in the Catholic Church, and nowhere else. If all men were like, for instance, St. Raymond of Pennafort, St. John of God, St. Vincent de Paul, or even Fenelon, a great and good man, yet far below the standard of a

Catholic Saint, there could and would be no lack of the good desirable, and no real evil could exist. There is not a form of evil in society, a single ill that flesh is heir to, which some one or more of our saints have not made provision for removing or solacing, and which they would not have removed or solaced, if they had been duly seconded, as you must know, if you have made yourselves but passably acquainted with the charitable institutions of the Church. Yet these saints did not go out of the Church, and did but come up to that standard of perfection which she proposes to all, and exhorts all her children to aspire to, and to which all may attain, if God gives them the vocation, and that, too, without any change of the existing political, social, or industrial order. All may have, in the bosom of the Church, whatever the external order, all the means needed for attaining to the highest perfection of which they are capable ; and by attaining to that perfection, all is secured that is or can be desired for society.

But you say, all are not saints. True ; but whose is the fault ? It is not the fault of the political, social, or industrial order, otherwise these could not have become saints ; not the fault of the Church, for she proffers to all the same means and assistance she extended to these ; nor precisely the fault of human nature, for these were no better by nature than others ; and many of the saints have even been wild and dissolute in their youth. All may not be called by Almighty God to the same degree of heroic sanctity, nor is it necessary ; but all are called to Christian perfection, and the means which have proved effectual in the case of those who have attained to it are extended to all, and must needs be, if adopted, equally effectual in the case of all. The fault, whenever any one falls below the standard of perfection, is his own, is in the fact that he refuses to comply with all the Church commands and counsels. The Church cannot take away free will ; and as long as men retain it, they will, to a greater or less extent, abuse it. Do the Associationists propose to take it away, and reduce men to mere machines ? We do not understand them to propose any such thing ; and if they should, it would be an additional objection to their scheme. God himself respects our free will, and governs us only according to our *choice*. He gives us, naturally or supernaturally, the ability to will and to do as he wills, and motives sweet and attractive as heaven and terrible as hell to induce us to will and to do as he wills ; but he does not will for us ; the will must be our own act. If the

Church proposes perfection to all, exhorts all to aspire to it, furnishes them all the assistance they need to gain it, and urges them by all the motives which can weigh with them to accept and use them, the fault, if they do not, is theirs, not hers, and she is not to be accused either of inefficiency or of insufficiency ; for she does all that, in the nature of the case, it is possible to do.

But even a far lower standard of Christian worth than we have been speaking of, and which is possible in the bosom of the Church to all, will suffice for the purpose of the Associationists. Suppose every one should do, not all the Church counsels, but simply what she commands, enjoins, as of precept, and which every one must do, or fall under her censure, what real evil could remain, or what desirable social good would be wanting ? There would be no wars, no internal disorders, no wrongs, no outrages, no frauds, or deceptions, and no taking the advantage one of another. There would be no unrelieved poverty, no permanent want of the necessities or even comforts of life ; for the Church makes almsgiving a precept, and commands all her children to remember the poor. There would remain no ruinous competition ; for no one would set a high value upon the goods of this world. The real cause of all the social and industrial evils the Associationists deplore, so far as evils they are, is covetousness, which is said to be the root of all evil ; and covetousness the Church condemns as a mortal sin. Eradicate covetousness from the heart, and your reform, so far as desirable, is effected ; and it is eradicated, or held in subjection, by every obedient Catholic. Hence, all that is needed is in the Church ; let every one submit to her and follow her directions ; nothing more will be wanting. All can submit to her ; for God, in one way or another, gives to every one sufficient grace for that, if it be not voluntarily resisted ; and she herself is the medium through which is communicated all the strength any one needs to do all she commands. The way to destroy the tree of evil is, to lay the axe at the root ; and this the Church does. She seeks always to purify the heart, out of which are the issues of life, and she never fails to do it in the case of any one who submits himself to her discipline.

But, you reply, there are evils in Catholic countries, and the result promised is as far from being attained there as elsewhere. This is too strongly expressed. There are evils in Catholic countries, but they are fewer and of a more mitigated

character than in other countries, and, moreover, diminish always in proportion as the country is more truly Catholic and more exclusively under Catholic influence. This is evident by contrasting Italy with England, Protestant England with Catholic England, or Spain and Portugal, as they now are, with what they were, when thoroughly Catholic, before they were prostrated by the prevalence of revolutionary and infidel ideas. M. Briancourt virtually admits as much, when he contrasts the present state of things with that which formerly existed, before infidel governments, philosophers, and reformers had detached modern society from the control of the Church. Besides, all in Catholic countries are not good Catholics ; and the evils complained of undeniably spring from the acts of those who do not faithfully comply with the requirements of the Church. If all complied, the evils would be removed. The Church is to be tried, not by the effects of non-compliance, but by the effects of compliance. She is answerable only for those who comply with her demands and follow her directions. She cannot force men against their will to comply ; and you would be among the first to cry out against her tyranny, were she even to attempt it. The objection implied in the existence of evils in Catholic countries is, therefore, of no weight. Men who reject the Church, or refuse to obey her, must not complain that she does not make all men good Catholics.

The Church, then, offers an easy and effectual method of removing all real evils, and of securing all that is really good in relation even to our present existence. She offers a feasible and an effectual way of serving our fellow-men, — of acquiring and of giving practical effect to the most unbounded charity. Submit to the Church, follow her directions, and you will need nothing more. You can secure all you desire, so far as wise in your desires, whatever be the form of the government, or the social or industrial order under which you live. The internal can be rectified in every state and condition of life ; and when the internal is right, you need have no fears for the external. This is a speedy way, and within the power of each individual, without his being obliged to wait for the coöperation of his brethren ; for each can individually submit himself at any moment he chooses. It is an effectual way ; for the reliance is not on human weakness and instability, but on the infinite and unchangeable God.

Let not our friends scorn this way, because it is old, simple,

and easy. God's ways are not ours. David, to slay the giant, chose a simple sling and a smooth stone from the brook, not the armor and sword of the king. The prophet bade the Syrian simply, "Go wash, and be clean." God's ways are always foolishness to human pride and human prudence; but whoso enters them finds them leading to life. Let not our friends scorn this way, through pride. Others as learned, as philosophic, as high in station, as proud as they, and who once looked upon it with as much distrust and contempt as they can, have, through grace, entered it; and they have found "hidden riches" which they did not look for, and which make all that is promised from Association, multiplied a thousand times into itself, appear poor, mean, and despicable.

ART. V. — *The Two Brothers; or, Why are you a Protestant?* — Concluded.

X. "YOU will bear in mind, James," remarked John, on resuming the conversation the next day, "that you have pledged yourself to prove that the Catholic Church authorizes superstition and idolatry."

"And if I do not prove it," replied James, "I will abandon the Reformers and the Reformation."

"Since you prefer the charge, it devolves on you to prove it."

"That is not difficult. The fact is notorious."

"Assertions are easily made by the unscrupulous, my brother; but I ask for *proofs*."

"Proofs, proofs! I have them in abundance. What else are your prayers for the dead, — your invocation of saints, — your worship of Mary, — adoration of crucifixes, pictures, images, relics of dead men and women? What is all this, but the most abominable idolatry and superstition? What else is your adoration of the mass, and all the vain and empty ceremonies of your church? O, it is frightful to think to what horrible lengths idolatry and superstition are carried among you! What more besotted, than for a full-grown man to believe that the priest can make his God at will, to fall down and adore a bit of bread, or to imagine that he is worshipping God by kissing the crucifix and telling his beads? I hope, John, you, at least, avoid the superstitious practice of telling your beads."

"I say my beads daily for your conversion."

"That is enough ; my charge is proved. When a man like you can do that, there is no need of other evidence to prove that your church favors superstition."

"It requires strong faith, no doubt, to be able to regard your conversion as possible ; but all things are possible with God, and he has never been known to deny his Holy Mother any request, for she can request nothing not in accordance with his will. If she intercedes for you, your conversion is certain."

"Worse and worse. You confess all I need to prove my charge."

"Did you ever read the record of the trial of our Lord ?"

"Why do you ask that ?"

"Because you remind me of his accusers, who pretended to convict him of blasphemy out of his own mouth. Yet it is nothing strange or uncommon for children to resemble their parents. You say the Church is superstitious ?"

"The *Romish* Church, yes ; and I prove it."

"What is superstition ?"

"A spurious religion or false worship ; a false system of religion, credulity, vain observance."

"You would hardly be able to convict the Church, or to attempt to convict her, of superstition, under that definition, without assuming that you have authority to determine, or by which you can determine, what is true religion ; which we have seen is not the fact. Allow me to suggest a definition a little more to your purpose. Superstition is a vice opposed to true religion, as the schoolmen say, by way of excess, as irreligion is opposed to it by way of defect, and consists in rendering worship to an object to which it is not due, or an undue worship to the object to which it is due. It is, on the one hand, the worship of false gods, and, on the other, the false worship of the true God, and includes all you mean by both superstition and idolatry."

"Very well ; I say the Romish Church is guilty of superstition in the sense in which you have defined the term."

"Superstition, in this sense, divides itself into the worship of false gods, and the false worship of the true God. It will be well to consider each division separately. Let us begin with the first, that is, *idolatry*, or giving the worship due to God alone to that which is not God ; or, in other words, worshipping as God what is not God."

"The Romish Church worships as God what is not God."

“ The proof ? ”

“ She pays divine worship to the Virgin Mary.”

“ The proof ? ”

“ She authorizes prayers to her.”

“ Nonsense ! prayer is nothing but a request or a petition, and may without sin or impropriety be addressed by one man to another. You might as well say, the constitution of the United States authorizes idolatry, because it recognizes the right of petition, and forbids Congress to make any law prohibiting the people from peaceably assembling and petitioning for a redress of grievances. As well say, every subject who petitions the king, or citizen who petitions the court or the legislature, is an idolater. Try again, brother.”

“ Your Church honors her, a mere woman, as the mother of God.”

“ Well, if she is the mother of God, where is the harm in that, since it is only honoring her for what she is ? ”

“ But she is not the mother of God.”

“ That is for you to prove. You must remember, however, that you are to convict the Church of idolatry by the light of nature, and you can in your argument deny nothing the Church teaches, unless it is forbidden by the natural law. Assuming the Blessed Virgin to be the mother of God, — as she must be, if Christ is God, — does the law of nature forbid her from being honored as such ? This is the question.”

“ The law of nature, which, as you have agreed, forbids idolatry, forbids her being honored as God.”

“ Unquestionably ; but does it forbid her being honored for what she is ? ”

“ But Catholics worship her as divine, and pay her the worship which is due to God alone.”

“ The proof ? ”

“ They call her our Advocate, our Mediatrix, and thus rob Christ of the glory which is his due ; for he is the only Mediator between God and men.

“ The only mediator and advocate, in his own right ; but, for aught the law of nature says, his mother may be an advocate and a mediatrix under him, by his will and appointment ; for she would then advocate or mediate only by his authority, and he would still be our only advocate and mediator, — since that which I do mediately by another, as my minister or delegate, I do myself as much as if I did it immediately. These terms, applied to the Blessed Virgin, no doubt imply that she

is exalted above every other creature ; but as her exaltation is that of a creature, and an exaltation not by her own natural right, but by grace, it by no means places her in the same rank with her Son, who is exalted above *every* creature, by his own right, the right of his own proper Divinity which assumed humanity."

"But Catholics pray to her much more than they do to God."

"That may be questioned ; but if so, it is nothing to your purpose. You must prove that they pray to her as God, ask of her what may be rightfully asked only of God, and that they pay her honors which are due to him alone."

"They pray to her to have mercy on them, and mercy is the prerogative of God alone."

"Mercy, in the sense of pardon or forgiveness of sin, is the property of God only ; and in this sense, Catholics never ask the Blessed Virgin to have mercy on them. But mercy, in the sense of pity or compassion, belongs to human beings. Thus we say, 'The merciful man is merciful to his beast.' To ask the Blessed Virgin to have compassion on us, and to intercede with her Divine Son for us, to obtain his pardon for us by her powerful intercession, is nothing more than we may lawfully ask of our pastors,—nothing more than what the Scriptures say the Lord commanded the three friends of Job to do."

"The worship which Catholics pay to the saints in general is idolatry."

"The highest form of worship we pay to any saint is that which we pay to the Holy Mother of God. If that is not idolatrous, then, *a fortiori*, not that which we pay to the other saints."

"But you honor the saints."

"And what do you conclude from that ? Does not the law of nature command us to give honor to whom honor is due ? What authority have you for supposing that we pay *undue* honor to the saints ?"

"To honor them as God, in the place of God, is to give them an honor which is not their due, and is idolatry."

"Granted ; but who so honors them ?"

"Catholics."

"The proof ?"

"Catholics may not honor them as the Supreme God ; but they honor them as a species of inferior gods, as the *Dii Minores* of the heathen."

“ The proof ? ”

“ The fact is evident of itself.”

“ Not by any means. The honors the heathen paid to their inferior gods were different in kind from those which we pay to the saints, and, moreover, were paid as due them in their own natural right, and not as due only to what they became through grace. The heathen offered sacrifices, and therefore paid *divine* honors, to their inferior gods. Catholics offer no sacrifices and pay no divine honors to the saints ; they venerate them for what, through grace, they became, and they ask their prayers and intercession, which is no more than we may ask of the living, and is no more than your parishioners not unfrequently ask of you, — no more than you sanction whenever you pray God for your congregation, or for an individual who has requested to be remembered in your prayers.”

“ But you have no warrant in Scripture for praying to the saints.”

“ That were nothing to the purpose, if true. You bring your action on the law of nature ; and when you find that under the law of nature you have no cause of action, you are not at liberty to plead some other law. If praying to the saints is not idolatry by the law of nature, you cannot allege it under the head of idolatry, against the Church.”

“ But, unless the Church has a warrant in the word of God for praying to the saints, she has no right to pray to them.”

“ And unless it is forbidden by some precept of the law of nature, you cannot deny her right.”

“ The Romish Church worships crosses, dead men’s bones, locks of their hair, their finger-nails, and shreds of their garments.”

“ What then ? ”

“ Then she is idolatrous ; for we must worship God, and him only.”

“ *Worship* is a word of more than one meaning ; it may mean paying divine honors, and also simply paying a civil respect, honoring or acknowledging worth wherever we find it. In the former sense, it is due to God alone, and is by Catholics paid to him alone, and never to the objects you enumerate. In the latter sense, it may be paid, and the law of nature requires that it should be paid, to kings, judges, magistrates, to our parents, and to whomsoever by rank or worth is entitled to honor. In this sense, the law of nature not only does not forbid, but commands us to honor or to treat with respect such

objects as are related to eminent worth. To honor crosses and relics of the saints, for the worth to which they are related, is, then, in accordance with the law of nature, and it is only in this sense that we honor, respect, or, if you please, *worship* them."

"But you do not honor them merely as memorials of a worth which was real; you pay them divine honors."

"False!"

"Not false. Witness the Holy Coat of Treves."

"What of that?"

"Multitudes, in the recent pilgrimage to it, prayed to it, saying, 'O Holy Coat, have mercy on us!'"

"The evidence of what you assert?"

"It is said so."

"By whom, and on what authority?"

"Do you deny it?"

"Deny it? Do you suppose Catholics are so besotted as to pray to what has no life, no sense, no power to help them, and that, too, when their Church, as I showed you yesterday, positively prohibits praying to relics? The thing is impossible; no Catholic ever did, or ever could, utter such a prayer. You must not judge our people by your own. We preserve, and we honor, the relics of departed saints; they remind us of the worth of the saints; and when they do so, we pray to the *saints* to pray God for us, and procure for us the graces and favors we need. What precept of the law of nature does this violate?"

"Why not pray directly to God?"

"That question is out of place. Why do you ask a fellow-mortal to pray for you? Why do you pray and intercede for your congregation?"

"But you are idolaters, for you worship images."

"If by *worship* you mean paying divine honors, your assertion is false."

"Your houses and churches are full of images and pictures, and you kneel and pray to them."

"Kneel and pray *before* them, I grant; kneel and pray *to* them, I deny. There is a difference between praying *before* an image and praying *to* it, which I should suppose even a Protestant might understand."

"But you break the second commandment; and that your deluded followers may not detect the fact, you have expunged it from the Decalogue."

“ We do not expunge what you call the second commandment ; we only reckon it as a part of the first commandment.”

“ Nevertheless you break it, for it says, ‘ Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.’ ”

“ Graven *thing*, not graven *image*, is the correct translation, and more to your purpose ; otherwise the precept would not forbid making statues of Jupiter, Neptune, and other purely fictitious beings. But do you understand that precept to forbid absolutely the making and keeping of images, statues, or pictures ? ”

“ Of course I do ; I am not wise above what is written.”

“ Nobody asks you to be wise above what is written ; the question is, *What is written ?* Then I am to understand you to maintain that Moses broke that commandment when he made and set up the brazen serpent in the wilderness ; that Solomon broke it when he placed the brazen sea in the temple on twelve brazen oxen ; that it was broken by the images of the Cherubim, who spread out their wings over the mercy-seat where God promised to meet his people ; that our stern Puritans of Massachusetts break it by suspending the image of a codfish in their State House ; that Congress break it in ordering a statue of Washington ; and that it is broken by that dog’s head carved on your cane, and those lion’s-claws on the feet of your table ? ”

“ No, I do not say all that.”

“ Well, what do you say ? ”

“ Why, that the commandment forbids the making and keeping of images, &c., as objects of religious veneration.”

“ That is, ‘ Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them,’ or, as the catechism says, ‘ It forbids making them, so as to adore and serve them ; that is, it forbids making them our gods.’ ”

“ But the Romish Church commands, you cannot deny, supreme religious worship to be paid to what you call the sacred Host.”

“ What then ? ”

“ Then she is idolatrous ; for she commands her children to pay divine honors to a bit of bread.”

“ False ! She commands no such thing. She commands us to worship Jesus Christ, who is God and man, entitled in his

own right to supreme worship, and who veils his divinity and his humanity both under the sacramental species. It is not the bread, for she teaches there is no bread there, but the Son who is consubstantial to the Father, and whom we are to honor as we honor the Father, that she commands us to adore. There is, then, no idolatry in the adoration."

"But her teaching is false, — the Host is nothing but bread."

"That is a matter which you, by the light of nature, cannot decide."

"But she must prove to me that it is not bread, before I can be bound to adore it."

"Undoubtedly; but you must prove that it *is* bread, before you can pronounce the adoration idolatrous."

"But I have the evidence of my senses that it is bread."

"You have the evidence of your senses that the species of bread are there, and that the Church asserts; but that, under the species of bread, there is the *substance* of bread, you have *not* the evidence of your senses; for the senses never, in any case whatever, take cognizance of substances. You have, therefore, the evidence of your senses against nothing the Church asserts. Consequently, by the light of nature alone, you can neither affirm nor deny what she asserts; and unless you can deny it, you cannot say that the adoration of the Host is idolatrous. If what she teaches be true, the adoration is due, and commanded by the natural law, which commands us to give to every one his due. Have you any thing more to adduce in support of the charge of idolatry?"

"Perhaps it is true that Catholics worship, in the strict sense of the word, only God; but, though they may worship the true object, they render him a false worship."

"That is, they worship him in an undue manner."

"Yes, that is what I mean."

"To be able to say that, you must first determine the *due* manner of worshipping him. But you cannot do this without authority, and you have, as we have seen, no authority, except the light of nature. Are you able by the light of nature alone to determine what is the due worship of God?"

"I am able, in some cases, at least, by the light of nature, to say what is *not* due worship."

"Be it so; what is there, then, in Catholic worship forbidden by the law of nature?"

"All her peculiar worship, — her saint-worship, her venera-

tion of relics, her beads and crucifixes, her fasts and feasts, her empty forms and idle ceremonies."

"Her empty forms and idle ceremonies? By what authority do you pronounce her forms empty, and her ceremonies idle?"

"Do you deny that her whole worship consists of empty forms and idle ceremonies?"

"Of course I do. But be so good as to specify what you call an empty form, or an idle ceremony."

"The light of nature teaches us that God is not worshipped by mere show, by vain pomp and parade, and that no worship can be acceptable to him which is not real, in spirit and in truth."

"Granted; proceed."

"Your bowings and genuflections, your fasts and your feasts, are a vain mockery, if merely external, and the heart be far from God."

"No doubt of it; proceed."

"Confessions to a priest, external acts of penance, the repetition of *paters* and *aves*, and even the giving of alms, are vain illusions, and have no power to purge the conscience, if there be not genuine repentance, deep and pungent sorrow for sin."

"Nothing in the world more true; proceed."

"The heart must be right; there must be internal holiness, or all our outward worship will avail us nothing."

"As true as preaching. Go on."

"This is enough. In conceding this much, you condemn your Church."

"How so?"

"Because all she enjoins is outward, formal, mechanical, addressed to the senses and imagination, requiring no internal purity and holiness in the worshipper."

"And where did you learn that?"

"Is it not so?"

"What proof have you that it is so?"

"It is what the Reformers and we have always alleged against her."

"If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household! I have not asked what you allege, but the proof of what you allege, against the Church."

"Do you mean to call all Protestants false witnesses and calumniators?"

“ Is it more unreasonable to believe them to be such, than it is to believe that the overwhelming majority of all who bear the Christian name, or have borne it, have, for eighteen hundred years, or from the very age of the Apostles, been sunk in superstition, and guilty of the abominable sin of idolatry ? It seems to me much easier to believe that a Protestant can calumniate than that a Catholic can be an idolater ; and in so believing, I believe nothing worse of you than you profess to believe of us.”

“ What else can one see in your worship than mere outward form ? ”

“ What else should you expect to see in external worship but external worship ? External is by its very nature external ; and I am unable to comprehend how the Church should have an external worship, and yet not an external worship. But if you had ever taken the least pains to inform yourself, you would have known that the Church teaches all her children that no external act, which does not proceed from internal justice and sanctity, is, or can be, meritorious.”

“ You rely on the sacraments.”

“ Well, what then ? ”

“ Are they not outward ? ”

“ Are they not inward ? ”

“ Does not the Church teach that the child is regenerated in baptism ? ”

“ She does.”

“ And it is no superstition to believe that a little water poured upon the head of the child, and a few words muttered over him by the priest, can regenerate the soul ? ”

“ If you make the water and the words the efficient cause of the regeneration, it is unquestionably superstition, for none but the Holy Ghost can regenerate the child ; but if you understand by the water and the words simply the medium through which the Holy Ghost is pleased to communicate the grace which regenerates, there is no superstition ; for the cause assigned is adequate to the effect. The Church teaches the latter ; the former is the vain fancy of her calumniators.

“ If it is the Holy Ghost that regenerates, why can he not regenerate without the water and words as well as with them ? ”

“ That is a question which does not fall within the jurisdiction of the law of nature. You and I have no right to call Almighty God to an account, and to ask him, Why do you so ? ”

“ But how does the Church know that the Holy Ghost regenerates in baptism ? ”

“ That is a question which pertains to positive revelation, and not to the natural law. The revelation is her authority for what she asserts, concerning which, if it do not contradict natural reason, the natural law enacts nothing.”

“ There are other sacraments.”

“ Certainly ; but all are founded on the same principle, and are not the efficient cause of grace, but the media through which the Holy Ghost communicates the graces which our Lord, by his own infinite merits, has purchased for us.”

“ But any body can receive the sacrament, whatever his internal disposition ; and the efficacy of the sacrament does not depend on the recipient.”

“ Any body can receive the sacrament externally ; but nobody can receive any spiritual benefit from it, unless he receives it with proper internal dispositions. He who should approach the sacrament of penance, for instance, without all you understand by *repentance*, would, instead of receiving the fruits of the sacrament, only profane it, and add to his guilt. In the sacrament of the Eucharist, he who eats or drinks unworthily eats and drinks condemnation to himself. The efficacy of the sacrament does not, indeed, depend on the recipient ; but that the recipient may experience its effects, or that it may operate its effects in him, he must take care that he interpose by his malice no obstacle to its operation.”

“ But what is the use of your saint-worship ? ”

“ That is not precisely the question.”

“ The worship, if useless, is idle or vain, and therefore superstitious. You must, then, prove that it is not useless, or you do not clear your Church of the charge of superstition.”

“ You must prove from the light of nature that it is useless, or you do not sustain your charge against her. You bring the action, and the burden of proof is on you.”

“ I accuse the Church of superstition ; and I adduce as proof of my accusation the worship of the saints, which she authorizes.”

“ But you cannot adduce your accusation in proof of your accusation. The *cultus sanctorum* is conceded to be authorized by the Church, and the very point in dispute is, Whether that is or is not superstitious. It is only on the assumption that it is, that you can conclude from it that the Church is

superstitious. To assume that it is superstitious is to assume what is in question, which you are not permitted to do. You must, therefore, since the point is denied, prove that the *cultus sanctorum* is useless."

"Reason can see no use in it."

"That, if conceded, were not enough. You can conclude nothing against the Church from the inability of reason. Reason must be able to affirm its inutility, or it can affirm nothing to your purpose."

"But I must have affirmative proof that it is useful, before I can reasonably assent to it."

"Nothing more true ; but the authority of the Church suffices for that, unless you can divest her of her authority. You are attempting to convict the Church of superstition, in order to be able to conclude against her authority. You must, then, prove that she authorizes superstition, as the condition of setting aside her authority, and, therefore, that what she authorizes is superstitious, as the condition of proving that she authorizes superstition. It is, therefore, not for me to prove that the *cultus sanctorum* is useful, but for you to prove that it is useless, and therefore superstitious."

"It is an undue worship."

"That is the point you must prove."

"Any worship which God forbids, does not exact, or approve, is an undue worship, and therefore superstition."

"Granted ; what then ?"

"What is your authority for saying that God does exact or approve what you term the *cultus sanctorum* ?"

"Your memory is apparently very short. Let me ask you by what authority you assert that God forbids it, or does not exact or approve it."

"I find no authority for it in the Scriptures."

"That is not certain ; but you cannot appeal to the Scriptures, for you have no legal possession of them and are not authorized to interpret them, and because you bring your action, not on the revealed, but on the natural law. Besides, the fact that you find no authority for the *cultus sanctorum* is not sufficient for your purpose ; you must have authority *against* it, and you can conclude nothing against it, unless you find it prohibited by the law of nature."

"I know, by the light of nature, that God does not exact or approve, but forbids, all idle and vain worship."

"Undoubtedly ; but what is idle and vain worship ?"

“ The Romish worship of the saints.”

“ That is begging the question, or making your accusation the proof of the truth of your accusation, — the ordinary Protestant method of proving what they assert against the Church. But proceeding in this way, we shall never be able to come to any conclusion. Is not any worship superstitious in which the worshipper looks for effects from inadequate causes ? ”

“ Perhaps so.”

“ Thus it is superstition to fear bad luck because we have seen the new moon over our left shoulder, or because we have begun a piece of work, put to sea, or commenced a journey on Friday ; to expect to discharge what we owe to God by paying divine honors to what is not God, to please him by vain observances, or to obtain blessings by means of prayers to inanimate or senseless objects, — objects which can neither bestow the blessings nor intercede with God for them ; for in these, and all similar cases, the causes are inadequate to the effects. On the contrary, in all cases in which the effects feared or expected are feared and expected from adequate causes, although there may be error, there is no superstition.”

“ Be it so.”

“ Then in order to convict the *cultus sanctorum* of superstition, you must show that the effects we expect from it are expected from inadequate causes.”

“ That can easily be done. The saints cannot atone for our sins, and be our mediators.”

“ Granted ; nor do we expect any thing of the sort from them. All we ask of them is their prayers.”

“ Even that is superstitious, because the saints have no power to hear your prayers or to pray for you.”

“ How know you that ? ”

“ They are no longer living.”

“ In the flesh, conceded ; but the Church assures us that they still live in the presence of God, and if they do, they can hear our prayers in him, and do for us all we ask of them ; and how can you, from the light of nature, say they do not so live ? ”

“ Your veneration of relics is superstitious, for you acknowledge that they have no life or sense to help you.”

“ We do not expect them to help us.”

“ Then the veneration is idle, and therefore superstitious.”

“ In the respect we pay to the relics of a saint, it is the saint we honor ; and whatever we expect, we expect from the intercession of the saint, and through that intercession from God, who is honored in his saints, and who himself delights to honor them.”

“ But the superstition is in supposing that honoring the relics is honoring the saint.”

“ The law of nature teaches the reverse ; for that teaches us that honor to what belonged to another, because it belonged to him, is a pious and affecting mode of honoring him. Hence the universality of funeral ceremonies, the marks of respect which all men show to the relics of their deceased friends, especially to the remains of those held to be deserving of honor for their rank, their virtues, their services, their heroic deeds ; and surely none are more deserving of honor than the saints of God.”

“ Your feasts, fasts, and external observances are all superstitious.”

“ How do you prove that ? ”

“ They are all external and mechanical ; and to expect spiritual effects from them is to look for effects from inadequate causes.”

“ The law of nature commands us to worship God externally as well as internally, and an external worship must needs be external. The fact, that what you object to is external, is, therefore, no ground of objection. Feasts or festivals are merely days set apart for public thanksgiving to God for his mercies and favors to us, in becoming man for us, in suffering and dying for us, in rising again for us, in sending us the Holy Ghost, in raising up and giving to us such or such a saint, &c. If kept according to the intent of the Church, internal as well as external thanks are rendered by each worshipper, and therefore the observance of the festival is not and cannot be mechanical. The law of nature commands the giving of thanks to God ; and perhaps even the mere external observance of appointed seasons for public thanksgiving is better than no observance at all. Fasts are for the mortification of the body ; they are admirably adapted to that end ; and the light of nature teaches us that the mortification of the body is wholesome for the soul. Moreover, to fast, as required, is also to fast with proper interior dispositions. You cannot, then, say, either that in them there is only a mechanical action, or that we look for effects from inadequate causes.”

“ But the idle ceremonies and vain observances of your public worship are superstitious.”

“ If idle and vain, superstitious of course ; but how do you know that they are idle and vain ? Our public worship consists of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, prayers, and singing the praises of God. These you have no right to pronounce idle or vain. Our sacrifice we hold to be a real sacrifice, in an unbloody manner, of a real victim ; and prayers and the singing of praises have, by the common consent of mankind, — the authority for determining what is the law of nature, — always been held to be appropriate parts of public worship. Much of what you call idle ceremony and vain observance is integral in the worship itself ; and what is not absolutely essential is adopted for the sake of decency, solemnity, and the edification of the faithful.”

“ I am not edified by it.”

“ Because you are not one of the faithful, and do not worship. Satan, no doubt, could himself bring the objection to our worship which you do. Our worship is adapted to the edification of those who worship, not of those who do not.”

“ But your worship is calculated to lead the weak and ignorant into idolatry and superstition.”

“ It will be time to consider that objection when you have shown that a Catholic, by practising what the Church enjoins or permits, is rendered superstitious.”

“ Your worship is exceedingly offensive.”

“ To whom ? To Protestants ? Then let them become Catholics, — especially since they have no warrant from Almighty God to be any thing else.”

“ Your Church is exceedingly impolitic. The practices to which we object may have been very well in dark and superstitious ages ; but men in this enlightened and scientific age demand a more pure and spiritual worship.”

“ The policy you would recommend to the Church, then, is, to be superstitious with the superstitious, and irreligious with the irreligious ? If her practices could have a superstitious tendency, it is precisely in a dark and superstitious age in which they would be dangerous, and when it would be least proper to insist on them. If this age be what you suppose, it is precisely now that they are most appropriate, as being in opposition to dominant tendencies. But the Church is not reduced to the necessity of taking the advice of those who

despise her, and very possibly the age is not so enlightened as it appears to those whose eyes are accustomed only to the twilight. Have you any thing more to add ? ”

“ There is no use in continuing the discussion. Let me say what I will, you will dispose of it by declaring it irrelevant, or by a sophistical distinction.”

“ Do you keep your word, and give up the Reformers and the Reformation ? ”

“ You have not made me a Romanist.”

“ I have not attempted to do that ; I have simply demanded of you a reason why you are a Protestant.”

“ I have given you reasons which satisfy me, and that is enough. Each of us must answer for himself, and not for another.”

“ You pledged yourself, if you failed to convict the Church of idolatry and superstition, to give up the Protestant cause. Do you regard yourself as having made out your case ? ”

“ There is no use in multiplying words. My mind is made up.”

“ You have no right to make up your mind without reason.”

“ My choice is made. I was born a Protestant ; I have lived a Protestant ; and I will die a Protestant.”

“ If you choose death, you, no doubt, can have it. Almighty God forces no man to enter into life.”

“ I take the responsibility ; and nothing shall move me.”

Here the conversation ended, and the two brothers separated. John entered a religious house, where he resides, devoting himself wholly to religion ; James remains the minister of his congregation. He has recently married again, and he appears to have forgotten his domestic afflictions. He continues at the head of the “ Protestant League,” is louder than ever in praise of the Reformers and the glorious Reformation, and more violent than ever in his denunciations of Catholics and Catholicity. Humanly speaking, there is no hope of his conversion. It is to be feared that James Milwood is the type of a large class of Protestant ministers. I would judge no individual, but it seems to me that the notion many people have that Protestants are generally in good faith, and ready to embrace the truth, if presented to them, rests on no adequate authority. So far as I have known Protestants, they are ready to say, as said a Protestant minister to me the other day, “ I would rather be damned than be a Catholic.”

ART. VI. — PIUS THE NINTH, and the *Political Regeneration of Italy.*

FREEDOM and improvement walking hand in hand, with religion for their guide, is a spectacle, which, while it reflects immortal honor on the age wherein it is exhibited, cannot fail to excite the admiration and praise of generations to come. History will record the great names of those who endeavour to chain interest to the throne of virtue, and to imitate the divine legislation by deriving the strength of their dominion from happiness and order, reserving force for those only who are so perverse as not to value the blessings of the one or the security of the other. Meanwhile, we, as Catholics, may feel a noble pride—the pride of children in their mother's greatness—at witnessing the High Priest of our holy religion inaugurate this reign of peaceful glory, and at hearing the peal which summons a great nation to rise from its slumbers, loose the bonds from its neck, and resume its garment of joy, issue from the sanctuary of the Christian Church.

The ashes of the Fisherman slumber beneath the shrine of the Vatican, a fitting sepulchre; but we behold a new and brilliant proof that the vivifying spirit with which his Divine Master endued him on the shores of Galilee was not entombed with them, but was bequeathed, like the prophetic mantle of old, to his successor.

A condensed sketch of the principal circumstances, which, duly considered, will enable them to judge of the true attitude of the present Holy Father, with regard to his temporal dominions, of the difficulties against which he has had to struggle in introducing social reforms, of his prudence, and of the probability of his success, cannot, therefore, fail to command the attention of our readers, to whom we should do no slight injustice, if we supposed for a moment that they could be indifferent to the well-being of the native land of Columbus and Americo, the nursery of religion, science, and the arts,—classic, holy, beautiful Italy,—or to the hero of our age, the honor of religion, the friend of improvement, our great and glorious Pope, PIUS THE NINTH.

Cæsar is represented by Lucan in the act of pausing, in his march to Rome, on the banks of the Rubicon, the boundary line of its immediate territory, as if then and there alone his

gigantic enterprise had burst in its true light upon his mind. The same feelings of anxiety which agitated the breast of the conqueror, whose powerful arm lacerated the charter of Roman freedom, must have filled, from different motives, the heart of the Pontiff, on the eve of the publication of the far-famed decree of the Amnesty. This great decree was the Declaration of Roman independence, the harbinger of a new order of things, the corner-stone of a system which was to change the political condition of Italy, and to elicit a voice of surprise and exultation from all the inhabitants of the earth. The Pontiff might have assented, as had been done before, to the liberation of a few privileged individuals through a solitary act of mercy, — but a total and unreserved grant of forgiveness he could not have signed, without willingly or unwillingly persevering in the career of which such a grant was the first step. In order to understand and admire more fully the magnanimity which dictated this step, let us recall briefly the circumstances of the new Pope's position, and take a cursory view of the events which gave rise to the present liberal feeling in Italy.

The first blow struck at the system of exaggerated conservatism, — the conservatism of abuses, — in modern days, was the independence of this country, asserted at a time when the claim seemed almost ridiculous, and achieved, after a brief struggle, in spite of revered prescription and superior force. The principle, that rational liberty is a vested right of the people, which to withhold is tyrannical in a ruler, to regain heroic in a nation, was first practically proclaimed to the world by our gallant forefathers at Lexington and Bunker's Hill. Had every people claimed their rights with equal moderation, resorting to force only when driven to it by the unjustifiable obstinacy of governments, the past century, and the present, would not have so many fearful crimes to account for at the bar of Eternal Justice. But the just and true principles of popular freedom were appealed to as the apology for criminal excess ; and the horrors of the French Revolution were the first baneful fruit of their perversion. The spirit of liberty, however, was abroad, and its power shook the thrones of the earth. In some regions it produced tumult and bloodshed, but was quelled by the overwhelming force of its opponents. In other places it merely required and obtained redress of grievances, or a modification of the existing forms of power. Let us consider the effects produced by the new reign of ideas in Italy.

The report that the colonies of Great Britain, on the distant shores of North America, had thrown off their allegiance to the mother country, produced little or no excitement in Rome, where political innovations were considered worthy of particular attention only when they could be practically represented by *the fig of Cato*. The Romans were too indolent, or too wise, to trouble themselves about the dissensions of a people of whom they knew little more, at the time, than that they lived on the other side of the ocean. But, for the contrary reason, the tidings of the French Revolution struck horror and dismay to every generous heart; and the liberty which could raise its head and smile, amid such revolting scenes as were of daily occurrence in the public squares of Paris and Lyons, was regarded as a demon let loose upon earth,—an appellation frequently given to it by the Italian poets of the time.

Still, there were men in Italy imbued with the principles of the Gallic philosophy,—men who labored under pecuniary embarrassments, or were impatient of all restraint,—and these envied the adventurers of the French anarchy, and longed for the time when, imitating their violence, they might enjoy their good fortune by fishing for office and opulence in the waters of society, made turbid under the specious pretext of social reform. The storm soon rolled on and darkened the shores of Italy. The queen of nations now became a province of Gaul, whose strong men were once brought to Rome to waste their lives, for the amusement of their conquerors, in the slavish occupation of gladiators! *

The transition of France from a republican bedlam to an absolute monarchy, which occurred soon after, improved not the hapless condition of Italy. The heathen Directory, whose members considered the Son of God highly honored by the title of "*Citizen Christ*," dragged Pope Pius the Sixth to die, an aged and suffering exile, in Valence; and the first and last of "Most Christian" emperors dared to raise his sacrilegious hand to menace Pius the Seventh, his prisoner at Fontainebleau. Still, at the time appointed by the Most High, the scourge of his anger passed away, the home of the Italian was

* The manner in which the French generals, and the men whom they raised to office in the Roman and Alpine Republics, oppressed, exhausted, and debased them, is generally known, and could not have been more unjust, or more rude, had their administration been intended as a *rétribution* for ancient wrongs.

disencumbered of foreign usurpers, and the Martyr-Pontiff returned once more to his see. The brief reign of the French had produced, however, a strong impression and lasting effects on the holy side of the Alps. The doctrines of **LIBERTY** and **EQUALITY**, arrayed in French fashion, had spread far and wide through the land; secret societies had been organized in different places; the good and the bad of the whole nation had been roused from their lethargy by the stirring events of that memorable period. The factious and the rebellious lamented that the times of turmoil and impunity should have passed away so soon; and many of those who would have remained faithful to their sovereigns permitted their allegiance to be shaken by the noisy declamation of their restless fellow-citizens.

Yet, down to this time, all parties seemed to view the renovation of Italy, not as a peaceable amelioration to be effected through legitimate means, and with the blessing of religion, but as a forbidden fruit to be snatched with the fearful joy of crime. The Church, without whose *fiat* no extensive change in Italy was ever obtained even in part, and without whose co-operation it would be vain to attempt to remodel the social order of the whole country in any rational form, could not sanction the cry of liberty as raised in the beginning of this century in Europe; for the few voices that uttered it with the reverence due to that sacred word were drowned in the delirious uproar of the multitude, who used it as synonymous with the wildest anarchy. If, then, the Church kept her old standard, and remained conservative on the side chosen by all the elder European governments, the cause was not any predilection in her for absolutism, but the fault of the pretended patriots, who sought for a change which would only have given to the people their lawless and grasping dictatorship in lieu of the ancient sovereignties.

The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was the only part of Italy which claimed a definite reform, the particulars of which were laid down with precision. The demand put forward there was, to be redeemed from the yoke of Austria, and to exist once more as a nation of Italians, not as a populace of German serfs. Many of the noblest and most gifted sons of Northern Italy identified themselves with the national cause, and Italy's rights were advocated by the serried arguments of the philosopher and the lofty aspirations of the poet.

The error which they committed was that of the Irish

Patriots of '98. They determined to obtain by a plot, matured in secret and to end in bloodshed, what they could hope to accomplish, or at least to prepare, only by persevering and constitutional agitation. The strong arm of Austria cut asunder the threads of their machinations, and led those who were saved from the scaffold, either to bedew with tears the hard bread of the prisoner, or to wander unpitied and alone in eternal exile from their native shores.

The attempt made by the Lombard patriots, and the failure of their plot, resounded over all Italy. Austria, alarmed by their schemes, after having destroyed the authors of them, insured her sway by drawing closer and tighter the bands of oppression ; and the other Italian governments, in the apprehension of similar attempts, imitated her example. Still, the spirit of discontent ceased not its silent work, and a new proof that it was not dead was exhibited, in the Pontifical States, at the accession of Gregory the Sixteenth to the chair of St. Peter.

The revolution of 1831 was, in its abettors, its motives, and its object, less honorable than the Lombard movement. Its abettors were chiefly the malcontent and disreputable portion of the community, leavened with the old French Revolutionary spirit. Many of them were officers and soldiers in retirement, and nearly all of them were Carbonari. They hated the quiet government of the Pope, under whom the exciting scenes in which they had been actors during the days of the republic and the empire were unknown ; and their object was, generally speaking, nothing but plunder and revolt.* Bologna and some other cities joined in the rebellion, with the hope of escaping from the rule of their unpopular governors. But no representation of their grievances preceded their rash and injudicious outbreak, and their aim was so undefined, that in Rome itself, when the military were led out upon the Piazza of the Column of Trajan, to quell the insurgents, they were received with discordant and ridiculous cries by the rabble, some exclaiming, " Viva la Libertà ! " " Viva la Repubblica ! " others, " Death to the Pope ! " and others even, " Long life to Louis Philippe ! "

The good sense of the true Roman people — and their de-

* As an illustration to the purpose, it is a remarkable fact that one of those who were placed for a time in personal danger by their lawless proceedings was the Archbishop of Spoleto, now Pope Pius, and one most active and effectual in repressing them his cousin, the chivalric Secretary of State, Cardinal Ferretti.

portment is a redeeming feature of those turbulent times — taught them that such a disgraceful insurrection was neither calculated to do honor to their country, nor to correct what was wrong in its administration. The Trasteverini especially, who are now such enthusiastic defenders of Pius the Ninth and his wise ameliorations, sided not with the profligate and bankrupt Liberals who opposed Pope Gregory; and as in Italy every feeling elevated above the ordinary routine has its expression in music and poetry, a *tarantella* or ballad in the popular dialect was composed for the occasion, and sung through the streets, which is well remembered in Rome to the present day. One stanza of it ran thus: —

“Santo Padre! non tremate
Se sentite archibugiate;
Che per farvi star sicuro
C'è Clemente e Peppe il Duro.”*

Clement and “Joseph the Tough,” were the Ciceroacchios of '31. The refrain of the ballad was, —

“Chi non dice Viva Gregorio
Si prepari al mortorio.”†

But under the melancholy auspices and amidst the extraordinary difficulties mentioned before, began the reign of Gregory the Sixteenth, — a prince of great benevolence of heart and extensive learning, worthy of better times, or, at least, of more prudent advisers. Those by whom alone the real liberties of the people could have been properly asserted kept aloof from the movement of the self-styled Liberals, which they considered only as a puny and spurious imitation of the French Revolution, and those who came forward professing to be the organs of the people were interested and faithless demagogues. What course could the new Pontiff adopt? His kind and generous disposition was met uncandidly and rudely by a rabble he had never offended. No one came to his aid, who was able and wise enough to help him; no man of powerful intellect and established popularity was found to indicate the proper course to be followed, or to conciliate the affections of

* “Holy Father! tremble not
If thou hearest their guns fire.
For to assure thee
Thou hast Clement and Joseph *surnamed* the Tough.”

† “Let those who say not ‘Life to Gregory’
Get ready for their funeral.”

his people in his favor. The country was not ripe for renovation, nor had the day appointed for it arrived.

Gregory saw not at home a friendly power upon which he could rely for support in his greatest need, and in an evil hour for the country, it was supplied by the proffer of Austrian intervention. By the aid of friendly bayonets, insurrection was quelled, and the new sovereign's influence was forced to work as part of a system composed of two other and unwholesome elements,—the mean chicanery and petty tyranny of subalterns, and the gratuitous and unjust, yet perpetual, interference of foreign envoys residing at Rome. A conservative stand once taken, the correction of every abuse was sought from the vigilance or interposition of the civil authority, until this omnipresent government became a heavy burden both for the people and their virtuous and benevolent sovereign. It became, however, gradually understood all over Italy, that this order of things could not last for ever.

Endowed with at least equal genius and better natural advantages, the people of Southern Italy remained stationary while the world all around was undergoing a change, believed to be for the better. In the course of time, the horror of innovation, so characteristic of the Italians, began gradually to subside, and the more powerful minds of the nation were compelled to charge themselves with the task of ascertaining the applicability of the principles of social reform to the wants and deficiencies of their country. They began to look upon the regeneration of Italy now, not as a dream, but as a necessity ; and fortunately they understood that so desirable a consummation was not to be brought about by a faction, but by the nation at large ; not by the people alone, but by their sovereigns ; not in spite of the religion of Italy, but with its approval and by its concurrence.

The powerful and elegant writer, Vincenzo Gioberti, of Turin, was the first well-known genius who seized upon the idea that the regeneration was to come from the *good*, by *lawful* means, and to place it before the people in its true light. In his *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*, he told his countrymen, in glowing terms, of the glory of their ancestors, who had excelled in military renown, and in every branch of science and literature, beyond all competition. He showed them what they were capable of accomplishing ; he roused the moral power of the nation, and directed it towards a definite object, by telling the people and their sovereigns what end

they should strive to keep in view. The plan which, according to his advice, was to be carried out, consisted in a constitutional arrangement of the affairs of Italy, in pursuance of which Austria was to yield up peaceably to the Italian princes the apple of discord, her Lombardo-Venetian provinces, and to receive a compensation, by the consent of the greater powers, in some other region. The princes of Italy, without losing any of their rights, were to unite for their general good understanding and security in a confederation, similar to that of Germany, with the Pope at its head, as the least likely to inspire distrust or jealousy. The work of Gioberti was somewhat enthusiastic, perhaps dreamy, and his summary disposal of the peninsula seemed too arbitrary to be ever effected. In some instances, too, he allowed his private disagreements to lend a tone of unjust and unprofitable severity to a book intended for the impartial instruction of the public. Still, it made the Italian Revolutionaries pause to reflect, and understand that violence is not a prudent beginning, where mutual confidence and union are the ultimate object, and that, as they had tried in vain to arrange their difficulties by getting rid of the Pope, they had better make the most of him by soliciting the aid of his powerful authority. The body of the people at large, and the clergy, who understood that some extensive reorganization must eventually take place, were delighted at the proposal of a methodical adjustment of things, which did not make it necessary for them to sacrifice their religion and plunge into the worst of all public evils, an intestine war. The work of Gioberti became the theme of every tongue, and had an immense merit in schooling the minds of the people and preparing them for the great events that Providence ordained to take place.*

Cesare Balbo, one of the most influential members of the Sardinian cabinet, followed, explained and partially modified the views of Gioberti, in his work, *The Hopes of Italy*. Another of the most popular authors of the day, the Marquis d'Azeglio, author of the celebrated romance, *The Challenge of Barletta*, pursued the favorite subject in his new book, *The Last Events of Romagna*, in the same practical and popular spirit.

Thus had an all-wise Providence gradually disposed the

* We speak here only of the first edition of Gioberti's work. We detest as much as any body can what he says of the Jesuits in the *Prelomina* to his second edition.

Italian public for a change, upon sound, and not anti-religious principles. The feasibility of a great bloodless revolution was canvassed down to the minutest details of its execution, and although it was not known from what point of the peninsula the unusual movement would receive its earliest impulse, all felt confident that something great to be performed was no longer a matter of choice, but a solution as inevitable as it was expected to prove beneficial.

This condensed historical sketch of the state of Italy previous to the accession of Cardinal Mastai to the Pontifical throne was necessary in order to give our readers a correct idea of the circumstances in which the new sovereign was then placed, and the main features of his position and policy can now be easily and briefly traced. Let us, then, see how he found himself situated at the time in regard to his people, to the Church, and to foreign powers.

His people, as it appears from what we have said, were already ripe for great and durable changes. They were prepared to receive them thankfully from authority, and to coöperate for them, under its guidance, upon sober and reasonable principles. The deportment of Pius, and the rapidity of his reforms, sufficiently prove this to have been his own conviction. We may add, that it was the firm opinion of every body conversant with the state of affairs in Italy, that, had not the rights of a nation been conceded by some power, human or divine, a desperate effort would have been made to seize them, not by an obscure faction, but by almost every individual who did not believe patient endurance or thoughtless repose ever preferable to an open claim of indemnity, or who did not hold all popular revolutions, even when inevitable, to be evil in themselves. What was his position in regard to the Church? — It is singular to notice the awkward accounts given of this particular by different classes of people, when the news of the changes at Rome began to be diffused abroad. Some of the Rationalistic, or, if we may so distinguish them, of the Macaulay school, saw nothing in Pius the Ninth but a man of powerful genius in the act of giving a new form to the beautiful system framed by men similarly gifted who had gone before him. Of Protestants in general, some wisely discovered that a new, thorough, godly reformation was on the carpet; some saw nothing but a cunning artifice of Austria in disguise; while others hesitated, uncertain what opinion to express at what they considered as the novel event of Antichrist transformed suddenly into a George Washington!

The only persons who spoke rationally were the unprejudiced friends of true liberty, who cheerfully applauded the extension of its blessings to the Italian people ; and the Catholics, who were, moreover, rejoiced at viewing the action of the Holy See, freed from all the hateful trammels of secular intrusion, manifest itself with the vivifying spirit with which it was animated, at first, by that heavenly Founder who promised to be with it for ever.

The Church from the very beginning fearlessly proclaimed the doctrine, that there is a moral force, more powerful than the will of monarchs, derived from a sublimer source than merely human legislation. To this doctrine, under God, she owes her existence and increase, during the first three centuries, against the tyranny of pagan Rome, and, after Rome had bowed to her sceptre, against imperial usurpation and feudal intrusion, during the Middle Ages. If our Leos, our Innocents, our Gregories, and our Hildebrands are admired for their indomitable courage, it is because they opposed the unjust claims of the heads of empires and of armies. During the struggles of the commonwealths of Italy against the emperors of Germany, the head of the Guelph or national party was the Pope. Alexander the Third, of glorious memory, went to Lombardy in person to unite the principalities and the free cities of the North in the far-famed league against Frederic, and if he did not himself mount horse and lead them to the field of battle, as Julius would have done, he lifted up his hands to heaven and blessed their banners, as the army of patriots passed before him in military array. The city of Alexandria in Piedmont was built by the allies, as a monument of gratitude to the Pontiff after whom it was named, and exists to this day to bear testimony to the memorable event.

Even the ambition of the Borgias, with the sixth Alexander at their head, had for its object to drive all French, Spanish, and German interlopers over the Alps, and to unite all Italy in one compact monarchy under the sway of their house,—a sway that would have been at least home-born and congenial.

If the Church in later times has lent her influence to maintain conservatism in Europe, it has been only because the fanatical advances and the indiscriminate violence of the reformers of Germany, England, and France, and of their philosophical pupils, the Terrorists of the Convention, have rendered such a course wise and necessary for public order. What superstition is to religion, anarchy is to liberty. Now that the

thinking portion of politicians, all over the world, have purified the true gold of liberty from the base alloy of anarchy, the Church claims it again as her own, and as an ornament which only became foreign to her, when its character, by the folly and madness of its pretended friends, was rendered doubtful, and its value uncertain. The Church thus proves that it is never necessary for her security to be behind the wise ameliorations which the changes inevitable in human affairs demand from age to age, and from people to people, and, truly universal, she not only follows with a firm and certain step the march of events, but even directs them powerfully to their true goal, — the social happiness of nations.

What, finally, was the position of Pius in regard to foreign powers? He certainly owed them no debt of gratitude, where-with he may be reproached, now that he has dared to arrange the affairs of his family without seeking their advice or court-ing their approval. Many encroachments had been made by them, which were protested against in vain; and many agree-ments concluded with them by his predecessors, of which they enjoyed all the advantages, and the Popes endured the un-pleasant restraint. *Concordats* had been most prudently and candidly arranged by the nuncios of Rome to the different capitals, with the existing monarchs, or by the Pontiffs at Rome with the representatives of foreign princes; but the result was almost invariably, that, while the Pope was com-pelled to fulfil on his part every iota of the contracts mutually signed, the monarchs, generally speaking, had scarcely sealed the stipulation with their *ultimatum* when they violated its most important clauses.* As a recompense for their want of faith, they graciously extended their patronage to the Pope, their protection to the Holy See, and Austria especially was ever ready to hand over to the Italian police any unfortunate youth who had used the word “freedom” in a sonnet to the *Shade of Dante*, but was always deaf when the Papal nuncio solicited the restoration of a parish priest, suspended, because he did his duty, by a colonel of carbiniers.

Each succeeding act of officiousness and usurpation rendered

* The Pope might have addressed to some of the monarchs who ad-vanced to give him greeting the interrogation of our blessed Saviour, which the Romans, with one of those withering satirical allusions for which they are so famous, addressed to the Emperor of Russia when he went to give *his* kiss of peace to Gregory the Sixteenth: — “*Amice, ad quid venisti?* — Friend, whereto art thou come!” (Matt. xxv. 50.)

the Pope's protectors physically stronger, but increased and strengthened on his side that moral power, which, impelled by Pope Pius as a weighty engine against Austrian influence in Italy, has shattered it, let us hope, for ever. May the prayers of all good Christians hasten on the happy day when that bird of ill omen, the double-headed eagle, will cease to darken, not only Ferrara, but even Milan, with its lugubrious presence !

Our readers will perceive that our object thus far has not been so much to extol those traits of magnanimity and benevolence of our beloved Holy Father which have been so justly and frequently lauded by the press, as to show that the course of which the promulgation of the decree of amnesty was the first irretrievable step was a course rendered advisable by every circumstance of time and place, — a course inspired by the principles of humanity, virtue, and patriotism, — a course which was not merely the advance of one benevolent individual, but of a whole nation, — a course adopted with mature and prudent deliberation.

Should the views proposed have, perchance, the effect of inclining some to think that Giovanni Maria Mastai, taken as a man and a politician, is not after all so wonderful as he is represented to be, that, since he has only obeyed the mandate of the age and nation over which he is called to preside, his foresight and his ability do not appear after all so very surprising, — should they be thought to warrant such a conclusion, then must we say that Pius the Ninth is not a statesman at all, but a hero !! He is a prophet, an apostle sent upon earth by the God of nations. In him, then, must we see personified and individualized the spirit of moral power in this century, as in the last the soul of physical force was embodied in Napoleon Bonaparte. Then let Austria quail beneath his gaze, for Pius is not simply a hero, but a host, — not merely a patriot, but a nation, — not only a holy man, but religion ! As it has been said that Ireland was O'Connell, and O'Connell Ireland, so now far more truly may we say Italy is Mastai, and Mastai is Italy ! But while we admire the wisdom of the Supreme Ruler in preparing and arranging the materials of such a mighty task as that of rousing a great nation from the slumber of ages, let us not offend that wisdom by forgetting the extraordinary personage whom God has appointed to perform it. In our admirable army, when a general has fallen upon the field of battle, a hitherto unknown officer is sometimes seen to assume the command, and by his coolness and valor to extricate his

warriors from a position of jeopardy and exposure. In like manner did Pius step forth from the ranks, in the moment of difficulty, and with calm and resolute dignity seat himself upon the first of earthly thrones, and by the waving of his hand compose to peace and tranquillity the stormy elements whose incessant turmoil had rendered so difficult the times of his venerable predecessor. Who taught *him* to wear with ease the garments of sovereignty, who, a few days before, had only shown himself an individual adorned with the private virtues of integrity and prudence? Where did *he* learn to walk without discomfort in the brilliant but heavy panoply of a hero, who was but a fit shepherd for a small and remote portion of the Christian fold?

From his quiet and secluded home, he studied the condition of his native country and the wants of his fellow-citizens. He explained to himself the secret causes of division and mistrust, and divined the charm whose virtue was adequate to remove the motives of complaint. It is said, that he had registered the fruits of his long and accurate investigation, in the view of bequeathing, at his death, to the Pontiff who should then fill the chair of St. Peter, a book to serve as a guide towards the most certain and expeditious method of raising Italy to the level of modern improvement. And when called, himself, by the inscrutable dispensations of Providence, to fulfil the sublime duty which he had so much at heart, O, how the spirit of noble generosity and paternal benevolence pervaded the whole system of his government! The decree of amnesty is a beautiful example to show that these qualities are as great in the reigning Pontiff as are his consummate skill and unparalleled wisdom. We must be allowed to recall to the memory of our readers the beginning of that celebrated decree, the wording of which is the first, and a faithful, specimen of Pius the Ninth's diplomacy:—

“PIUS IX., POPE,

“TO HIS MOST FAITHFUL SUBJECTS.

“During the days when our heart was deeply moved by the public rejoicing at our exaltation to the Pontificate, we were unable to repel an emotion of sorrow, upon thinking that not a few families of our subjects were held back from a full participation in the common joy, because, in the deprivation of domestic comfort, they suffered a great portion of the punishment merited by some relative who had done injury to social order and the sacred rights of his legitimate sovereign. In like manner we turned an eye of compassion upon many inexperienced young men, who, although

drawn by fallacious inducements into political turmoil, seemed to us rather the victims than the authors of seduction. From that very time, therefore, it was our intention to extend our hand and offer peace to the children who had gone astray, should they wish to exhibit signs of repentance. The attachment which our good people has shown to us, and the evidence of constant veneration which the Holy See has received in our person, have assured us that we can pardon without danger to the public. Accordingly, we ordain and direct that the opening of our Pontificate be solemnized by the following acts of sovereign grace.

"I. To all our subjects who find themselves at the present moment in a place of correction, on account of political offences, we forgive the remainder of their penalty, provided they solemnly make a written declaration, upon their personal honor, that they will not at any time, or in any place, abuse this concession, but that they will rather endeavour to fulfil every duty of a faithful subject.

"II. Under the same condition, all those subjects who have gone to foreign parts for political motives will be received again into our States," &c., &c., &c.

These words were a signal for entoning a hymn of thanksgiving by millions of happy men. When the bereaved mother, the daughter, the spouse, the sister, of the captive and the exile read those words, tears of gratitude and joy gushed from their full hearts, and, fervently kissing the document which bore them, they lifted up their eyes and their hands to heaven, praying that God would bless and protect that Father who in the days of his exaltation had thought of the secret grief of their unhappy families. And when the decree of mercy was read to the emaciated prisoner himself, — "What," he exclaimed, "am I to give promise of submission and just obedience upon no bond but mine *honor*, — I, who would not have been listened to before now as capable of uttering a truth, though accompanied by the most sacred and awful oaths?" — and seizing the pen with which he was to sign the sentence of his own liberation, he wrote, while his hand trembled with emotion, that he would yield up his blood and his soul in defence of the great and good Pius, who rendered his benefits a bond of double force by the winning grace and magnanimous generosity with which he conferred them.

After the promulgation of the decree of amnesty, some time was spent by the Holy Father in maturing his designs of improvement. This circumstance should not be forgotten by those who are tempted to think that he proceeds too rapidly

in his measures of reform. Although day after day he was closeted with the wisest amongst the cardinals, with the Roman princes, and the true friends of the people, still weeks and months rolled by and no radical or general amelioration was announced. An incident was recounted in Rome at the time, which may be mentioned as characteristic of his appropriate and graceful manner of doing even a little thing well. A sheet of gilt-edged paper was found by a prelate, one afternoon, upon the staircase that leads to the Pope's apartments in the Vatican, bearing two Italian verses, the sense of which was, —

“Mastai, you promised wonders,
Pray what are they to be?”

The Holy Father was not in the palace, but when he passed through the antechamber upon his return, the prelate presented the curiosity to him. Having read the verses, he quietly took a pen from a table near at hand, and in his usual happy and easy mood completed the stanza with no unsatisfactory answer, —

“Mastai, you promised wonders,
Pray what are they to be?”
“*Have patience yet a little while,
And I will let you see!*”

He has redeemed his promise. By resigning in favor of his people privileges heretofore absorbed by the sovereignty, he has shown that he felt himself in possession of despotic power to its widest and farthest extent, and that he acknowledged a well-educated and religious people to be its most fitting and worthy co-administrator.

The greatest concessions made, up to the present day, have been the liberty of the press, the National Guard, the grant of constitutional privileges. These three great concessions, while they elevate the people to the enjoyment of the blessings they so ardently desired, return back to him who granted them in the character of a certain and unfailing support. For the temperate and judicious regulations of the press have enlisted that great engine of public opinion, and the moral power of which it is the vehicle, in defence of the sovereign's wise and independent measures; the National Guard, superseding the friendly bugbear of foreign protection by the aggregate of the country's force, is his assurance against annoyance from without and turmoil within; and the constitutional reform,

including the adequate representation of the provinces, the reorganization of the civil and criminal code, and the remodeling of the administration throughout his dominions, will redeem him from the incessant anxiety and unpleasant sense of responsibility which ever afflict the sovereign of an unhappy country. The people will be employed by the exercise of these powers under the auspices of their sovereign, who, while he renders them quiet and contented, has placed upon them the responsibility hitherto incumbent upon himself, making it their interest to conduct themselves with propriety, and in a certain measure identifying their safety and their happiness with their loyalty.

In the Church, of course, no reorganization is intended, no improvement is needed or expected of Pius the Ninth. But to the minor and every-day details of her intercourse with the civil power, and her well-being in particular times and places, her Chief Pastor will devote himself with a sincerity of zeal, which, while it purifies and encourages those who are within, will edify and attract those who are without. This the Holy Father has expressed to be his greatest and dearest wish. In the very beginning of his administration he is known to have said, — “I wish now to regulate well the little wheels of my state, that I may afterwards do my duty at those great wheels of the Church which the Almighty has appointed me to direct.”

Were it the object of our present remarks, we might here point out the good effects already obtained by Pius the Ninth, in his character of Sovereign Pontiff, amidst his incessant occupations and various cares as monarch. Madrid, London, Jerusalem, to pass over in silence other places which might be mentioned, have borne brilliant testimony to them. The infidel monarch of the East, once so much dreaded, has proffered the right hand of friendship to the old enemy who broke his armaments and scattered his forces at Lepanto and Vienna. May we not hope that the various Christian populations of the East — who wander apart, but not far from the precincts of the true fold — will, ere long, be led by all-powerful grace to bethink themselves of the Father, whose name, in the days of Chrysostom, and Athanasius, of Gregory the Illuminator, and Anthony the Abbot, was emblazoned in letters of gold upon the sacred Diptychs, and breathed with reverence amidst the mysterious rites of the incruent Sacrifice? May we not hope that Pius is the shepherd chosen by the Almighty to gather

these wandering children back into the fold? And, to continue this strain of joyful anticipation, is it too much to hope that the influence of the Pope's humane polity may teach other rulers — though Italy claim them not for her children by their birthright or their faith — that there is a triumph more glorious than that of the leader of victorious armies, — a triumph which extends its conquest over the heart of a people, by permitting it to breathe legitimately the hymn of freedom? It was from the City of the Seven Hills that the Western world learned its veneration for that false military renown which has caused rivers of tears and of blood to flow in many a hapless region. The ideal of a Christian hero now exhibited by the same city to the world cannot be given by the Almighty as an object of sterile admiration. O, may the day be not far distant when the glory of Pius will be emulated in other lands, when the same notes of content which make the cloudless sky and the sunlit plains of Italy look more beautiful will be reëchoed by a thousand happy voices in other regions and in other tongues, — in every land where oppression yet counts one dishonorable shrine, from the blood-stained battlements of Cracow, Prague, and Warsaw, to the plain of Clontarf and the hill of Tara!

Rome — Italy — affords ample reason to hope for so consoling a spectacle. For the influence of the spirit which animates the breast of Pius seems to breathe, under his auspices, through the whole country, whispering to every heart lessons of duty, of religion, of propriety.

When the numerous prisoners of Sant' Angelo in Rome beheld the gates of the castle open before them, as by miracle, and heard their sometime guardians invite them to walk forth wherever it liked them best, what were the first noisy demonstrations of their joy? No obstreperous display of rejoicing was there, but the same hand which broke the fetters of bondage from their limbs adorned their necks with the golden chain of religion. Of their own free will and accord, they assembled in the venerable Basilica of St. Peter *ad Vincula* on the Esquiline Mount, there to kneel in humble repentance before the altar of the Most High, and to partake of the bread of life; not deeming themselves fully delivered while a stain remained upon their conscience, and escaping at the same time from the fetters of oppression and the bondage of crime.

Scarcely had Pius inaugurated the reign of pardon and friendship from the Vatican, when the spirit of dissension

seemed to take an eternal departure from the dominions of St. Peter. No theft, no quarrel, no crime, was heard of throughout the city. If a crowd assembled, and it was breathed that its proceedings would displease the Pope, it spontaneously dispersed, each one retiring quietly to his own home.

Compare these results of paternal benignity with the consequences of the opposite system in the sister kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In the squares of Reggio and Messina the guillotine is erected, in lieu of the arches of peaceful triumph which adorn the thoroughfares of Rome and Bologna ; and in place of the hymn of gratitude which greets the ears of the benevolent Pontiff, the misguided monarch is assailed with the curses of a people driven to misery and guilt by his obstinate and imprudent severity. The name of King Ferdinand, had he imitated the noble example proposed to him, might have been handed down to posterity with the name of Pope Pius ; yet, in all probability, Sicily is a picture of what Latium would have been, but for the wisdom and benignity of its godlike ruler.

To adduce another instance of what the Roman provinces are now, rival townships, which from the days of the Guelphs and Ghibellines had maintained hereditary hostility and kept alive traditional feuds, have sent their people, telling their beads, with their priests at their head, to salute each other as brothers, and to unite in the kiss of peace, from their magistrates down to the humblest artisans.

All seem to have taken for their maxim the beautiful sentence which appeared in large letters upon the Ruspoli palace in the Corso, on the day of Pius's first triumph, the glorious 8th of September, 1846 : —

“ Not one of us will be guilty of
a thought or a deed that might
disturb for an instant the calm
of his paternal heart.”

O, how much this noble, this generous, this religious people are wronged by those who think that they would be capable of abusing the gifts bestowed upon them by the anointed hand of Pius, to the injury of social order, or that God will permit them to succumb in their efforts to reach the goal of national security and happiness ! The work commenced by the Sovereign Pontiff is the work of God, and must and will be crowned with that success so ardently desired by every heart to which the sacred charity of the Gospel is not a stranger.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. — *Christian Ballads*. Revised Edition, with Additional Ballads. Hartford: Pearson. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 192.
2. — *The Story of Raymond Hill, and other Poems*. By JOHN DENNISON BALDWIN. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 123.
3. — *Remarks on the Past and its Legacies to American Society*. By J. D. NOURSE. Louisville, Ky.: Morton & Griswold. 1847. 12mo. pp. 223.
4. — *Locke Amsden, or the Schoolmaster*. By the Author of "May Martin," "The Green Mountain Boys," &c. Boston: B. B. Mussey & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 231.
5. — *Human Knowledge: a Discourse before the Massachusetts Alpha of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Cambridge, August 20th, 1847*. By GEORGE P. MARSH. Boston: Little & Brown. 1847. 8vo. pp. 42.
6. — *The Progress and Prospects of Germany: a Discourse before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Brown University, at Providence, R. I., September 1st, 1847*. By HENRY WHEATON, late Minister of the United States at the Court of Prussia. Boston: Little & Brown. 1847. 8vo. pp. 54.
7. — *Fame and Glory. An Address before the Literary Societies of Amherst College, at their Anniversary, August 11th, 1847*. By CHARLES SUMNER. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1847. 8vo. pp. 51.
8. — *The Duty of Obedience to the Civil Magistrate. Three Sermons preached in the Chapel of Brown University*. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, President of the University. Boston: Little & Brown. 1847. 8vo. pp. 40.
9. — *The Massachusetts Quarterly Review*. No. I. Vol. I. December, 1847. Boston: Coolidge & Wiley. 8vo. pp. 143.
10. — 1. *The Saints and Servants of God. The Life of St. Philip Neri, Apostle of Rome, and Founder of the Congregation of the Oratory*. 2. *The Lives of St. Thomas of Villanova, Archbishop of Valencia and Augustinian Friar; and of St. Francis Solano, Apostle of Peru, of the Order of St. Francis*. New York: Edward Dunigan. London: Thomas Richardson & Son. 1847. 2 vols. 8vo.
11. — *Oregon Missions and Travels over the Rocky Mountains in 1845-46*. By FATHER P. J. DE SMET, S. J. New York: Edward Dunigan. 1847. 12mo. pp. 408.
12. — 1. *Instructions on the Commandments and Sacraments*. From the Italian of St. Liguori. By a Catholic Clergyman. Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1847. 32mo. pp. 254. — 2. *Man's only Affair: or Reflections on the Four Last Things to be remembered*. From the French. Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1847. 32mo. pp. 160. — 3. *The Christian sanctified by the Lord's Prayer*. From the French of Father Grou. Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1845. 16mo. pp. 120.
13. — *The Metropolitan Catholic Almanac, and Laity's Directory, for 1848*. Baltimore: F. Lucas, jr.

. WE send out here the first number of the second volume of our new series. Our readers, we trust, will find it not quite so heavy as have been some of the preceding numbers. We think, from the promises of assistance we have received, that we may assure our readers that they will have in the Review hereafter a periodical coming nearer to what a Catholic Review in this country should be, than they have heretofore had. Several vexed questions, which it was thought necessary to discuss, and which could not be discussed without grieving some worthy people, probably will not come up again, and we shall, most likely, henceforth be free to carry on the war solely against the errors of the avowed enemies of Catholicity.

Some have complained that the Review adopts a tone unbecoming a recent convert and a layman, but without justice. The editor of this Review is indeed a recent convert and a layman, but he is nobody, and should not be taken into the account, because the question is not what it is or is not becoming in him to say, but what is or is not becoming in a Catholic Quarterly Review, and because it is well known that in religious and theological matters he does not speak from his own head, but under the revision of those who are neither laymen nor converts. Then, again, it is hardly Catholic to look at the editor, rather than at the doctrine he advances. If the doctrine is sound, it must be held, let who will advance it; if it is unsound, its unsoundness is a sufficient reason for not holding it.

We have never expected to be able to please every body, but we are bound to say that our success has been greater than we ever expected. The patronage extended to the Review has been and is encouraging, and demands our warmest thanks, especially to the venerable prelates of the American Church, and to the reverend clergy, whose approbation we court, and against whose approbation we could not succeed, and should be sorry to succeed, if we could. We publish the Review for them and the faithful generally, and to them we commit it without reserve. It is theirs; we are only their servant, to do the bidding of the pastors of the Church, without any reference to our own will or pleasure.

The continued success of the Review will depend entirely on the interest taken in it by the venerable bishops and clergy, who have thus far shown it all the favor that could be asked; we shall do our best to render our labors not unworthy of their approbation hereafter, and, if not to serve, at least not to injure, the cause of our holy religion.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1848.

ART. I.—*Admonitions to Protestants.* No. II. *Obligation to worship God. — Insufficiency of Reason.*

I. You know, my brethren, that God is ; for the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from creation, being understood by the things that are made. You cannot, then, doubt that you are under an obligation to worship him, and an obligation from which neither you can withdraw yourselves, nor even he himself dispense you.

Is not this the common sense of mankind ? In every age and nation, savage, barbarous, or civilized, do you not find the fact of our obligation to worship God acknowledged and asserted ? Have not even those of your philosophers, who maintain that religion is a law or principle of human nature, universal, permanent, and indestructible, triumphantly proved, that religious worship, of some sort, is coeval and coextensive with the race ? Assuredly, what is approved by all men, in all ages of the world, is a dictate of reason, and we cannot deny it without divesting ourselves of that which constitutes the peculiar dignity and glory of our nature, and, as far as in our power, placing ourselves out of the category of men, and in that of irrational beings.

Moreover, the obligation of all men to worship God is not only certain from the common sense of mankind, from what Immanuel Kant calls the practical reason, but it is a truth of the pure reason itself, and as demonstrably certain as any truth of philosophy or mathematics. Certainly, the creator has the sovereign right of property to the creature, — the maker, to

the thing made. Is not this what you assert, when you say, a man has a right to the produce of his own hands, or the laborer is worthy of his hire? Is not God our creator? Has he not made us and bestowed upon us all our original endowments? You cannot deny it; for we could not act before we were, or bestow what we had not. Then he has the sovereign right of property to us; then we are his, not our own; and then we are bound to render ourselves, with all our original endowments, unto him, for justice requires us, as is undeniable, to render unto every one his own.

To render ourselves, that is, the tribute of our whole being, unto God as his due is, in general terms, what is to be understood by worshipping him. If, then, justice, as it undeniably does, requires us to render unto every one his due, and if we are due to God, are his and not our own, assuredly we are bound to worship him. This you cannot deny.

Can we ever withdraw ourselves from this obligation, or can it, by any act of ours, ever become true that we are not bound to worship God? Certainly not, unless we are able to destroy the relation which we hold to God as his creatures. We are bound to worship him because we are his; and we are his because he has made us. We are bound to render unto him the tribute of our being because he is its author, and of our whole being because he is the author of the whole. So long, then, as it remains true that he is the author of the whole, we must be bound to worship him. Can we ever make it true that he is not the author of our whole being, that he has not made us and bestowed upon us all our faculties? If not, — and we cannot, for it is metaphysically impossible, — we can never withdraw ourselves from the obligation to worship God, or be released from it by any act of ours.

But cannot God, if he chooses, dispense us from this obligation? The obligation to render unto every one his due, and therefore ourselves unto God, is an obligation of eternal justice. To deny it would be to deny justice itself, that which is essential to the very conception of justice. To dispense from it would, then, be to dispense from the obligations of eternal justice, and to authorize injustice. God cannot do this, or choose to do it; for he is essentially just, and it would be to contradict his own essential, eternal, and immutable nature. Then it must follow, that, as long as we exist, we are bound to render unto him, and he must exact, the tribute of our whole being. Then are we under obligation to worship God,

and an obligation from which neither we can withdraw ourselves nor he himself dispense us.

You must concede this, my brethren, or deny all morals. A moral action is not merely one which it is agreeable, convenient, or useful to perform, but a debt which we owe and are obliged in justice to pay. All morality rests on the idea of duty, and all duty on the principle, that we are bound in justice to give unto every one his own. If, then, you assert moral obligation at all, you must concede that we are bound to worship God ; for, evidently, we cannot be less bound to render unto God what is his than unto others what is theirs. Then, if you deny the obligation to worship God, you must deny that we are bound to render unto every one his own, and then moral obligation itself, and with it all morals.

But the obligation to worship God, if conceded, includes all our obligations, and is the only obligation which can be asserted. It is obvious to every one, that we can owe only on condition, that, to the extent of our indebtedness, we are not our own ; and equally obvious, that we can owe only him whose we are. We owe God, because we are his, — our whole being, because our whole being is his. If we owe our whole being to him, we can owe only him ; for we evidently cannot be indebted beyond our whole being. Owing our whole being to God, we are incompetent to contract debts to or from another. The earnings of property are the proprietor's. If God owns our whole being, as he must if the author of the whole, he owns our faculties, and then all that we can do or acquire by their exercise. We are, then, in the condition of the son under age, who is incompetent to acquire property or to contract debts. What is due to the services of the son is due to the father ; what is due to services rendered by others to the son is due from him only in and through the father. So with us, we can bind or be bound only in and through God, whose we are. If we can bind only in and through him, others can be bound to us or owe us any thing only as they owe, and for the reason that they owe, it to him ; and if we can be bound only in and through him, we can owe others but as we owe, and for the reason that we owe, him. Is it not undeniable, then, that our duty to God is our only duty, and that our obligation to worship him includes all our obligations ?

Unquestionably, we are bound to take proper care of ourselves, and to do ourselves no harm. But to whom are we

bound? To ourselves? That is absurd, for it implies that the binder and the bound are identical, and also that we are our own; but so far as our own, it is evident that we are not and cannot be bound at all. If our own, we are free to dispose of ourselves as we please. May I not do as I will with mine own? If our own, whose business is it, if we waste our strength and activity, destroy our health of mind or body, and kill ourselves, body and soul? But we are not our own; we belong, in our whole being, to God, who has the sovereign right to all that we are and have; therefore we are bound, not to ourselves, but to him;—and bound to him to take proper care of ourselves and to do ourselves no harm, because justice requires us to take proper care of what is intrusted to us, and to refrain from all injury to the property of another.

Unquestionably, again, we are bound to do as much for our neighbour, to love him as we love ourselves. But to whom are we bound? Not to him; for he is no more his own than we are our own. Not being his own, he cannot bind us; having nothing of his own, he cannot bring us in debt to him. The obligation, therefore, is not to him, but to God, whose he is, and whose is all that he has, or that we receive from him. He being the property of God, who is our owner, our master, as well as his, and being also our equal, we are bound to treat him as ourselves; for we must needs be as much bound to protect and not to injure the property of our master in another as in ourselves.

If this be so, it is evident that we cannot worship God, if we refuse to love and serve our neighbour. The claim of God extends to our whole being, and covers every sphere of our activity. God is the author of our whole being, and of all our relations, whether relations of family, of neighbourhood, of country, or of humanity; and therefore whatever is due to these is due to him, and must be paid, or we fail to discharge the debt we owe him. The duties growing out of these several relations are as integral in the worship of God as any other duties we do or can owe. He who would love God must love his brother also; and he who would worship God must serve his neighbour. There is no such thing as being faithful Godward, and faithless manward.

But because the worship of God includes integrally all our duties, you must not suppose that this worship is resolvable into the love and service of humanity, as do your Socialists and Humanitists. The debt is due to God, and to him alone.

As sovereign proprietor of it, he may transfer it, and make it payable to whom he pleases ; but it must be paid to him, or his order, or it is not paid at all. It may be payable to our neighbour, but only because God appoints him his agent to receive it. The error of your Socialists and Humanityists is not in asserting our duty to love and serve our neighbour, nor in identifying this love and service with the worship of God ; but in asserting that they are due to our neighbour in his own right, and that we pay it to God because we pay it to man. We are assuredly to love and serve humanity, but not for humanity's sake. We love and serve our neighbour for God, and when we do so we worship God. But we cannot reverse it, and love and serve God for our neighbour ; for our neighbour, not being the owner of God, cannot be the owner of the debt. The debt is not due to our neighbour, and to make it due to him is to deny it to be due to God, — is to put man in the place of God, — the very essence of idolatry, forbidden alike by reason and revelation, and which threatens, unless checked, to assume ere long an avowed and public form, as is not obscurely indicated in the “ soul-worship ” and “ Hero-worship ” of your Transcendentalists.

Nevertheless, my brethren, do not start at the assertion of your obligation to render unto God the tribute of your whole being. Undoubtedly, it implies your absolute subjection, soul and body, to God, — but this is not, as some of you have alleged, slavery ; for slavery is not in subjection, but in *unjust* subjection. The slave is not more subjected to his master than the wife to her husband, or the son, while he serves, to his father, and if equally due, his subjection would be no more a grievance, or slavery, than theirs. Absolute subjection to God, if just, — and it is just, if his due, — is, then, no slavery, no grievance, no infringement of man's natural right or freedom.

All men do and must concede their absolute subjection to God, for they all do and must concede their absolute subjection to justice. No man can pretend that he has the right to be unjust, the right to do wrong ; for it is a contradiction in terms. Rights are founded in justice, or they are wrongs, not rights. The denial of justice is the denial of right, and the denial of right is the denial of rights ; for *rights* are only by participation of *right*. The ground of all complaints is the real or supposed injustice of the matter complained of ; and whatever men demand they demand it on the ground of its

real or pretended justice. The highest conception of freedom is in absolute subjection to justice, and to justice alone ; and authority, civil or ecclesiastical, is held to be tyrannical or oppressive only because it is held to be unjust in its origin or exactions. What is just all men feel they may exact, and are bound to give. It is clear, then, that they acknowledge the absolute sovereignty of justice. But justice is God, who in himself is eternally and essentially just. Absolute subjection to God is, then, simply absolute subjection to justice. All men, therefore, in admitting their absolute subjection to justice, admit their absolute subjection to God ; and since no one ever regards it as a hardship to be subjected to justice, no one can feel it a hardship to be subjected to God.

The repugnance manifested by your Liberals to the doctrine which requires every man to render unto God the tribute of his whole being results either from their hatred of justice, or their supposition that justice and God are separable. If the former, they are clearly condemned ; for no man hates justice, unless conscious that his deeds are unjust. The latter cannot be entertained. We are not permitted to suppose that justice may stand on one side, and God on the other ; for that would be to suppose God without and opposed to justice. Reason is declarative, not legislative. In teaching that justice requires us to render unto every one his due, it declares the precept of justice, but does not create it. Justice itself must, then, be prior to and independent of reason. Prior to and independent of reason, it must be something or nothing. It cannot be nothing ; for that would deny both reason and justice. Then it must be something ; and if something, since reason declares it to be universal, eternal, and supreme, it must be God. Then God is essentially just, and we cannot suppose him distinguished from justice without supposing his non-existence. But his non-existence is not supposable ; for he is a necessary existence, — *ens necessarium*. His existence, then, must be supposed always and everywhere ; and then, always and everywhere, must he be supposed as essentially, infinitely, immutably, and eternally just, — justice itself. It is, then, absurd, as well as impious and atheistical, to suppose him ever otherwise than just, or that we, in surrendering ourselves unreservedly to him, can possibly run any risk of losing our rights, or of being oppressed. Our rights have thus the guaranty of infinite justice.

Moreover, my brethren, you must not fall into the error

common to many of your number, that, though we are bound to worship God, we are nevertheless not bound to render him any outward or external service. The worship of God, exacted by eternal justice, is the tribute of our whole being. Our being consists of body and soul, and is at once external and internal. Consequently, we must be bound to render unto God both soul and body, and therefore both internal and external worship.

This much you must concede, or deny human reason itself. But human reason itself you cannot deny ; for you have nothing but it on which to deny it, and to deny it on its own authority is to affirm it. That you are bound to worship God is as certain as any moral or even mathematical truth is or can be ; for it combines in its favor both the practical reason, or common sense of mankind, as is historically provable, and the speculative or demonstrative reason, as you have just seen, — the only two kinds of certainty which natural reason ever furnishes or demands. Let it be assumed, then, that we are under an obligation to worship God, from which neither we can withdraw ourselves, nor even he himself dispense us. This is, and must — let the consequences be what they may — be conceded to be, certain and undeniable.

II. But, my brethren, though natural reason suffices to teach us that we are bound to worship God, to render unto him the tribute of our whole being, is it certain that she also suffices to prescribe, practically, the worship we are to render ? It is not enough to know what is the worship of God in the abstract, if we know not also what it is in the concrete, — what it is in general, if we are ignorant of what it is in particular ; because the abstract has no actual existence, and because all actual knowledge is restricted to the knowledge of actual existences. There is no knowledge of things in general, if none of things in particular ; for we know the general only in the particular. We know man only as we know men, in which man in general is rendered special and individual. This principle holds universally true with regard to human life. Every act of life is individual, particular. We may know in general that we are bound to render our whole being unto God as his due ; but we know not what it is to worship him, unless we also know our being, what is rendering it to God, and what is the way or manner in which he requires it to be rendered.

To render ourselves to God implies on our part an act ; to

worship God is to do something, and is in all cases, in thought, word, and deed, to do that which God commands. But this act, this doing, must be *our* act, and therefore a voluntary act; for an act done from necessity is not our act, but the act of that which necessitates. No act is properly a voluntary act, if not done from intellectual apprehension of the end for which it is done. No act, then, is an act of worship, unless we know that God commands it, and do it because he commands it. The obligation to worship God is, indeed, our only obligation, but it extends, as has been said, to our whole being, and covers every sphere of our activity, and therefore requires every act we perform to be an act of worship. Evidently, we cannot fulfil this obligation, unless in every sphere of life, in every department of human activity, we know the particular acts God commands. Now is natural reason able to give this extensive and minute knowledge, and not only to the highly gifted few, but to every individual of our race who is bound by the obligation to worship God? Or, in other words, is natural reason sufficient to prescribe, practically, the worship of God?

Do not conclude, in your haste, that this question impeaches or is intended to cast suspicion on the veracity of reason. The veracity, the infallibility, of reason is conceded, and must be held, or nothing can be concluded or affirmed on any subject whatever. This is settled, for the obligation to worship God is itself asserted on her authority, and we cannot without inconsistency recognize it in one case and deny it in another. But may not reason be infallible, and yet not be sufficient? May there not be things necessary for us to know, to which her light does not extend? Is it not possible for her to be able to declare that we are in all things subject to law, and yet not be able to declare in all cases what is the law, — that we are, always and everywhere, bound to do right, and yet not able, always and everywhere, to declare what is right? However infallible reason may be where her light shines, she is undeniably limited. All men find themselves confronted with the unknown, and, by natural means, the unknowable. Who knows not that reason asks more questions than she answers? Who pretends that human beings have the attribute of omniscience, as they would have if reason were unlimited? To assert that reason is limited is no impeachment of her veracity; for this she herself asserts, and never does she assert the contrary. She declares her

own limitations, and they are asserted on her own authority. She must be as competent to declare that she does not know, where she does not, as that she does know, where she does ; and to confide in her in the former case is to affirm her veracity as much as it is to confide in her in the latter.

Do not, again, conclude that the question must needs relate to the sufficiency of reason to prescribe a worship of God satisfactory to the Christian believer. The Christian professes to have a supernatural revelation. To require reason, on pain of being condemned as insufficient, to prescribe a worship satisfactory to him, would be to begin with the assumption of what is in question, to assume the truth of Christianity, and erect it into a standard for reason ; which were not to reason, but to dogmatize. No standard outside of reason can be set up, till it is authorized by grounds of credibility satisfactory to reason herself. Till then, reason is her own standard. All that can be asked of her is that she prescribe a worship with which she herself is satisfied. If she can prescribe such a worship in the concrete as well as the abstract, she must be pronounced sufficient, unless Almighty God in a supernatural manner informs us of her insufficiency. But if she be unable to do it, then, on her own authority, we must pronounce her insufficient. The question, therefore, simply asks, Is reason able to prescribe a worship which meets the demands of reason ? or, Does reason suffice for reason ?

This question is evidently a question of fact, not of speculation, and is to be answered by an appeal to experience, not to reasoning. Our powers of knowing are innate, but our knowledge itself is by experience, whether of ourselves or of any thing else. We know ourselves only as we see ourselves manifested in our acts, in like manner as we see our faces only as they are reflected in a mirror. We ascertain what faculties we possess, and what is their reach, only in their operations. We know sight by seeing, taste by tasting, touch by touching, love by loving, fear by fearing, joy by joying, reason by reasoning, or by detecting it in its operations in ourselves and in others. All men know and concede this ; for no man pretends that he can stand face to face with himself, and look into his own eyes. The measure of our experience — using this term in its proper sense, not in the narrow sense of some modern philosophers — must be the measure of our knowledge ; and, consequently, we can claim for ourselves no power which transcends the limits of experience,

or which goes beyond what we have actually manifested in our operations.

The question, then, becomes simply this,—Has reason ever proved herself able to prescribe a worship satisfactory to herself? It is well known that she has not. Aside from the Christian religion, which must for the present be placed out of the account, the history of the race for six thousand years presents no instance of a worship or religion acceptable to reason. The religions of ancient heathendom stand, every one of them, convicted at the bar of reason herself of gross error, immorality, and absurdity. Nations the most renowned, enlightened, and civilized, practised religions from which reason and humanity recoil with horror. One hardly dares relate the ceremonies of the “immortal gods” and their impure mysteries. “The amours of these gods,” as remarks the illustrious Bossuet, “their cruelties, jealousies, and other excesses, were the subjects of their festivals, of the hymns which were chanted to them, and of the pictures consecrated in their temples. Crime was adored, and recognized as necessary to their worship. Plato, the gravest of philosophers, justifies drinking to excess, if at the feasts of Bacchus and in honor of that god. Aristotle, after blaming severely indecent images, excepts those of the gods, who, he says, will to be honored by such infamies. We cannot read without astonishment the honors which it was necessary to pay to Venus, and the prostitutions consecrated to her worship. Greece, all polished and wise as she was, received these abominable mysteries. Individuals and cities, in the pressure of affairs, vowed harlots to Venus, and Greece herself did not blush to ascribe her salvation to their prayers to their goddess. After the defeat of Xerxes and of his formidable hosts, a tablet was placed in the temple, on which were represented their vows and processions, with this inscription from a famous poet, Simonides:—‘These prayed to their goddess Venus, who for love of them saved Greece.’” *

Nor to Greece alone were these abominations confined. “Roman gravity treated religion with no greater seriousness. It consecrated to the honor of the gods the impurities of the theatre and the bloody spectacles of the gladiators; that is to say, all that can be imagined of the most corrupt and the most barbarous.” † At Babylon every woman was required

* *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle.*

† *Ibid.*

to prostitute herself to the first comer on the festival of Venus ; marriageable virgins, at Byblus and other places, were sent forth on one of the festivals of Astaroth to collect from prostitution their marriage dower. It needs not to speak of the impurities of the worship of Venus in the island of Cyprus and at Corinth, or of the worship of the Phallus — the Lingam of modern India — in Egypt, Greece, or Rome, the orgies of Bacchus, or the abominations of Isis. In all pagan nations the gods were worshipped by the sacrifice of reason, chastity, and humanity ; and among them all there was not one that did not seek to appease the anger or to propitiate the favor of the gods by offering human victims upon their altars.

These vices, crimes, and abominations were not exceptional, were not excesses forbidden, and breaking out in spite of the public religion. They were warranted by the examples of the gods adored, were integral portions of their worship, erected into sacred rites, and prescribed by the recognized religious authorities. It would be an insult to your understandings, my brethren, to suppose, for a moment, that reason ever was or ever could be satisfied with any one of the ancient mythologies or abominable idolatries. She finds in them, undoubtedly, the recognition of the fact of man's obligation to worship God ; but that is all that she finds, from which she does not turn away with horror and disgust. She sees clearly enough that God was not worshipped in them, and that the worship offered, if it had been offered to him, was not such as he would or could accept. She knows that God is the only true object of worship, and that the elements, sun and moon and stars, wood and stone, silver and gold, lizards and crocodiles, leeks and onions, fishes of the sea and fowls of the air, four-footed beasts and creeping things, men and women living or dead, works of men's hands and creatures of the imagination, are not God, the Supreme Being who made heaven and earth and all things therein, and whose existence and attributes are manifest from the works of creation. She knows that all these religions were idolatries ; and idolatry, in any and every form or degree, she does and must utterly condemn ; for, as you have seen, she demonstrates with ease that we are bound to worship God, and him alone, — to render unto him the tribute of our whole being. When we give ourselves up to idols, or to any thing, real or imaginary, other than God himself, we do not render to him the tribute

of our whole being, nor indeed any tribute at all. We do not render to him his own, and justice does and must condemn us. Yet, excepting, perhaps, Mahometanism, the religion, in ancient or modern times, of every nation confessedly abandoned to natural reason, has been and is nothing but an abominable idolatry. How, then, say that reason is sufficient to prescribe a worship satisfactory to herself?

So evident is it that these ancient religions do not satisfy reason, that she cannot hold these indecencies, these licentious and filthy rites, these horrid cruelties, these human victims smoking upon the altars, to be the worship acceptable to God, that many heathen philosophers and poets themselves inveighed against them, and in Greece and Rome, perhaps in other nations, the more enlightened classes, as in China and most Protestant countries now, inwardly condemned them, and lapsed into the opposite and no less deplorable error of complete irreligion, and contented themselves with occasional outward conformity, from social or political reasons.

Indeed, the insufficiency of reason to prescribe the worship of God is clearly evinced by the conduct of those enlightened gentlemen and ladies who in modern times reject the Christian revelation, and profess to take the simple light of nature for their guide. They are far from being agreed as to what is the religion nature teaches, and their sects and varieties are almost innumerable. They find, avowedly, nowhere in history a religion ready made to their hands. They are unable to satisfy themselves with Greek and Roman polytheism, or even with African fetichism. The religions of ancient Egypt, Syria, Phœnicia, Chaldea, Persia, Greece, Rome, Gaul and Britain, modern India, China, Africa, America, alike fail to meet their wants; and whatever secret affection they may have for the Cyprian goddess and the orgies of Bacchus, they are far from being prepared to reconstruct the altar of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Baal, Dagon, Astaroth, Apis, Kneph, Vichnou, Schiven, Buddha, Fo, Woden, Thor, Freya, Manitou, Viztli-Puztli, or even Mumbo-Jumbo. The deism of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, like the Theophilanthropy of Revellière-Lepaux, has no prototype among the various religions of mankind, and is utterly unable to command the suffrages of those who, leaving the Church, profess to follow reason.

Your modern Eclectics, indeed, assert the sufficiency of reason and the infallibility of the human race. They patron-

ize, to a certain extent, all ancient and all modern religions, and hold that each symbolizes a great truth ; but they confess that the religion satisfactory to reason has never yet had a concrete existence. Such a religion remains to be instituted. It may, they allege, be attained by resolving all past and present religions into their original elements, and selecting from each the portion of truth it now conceals, and moulding the separate truths, thus collected, into a new, complete, and harmonious whole. But this avails them nothing ; for this new religion, in its satisfactory form, has had no historical existence, and the task of forming it from the old religions is hardly, if at all, less difficult than that of original invention. Moreover, the Eclectics are far from being agreed as to what elements to take and what to leave. They tell you also, that however successfully they may accomplish their task, it will be only for a brief moment. The new religion will no sooner be organized than it will be found too small for humanity, become a galling chain to the free soul, and a barrier to progress. They confess that reason will disown their work as soon as they have done it, and begin forthwith to undo it. Alas ! what satisfied reason yesterday will not satisfy it to-day, far less to-morrow. The truest and holiest forms of faith and worship are as short-lived as the summer flower, as transient as the morning dew. All things change their forms, and nothing remains but the abstract obligation to be good and do good ; while the answer to the question, What is it to be good and do good ? varies ever from one age of the world to another, from nation to nation, and even from individual to individual. What is all this, granting all that is claimed, but an unequivocal confession of reason's inability to suffice for reason ?

Indeed, the more prudent and philosophical of the recent rejecters of supernatural revelation seek to make out their case by claiming Christianity herself as a product of natural reason. They even censure those who openly array themselves against her, call themselves her especial friends, and profess to be more Christian than Christians themselves ; they patronize our Blessed Lord, lavish on him their caresses, and enroll him as one of their company. All this has a fair seeming, but it avails them nothing ; since, unhappily for them, Christianity has always professed, and has always been held, to be a supernatural religion. If they embrace her as such, they condemn themselves ; if they deny her to be such, they condemn her, — for she has then made a false profession, and

reason can tolerate no false profession, — approve no religion which is not what it professes to be. Christianity, if conceded to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of reason, can be an argument for the sufficiency of reason only when taken in her historical character, as she has been hitherto received, and in the sense in which she claims to be accepted ; but, if so taken, she is a plain, unequivocal denial, on Divine authority, of the sufficiency of reason. This the gentlemen referred to appear to understand, and hence you find them modifying Christianity in all directions, and seeking to give her a sense essentially different from that in which she has hitherto been received by both friends and enemies, — a sense which they, indeed, say is the one in which she ought to have been taken, but in which they must confess she has not been. But so taken, she ceases to be the Christianity of history, and becomes, as some of them expressly call her, a new Christianity, and therefore unable to afford any argument from experience in favor of the sufficiency of reason to prescribe the worship of God ; for experience has not yet demonstrated that in this new sense Christianity is able to meet all the demands of reason.

If a man, my brethren, were to start in pursuit of a religion outside of the Church, satisfactory to reason, where can you imagine him to find it ? Not with any of the ancient or modern pagan mythologies, it is certain. Not with any of the forms of dogmatic Protestantism, it is equally certain ; for they all arraign one another, and there is not one of them that is not either too much or too little for reason, — that reason does not convict of inconsistency in being so much and no more, or so little and no less. Not with Mahometanism assuredly, for reason is offended with its heaven and its sensual paradise, and above all with its absolute fatalism, which denies free will, and with it all moral obligation, and therefore the very obligation itself to worship God. Will he find it with the ancient philosophers ? Which of them ? With Socrates, reputed the wisest of them all ? Can reason approve the *Socratic love*, that sin against nature, which brought down destruction upon “ the cities of the plain,” and which Socrates in Plato not obscurely avows, and apparently defends ? Can it approve the order to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius, which Socrates gave just before his death to his disciple Crito ? Did he hold Æsculapius to be a god, and the cock to be his due ? Then he was a gross idolater. Did he not so hold ? Then he was a base hypocrite, or a miserable conformist to

popular superstition. Will he find it with the "divine Plato"? What! and hold it a dictate of reason to deny marriage, to assert the lawfulness of universal fornication, and maintain that it is every one's duty to conform to the religion of the state under which he is born, however gross, filthy, or abominable? Will he find it with Cicero? that is, hold it right to be one of the ministers of a pagan idolatry, to conform outwardly to a popular superstition which he inwardly despises, to profess a philosophy of Doubt, and to live for Fame or Glory, not for God?

Or suppose he comes down to modern times, with which of your modern philosophers will he find it? With Locke? He is obsolete. With Reid and Stewart? They are forgotten. With Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin? They were great names yesterday, but they have already dwindled into insignificance, and their systems, if pushed to their last consequences, leave no God to adore. Will he find it with the Scandinavian prophet, the founder of the New Church, the famous Swedenborg? What! with one who makes God *essential* man, and whose system finds its strongest evidence in Mesmerism, and paves the way for the Demonism of Davis's Wonderful Revelations, just published,—a system which confounds God and man, the natural and supernatural, making man a mere receptacle, and therefore denying him all real substantive existence? Will he find it with Saint-Simon, the Parisian count, debauchee, beggar, would-be self-murderer, and inventor of *Nouveau Christianisme*? Alas! his disciples were never able to agree as to what he taught; and they have separated and disappeared. Will he find it with Fourier? What! with one whose god is Mammon, whose rule of life is inclination, not duty, passion, not reason, and who places worship in selfish indulgence?

Alas! my brethren, the poor man would be like Noah's dove let loose from the ark, before the waters were dried up; he would find no resting-place for the sole of his foot. He would be obliged either to reject all religion, or to attempt, with Chevalier Bunsen, to construct "the Church of the Future,"—to have no religion, or to fabricate one for himself. To this conclusion come all your philosophers, and hence you everywhere see them either plunging into absolute irreligion, or heaving at the bellows and hammering at the anvil, in the endeavour to forge out a religion for themselves, —and throwing away their work in disgust, as soon as completed.

Certain it is, my brethren, that reason has never yet succeeded in prescribing a worship which meets her own demands. Equally certain is it, if she has not done it, that she never will and never can do it. It is idle to expect her to do what she has never been able to do. She is no new power, no recent gift or acquisition. She is a natural endowment, and as old as mankind. Men possessed her in the beginning, and have had from the first all the reason that belongs to human nature. The heathen nations fell not into their gross superstitions prior to receiving the gift of reason, but afterwards ; and they practised those abominations, which it is a shame even to name, with all the light of reason, and all the protection to truth, justice, and purity which she affords. If she is sufficient, whence those foul and abominable superstitions ? If, notwithstanding all she does or gives, men, whenever abandoned to her alone, invariably fall into them, how can you say that she suffices to prescribe the worship of God ?

It will not do to say that reason has not had fair play ; that she has been impeded in her operations, and has never been able to put forth her whole strength. She has had six thousand years for her experiment ; and she has found no impediments but such as grow out of human nature, and therefore such as she must always and everywhere find. No doubt, appetite and passion, the workings of concupiscence, have prevented her from doing as well as otherwise she might ; but this is a proof of her insufficiency, not her apology. No doubt, these have often drowned her voice and rendered her instructions unavailing ; but this was one of the contingencies to be provided for, — one of the practical obstacles to be surmounted. No doubt, she saw clearly enough that the superstitions and abominations into which these dragged individuals and nations were not the worship of God ; no doubt, she protested against them ; but what availed it, as long as she had no executive force either to prevent or to arrest them ? What availed it, that she knew what was *not* the worship of God, if she knew not what was his worship ; or if in some degree knowing it, she could not assert it with sufficient distinctness, energy, and authority, to make herself heard and obeyed ? If she had sufficiently known and asserted it, the nations could not have fallen into their abominable superstitions ; and the fact that they have so fallen is a proof that she did not and could not sufficiently know and assert it. If she could not in the past, she cannot now or ever hereafter ; for her natural strength is

always the same, and so are the obstacles presented by human nature for her to overcome ; since human nature does not change, and could not change and remain human nature.

Nor is this conclusion to be set aside by any of your modern theories of progress. No progress of nature can be asserted, and progress by natural causes in relation to reason and concupiscence is contradicted by all experience. In Christian nations, where the influence of Christianity has been felt, there has been progress ; but these nations, in a question as to the sufficiency of reason, are not to be taken into the account ; for it remains to be proved that their progress has been the result of natural causes. Our observations must be restricted to nations confessedly abandoned to the light of nature, and from them alone we must collect the facts which are to warrant the induction of natural progress ; otherwise we shall fall into the sophism of assuming what is in question. The conclusion obtained can be set aside only by establishing in the history of these nations the fact of progress, and of progress in the knowledge and worship of God. Simple material progress effected by industry or force of arms, or scientific and artistic progress effected by reason serving appetite or passion, is nothing to the purpose ; for such progress does not necessarily imply any progress in the knowledge and discharge of our duty. If in these nations we find a gradual moral improvement, — if we find them, as time flows on, ameliorating their manners, attaining to less and less unworthy conceptions of God, abandoning their idols, and purifying their worship of its abominations, we may regard it as a presumptive proof of progress by natural causes ; but if we find nothing of all this, if we find the nations sinking deeper and deeper in moral corruption, and adopting grosser and grosser superstitions, we must conclude, with all the certainty of experience and of fact, against natural progress.

It is historically certain that no progress of the kind needed by the argument can be traced in the history of a single nation, ancient or modern, confessedly abandoned to the simple light of nature. Under the moral and religious point of view, the progress of all heathen nations is a progress in corruption. The period of their history least offensive to reason is invariably the earliest. There may have been degrees of error and abomination in the heathen superstitions, and the less degraded and debased may have done something, for a time, to elevate relatively the more degraded and debased ; but taking

each nation by itself, its abominations invariably grew with its growth and strengthened with its strength, and were the greatest when the nation was at the acme of its civilization and in the zenith of its glory. Never is reason, in a single heathen nation, seen gradually recovering its empire, but always losing it more and more, and becoming less and less able to withstand the tide of corruption, which sets in, and continues to rise higher and higher till it deluges the land and extinguishes the national life. The renowned nations of antiquity have passed away. Egypt, Assyria, Phœnicia, Carthage, pagan Greece and Rome, are extant only in their mouldering ruins. Thebes with her hundred gates lies entombed in her own catacombs. Tyre sits desolate on her island, and the poor fisherman dries his nets where her "merchant princes" did congregate. The owl calls to his fellow in the solitude of Babylon; the rank grass grows in the once thronged mart, and silence succeeds to the hum of industry. All these nations have expired in their own corruption, of their own rottenness; and in their fate the philosopher reads the impotence of reason, and the falsity of your modern theories of progress.

Nowhere, except in countries under Christian influences, do you ever see any signs of real progress. History records no instance of spontaneous civilization. Ages on ages roll over the savages of Asia, Africa, and America, and bring no change for the better. The tribes east from the Persian Gulf, along the coasts of the Indian Ocean, are to-day precisely what they were found by the companions of the Macedonian conqueror. The glory of Persia and Arabia is in their dim and fading recollections,—of India, in a remote and unchronicled past, in which, all her monuments attest, she possessed a worship far less degrading than her present abominable superstitions. The vast populations of China and Japan sink, each generation, into a lower deep of ignorance and infamy. The Turkish hordes have shown no sign of improvement during the five hundred years they have been encamped in Europe, and Moslem life, universally, appears to be burning out, and ready to flicker and expire in its socket. The nations of the New World, when discovered by the Europeans, which approached nearest to civilized life, as Mexico and Peru, were the most corrupt, and precisely those whose religious practices were the most revolting to reason and humanity.

Indeed, the philosophers of the Progressist school are themselves so well satisfied that heathen nations afford no ex-

ample of the progress they contend for, that they appeal exclusively to Christian nations for the facts on which they attempt to build their theory. They assume, without proof and against evidence, that the Christian religion is the result of the natural growth and expansion of intellect, and has been attained to by mankind in the order of their natural progress through the ages. So assuming, and finding it superior to the religion of the Gentiles, and that there has been a marked progress in the nations subjected to its influence, they gravely take it and the progress effected under it as conclusive evidence of their theory of progress by natural causes. It is bad logic ; for before they have or can have a right to appeal to Christianity in support of their theory, they must prove that Christianity is a natural development. But, unhappily for them, this they cannot prove. The facts are against them. They cannot, as they should, trace a continuous progress of mankind from heathenism to Christianity. The worship of heathen nations least remote from the Christian is their earliest, not their latest. The question is evidently an historical question ; but history, as is well known, presents us the worship of God before it introduces us to fetichism and polytheism. At the very dawn of history, you find the worship of one God known and practised. If we are to rely on history, as the advocates of natural progress must, the worship of God, as held by Christians, has not been a development of heathen superstitions, but preceded them, and they are corruptions of it. Truth is older than falsehood, and history proves it, by proving that religion was anterior to superstition. The heathen philosophers themselves, who, from time to time, inveighed against popular superstitions, and whose doctrines are sometimes appealed to in proof of the progressiveness of heathenism, profess always to speak according to the wisdom of the ancients, and propose simply to recall their contemporaries to the worship observed by a remote antiquity. So far as they recognized the unity of God at all, they recognized it as an ancient doctrine, long since lost sight of and forgotten in consequence of the corruptions of later ages.

These philosophers themselves, undoubtedly, had some just conceptions of the Supreme Being ; but they cannot be appealed to in favor of progress ; because they professed to derive these from the ancients ; because they had, most of them at least, travelled in Egypt, Syria, or Phœnicia, and might have learned, and not improbably did learn, much from the

people who, during all the darkness of heathendom, had preserved the worship of the true God ; and because they changed nothing in the manners or morals of their countrymen. With scarcely an exception, they, while despising, conformed, and recommended their disciples to conform, to the superstitions of the vulgar. Never did Greece and Rome decline more rapidly in virtue than under and after the teaching of their renowned philosophers ; never was the heathen world generally, so far as it had not fallen into absolute irreligion, sunk in grosser immoralities, or in more abominable superstitions, than at the advent of our Blessed Lord ; and never, to human judgment, was it less prepared for the Gospel, than when the Fisherman of Galilee transferred the seat of Christian empire from Antioch to Rome. Preparation there certainly was, but not from the Gentiles themselves. It was in the providential settlement and influence of the Jews in the chief places of the Roman Empire, who, when the heralds of the cross went forth from Jerusalem, formed in each the nucleus of a Christian congregation, as do the Irish now in every part of the Protestant world in which the English is the mother tongue of its rulers.

All this belies the hypothesis that Christianity is a natural development. If it had been, you would see in the heathen nations themselves a gradual approximation to its faith and worship. Some might have reached it sooner than others, but all would have been looking and advancing towards it. But you see nothing of all this, and you know from history the violent opposition Christianity encountered on its first promulgation, and that it did not fully extirpate paganism from the Roman Empire till after an obstinate struggle of nearly six hundred years. Your philosophers, then, cannot appeal to the phenomena of Christian nations to sustain their theory. Those phenomena are peculiar, singular, exceptional to the general rule, and authorize no conclusions beyond the nations in which they are exhibited.

Nor is this all. If Christianity were a natural development, the nation once professing it, on ceasing to do so, would necessarily appear in advance of the nations adhering to it, and in advance also of what it was itself before ; for it could reject Christianity only by outgrowing it and attaining to something superior to it. How happens it, then, that this is not the fact ? How happens it, that the reverse is what you always see, and that the nation which throws off Christianity

invariably falls below the nations which remain faithful, and below what it was itself when Christian? The fact is undeniable. A great part of Asia was once Christian; but what is that part of Asia now in comparison with what it was then? Compare the Alexandria of Clemens, Origen, St. Athanasius, and St. Cyril with the Alexandria of to-day; or the Northern Africa of the present with the Northern Africa of Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and St. Augustine! The Eastern or Greek Empire, long after the introduction of Christianity, surpassed the Western in wealth, refinement, learning, talent, and genius. What is it now? Do you say that barbarians overran and conquered it? So did barbarians overrun and conquer the Western; but the Church was there; it arrested them, converted them, and has made them the leading nations of the globe. The Eastern broke the unity of faith, separated itself from the centre of Christian life, fell beneath the power of the barbarians, was unable to civilize them, and has ceased to exist. It has passed away, and its conquerors, unconverted, remain barbarians, as they were at the epoch of conquest. The Protestant nations have visibly declined since Luther and Calvin, in all save mere material greatness, and even that has evidently culminated. England, in moral, social, and political well-being, is far below what she was at the accession of the first of the Tudors. Even Catholic nations themselves, when for a moment they seek to subject the spiritual to the temporal, or lose sight of their faith, decline with fearful rapidity, as Austria, France, Spain, Portugal, and Spanish America conclusively prove. Paris, under the reign of the Terrorists, the pupils of your philosophers, recalled all too vividly the abominations of pagan Athens and Rome. In every country, as the Church retires, you may behold the seeds of the old national superstitions sprouting anew. Germany tends undeniably to revive her old Nature-worship; and Scandinavia threatens to rehabilitate Woden and Thor, and to rejoice again in the prospect of quaffing nectar from the skulls of her enemies in the halls of Valhalla.*

* This is not a mere rhetorical flourish, as any one deeply read in modern Teutonic and Scandinavian literature must acknowledge. Let any one read, understandingly, the Lectures on "Heroes and Hero-worship," by Thomas Carlyle, especially the Lecture on "The Hero as Divinity," and he can hardly fail to perceive that the assertion in the text is far from being gratuitous. The undeniable tendency of all modern thought and philosophy is pantheistic, and he has studied the various heathen

Moreover, my brethren, you must not forget that the nations which adopted and practised all the abominations of heathenism were the mightiest and most renowned nations of the earth, — nations which astonish us even in their ruins. In general science, arts, literature, and refined civilization, they remain even to this day unapproached. No poet rivals Homer ; and Plato and Aristotle continue to teach us philosophy. We still study the classics as our models. In purely intellectual and artistic culture, not even Italy comes up to what Athens was ; and in statesmanship and the conduct of

mythologies to little purpose who has yet to learn that they all originate in pantheism. The human race has a method in its madness, and never loses all trace of its rational nature. It has always a reason, of some sort, for its wildest errors, and connects them by some logical tie to a great fundamental principle, in itself, and in its place, not unsound. It evidently began with the worship of one God, and all the superstitions it has adopted are only corruptions of that worship. Its first downward step was in confounding the Creator with creation, and its second, in identifying the two. They are identical ; then God is the universe, and the universe is God, — pure pantheism. But God is one, absolute unity. Then each element, each part, each object, of the universe, whatever the appearance to the senses, is identically God, and may rightfully receive divine honors. Then individuals and nations may select any portion or object of the universe they please, as the peculiar object of their worship. Hence fetichism, polytheism, and the foundation of all the mythologies which have been or are. Analyze them, and pantheism — the corruption of the doctrine of the unity of God — will be found at the bottom. Like causes produce like effects. Revive pantheism, as you are reviving it, and you reproduce all the abominations of heathenism. The human race repeats its old errors ; it has long since been unable to invent a new one. Christianity restored the worship of one God, which was in the beginning, and which the Gentiles, through their corruptions, had lost. They who break away from it take the very starting-point of these Gentile corruptions, and in process of time must, if not recalled to the Church, run through the whole cycle of Gentile error and superstition. These defences of the heathen mythologies, these efforts to place them and Christianity in the same category, so common in our day, — linked as they invariably are to pantheistic speculations, — are profoundly significant, and deserve a more serious consideration than they appear to have received from the friends of Christian truth ; for when we have once revived pantheism, we shall not be able to stop there. We shall be obliged, in view of the mixture of good and evil in the world, to go farther, and reassert the old Oriental Dualism, and thus pave the way for the revival of Demonism and Demon-worship. Be assured, that it was not from a narrow-minded bigotry, not from a persecuting spirit, not from a vain and shallow thought, or without solid reasons in human nature itself, as well as in revelation, that the Church so energetically opposed the Gnostic, Arian, and Manichæan heresies, so dear to modern sectarians, and which contain in germ the whole of heathenism.

armies, the ancients have never been surpassed. In vigor of intellect, in depth and acuteness of thought, in logical force and subtilty, the old heathen philosophers far transcend their modern successors. Reason was more assiduously cultivated, and received, as natural reason, a fuller development, a greater expansion, with them than with us. We can raise no question in intellectual or moral philosophy which they did not raise, and we can wring out from reason, unenlightened by the Gospel, no answer they did not obtain. In whatever point of view we choose to contemplate them, these ancient heathen nations had every advantage that nature and natural cultivation can give. No nations can be conceived more richly endowed or more kindly favored by nature than they were. We can conceive no natural advantage which they had not. They were in the condition to give, and they did give, to natural reason a fair trial, and have shown us its limits. We surpass them in nothing, except in what we owe to Christianity; nay, except in that, we evidently fall far below them. Yet with all their advantages, with all their intellectual and artistic culture and greatness, which continue to excite the wonder of the world, they were sunk in the grossest superstitions and the most abominable idolatries, made no advance towards the Christian religion, and continued ever to recede farther and farther from it. How idle, then, to pretend that Christianity has been attained to by the natural development and growth of human reason! Be Christianity true, or be it false, you can never regard it as following in the order of natural development, and simply marking, as your philosophers would persuade you, a stage in the continuous progress of humanity.

That man himself is progressive in the sense of your philosophers, or that the race goes on through the ages, in obedience to a natural law of progress, towards a more and more perfect state, is contradicted by all the monuments of the past. Nations, outside of Christendom, may modify their institutions, and advance by industry, arts, and arms, as did Rome, as did Carthage, from the petty burgh, or the feeble colony, to mighty and renowned empires; but progress of this sort is not to be counted; for it may be, and usually is, effected by reason as the minister of appetite, passion, or lawless will, — by national and individual unscrupulousness, or forgetfulness of duty. The history of the renowned states and empires of antiquity is the history of an almost unbroken series of wrongs and outrages, of violence and rapine, of tyranny and oppression.

Athens in her best days contained in her bosom four hundred thousand slaves to twenty thousand freemen. These states and empires were founded in injustice and cemented by crime, — and hence their fall; for iniquity never prospers, — except for a time. The same may be said of Russia, of Great Britain, and, perhaps, hereafter, of the Republic of North America. Who knows not that our national sense of justice is far from keeping pace with our industrial and commercial prosperity, and that we grow corrupt and rotten within, in proportion as the world is attracted by our phosphorescent splendor without? Progress of this sort is not denied; but it is not to be counted, for it is not progress in the knowledge and worship of God.

Nevertheless, your more recent philosophers, those to whom you listen with the most reverence and enthusiasm, tell you that the doctrine, that man, even human nature itself, is progressive, is the *Evangile* of the nineteenth century. Whoever denies or doubts it they brand as a social delinquent, as a traitor to humanity, and hold up to derision and scorn as one “whose face is on the back side of his head,” dwelling, like the possessed Gadarene, only among tombs. Some of them go even so far as to assert the progressiveness of all natures, of the entire universe, nay, of God himself! But to assert that God is progressive is to deny his perfection, — for progress is not predicable of that which is already perfect, — and to deny his perfection is to deny his existence; and therefore to assert his progressiveness is nothing less than a plain contradiction in terms. The progress of the universe must be the progress of the natures of which it is composed; but a progress of these natures is metaphysically impossible, and it is no mean refutation of the doctrine itself, that there are men in the nineteenth century who assert it, and are looked up to as the lights of the age because they assert it. What is not cannot act; what is cannot make itself more than it is; for no one can transcend as cause what he is as being, and for a being to make itself more than it is differs in no sense from nothing making something out of nothing.

It is absurd to assert the progressiveness of human nature. Man has received from his Creator a determinate nature, by virtue of which he is man. His nature is that with which he is born, and with which he must be born, or he ceases to be man. Change it, make it more or make it less, and he passes to another order in the universe, and is no longer a *human*

being. If he is to remain man, his nature must remain ever the same. Every one to be born a man must be born with the same nature. This is true of every individual of every generation, from the first to the last. Then all must be born with the same essential faculties, and these faculties must be essentially the same in all. Then no progress of nature ; then none of reason. Then, if reason has uniformly proved herself, by her own light, insufficient to prescribe the worship of God satisfactory to herself, she must always prove insufficient.

But even allowing your philosophers to appeal to the history of Christian nations since they became Christian, they can obtain no argument in favor of their doctrine of progress. The progress observed in these nations is extrinsic, not intrinsic. The Christian worship was as perfect in the first moment of its institution as it is now. Indeed, your ministers tell you it was much more so ; for they contend that the Church has corrupted it. Even those among you, who are the most extravagant in their views of progress, pretend that hardly had Christianity gained a footing in the world, when men despoiled it of its truth and beauty, and perverted it into a degrading superstition. Your early Reformers professed to proceed on the hypothesis, that in their day the Christian religion was buried beneath a mass of rubbish, and was to be disinterred, and restored to its former simple and majestic proportions. But be all this as it may, it is evident that there has been no progress of Christianity, save in its diffusion, in the more extended belief and practice of what it taught and commanded from the first, and in the more perfect realization of its doctrines and precepts in the life and institutions of the nations professing it. The saint of the nineteenth century does not surpass the saint of the first ; and the Christians of the martyr age, in faith, charity, piety, fervor, did not fall below the Christians of our own times. The early Doctors and Fathers are still studied and revered, and the Justins, the Origenes, the Gregories, the Leos, the Hilaries, the Basils, the Chrysostoms, the Ambroses, the Jeromes, the Augustines, remain without rivals. Study St. Thomas, and you will find that he only clothes in a scholastic dress the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great. The ablest scholars and divines of our day only adapt to modern tastes and controversies the doctrines learned from the early Fathers. In Christianity itself, regarded as a religion, as an answer to the question, What is the worship due to God ? or as affording

the necessary assistance in rendering to God what is his due, there evidently has been no progress, and, what is more to the purpose, none is allowed.

The progress in other respects observable in Christendom has been a progress in obedience to Christianity, in removing impediments to its operation, or in matters not necessarily involving any moral or religious amelioration. The moderns may have extended the field of observation; they may have pushed farther than the ancients their investigations into matter; surpassed them in chemical analysis, and in numbering and measuring the stars. The boasted superiority of the moderns over the ancients in the purely physical sciences may be conceded; but progress in these throws no light on the great questions of duty, and has in our times been usually accompanied by a progress in irreligion. It is evident to reason, that a man does not extend even his knowledge of what he owes to God, far less does he strengthen himself to render unto him an acceptable worship, by becoming acquainted with the number, names, and magnitudes of the stars, with oxygen, hydrogen, and chlorine, electricity and magnetism, the powers of the screw and lever, with mica, quartz, and grauwacke, or even the modern systems of stocks and banks; and it is hard to believe that one cannot perform his whole duty as well without as with spinning-jennies, power-loom, steam-engines, railroads, balloons, and lightning-telegraphs. These things may or may not be useful to us as a superior sort of animals, but they evidently, in themselves considered, lie outside of our moral relations, and knowledge of them throws no light on our obligations as human beings. What reason can say of these relations and obligations she had said before the dawn of authentic history; for we find, at the dawn of authentic history, the human race already in possession of all that reason has since said, and all that she now says; and if we possess any thing more, it is historically traceable to a Christian source, and was as fully possessed by the earliest Christians as it is by us.

Here, then, you are, my brethren. You are forced to admit of reason what universal experience proves to be true of nature, namely, that it never suffices for itself; and this you might have known from the first; for reason is included in nature, and if nature cannot suffice for nature, it is evident that reason cannot suffice for reason. Doubtless, Almighty God could, if he had chosen, have made reason sufficient for

herself; but the fact that she has universally and invariably, when left to her own resources, proved insufficient, is ample evidence that he has not. Nor would it be of any avail, if you should succeed in showing, that, taken abstractly, reason can suffice for herself; because the question relates not to her power in the abstract, but in the concrete. Man does not live in the abstract, and the abstract, as abstract, has no actual existence. Reason must be able to prescribe, under all the various actual circumstances of our concrete life, the worship which satisfies her demands, or she is undeniably insufficient. This it is clear from experience she is not able to do.

Nor, finally, will it answer any purpose to show that the insufficiency of reason is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic. Man is to be taken as he actually exists in space and time. No doubt, the chief obstacles to reason are created by our inferior nature, by concupiscence, appetite, and passion; but these obstacles are thrown in its way by a cause as permanent and universal in us as itself,—a cause which is more or less active in all men; often the most active, and the most powerful too, in men of the most striking genius and enlarged and cultivated reason. Hence the proverbial infirmities of genius, and the fact that intellectual greatness is rarely accompanied by a corresponding moral greatness. Nothing is sufficient for us that is not able to overcome concupiscence,—that does not rule it, instead of being ruled by it. As reason is evidently not able to overcome it, it is as much insufficient as it would be in case its insufficiency were wholly intrinsic.

But, my brethren, if reason is insufficient, as it undeniably is, either you must be unable to render to God a worship satisfactory to reason, or there must be provided something above reason, prescribing a worship which will satisfy her. One or the other must be true; which is it? Do not slight the question.

ART. II. — *The Influence of Catholicity on Political Liberty.*

It is not the province of religion to exert any immediate influence on political institutions. Its object is not to prepare man for this world, but for the world to come; to free him, not from temporal bondage, but from the servitude of sin. It

addresses itself immediately to the mind and heart of men, striving to enlighten and to purify them, and, by making the individual himself good, to make him, at the same time, a good son, a good father, a good citizen, or a good king. Without, therefore, acting directly on any institution, civil or social, or any state of life, it is evident that religion must act indirectly on them all ; for the stamp which it impresses on a man will accompany him everywhere, and will be seen more or less in every thing he undertakes. Now it is said, that this general influence of Catholicity has been to favor despotism ; nay, more, that the Catholic Church has directly, both by its principles and its institutions, exerted a disastrous influence on civil liberty.

This charge is a very grave one ; for it is evident that the religion of Christ can never be opposed to *true* liberty. Either, therefore, this accusation is false, or Catholicity is not the religion of Christ. We, who are Catholics, *know* that it is false ; we know that Christ founded the Catholic Church, and that no other body has a just title to this glorious origin. We know, therefore, even without reading a word of history, that the Catholic Church, as such, never favored tyranny, and that if any of those belonging to her have in the lapse of ages done so, it was not in accordance with, but in direct opposition to, her teachings. Nevertheless, this faith, though abundantly sufficient for ourselves, will not suffice for those who are out of the Church ; and who, however inexcusable their ignorance, really are ignorant that the Catholic Church is the Church of Christ. To remove their objections, therefore, as well as for the instruction and consolation of the faithful, we shall, with the help of God, undertake to refute this charge, and to show that the Catholic Church, in addition to her regular and direct object of inculcating and promoting religion, has constantly, by the principles she has taught, and by her own institutions, exerted a most powerful influence in favor of civil liberty.

I. We begin by examining the Catholic principles with regard to Civil Governments.

The first charge made against the Church is, that *she* teaches the divine right of government. This charge is most true ; and the doctrine of divine right is founded immediately on the Holy Scripture. For St. Paul writes, — “ Let every soul be subject to the higher powers ; for there is no power except from God, and those which are are ordained of God.

Therefore he that resisteth power resisteth the ordination of God. And they that resist acquire for themselves damnation. 'Therefore of necessity be ye subject, not only on account of wrath, but also for conscience' sake.'* And similar passages occur frequently in Scripture. It is evident, therefore, that governments are, in some sense or other, of divine right, and that we are by the same right bound to obey them. "The powers which are are ordained of God, and he that resisteth them resisteth the ordination of God."

But how do Catholic theologians understand this doctrine of divine right? Does it mean that God has established any particular form of government, — monarchy, for example, — and has made that authoritative on all men? or that he has established a particular family on the throne, and given it a special and inalienable right to rule mankind? God forbid! for this would indeed favor tyranny. Catholic theologians understand no such thing, but merely that government in general, some government or other, is necessary by the ordination of God for the preservation and well-being of society, and therefore that we are by the same authority bound to obey it. But in order that our readers may understand clearly what we mean, we will give them a condensed view of the doctrine, as St. Thomas of Aquin † and Cardinal Bellarmin ‡ explain it.

The very nature of man, says St. Thomas, evidently requires that he should live in the society of others, because neither his physical wants can be supplied, nor his moral and intellectual faculties developed, except in society. But it is evident that if every one in society were to act solely for his own interests, without regard to the rights and interests of his neighbour, the continual conflicts and shocks of individual interests would soon dissolve society altogether. The social body, therefore, requires organization as much as the physical body; as well might you expect to keep up a healthy circulation in the veins of the human body, if the central impulse of the heart were wanting, as to expect health and unity in the social body in all its complicated civil and political relations, without a strong central head to direct it, and a strong arm to uphold it. In other words, society cannot exist without order, — order without justice, — justice without law, — nor law without some one to make, expound and enforce it; that is,

* Rom. xiii. 1–5.

† *De Regim. Prin.* l. 1, c. 1, and *Sum.* 2, 2, Q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 6.

‡ *De Laicis*, l. 3, c. 6.

without government. The very nature of man, therefore, which makes society necessary for him, makes government necessary for society ; and as it is God who created this necessity, it is evident that to him government must be referred, and that its rights and the obligations of society toward it are according to the ordination of God.

Such is the Catholic doctrine as to the origin of civil government, so simple, so clear, that to state it is to prove it. Our limits will not allow us to enlarge upon it, and to show how it alone of all the theories proposed can satisfactorily account, not only for the origin of government, but for some of the rights which government is universally acknowledged to possess, and which could not have been transmitted by individuals, because individuals never possessed them. But we will simply remark that it can never be distorted to favor tyranny ; — 1. Because it does not make the rights of government an especial and extraordinary grant, distinct from creation, but merely something immediately resulting from the nature of man. 2. Because it establishes no particular form of government, but relates only to a governing power in general. And lastly, because while it makes it obligatory on the conscience of the people to obey all just commands, it makes it equally obligatory on the conscience of the rulers to command justly. It does not favor any particular form of government, nor the government itself more than the people, but it settles the rights both of the government and of the people on a solid basis. The government is amenable to God for its enactments ; and the people are amenable to God for their obedience.

But, it may be asked, if this doctrine relates only to government in general, how does any particular government receive its powers ? Does it receive them directly from God, or mediately, through the people ? The Catholic *faith* does not enter into particular questions of this nature, but contents itself with establishing the general principle. There is, therefore, no dogma of *faith* on this point ; nevertheless, theologians have written much about it. We will give the opinion of Cardinal Bellarmin,* not only because of his personal authority, but because the other authors we have consulted on the subject generally agree with him.

After establishing from reason and Scripture the doctrine we have already explained, that the governing power of so-

* *De Lâicis*, l. 3, c. 6.

ciety is from God, he goes on to say, that, nevertheless, as prior to positive law, there is no reason why this power should exist in one man more than in another ; it is evident that the power of government does not rest primarily, by nature and the gift of God, in any particular individual or individuals, but in the whole body of society at large, which, constituting a moral whole, a moral body, has the right of governing itself ; because government is necessary to its preservation. Primarily, therefore, and immediately, the right of government rests in the whole community. But, by the same law of nature by which it is necessary that society be *actually* governed, it is necessary that society should transfer this power to some individual or individuals, because the *exercise* of it, which is absolutely necessary, is impossible to the community at large. If, then, society transfer this power to a single man, the government is a monarchy ; if to a few nobles, an aristocracy ; if to delegates from all classes, a democracy. So that particular governments are of divine right only through the intermediate tacit or express consent of the community ; immediately they are only of human law. That is to say, the *form* of government in any country depends on the particular constitution of that country, and not on the immediate ordination of God ; all that is of immediate divine ordination is the duty of the government to legislate for the welfare of society, and the duty of the people to obey the laws.

Certainly, nothing can be more just and excellent than this theory ; nothing farther removed from favoring tyranny, or from granting to any man or any hereditary line of men a natural superiority or right to command their brethren. This theory is not only defended by Cardinal Bellarmin, but by Suarez, Concina, Billuart, Busembaum, Liguori, and others. It has never been impugned by the Church, and Bellarmin, not only an Italian cardinal, but a most strenuous defender of the Papal rights, residing and writing in Rome itself, is not to be suspected of publishing or holding any thing not perfectly conformable to the Catholic doctrine.

Nevertheless, he was most fiercely attacked on account of this very theory, — and by whom, think you ? Why, by no less a personage than James I., the Protestant king of England. This Protestant king maintained, as Hobbes, another English Protestant, maintained, that the power of individual kings is immediately and directly from God, and most absolute and unlimited. And James, not content with theorizing on the

subject, dared even declare to his English Parliament, that God had made him absolute master, and that all their privileges and pretended rights were only gracious concessions of the royal will. And this he did without opposition, whether from the lay lords of Parliament, or from the Anglican bishops who sat with them. How different from the conduct of those noble *Catholic* bishops who in former days had stood so firmly against the usurpations of the English monarchs !

But, though this despotic assertion of the English king, to whom his courtiers with vile adulation gave the title of the modern Solomon, met no rebuke in Protestant England, it was not left without a stern rebuke in *Catholic* Spain. For the Spanish Jesuit, Suarez, in his masterly work, called a "Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against the Errors of the Anglican Sect,"* expressly refutes this opinion of King James, and proves it to be "*new and singular*"; while that of Bellarmine is "*ancient, received, true, and necessary*." So that it was left to a Spanish Jesuit and an Italian cardinal to rebuke the despotic arrogance of an English king !

But it may be thought, that, though the Catholic doctrine is just and beautiful with regard to the *origin* of government, it may, nevertheless, favor tyranny, by granting to governments unlimited attributes, an arbitrary *extent* of authority. Let us, then, examine the doctrine of St. Thomas on this point, and see whether it favors oppression and injustice.

We select St. Thomas, not only because his works for the last six centuries have had such authority in all theological questions, that to quote him alone is to quote a host, but because we wish to show how clear and just were the notions of those scholastic works of the Middle Ages, long before the boasted light of modern times appeared, on the great questions which most deeply affect the welfare of humanity.

Let us, then, examine what he holds with regard to *law*, for it is by law that government acts upon the people.

"Law," says St. Thomas, in his *Summa Theologica*,† "is a regulation founded on reason, directed to the common good, and promulgated by him who has the care of the community." Scarcely a dozen words, yet embracing all that can be said on the subject. "A regulation founded on *reason*"; why, this at the very outset destroys the idea of any thing arbitrary, of

* *De Prim. Summi Pont.* l. 3, c. 2.

† *Summa*, l. 2, Q. 90, a. 4.

any thing despotic, and founded on the mere *will* of princes ; for tyranny consists in the domination of the will, to the exclusion of reason. Nor did St. Thomas use this expression by chance ; for he goes on to say that it is evident that the *will* of a ruler must also intervene in a law, because otherwise it would be a mere act of the intellect, not a command ; but it is its foundation in reason which makes it obligatory, for, without such foundation, the will of a ruler would “ be rather an *iniquity* than a law.” *

But it is not enough that a regulation be founded in reason in order to have the character of law ; for many things may be in themselves conformable to reason, which nevertheless are not useful to the community. A law, therefore, says St. Thomas, must not only be reasonable, but it must be expressly “ directed to the *common good*.” This is the object of law, the *public good*. Does this savor of arbitrariness ? Does this favor tyranny ? Can any thing be devised more entirely opposed to tyranny and injustice ?

And, finally, it must be promulgated “ by him who hath the care of the community.” Can any thing be more admirable than this ? He does not say, by the emperor, by the king, by the senate, by the president ; he does not prejudge or predetermine any particular form of government, but, admitting all, he calls the head of the government “ him who hath the *care of the community*.” Showing, on the one hand, that, whatever the form of government, its object is always the same, namely, to take charge of the interests of the community, and not of itself ; and on the other hand, that, whatever the form of government, law is the same, namely, to be regulated by reason, and to be directed to the public good.

Here you have in a nutshell, as it were, the nature of law, the object of governments, their rights, and their limits. The public good is their object, to legislate for this their right, reason and justice their limit.

Now this was the Catholic doctrine in the Middle Ages, and by them taken from the Fathers of the Church who preceded them. It has been the Catholic doctrine ever since ; and not without the deepest influence on the progress of society. It was the doctrine taught in the great Catholic Universities at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Rome ; it was thrilled by confessors into the ears of their royal penitents ; it was sought to be carried

* *Summa*, 1, 2, Q. 90, a. 1, ad 3.

out in practice on every occasion; and was by the Church carried out in all her own institutions. "The kingdom," says St. Thomas in another place,* "is not for the king, but the king for the kingdom; the end of governments is that they may preserve every one in his rights; and if they do otherwise, turning things to their private advantage, they are not kings, but tyrants." In a similar spirit the Spanish Counsellor of the Crown, Saavedra, says, in his *Idea of a Christian Prince*:—"It is the centre of justice whence is drawn the circumference of the crown, and the crown would not be necessary if we could live without justice, . . . and justice failing, the order of the republic fails, and the office of king ceases."

But the most remarkable instance of the correctness of principles in Catholic countries, and of the determination not to see these principles violated, is found in an act of the Spanish Inquisition, during the reign of Philip II. A certain preacher, wishing to ingratiate himself with the king, declared, in a discourse delivered in the royal presence, that "sovereigns have absolute power over the person as well as property of their subjects." A declaration not very dissimilar from that which we have seen the English King James make to his Parliament. But mark the difference,—the Protestant Parliament listened in silence, if not with applause; the Catholic people denounced the man to the Inquisition. And the Inquisition, after due investigation as to what the man had really said, declared his assertion contrary to sound doctrine, and not only imposed a salutary penance on him, but obliged him to make a public recantation in the same pulpit, and to declare that "kings have over their subjects no authority but what has been granted them by *divine and human law*, they have *none* which proceeds from their free and absolute *will*."† Such was the justness and liberty of speech and theory in Catholic Spain and Italy, where the people were solidly religious and government was profoundly respected.

But, it may be said, these principles are indeed most excellent, and governments undoubtedly *ought* to rule according to truth and justice; but suppose they do not; suppose they abuse their powers, as they so frequently have abused them; what then is to be done? Must we obey every command,

* *De Regim. Prin.* l. 3, c. 11.

† D. Antonio Perez, *Relaciones*. V. Balméz.

whether just or not? Must we sit with folded hands, and tell them they ought to have done better? The answer is ready; for the theologians of whom we speak were not men to forget or to shrink from any part of a question, however delicate. “Laws,” says St. Thomas,* “may be unjust in two ways, — by opposing the divine good, or by opposing human good. When they oppose the divine good, that is, command any thing bad in itself, they must not be obeyed on any consideration whatsoever. Human good they may oppose in three ways: either by being contrary to the true end of a law, which is the common good; or by their form, as when burdens are imposed unequally; or from their author, as when he makes a law beyond the power committed to him. And such laws as these are rather *violences* than *laws*; for, as St. Augustine says, ‘that does not appear to be a law which is not just.’ Therefore such laws do not oblige in conscience, and no man is bound to obey them, if he can resist them without giving scandal or causing greater injury; for to avoid this a man should forego even his own rights, in accordance with the teaching of the Gospel.”† This is the constant doctrine of St. Thomas, — a law not for the common good, not equally distributed, not made by a legitimate legislator, has no force to bind a man, and he may resist it lawfully, because it is not in accordance with the eternal law of God, which alone can induce an obligation on the human conscience. Nevertheless, if resistance would cause scandal, or would produce greater evil than complying with the law, it will be necessary to obey, not because of the law itself, which has no force at all, but because of Christian charity, which forbids us to press our own rights to the injury of our neighbour.

But there is a wide difference between refusing to obey a law and resisting its execution by force of arms; and as nothing is said here as to the kind of resistance which may be made, the question may still arise, whether Catholic principles will under any circumstances allow that a nation may be absolved from its allegiance, so as to make war upon the tyrant. We answer, that undoubtedly there are circumstances under which Catholic principles allow this; and we found this answer, not only on the reason of the thing, and on the arguments of St.

* *Summa*, 1, 2, Q. 96, a. 4 & *Id. art.* ad 3.

† Consult also *Ib.* 2, 2, Q. 104, a. 6, ad 3.

Thomas, Suarez, and Bellarmin, as above cited,* but on the practice of the Holy See itself, which in the "Ages of Faith," when all Christendom acknowledged the Pope as the divinely constituted umpire between monarchs and people, never hesitated, when appealed to by an outraged nation, to declare them, if due cause were shown, absolved from their allegiance to the tyrant. Nevertheless, it is certain that such a claim should be the very *last* resort, that the tyranny must be really excessive, that every peaceful mode of representation, entreaty, prayer, should have been made in vain, and that there should be a reasonable hope of success in establishing a legitimate and just government; for otherwise to rise in arms would be but a senseless vengeance, which is never lawful. And it is more in conformity with the spirit of Christ to suffer oppression, as long as oppression, morally speaking, can be endured, than to resist it. And a nation thoroughly impressed with the Christian spirit will find it *easy* to suffer, as the early Christians suffered under the persecutions of the Roman emperors. Read the lives, or rather the deaths, of the martyrs. There was no cringing, no fear; but a courage above human courage, a courage altogether supernatural, which struck wonder and terror into the hearts of their persecutors, and made thousands acknowledge the hand of the Almighty. So that Tertullian could gloriously say, in the second century:—"We have strength enough to fight, but we have learned of Christ to suffer all things. For what war were we not ready, even with unequal forces,—we who are led to slaughter so willingly,—were it not that we have learned from Him that it is better to be slain than to slay?" And such has ever been the sentiment of Catholic nations; penetrated by Christian faith, by Christian hope, and Christian charity, they have firmly believed those words of Christ, that "blessed are they who suffer persecution for conscience' sake," as every man does who for the love of Christ suffers any persecution whatsoever; they have hoped with a constant hope to inherit the kingdom of heaven promised to such; and they have loved their neighbour too well to bring destruction on him in vindicating themselves from oppression. If, then, you see anywhere a Catholic people suffering patiently when they have power sufficient to throw off the yoke, consider that it is not from apathy, not from fear;

* St. Thos. *Summa*, 2, 2, Q. 42, a. 2, ad 3, and *De Regim. Prin.* l. 1, c. 6 & 10; Suarez, D. 13, Sect. 3; Bellarm. *De Rom. Cont.* l. 5, c. 7.

but it is because the words of Christ have sunk deep into their hearts, and they have a hope in store laid up for them, which makes temporal sufferings seem light in the balance. Wonder not, on the other hand, when you see a nation without faith uneasy under the slightest shadow of oppression ; for this temporal welfare is all that has charms for them ; it is all that they believe in ; all that they love ; all, alas ! that they may hope for. But the Catholic has a higher good, a good to which all else is trifling ; he knows that “ what is light and momentary of this present tribulation worketh in us above measure in sublimity an eternal weight of glory.”

We have now explained the Catholic doctrine with regard to civil governments, — their origin, their object, their rights, their limits, and the means of redress against them. Nothing could be more perfect and complete ; nothing is forgotten, no interest unattended to, no right unfulfilled. It is truly Catholic. Order is assured on the one hand, and on the other liberty. The rights of government are protected ; so are the rights of the people ; and above all, the rights of God, the Author and Ruler of both.

Protestant theologians and philosophers have in vain attempted to improve upon this theory ; they have departed from it only to wander from the truth, to the right hand or to the left, — by excess or by defect. When they have sought to establish order, they have done it at the expense of liberty, as in the theory of Hobbes, the Antinomians, James I. When they have sought to defend liberty, they have done it at the expense of order, as in the “ Social Contract ” of Rousseau, which makes the obligation of law depend on the general *will* ; as though the will, whether of one man or of many, could ever found a legitimate obligation, or be any thing else *as such* but the grossest tyranny, unworthy the character of a rational being. Nor are even they exact, who place the obligation of law on the *general reason* of the community ; for even human reason *as such* gives no authority ; it may counsel, advise, enlighten, it can never command. This it has only in so far as it is in conformity with the eternal law of God, and because it is the application of this, by one having authority, to the particular case. Without this, you can found no obligation on the conscience, no right to command, no duty to obey. But not only have the Protestant systems invariably favored one party at the expense of the other, — government at the expense of the people, or the people at the

expense of government, — but they have generally left the most important party out of the question altogether. They have formed their theories as though God had no share in them ; they have excluded the Creator from the noblest of his works.

Such being the Catholic teaching with regard to civil governments, it is evident, that, if in the course of ages we see individuals departing from it and favoring tyranny, this is not from the influence of the Catholic Church, but in direct opposition to it, directly in spite of it, and therefore, of course, cannot be laid to its charge. The first part of the accusation, therefore, is refuted. The doctrines of Catholicity are not favorable to despotism, but are directly opposed to it.

II. Let us come, then, to the second part of the charge, and examine whether the *action* of the Catholic Church has been in accordance with its principles, whether the institutions of the Church have been conducive to political liberty.

It will not be necessary to enter into any historical detail of what the Church accomplished during the fifteen hundred years of Christianity which preceded the introduction of Protestantism ; for that has often been done in works accessible to most of our readers. It will be sufficient to recall to their minds a few leading points. When St. Peter established his see in Rome, the whole, so-called, civilized world was subject to the Roman empire, — a tyranny reigned in Rome horrible as that of the Oriental despots, and the whole world was sunk in idolatry, cruelty, lust, and rapine. It was in this world that the Church began her work, and by the lives and teachings of her saints, the writings of her sages, the blood of her martyrs, — constant, steady, unwearied, age after age, — she stemmed the torrent of vice, refuted the pagan philosophies, overthrew the idols of the nations, and won the Roman empire to Christianity. Scarcely was her triumph complete in this great empire, when the barbarian nations, like mighty waves of a Northern sea, rolled down over the sunny fields of the South, sweeping all before them, destroying every green thing, and threatening, not only to efface every vestige of Roman civilization and art, but to overwhelm the Church itself in the widespread ruin. But the billows of that spring-tide of barbarism dashed in vain against the Rock of Peter ; in vain the whirlwinds and tempests of battle whistled and roared around it, for the Wise Builder himself had founded it, and the gates of hell could not prevail against it.

Here was a new world for the Church to subdue. Wild and lawless, heathen and heretic united, the barbarians covered the face of Europe, — a motley and chaotic assemblage of tribes, languages, customs, and governments. But the Church began her work again, and dauntless missionaries went forth on every side, till Goth and Visigoth, Saxon and Hun and Vandal, before whose fierce valor the mailed legions of the empire had quailed, yielded to the peaceful teaching of those men of God, and bowed their necks to the sweet yoke of Christ. And thus the Church went on, diffusing the light of civilization and Christianity, till, long before the approach of Protestantism, paganism, barbarism, and heresy had alike disappeared ; all Europe was civilized ; all civilization was Christian ; and all Christians were Catholic.

This glorious change the Church had effected chiefly by her religious teaching ; but in addition to this, she had directly operated on the social and political amelioration of Europe by the celibacy of the clergy, and by the temporal power of the Popes.

1. What was the effect of this celibacy ? The distinguished Protestant statesman and philosopher, M. Guizot, with profounder thought and more candor than has usually characterized Protestant authors in speaking of Catholic institutions, declares, in his *General History of the Civilization of Europe* (lect. 5), that it was their celibacy alone which prevented the clergy from forming a caste like those in India. Had the clergy been married, it would have been, he says, morally impossible for the Church dignities not to have become hereditary, like the rank of the feudal lords. For the clergy would naturally have allied themselves by intermarriage and common interests with the feudal nobility, and would have united with them in retaining in their own hands all the intelligence of the age, all the wealth and power of the nations ; while the lower classes would have been irretrievably sunk in ignorance, poverty, and servitude, like the wretched lower castes of India. "This would have been," he says, "the inevitable consequence of the marriage of the clergy ; whereas the effect of the celibacy was, that, while all else around her fell under the *régime* of privilege and birth, the Church alone maintained the principle of equality, and admitted all men, without regard to their origin, to all her charges and all her dignities." This avowal is alike creditable to M. Guizot, and conclusive as to the influence of this institution on civil liberty. For not

only did the example of the Church, in this matter, have a vast influence in bringing temporal governments to acknowledge the general rights of mankind, — but, as a matter of fact, the Church by this institution not only threw open to the poorer classes all the means of education, all the treasures of learning, all the dignities and wealth which she herself possessed, but, moreover, through the immense temporal power which the clergy then enjoyed, opened to them at the same time all the highest offices of the state. So that it was the glory of the Catholic priesthood in those barbarous ages, when the rights of mankind were in vain pleaded for, to accomplish, by severe institutions against themselves, that which even in modern times has been obtained only by revolution and bloodshed. Yes, even as the modern deliberative assemblies of State are but the faintest shadow of those great Catholic Councils in which the collective wisdom of nations was called to regulate harmoniously the affairs, not of a single country, but of all Christendom, so the eligibility of every man to the highest office in the republic, which this nation of ours boasts as its greatest glory, wrenched, as it was, from England only by eight years of war, is but the faintest shadow of what has for eighteen centuries been the ordinary course of events in the Church of God. For, long before modern political institutions were thought of, the Church had practised them for centuries in her own bosom, and presents us the living model of every social improvement which has been made. And if we consider that the priesthood, by renouncing marriage, not only renounced the strongest of natural affections, the love of domestic happiness and comfort, but also that ambition which they might have gratified so fully by founding illustrious lines and dynasties ; if we consider how far those men must have stood above the common views of the age, who, while they possessed wealth and power greater even than those of the feudal nobility, nevertheless hesitated not to assume into their glorious company, and make partakers of all their dignities, the wretched slaves and serfs, who in the eyes of others were little better than brutes ; if, finally, we consider that this was not a step *forced* upon them, as every such participation of the people in *temporal* governments has been forced upon those governments, but that the Church herself, in the plenitude of her power and influence, maintained this institution, guided only by the spirit of Christian love and self-sacrifice, and that age after age she has, for eighteen centuries, unwaveringly

preserved it ;—if we seriously and honestly reflect on these facts, in connection with the motives which usually govern men's actions, we cannot fail to recognize in this institution the inspiration and support of Almighty God, and, recognizing his presence, we cannot fail to acknowledge that the Catholic Church is that Church of which the inspired Apostle writes to the Ephesians (v. 25–27), that “Christ loved the Church, and delivered himself up for it that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life ; that he might present it to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, nor any such thing ; but that it should be holy and without blemish.”

Nor would the occasional misconduct of individuals be a stumbling-block ; for while, on the one hand, the upholding of the Church by God still leaves every individual master of his own actions and personally accountable for them, it is certain, on the other hand, that the dereliction of individuals has never been so general as to impede the regular onward progress of the Church, or prevent her from accomplishing the glorious ends for which she was constituted. No, the tree which Christ planted has never failed ; a twig may have withered and dropped off here and there, but the glorious old trunk has never shown sign of decay, but continues ever putting forth new flowers and new fruit, in one ceaseless spring-time of blossom, and one ceaseless summer of maturity.

2. The second engine of political liberty was the temporal power of the Popes ; for at a time when the people were too weak to protect themselves, the Church stretched out her hand to them, and preserved them from the encroachments of the civil authority. The greatest errors are prevalent among Protestants as to the origin, nature, and exercise of this power. It must be remembered, that it did not consist in extent of territory, for the Popes never added an acre to their own dominions, however easily they might have done so. Nor did it consist in armies and fleets, for the Popes' soldiers were never very formidable. It consisted simply in influence in political transactions, — an influence which, looking at it in a merely human point of view, was not at all usurped, but the voluntary and natural offering of all Catholic nations. When the Church civilized the barbarians, in whose hands were the intelligence, ability, and integrity of the age ?—in the hands of the barbarians, or of the Church who civilized them ? Was it not natural, then, that, not only reverencing the sacred char-

acter of the Church, but acknowledging her superior human intelligence also, they should have put themselves entirely under her tutelage, and desired her advice on all matters, as well temporal as spiritual? Looking at it, therefore, we say, in a merely human light, it was but the homage justly due to superior virtue and ability.

And the Church used this power for the common good ; — she interfered with the natural growth of no country whatsoever ; the various forms of government grew up, under her fostering care, according to circumstances and the character of the people ; here monarchy, there feudalism, and in Italy alone, where the influence of the Popes was most immediate and powerful, republicanism. The Church stood by, the natural ally of all, the enemy of none ; the natural mediator between kings and their subjects, the living expression of the Almighty will, the living expounder and enforcer of his laws, — to bid monarchs stop, when ambition led them to oppress ; to bid nations stop, when they mistook license for liberty. She stood the mediator between all, herself formed of every class, possessing the confidence of all, admirably adapted to aid every class in what was just, and to prevent the unjust preponderance of any.

Hence we find that two opposite charges are made against the Church by her enemies ; — the one, that she has leagued with kings to oppress the people ; the other, that she has leagued with the people to overthrow the royal authority. The fact is, that she has leaned neither to one side nor to the other, but, when either has transgressed, she has thrown her influence into the other scale, till the balance was restored.

Nevertheless, in history we find her more frequently siding with the people against the king than with the king against the people ; because the kings more frequently sought to tyrannize. And this is why many of the kings made such violent efforts to weaken her influence in their states, — for they felt, that, so long as she had a strong footing, their power was essentially limited ; whereas, if she were once removed, they could easily overpower the nobility, their only important check, and trample at will on the people, who had no bond of union in themselves, no power, wealth, or intelligence of their own to cope with them, though they found a rich store of all in the Church, their mother, who never turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of her children. So far, then, was the temporal influence of the Church from being a source of tyranny, that it con-

stituted the only solid check on the arbitrary will of the monarchs, and prevented their power from becoming absolute and all-absorbing. Nobly, therefore, did the Popes merit the title which the Protestant historian Voigt gives them of "Tutors of the European nations in the ways of civilization."

It was under the combined influence of the spiritual teaching of the Church, and the actual operation of these institutions, that Europe rose from the abyss of idolatry, tyranny, debauchery, and degradation in which she appears when the Church was founded, to the state of glorious progress in which we see her at the commencement of the sixteenth century. The foul slavery of Rome had long given place to the milder form of serfdom, and serfdom was now fast yielding to freedom, and the people were forming a strong part of society, as the feudal system gave way to a more enlarged and perfect social organization. The barbarian tribes had coalesced into powerful nations, — Germany, France, Spain, Italy. Government had assumed a definite shape ; parliaments, diets, states general, cortes, everywhere existed as checks on the royal power ; large and powerful cities had grown up, vast universities been established ; the great republics of Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Venice, in Italy, and the Hanseatic league in Germany, had carried the products of Europe to every part of the known world ; industry and the arts had reached a wonderful degree of development ; poetry and painting had attained to perfection in Italy ; Vasco de Gama had discovered the passage of the Cape of Good Hope ; Columbus had discovered a new world in America ; printing was spreading light among the nations ; and in every thing connected with human welfare, physical, moral, and intellectual, the world seemed marching with rapid strides towards perfection. The Church had done this, for the Church alone existed ; and what she had done she created, for none went before to show the way. And now Protestantism appeared, — not to convert idolaters, for that was already done ; not to civilize barbarians, for they were already civilized ; not to create new elements of temporal prosperity and happiness, for every element of human welfare was already in active operation, — but she came to impede, to destroy, the harmonious development of what was rapidly progressing under the fostering care of the Church who had created it.

The immediate effect of Protestantism was to sow seeds of deadly hatred, not only among friendly nations, but between

different portions of the same nation. Desolating civil and religious wars followed its footsteps wherever it appeared, in Germany, France, England, the North ; and wherever Protestantism triumphed, commenced a series of cruel persecutions against the Catholics, scarcely paralleled in the annals of the Roman Neros.

The influence of Protestantism on political liberty was as disastrous as on civilization generally. Its first object of attack was the temporal power of the Popes, and, by destroying this before the people had yet acquired strength to defend themselves, it left the royal power without a check, and the people without protection. Moreover, not content with stripping the Popes of their temporal authority, it transferred their spiritual authority to the kings, and the throne in Protestant countries acquired immense additional power by becoming the head of the Church, and possessing all its patronage. But with an inconsistency which has equally characterized it in matters purely religious, while Protestantism thus, on the one hand, put an immense power into the hands of kings, it, on the other, excited the people against the crown by preaching doctrines subversive of order. Its influence was twofold ; — on one side, to dispose the people to rebellion, partly by its doctrines, and partly by depriving them of the moral means of redress which they before had in the Papal authority ; and on the other side, to dispose the kings to tyranny, by making them fear the people, while at the same time their power to crush them was increased. Thus the crown and the people were brought face to face in direct and deadly opposition, and hence the rebellions and revolutions which occurred in all the countries where Protestant principles acquired sway. And hence naturally we see these revolutions followed by the establishment of absolute governments in all the Protestant countries ; in England, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, and Germany generally. For not only is it the natural effect of rebellion to produce despotism, as of despotism to produce rebellion, but the people themselves at last gladly resign a vast power to the executive, rather than remain a constant prey to civil contention. Nor can we wonder at the formation of similar absolute governments in the countries which remained Catholic ; for, though Protestantism itself could get no hold there, the influence of its principles was felt everywhere, and, on the one hand, compelled the governments to look to their own welfare, while, on the other, the people willingly permitted the government to do, as

a preventive of evils, what in Protestant countries was required for their cure.

But it is necessary to remark, that an absolute form of government has not those evils in Catholic which it has in Protestant countries. For, in the first place, as Catholic principles exclude the government from power in spiritual matters, the clergy, though possessing no temporal power, constantly exert a moral check which is wanting in Protestant countries. Moreover, the equality of all before the Church, the union of all classes in religious confraternities, the deep mutual sympathy in all that relates to the highest interests of man, produce a fellowship of feeling among all classes which is utterly wanting in Protestant countries, and exert a moral influence on both governors and governed which makes those material forms comparatively unnecessary which are found so absolutely essential in Protestant countries.

Such, then, was the immediate and direct influence of the Reformation on political liberty. If we look at Europe after Protestantism had been one hundred and fifty years at work in it, we find the civilizing work of the Church thrown back, the civil wars produced by Protestantism scarcely yet ended, or ended only by the substitution of despotism. The moral checks of Catholicity being removed, the nations were forced to have recourse to rebellion, and the governments to bayonets.

What political amelioration has taken place since the fierce bigotry of early Protestantism has given way to comparative indifference it would be idle to attribute to Protestantism. Catholicity has been at work as well as Protestantism, but neither has exerted a great and direct influence on political liberty. The amelioration which has taken place in political institutions is to be attributed chiefly to the extension of industry and commerce, and the multiplication of the modes of communication between countries, which have given to the people greater wealth, power, and intelligence than were before possible, and have therefore enabled them to hold a more important position in political affairs, than, from the nature of things, they could have filled before.*

* Nevertheless, even this effect in Protestant countries is seen only in our own country and in England, and it is shown in England to be the effect of no principle, because, with liberal forms at home, where she is forced to them, she wished to tyrannize over us, and does still tyrannize over poor Ireland and over her provinces in the East, where the people have not power to resist her. But the other Protestant countries of Eu-

We have now shown that the Catholic Church has never favored tyranny, — that not only are its principles completely opposed to it, but that in its own institutions it practised from the beginning all that has in modern times been considered most glorious. The constitution of the United States is not opposed to the spirit of Catholicity ; on the contrary, it is of all national constitutions the most like what the Church has always adopted in her own practice. From Catholicity this country has nothing to fear, but every thing to hope ; for Catholicity would make it a matter of conscience to preserve the constitution in its integrity, and would have sufficient influence to preserve the people in order with little outward force.

But it is a most grave error to suppose that true liberty depends upon, or can be insured by, written constitutions or material forms. Liberty depends not on the form of the government, but on its administration, and a good administration can be insured only by religion. Where religion is wanting, no form of government, however admirably devised, can long save the people from oppression. For irreligion is necessarily immoral and selfish, and therefore disposed to injustice, and, when occasion offers, will inevitably tyrannize ; — mere outward forms will do little, where the life-giving spirit is wanting. On the contrary, where both rulers and people are profoundly religious, even an absolute form of government will not be oppressive, because the government will confine itself to the true object of government, the welfare of the people, and the people will cheerfully conform to what they see is for their good. And, on the other hand, where there is religion, the most liberal forms of government may flourish, for the sense of responsibility to God will of itself suffice ; but where religion is wanting, this element must be supplied by force ; for obedience to government is necessary to the very existence of society, and where religion does not supply moral means, the government must strengthen itself by physical ones.

If, then, you would insure liberty in any country, strive to make your children solidly religious. But religion you will seek in vain, except in the Church which Christ has founded. If nothing else, sad experience at last will show you that lib-

rope, Norway, Sweden, Prussia, and the German states generally, are still governed by absolute princes, without written constitutions or limitation. And this is enough to show that Protestantism, as such, has no tendency to produce even those forms which Protestants themselves generally consider essential to liberty.

erty is impossible without religion, and religion without the Church.*

ART. III. — 1. *Deux Mots sur le Monastère de La Cava.*

Par GUILLAUME DE CORNÈ, Directeur des Archives du Monastère.

2. *Monasterii Sanctissimæ Trinitatis Cavæ Ordinis Sancti Benedicti Congregationis Casfinensis asserta Privilegia Constitutionibus Summorum Pontificum. Romæ: Typis Reverendæ Cameræ Apostolicæ.*

ONE of the most delightful excursions a traveller can enjoy in the environs of Naples is undoubtedly a visit to the celebrated monastery of La Cava, more commonly known in the neighbourhood under the name of "*La Trinità*." Whether he be an artist in quest of beautiful scenery, a student of antiquities, or a devout pilgrim, he is sure to be more than satisfied, and to obtain at La Cava both literary and religious instruction.

The monastery is situated in a valley of the Western Apennines, four miles from Salerno, and about forty-six from Naples. Were we engaged in a literary sketch, in place of a sober archæological narrative, we might remark, that the traveller is almost uncertain, at the end of his journey, whether the road is not more interesting than its termination. For, leaving Naples in the cars, you are whirled along the edge of its far-famed gulf, passing before the royal palace at Portici, then, over beds of lava, through Torre Annunziata and Torre del Greco, behind which stands Vesuvius, with its bright column of smoke rising, at times, straight from its fiery basis up into mid air, like a pile of icebergs, at times bending horizontally before the wind, and stretching at an angle with the top of the cone far over the smiling Campania, like some gigantic serpent of glass. Your attention is occasionally recalled to

* Should any of our readers wish to see this subject treated more at large, we would recommend to them the work of Balmes, noticed by another hand in a subsequent article, — a work to which we have been greatly indebted in preparing this brief essay, and in which the author most profoundly investigates the comparative influence which Protestantism and Catholicity have exerted on every subject connected with the temporal welfare of society.

the mountain by sudden rebuffs, which at that distance sound not much louder than the puffing of the engine, but to a person standing on the crater assume the reality of deafening thunder, shaking the ground beneath, and followed by volleys of cinders, and red-hot fragments of stone, and crystals, which shoot high up through the smoke, and either fall again into the chasm, or roll down its sides accompanied by streams of burning lava.

You are roused from your contemplation of the wonders of nature by the train stopping near Pompeii, whose miniature palaces and lofty temples shine brightly in the sun, showing you what man was able to erect in the hour of his pride, — a monument of Vanity to Silence and Death. Angri, Scafati, Pagani, and Nocera are passed in rapid succession. Pagani is endeared to the Christian traveller by the memory of St. Alphonsus Liguori, who made it his dwelling-place for many years, and whose relics are enshrined there, beneath the altar of San Michele, the mother-house of his Order. Cava is only three or four miles beyond Nocera, and will soon be linked to Naples by the railroad which the Neapolitan government intends to carry on to Salerno.

Few parts of Italy present a view equal to that of the neighbourhood of La Cava for the singular contrast of wildness and beauty, the whole forming a panorama of romantic grandeur which would be more naturally expected in the mountains of Switzerland than on the smiling shores of Campania the Blest.

As you ride up the winding road that runs from the town of La Cava to the abbey, new hills seem to rise suddenly before you, while those you have passed are as suddenly lost to the eye. For a long time you enjoy only an extremely limited horizon, as the rugged path threads its way between a deep precipice on one side and a cluster of mountain-tops on the other, abruptly severed by narrow ravines, and covered with wild vegetation. At an unexpected turn of the mountain-pass, the smiling valley of Cava opens beneath you far and wide, with its well-cultivated fields, its bright little town, its meandering river, and the blue hills in the distance, over which the sun pours a stream of glory upon the enchanting scene.

From this point of view two objects especially attract the attention of the spectator. On the left hand, the Apennines, swelling in terrific grandeur from the valley, present to the eye their rugged sides covered with a forest of chestnuts, which

form a broad mass of deep and dark foliage, and end in a lofty ridge, overtopped again by two banks of naked rock, which join together at the highest elevation, leaving beneath a wide quadrangular opening, which appears in the distance like a great window hewn through the solid mountain-side by the hand of Nature. This phenomenon has given to the place the appellation of *Monte Fenestra* (Mount Window), and the effect produced by the rays of the sun shining through this strange aperture is very striking. On the opposite side, a Capuchin convent is descried, whose little courts, gardens, and vineyards look like a landscape traced by art on the side of the hill, which shoots still higher up into a grayish isolated rock in the form of a sugar-loaf. This eminence was formerly crowned by a little fort, the ruins of which are still found scattered about. On an evening during the Octave of the Corpus Domini a temporary altar is erected there, and a procession wends its way up to it, the festival ending with the Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament, given, under the broad canopy of Italy's blue sky, from that sublime height, in full view of all the inhabitants of the valley, to their families, their dwellings, their fields, and forests. The whole ascent is illuminated by hundreds of torches, colored lanterns, and ranges of fireworks, the summit ending in a perfect blaze of splendor. The awful moment of the terminating ceremony is announced by a peal of martial music and the echo of innumerable volleys, the whole pageant, combined with the picturesque grandeur of the surrounding scenery, producing an effect which is described as truly magnificent.

But return we to the abbey. To find one's self suddenly beneath the gilded ceiling and surrounded by the stuccoed walls of the convent church, after wandering so long amongst the wild fastnesses of the rugged Apennines, is so delightful a surprise as to seem the effect of magic. This surprise is not lessened at discovering what treasures are contained in this happy wilderness. It will not, we hope, prove unacceptable to our readers, if, before describing them, we give a brief account of the origin and early history of the monastery.

The date of its foundation has not been established with precision, but Pellegrini and Mabillon refer it to the beginning of the eleventh century. About the year 1006, a monk of illustrious lineage, whose family was allied to the Lombard princes of Salerno, but who was still more distinguished by his virtues than by his noble birth, departed that city, where he

had the direction of several monastic institutions, to find a solitude where he might lead a life of penance and prayer, far remote from the noise and vanity of a deceitful world. He discovered a spot answering his pious intentions in one of the wildest defiles of the Metellian valley, called *Cava arsiccia*, which name was afterwards given to the town situated a mile and a half from the convent. The holy recluse chose for his dwelling an humble hermitage, which a monk of Monte Cassino, called Liutius, had erected long before in the midst of the wilderness, hoping to enjoy in its secluded cell that peace and retirement of which Monte Cassino had been deprived, in consequence of the intrusive election of an abbot sustained by the secular power.

The odor of the sanctity of Alpherio Pappacarbone, for this was the name of the new inhabitant of La Cava, soon began to diffuse itself abroad. A numerous band of pious persons, who like himself were weary of the world, and desired to embrace a life of perfection, came to put themselves under his guidance. Alpherio with great reluctance consented to assume the direction of these good brethren, and, obeying the mysterious decrees of Providence, which did not permit him to remain in the obscurity he had so anxiously sought after, erected in due time a convent and church in that solitary place. The hymn of praise was heard to swell upon the mountain breeze from the lips of a numerous choir, and the steam of the censer soared towards the skies from recesses untrodden before by the foot of man. Alpherio dedicated the new institution to the Ever-blessed Trinity, and taught his twelve companions the rule of Cluny as he had learned it in the monastery of San Michele della Chiusa in Savoy. While ambassador at the court of the Emperor Otho the Third, he had been forced by illness during a journey to apply for hospitality at the above-mentioned monastery, where he received the habit at the hands of the venerable Abbot Odilon.

Several years had elapsed, during which Alpherio trained up his disciples in a life of piety united with study, when he was gathered to his fathers in a good old age. He was succeeded in the abbacy by Leo of Lucca, and then by his nephew, Peter Pappacarbone, who, at the request of Leo, had come to their monastery from Cluny.

The remains of these venerable abbots repose in the church originally built by their hands, and are justly venerated as the relics of saints. Under their direction, the abbey increased in

reputation, and many of the inhabitants of the neighbouring valleys came to put themselves under its protection. Many flourishing townships were formed in this manner during the Middle Ages, not only in Italy, but in Germany, France, and England. The abbey, invested with the rights of a landlord, formed the nucleus of the increasing settlement, which was protected by the shield of religion, and, when it became necessary, by the sword of the abbot, who was not backward in defending his tenants, if the insolent feudal seignior, the marauding Saracen, or the lawless bandit dared to attack them beneath the shade of the convent walls. The origin of the town of Cava is usually dated, according to Eustace, from the invasion of Genseric, and the destruction of the neighbouring town of Marciana, whose inhabitants took shelter in the mountains, and, at the persuasion of the abbot, settled around the monastery.

It is unfortunate that the accomplished classical tourist did not find leisure to pay a visit to the abbey, as he would doubtless have met there some further poetical coincidences to show that we Catholics are not, after all, quite so unamiable as might be supposed, and that our religion may be even brought finally to harmonize with the enlightened spirit of the age, if our affable Protestant masters will deign to encourage it with the dews of their piety, and beautify it with the irradiations of their superior wisdom.*

* On a reperusal of these expressions, we are led to fear lest they be taken as a slur upon the memory of the amiable author of the *Classical Tour through Italy*. But our allusions are wholly directed to his book, which has been so much read and so highly praised by Protestants. The spirit of the work, as far as religion is concerned, is, we fear, but too accurately described above. It is said that Eustace, in his later years, often expressed his regret that the work had ever been published. Perhaps, if the times he lived in and the connections amongst whom he moved had been different, he would not have obscured the lustre of his fine talents by a defence of his religion, the servile and yielding spirit of which is the most cruel libel he could have penned against it, albeit interspersed with expressions of sincere attachment to the Church.

The Catholic religion cannot be justified on the grounds of Protestantism, as Christ cannot be proved amiable or agreeable according to the principles of the world. If Protestants do not like the Church such as she is, so much the worse for themselves. She will never soften down, or explain away, the austerity of her doctrines to suit their fancy, or come to a compromise to allure them to her communion; and it is both treacherous to her, and unfeeling towards them, to describe her in such a manner as to induce them to believe that they can be welcomed in by

The monastery was in its highest degree of splendor, when Pope Urban the Second, who had been compelled, by the rudeness of the times, to seek refuge in Salerno, governed by the Duke Roger Borsa, became desirous to give a token of his friendship to its inmates by consecrating the newly erected church of the Most Holy Trinity. Urban had formerly been a monk of Cluny, under the name of Odon, and, having followed the Abbot Peter to La Cava, he had passed several years within its walls.

Among the privileges granted by Urban to the monks, the most remarkable one is the elevation of Peter to the dignity of a bishop. The Duke Roger likewise invested the abbot and his successors with temporal dominion over all the lands of the abbey. The monks made use of this power to protect the neighbourhood from the incursions of the numerous petty princes whose turbulent spirit never permitted them to live in peace with their vassals, or in friendship with their neighbours. The Abbot Costabile, by the erection of Castel Abate, provided a refuge for the inhabitants of Licosia, as Peter Pappacarbone had done for the vassals of the convent spread over the Marcine valley by the construction of the stronghold called *Corpo della Cava*.

Nor is this the only obligation the inhabitants of the country are under to the Benedictines. During centuries of ignorance and barbarism, their convent-walls were the asylum of science and literature, as their precious archives amply testify. Far from the gaze of the world, the Italian monk spent his life in transcribing the works of the Fathers, and the classics, while the ancestors of those who now upbraid his memory with the sacrilegious epithets of *lazy*, *useless*, and *ignorant*, were setting fire to palaces and churches, and tumbling to earth the stately monuments of Roman grandeur and ingenuity.

Through each succeeding age, the monastery of La Cava continued to be exemplary in the maintenance of religious discipline, and in its love for learning, until the introduction of commendatary or honorary abbots caused a degree of relaxation in its cloisters which it was found necessary to repress by efficacious measures. Cardinal Carafa, the last commendatary

her, without abandoning altogether those sentiments, maxims, and habits which fitted them to move with applause outside. They have been led to understand pretty well that Christ and the Devil are enemies, but they want to be persuaded a little better that the former can never agree with the world and the flesh. God help them !

abbot, began the good work by resigning, with permission of Pope Alexander the Sixth, his abbacy into the hands of the Benedictine congregation of St. Justin of Padua. Through the vigilance of the new superiors of the monastery, the influence of ancient authority was reasserted, and studies were resumed with an ardor which made several names dear to the republic of letters.

In the sixteenth century, the town of La Cava, which had been elevated by Benedict the Ninth to the rank of a city in 1394, ungrateful to its faithful protectors, was led by the spirit of the age to get weary of its ancient lords and their patriarchal sway. The Order yielded to the earnest solicitations of the citizens, and the abbot made over to them the rights of temporal jurisdiction with which his predecessors had been invested. The city of La Cava was subsequently elevated to the rank of a bishopric, but the other domains of the abbey remained in its possession. Things continued in this state down to the days when the French conquerors, marching into Naples, drove the bishop from his cathedral, and the monks from their convent, substituting the musket for the crozier, and the roll of the drum for the music of the psalms.

Fortunately the rapacity of the invaders spared the precious archives of the monastery. They were not dispersed, nor sold at auction, nor stuffed ignominiously into boxes to be carried to Paris, as it was customary to do in similar cases, but, being considered a section of the records of the kingdom, they were confided to persons who guarded them with praiseworthy vigilance. After the fall of Joachim Murat, the most humane tyrant of his day, and the return of the Bourbons, the monks regained peaceful possession of their ancient home, and of the treasures of learning which it contains.

After this outline of the history of the convent, taken from chronicles preserved in it, we will proceed to say something of the attractions it has for a traveller. The church, which seems at first sight to start up, as if by enchantment, in the midst of crags and forests, is nearly overhung by the jutting brow of a rock that protects it on the northern side. It is more to be admired for its solidity, a necessary precaution in a mountainous neighbourhood visited at times by tremendous storms, than for the beauty of its architecture. In the vestibule is to be remarked the tomb of Queen Sybilla, wife of Roger, king of Sicily. The style of the interior is a mixture of Greek and Roman. The organ-loft is an elegant piece of workmanship,

in the Gothic style, tastefully executed by Chevalier Petrelli. The fame of the organ of La Cava has spread all over Europe. It has eighty-four stops, and three key-boards of six octaves each. Nine thousand francs were spent, not long ago, merely to add new instruments to it. The whole receives life from one enormous pair of bellows, the breath of which is made at pleasure to imitate the sound of almost every known instrument. The builders of this celebrated organ were Quirico and Gaetano Gennaro of Lanciano, whose names have been made the theme of their praises by nearly all European periodicals.

The chapel on the right, ornamented with a profusion of rare marbles and precious stones, contains the relics of St. Alpherio, and his three immediate successors in the government of the abbey. In the nave of the main altar, on the same side, there is an inscription which refers to the consecration of the church by Urban the Second, in 1092, and opposite to that a piece of marble in the wall, which bears a kind of inverted mitre. This device, which is evidently symbolical, has given rise to the strangest conjectures. That which supposes the said marble slab to cover the tomb of the Antipope Burdin, exiled to the monastery of La Cava to do penance for the disturbances he had created, is not the least curious. As this conjecture has no sure foundation in history, perhaps the symbol in question is nothing but the escutcheon of a knight buried at a remote period in that part of the church.

The secluded position and fortified walls of the convent protected its archives from those lamentable inroads which dispersed the literary treasures of many other abbeys. There is nowhere else to be found a collection of documents so ancient, so important, so well preserved, and so judiciously arranged. Mabillon calls this collection *integerrimum*. The admirers of the *Dark Ages* (amongst the foremost of whom, humble as we are, we count ourselves) find in this sanctuary vast records of the utmost importance to history, and a rich collection of laws, customs, deeds, formularies, and donations, the consideration of which is indispensable to him who would form a just idea of those times, so indiscriminately misrepresented and so little understood. Before mentioning a few of the most remarkable documents, we cannot refrain from paying a just tribute of praise to the venerable religious for the neatness and order with which the archives are kept. The well-written catalogue formed by their patience and industry furnishes the curious

with the most satisfactory classification. In the first column, each diploma or charter is specified ; in the same line on the ensuing columns is found its number, the year, the month, and indication of its date, the name of the prince or king under whom it issued, the kind of writing it exhibits, the quality of its seal, and, finally, a summary of its contents. A new chronological catalogue has likewise been written, in alphabetical order, in the form of a dictionary.

The archives are composed of forty thousand parchments, upwards of sixty thousand acts of different kinds, and about sixteen hundred bulls and diplomas.

The first act in this long list is dated A. D. 840. By it, Radelchis, Prince of Benevento, grants to the Abbot of St. Sophia the possessions of a certain Lambayard forfeited by the crime of rebellion. Two other diplomas famous in the history of La Cava refer to some of its earliest endowments. One bears the date of 1025, and the other of the following year. By them, Waimher the Third, Prince of Salerno, makes a donation to the abbey of the valley which Alpherio had chosen for the site of its erection, and of the surrounding woods, which had hitherto been hunting-grounds of the prince. To this donation he adds ample privileges and exemptions. The seal of Waimher is a pendent one of wax, on one side of which is a bust of the prince, with his crown and sceptre, and the inscription *Waimaius Princeps*, and on the reverse the closed hand of Justice. By another act, a subsequent Prince Waimher, styled, nevertheless, *the Wicked* in the Cava chronicle, grants to the convent of St. Maximus of Salerno the property and person of a certain Lupo, with his wife, his children, and grandchildren, for having treasonably acted as guide to the Saracens, when they besieged Salerno in 870. It is remarkable, that, not long after, having been dethroned by his rebel subjects, Waimher the Wicked was obliged to seek refuge in this same monastery. The document is signed 899, and, although of little importance in itself, it settles the date of important historical events.

To the right, upon entering the archives, is perceived a celebrated diploma of Roger, king of Sicily, dated in the first year of his reign, 1130. The king yields up to the monks of La Cava extensive lands in Sicily, and a goodly number of Christian and Saracen vassals. The diploma bears a golden seal, with an impression of our Saviour standing with a book in his hand, and on the reverse a full-length portrait of Roger

dressed in a *Dalmatica*, the robe of a deacon. This is intended, most probably, to show his dignity of legate *a latere* of the Pope in Sicily. At the end of the writ is an autograph signature of the Norman leader in Greek letters.

There is to be found, likewise, an act of Baldwin the Sixth, king of Jerusalem, dated *anno* 1181, which grants free navigation to the ships of the monastery in the waters of Syria.

There is an act which speaks of the *morgengabe*, or morning-gift which the bridegroom gave to the bride the morning after their marriage. A law of King Luitprand expressly establishes that the *morgengabe* is in no case to exceed the fourth part of the donor's property! A verdict of the year 844 condemns a certain Theodelgard to pay the sum of nine hundred pence, in reparation of her injured honor, to a maiden of free condition. Upon Theodelgard's declaring himself unable to advance the sum, the act mentions that the judge *seized him by the hair*, and handed him over to the offended party as security for its payment. An act of 1053 gives the exact measure of the foot used by the Lombards; and another, in which Nicholas, Count of the Principate, grants extensive lands to the abbey *per fuslem*, is attached to a small wooden roll, which bears the inscription, *Nicolaus Comes P. R. C.* A privilege granted by Pope Alexander the Fourth deserves attention for the title which he takes, of Supreme Lord of Sicily.

In a bull of Urban the Second, issued at the time he consecrated the church of the Blessed Trinity, the Pope confirms, in virtue of the same authority, and at the *humble request* of Roger, the privileges granted by this prince to the monastery. We may remark, in passing, that among these privileges there is the singular faculty by force of which the religious could save from death any person condemned by the secular power. We may be permitted to express a thought which passed before our minds in recording it, — what interesting use might be made of this privilege in works of fiction, the scene of which lay in the Middle Ages!

The bulls published by different Popes, and preserved at La Cava, amount to five hundred and sixty. An exposition of their contents would certainly be interesting, but few of them remain unpublished. The few we inspected contained grants of jurisdictional power to the monastery, chiefly by Urban the Second, Paschal the Second, Alexander the Third, and Gregory the Fourteenth.

The convent library is not remarkable for the number of its

books, but it has a magnificent collection of manuscripts and rare editions. The manuscripts, of which there are more than sixty, from the seventh down to the fourteenth century, are in different respects highly valuable. We will mention, —

1. The book of Bede on the history of Italy from the ninth to the tenth century, the margins of which are covered with interesting notes, written from year to year by contemporary witnesses. These valuable notes have been published by Muratori, in his great collection of Italian writers, but unfortunately with not much accuracy.

2. Two manuscripts of the fourteenth century, elegantly written and beautifully illuminated.

3. We have purposely reserved for the last two of those delightful rarities which the learned traveller must not expect to meet with more than once at every six hundred miles, and over which he gloats with the eagerness of a worldly-minded gourmand who has a favorite dish, not seen for a considerable time, placed unexpectedly before him. One is a Latin Bible of the seventh century, so exquisitely written and so entirely preserved, that it cannot be viewed without amazement, considering its antiquity. Its neat and regular pages present five different kinds of writing. In the capitals the uncial characters predominate, and in the text the small Roman letters, amongst which last there is an occasional resemblance to the ancient Lombard. This precious manuscript contains all the books of the Old and New Testament, but they are arranged differently from the usual order. The Psalms, of which there is one more than elsewhere, present several variations, which are found, also, in the Old Italic version, circumstances that prove the antiquity of the manuscript.*

* We will add to this description the remarks of Dr. Wiseman upon this celebrated manuscript, which have been pointed out to us since this was written. We copy from the first of his *Two Letters on some Parts of the Controversy concerning 1 John v. 7*.

“The first document to which I beg the attention of critics is the beautiful manuscript of the Vulgate preserved in the venerable Benedictine abbey of La Cava, situated between Naples and Salerno. . . . When visiting that part of Italy some years ago, I turned aside to the monastery, chiefly for the purpose of inspecting it. I have, however, found still more favorable opportunity to study its text. For the indefatigable librarian of the Vatican, Monsignor (now Cardinal) Mai, considered this manuscript of sufficient value to deserve an exact transcription. This was ordered by Pope Leo XII., and in the course of last summer (1834) the last sheets were deposited in the Vatican library by Father Rossi, the archivist of La Cava. It will be difficult at a distance to esti-

The second rare manuscript alluded to is a Lombard code of the tenth century. It is the most ancient collection of Lombard laws in existence, and teems with the most precious items of information. This manuscript, in 1642, furnished Camillo Pellegrini with six treatises, which he has published in the *History of the Lombard Princes*. Mabillon, the historian Giannone, Pratilli, and the Abbé de Razan, and, still more recently, Carlo Troja, consulted it with success on several important points. When the writer of the present article visited La Cava, in 1846, Father de Cornè, then director of the archives, was engaged in the laborious task of illustrating this important remnant of the Middle Ages with explanatory, historical, and philological notes, and was in hopes to be able to publish it in due time, with his copious and erudite commentary.

What distinguishes the library of La Cava is a collection of more than six hundred volumes of the earliest editions issued after the invention of the art of printing. We will mention in particular a book beautifully printed at Mayence in 1467; the well-known Bible of Hailbronn of 1476; the first editions of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Eusebius; and the first edition of the golden little treatise *De Imitatione Christi*. Moreover, St. Augustine *De Civitate Dei*, printed by the Benedictines of Subiaco (if we remember well) in 1465, the first book ever printed in Italy. There is also a Juvenal of 1478; a Tibullus

mate the labor and trouble with which this transcript has been effected. It contains the Old and New Testaments, copied line for line, and word for word, with an exact imitation of the painted and ornamental parts. The original manuscript is written on a beautiful vellum, in large quarto; each page, like the celebrated Vatican (1209), contains three columns. There is no division between the words except by an occasional point. The character is exceedingly minute; the initial letters of paragraphs are somewhat larger and stand out of the lines; the marginal notes are written so small as to require a good lens in order to decipher them. A very detailed description has, however, been published by the Abbé Razan, who has carefully collected all those characteristics which can have weight in deciding its age. I will give the result of his investigation." The Abbé winds up, rather unexpectedly, by concluding that the manuscript is *only* a thousand years old, agreeing with Cardinal Mai in attributing it at least to the seventh century.

The marginal notes refer to the errors of the day. For example, opposite the famous text of John v. 7, the comment says, "*Audiat hoc Arius et ceteri.*" Were a monk of our days commenting on the Holy Bible in the same convent, on the same stool, near the same altar, he would probably write, in the same spirit, opposite some other text, "*Audiat hoc Fourier, Pusey, Ronge, et alii.*"

of 1488 ; and, finally, Boccaccio's book *De Genealogia Deorum*, printed for the first time at Reggio, an edition of the rarest value.

The library of La Cava likewise possesses four hundred impressions in the black letter. In running over these works, an idea can be had of the variations undergone by that Gothic character, so pertinaciously adhered to for a long time, then all but universally abandoned. The Germans are the only people who have preserved an alphabet somewhat similar to the old-fashioned calligraphy. Fortunate for them, had they adhered with equal fidelity to far more important institutions venerated by their Catholic ancestors, and not permitted the unfrocked Augustinian of Wittenberg to make use of the honest, though somewhat unwieldy, gear of their ideas to dizen out a new gospel for mankind !

In examining the earliest productions of the press, the curious are often surprised, while turning over the leaves of books, the strong white paper of which, the even, neat, and clear type, is scarcely equalled by the best specimens of our own times, after all the myriad inventions and improvements of three centuries.

We have only to mention a few of the most beautiful paintings which adorn the quarters occupied by the abbot, and then bid adieu to La Cava.

We will do it briefly, mentioning, —

1. A *Sacra Famiglia* on wood, attributed to Raphael, and at least one of the finest productions of that school of smiles and sunbeams.

2. Two paintings by Pietro Perugino ; viz. *The Adoration of the Magi* and *The Resurrection of our Saviour*.

3. An *Assumption* by Andrea Sabatini of Salerno, a scholar of Raphael.

4. *Judith*, by Hundorst, better known as Gherardo delle Notti. According to the well-known style of this master, the whole scene is artificially illuminated from one point, and the effect produced is strikingly allied to reality.

5. *Jacob*, disguised as Esau, receiving the blessing of his aged father, by the same artist.

6. *The Burial of our Saviour*. The author is Jacopo da Ponte, commonly called Il Bassano.

7. *St. Jerome*, by Mattias, a Calabrian priest. There is in the convent a *St. Augustine*, by the same author, which we did not see, but it was represented to us as possessing great merit.

8. All these are admirable, more or less, for their particular perfections. But the writer will never forget the ecstasy of surprise and emotion with which he stood for a considerable time contemplating a *Mater Dolorosa*, by that gentle and feeling master, Carlino Dolce. The artist must have been possessed by a poetical desire to produce, living and breathing, the heavenly vision which existed in his imagination, and he has been half successful. In the features of the Blessed Mother there is a radiance of celestial beauty, tempered and *spiritualized* by noble, unaffected modesty, that is truly inimitable. The delicate form seems to stand out from the canvas, and the beautiful hands, which she holds joined before her breast, are of such astonishing perfection, that the more they are examined, the more you are inclined to believe them real and not painted. The composition and finish of the drapery leave nothing to be desired.

But these are the minor beauties of the painting. The artist has contrived to give such a settled expression of resigned yet deep grief to the heavenly features of the bereaved Mother, to the eyes, to the mouth, and breast heaving with a long-drawn sigh which relieves not the heart, that the beholder inevitably feels the influence of sorrow in his own breast. For our own part, we could not help remembering the words, "*O vos omnes qui transitis per viam, attendite et videte si est dolor sicut dolor meus*," which the Church applies to the Blessed Virgin, bereaved of her divine Son by our sins. We lifted up our hearts to the Mother of Jesus with the appeal of the Litany, — "*Regina Martyrum, ora pro nobis*."

9. Another piece, the healthy and natural cast of which is very remarkable, is a *Judgment of St. Benedict*. It is by Albert Durer. A youthful monk, guilty of some flagrant transgression of the rules, is brought before the saint by another monk who stands as his accuser. St. Benedict is seated. His mild and charitable look is that of a man in whom paternal authority is directed by wisdom and virtue. Before him stands the young man, whose pale, unsettled features, downcast look, and timid attitude belie the exculpation which he attempts to deliver. By his side is another monk, of maturer years, whose hard and sunburnt countenance, though bearing the expression of severity, still make you believe him to act only from an honest sense of duty, while with pointing finger he shows the companion whose fault he is repeating to their superior. The last figure is that of a monk whose salient forehead, and eyes

vaguely turned towards the culprit, are a fine portrait of unconcerned curiosity, and contrast with the earnestness of the others. The distribution of light, the simplicity of composition, the nature and truthfulness of the parts, and, above all, the masterly execution of the heads, do immortal honor to the Nuremberg artist.

This is a brief notice of the celebrated *Monasterium Cavenense*, written partly from our own recollections, but mostly taken from a description of it printed by Father Guillaume de Corné, of whom we made honorable mention in another place, and the title of whose pamphlet we have placed at the head of this article. To this gentleman, who is distinguished at once by the characteristic courtesy of the Benedictines and the learning which is hereditary in his Order, we acknowledge ourselves doubly indebted for his oral and written illustrations of the treasures of the abbey.

The monastery has been visited from time to time by several of the crowned heads and princes of Europe, and by nearly every *savant* who travelled as far as Pompeii; and amongst a vast number of celebrated names which we saw in a blank book on the library table, we remember to have observed that of Cardinal Mai, and the well-known handwriting of *Sir Walter Scott of Abbotsford*.

The hardy monk of St. Bernard built his hermitage in the marshy valley, which was afterwards rendered a garden by his toil and industry. The unassuming Franciscan devotes his life to the religious instruction of the poor, in hamlets and villages spread over the country. The affable Jesuit consecrates his energy and learning to the training up of the youth in populous cities, where they are exposed to the perverse influence of a world refined in wickedness. But the erudite Benedictine is to be found in his cell, on the brow of some rugged mountain, enriching with comments the page of an early Father, pruning the redundancy of annals penned centuries ago by some less keen-sighted brother, or putting the heresies of the day to blush by bringing to bear upon them the steady light of Scriptural and traditionary evidence. So the varied usefulness of the different Orders is expressed in an old distich:—

“Bernardus valles, montes Benedictus amabat,
Franciscus pagos, magnas Ignatius urbes.”

We have endeavoured to relieve the seriousness of more weighty disquisitions by giving in this lighter article a sample

of what a section of one religious Order has done for religion, science, and civilization. A work has been issued lately in Italy by Father Tosti, descriptive of the abbey of Monte Cassino, containing its history to the present time, an account of the treasures it contains, and a collection of notes and documents of great value ; thus showing what another section of the same Order did for the same cause. Who is ignorant of the Herculean labors of the Maurine Congregation of St. Benedict, and of their admirable fruits ? Nevertheless, those who are in the habit of profiting by the works of the learned and holy monks will still cry out that they were an idle encumbrance to society ! Of such men and their advisers we will say no more, but hope better at least from you, good reader, concluding in the words with which the religious writer of the second little work whose title is prefixed to this article concludes his Preface : — “ *Hæc, benevole lector, quovis partium studio amoto lubens accipe, teque omnibus precibus obtestamur, ut divi Benedicti sobolem vetusto amore prosequaris.*”

ART. IV. — *The Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament proved to be Corrupt Additions to the Word of God. — The Arguments of Romanists from the Infallibility of the Church and the Testimonies of the Fathers in Behalf of the Apocrypha discussed and refuted.* By JAMES H. THORNWELL. New York : Leavitt, Trow, & Co. Boston : Charles Tappan. 1845. 16mo. pp. 417.

SOMETIME in 1841, Mr. Thornwell, a Presbyterian minister, and “ Professor of Sacred Literature and the Evidences of Christianity in the South Carolina College,” published, anonymously, in a Baltimore journal, a brief essay against the divine inspiration of those books of the Old Testament which Protestants exclude from the canon of Scripture. To this essay, as subsequently reprinted with the author’s name, the Rev. Dr. Lynch, of Charleston, S. C., replied, in a series of letters addressed to Mr. Thornwell, through the columns of *The Catholic Miscellany*. The volume before us is Mr. Thornwell’s rejoinder to Dr. Lynch, and contains, in an Appendix, the original essay, and the substance of Dr. Lynch’s reply to it. The rejoinder consists of twenty-nine letters,

which cover nearly the whole ground of controversy between Catholics and Protestants, and, though written in a Presbyterian spirit, they are respectable for ability and learning. The work, though nothing surprising, is, upon the whole, above the general average of publications of its class.

The purpose of the essay was to "assert and endeavour to prove that *Tobit, Judith, the additions to the Book of Esther, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, with the Epistle of Jeremiah, the Song of the Three Children, the Story of Susannah, the Story of Bel and the Dragon, and the First and Second Books of Maccabees* are neither sacred nor canonical, and of course of no more authority in the Church of God than Seneca's Letters or Tully's Offices." (pp. 339, 340.) In the present work, the author attempts to maintain the same thesis, and to refute the objections urged by Dr. Lynch against it. He professes on his very title-page to have *proved* the books enumerated "to be corrupt additions to the word of God," and to have discussed and *refuted* "the arguments of Romanists from the infallibility of the Church and the testimonies of the Fathers in their behalf." The question very naturally arises, Has he done this? Has he proved that these books are uninspired, as he must have done, if he has proved them to be corrupt additions to the word of God; and has he refuted the arguments of Catholics, or rather of Dr. Lynch, in their behalf?

The arguments which Dr. Lynch adduces for these books are drawn from the infallibility of the Church and the testimony of the Fathers. If the Church is infallible, the testimony of the Fathers is of subordinate importance, for the infallibility alone suffices for the faithful; if the Church is not infallible, it is of still less consequence what the Fathers testify; for then all faith is out of the question, both for Catholics and all others. We may, therefore, waive all consideration, for the present, of the argument for the deuterocanonical books drawn from the testimony of the Fathers, and confine ourselves to that drawn from the infallibility of the Church. The argument from infallibility must, of course, be refuted, before the author can claim to have refuted Dr. Lynch, or to have proved his general thesis, that the books in question are "corrupt additions to the word of God."

The Catholic Church, undeniably, includes these books in her canon of Scripture, and commands her children to receive them as the word of God. This is certain, and the author concedes it; for he adduces it as a proof of her "intolerable

arrogance." If she is infallible in declaring the word of God, as all Catholics hold, these books are certainly inspired Scripture, and rightfully placed in the canon. This is the argument from infallibility; and it is evident to every one who understands what it is to refute an argument that it can be refuted only by disproving the infallibility, or, what is the same thing, proving the fallibility, of the Church. To prove the Church fallible, moreover, it is not enough to refute the arguments by which Catholics are accustomed to prove her infallibility; for a doctrine may be true, and yet the arguments adduced in proof of it be unsound and inconclusive. It will, therefore, avail the author but little to refute our arguments for the infallibility, unless he refutes the infallibility itself; for so long as he is unable to say positively that the Church is fallible, he is unable to refute the argument *from* her infallibility. It may still be true that she is infallible, and if she is, the books are not uninspired compositions, but infallibly the word of God.

Mr. Thornwell, who regards himself as an able and sound logician, appears to have some consciousness of this, and indeed to concede it. Accordingly, he devotes a third of his whole volume to disproving the infallibility of the Church, or rather, to proving her fallibility. "I have insisted," he says in his Preface, "largely on the dogma of infallibility, — more largely, perhaps, than my readers may think consistent with the general design of my performance, — because I regard this as the prop and bulwark of all the abominations of the Papacy." (p. 8.)

But to prove the fallibility of the Church, or to disprove her infallibility, is a grave undertaking, and attended with serious difficulties. The Church cannot be tried except by some standard, and it is idle to attempt to convict her on a fallible authority. If the conviction is obtained on a fallible authority, the conviction itself is fallible, and it, instead of the Church, may be the party in the wrong. The Professor cannot take a single step, cannot even open his case, unless he has an infallible tribunal before which to summon the Church, — some infallible standard by which to test her infallibility or fallibility. But before what infallible tribunal can he cite her? What infallible authority has he on which he can demand her conviction?

The only possible way in which the fallibility of the Church can be proved is by convicting her of having actually erred on some point on which she claims to be infallible. But it is evident, that, in order to be able to convict her of having erred

on a given point, we must be able to say infallibly what is truth or error on that point. Clearly, then, the Professor cannot commence his action, much less gain it, unless he has an authority which pronounces infallibly on the points on which he seeks to convict her of having actually erred. But what authority has he? Unhappily, he does not inform us, and does not appear to have recognized the necessity on his part of having any authority. He sets forth, formally, no authority, designates no court, specifies no law, lays down no principles. This is a serious inconvenience, and affects both his legal and his logical attainments. His argument, let him do his best, must be *minus* its major proposition; and from the minor alone we have always understood that it is impossible to conclude any thing.

Mr. Thornwell denies the infallibility of the Church, and he recognizes no infallible authority in any one of the sects, including even his own. He has, then, no authority which he can allege, but the authority of reason, and his own private judgment. His own private judgment is of no weight, and cannot be adduced in a public discussion. The authority of reason we acknowledge to be infallible in her own province; but her province is restricted to the natural order, and she has no jurisdiction in the supernatural order, to which the Church professes to belong. The Church has the right to be tried by her peers. Reason is not, and cannot be, the peer of the supernatural, and is totally unable, in so far as the Church lies within the supernatural order, to pronounce any judgment concerning her infallibility one way or the other.

Reason, undoubtedly, knows that God is, and that he can neither deceive nor be deceived. It knows, therefore, if he appoints the Church, commissions her, as his organ, to declare his word, that she must declare it infallibly; for then it is he himself that declares in her declaration, and if she could either deceive or be deceived, he himself could either deceive or be deceived. If, then, reason finds sufficient or satisfactory grounds for believing that God has appointed or instituted the Church to declare his word, to teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever he has revealed, it pronounces her infallible, and acknowledges its obligation to receive, without any questioning, whatever she teaches.

Reason, again, knows that God cannot be in contradiction with himself, and therefore, since both the natural order and the supernatural are from him, that he cannot establish princi-

ples in the one repugnant to those established in the other. On the authority of reason, then, we may always assert that he cannot teach one thing in the natural order and its contradictory in the supernatural order. If, then, it be clearly established, that the Church, on matters on which she claims to teach infallibly, teaches what is in contradiction either to the supernatural or the natural order, it is certain that she is fallible. But as reason cannot go out of the order of nature, we can on its authority establish the fallibility of the Church only on the condition of convicting her of having actually contradicted some law or principle of the natural order. If the Church, in other words, contradict reason, reason is competent to conclude against her, but not when she merely transcends reason; for what is *above* reason may be true, but what is *against* reason cannot be.

It follows from this that the authority of reason in the case before us is purely negative, and that the Professor can conclude from it against the Church only on condition that he proves that she actually contradicts it. But it is necessary even here to bear in mind that the natural can no more contradict the supernatural than the supernatural the natural. When the motives of credibility have convinced reason that the Church teaches by supernatural authority, her teaching is as authoritative as any principle of reason itself, and may be cited to prove that what is alleged against her as a principle of reason is not a principle of reason, with no less force than the alleged principle itself can be cited to prove that she contradicts reason. The Professor must, then, in order to prove her fallibility, adduce a case, not of apparent contradiction, but of real contradiction, — a case in which what she teaches must evidently contradict an evident principle of reason, — so evident that it is clear that to deny it would be to deny reason itself.

The position, then, which the Professor must take and maintain, in order to establish his thesis, is, that *the Church, in her teaching on matters on which she claims to teach infallibly, has taught or teaches what contradicts an evident and undeniable principle of reason.* This he must do before he can prove the fallibility of the Church, and he must prove the fallibility of the Church before he can refute the argument drawn from it for the books enumerated. Has he proved this? Unhappily, he does not appear to have understood that this was at all necessary, or to have suspected that it was only by proving the Church to be against reason that he could conclude her falli-

bility. He does not appear to have known that there are and can be no questions debatable between Catholics and Protestants but such as pertain exclusively to the province of reason. He labors under the hallucination, that he has something besides the reason common to all men which he may oppose to us, that he has the revelation of Almighty God, and that he is at liberty to attempt to convict the Church, not on reason alone, but also on the word of God. This would be ridiculous, if the matter were not so grave as to make it deplorable. He has no word of God to cite against us, and if he cites the Holy Scriptures at all, he must cite them either in the sense of the Church, or as simple historical documents ; because it is only in the sense of the Church that we acknowledge them to be inspired. We can cite them as inspired Scripture against him, as an *argumentum ad hominem* ; for he holds them to be inspired Scripture as interpreted by private judgment. But he cannot against us ; for the argument would not be *ad hominem*, unless cited in the sense of the Church, since it is only in that sense, that, on our own principles, they are the word of God.

The fact is, Mr. Thornwell from first to last forgets in his argument that we are as far from admitting his authority as he is from admitting ours. He writes under the impression, that he has the true Christian doctrine, and is invested with ample authority to define what is, and what is not, the word of God. He assumes his Presbyterianism to be true, and when he has proved that Catholicity contradicts it, he concludes at once that Catholicity is false. But Presbyterianism is only his private judgment, and therefore of no authority. By what right does he erect his private judgment into a criterion of truth and falsehood, assume that it is infallible, and proceed to pronounce *ex cathedra* on the revealed word of God ? We cannot recognize his authority as sovereign pontiff, unless he brings us credentials from heaven, duly signed and witnessed. His assumption we cannot admit. He is confessedly fallible, and his decisions we cannot even entertain. He does not come to us duly commissioned by Almighty God to teach us his word ; he is simply a man, with no authority in the premises which may not be claimed and exercised by every other man as well as by himself. In an argument with Catholics he can be only a man, and is at liberty to adopt no line of argument that would not be equally proper in the case of a pagan, Mahometan, or any other infidel.

Protestant controversialists are exceedingly prone to forget this. They assume that they have the word of God, that they know and believe what God has revealed, and that they have in their opinions a standard by which to try the Church. Yet they claim to be reasoners, and tell us that we have surrendered our reason ! But whether the Church be or be not commissioned to declare the word of God, it is certain that they are not. Certain is it, that, if she is not authorized to declare it, no one else is ; and equally certain is it, that no one not so authorized has any right to adduce in an argument any thing he takes to be the word of God, save by the sufferance or consent of his opponents. It is a grave mistake to suppose that there is any other common ground between us and our adversaries than that of reason. It will not do for our adversaries to suppose, that, because we hold to the inspiration of the Scriptures, they may allege them in their own sense against us ; for we admit their inspiration only on the authority, and in *the sense*, of the Church. On her authority, and in the sense in which she defines their doctrines, we hold them to be the word of God ; but in no other sense, and on no other ground. Independently of her authority and interpretations, there are no inspired Scriptures for us. This fact must never be lost sight of, and it would save Protestants an immense deal of labor, if they would keep it in mind, and govern themselves accordingly. If they cite the Bible against us, on any authority or in any sense but that of the Church, it is not for us the word of God, but simply their private opinion, by which we are not and cannot be bound. Among ourselves, who admit the authority of the Church, and therefore the inspiration of the Scriptures, it is lawful, on a point on which the actual teaching of the Church is matter of inquiry, to appeal to the written word, as also to the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and the analogies of faith ; but it is never lawful for those out of the Church, denying her authority, to make a like appeal against us ; for the *authority* to which we appeal is resolvable into the authority of the Church, which they deny.

The rule we here insist upon is that of common sense and common justice, and rests for its authority on the principle, that no man has the right to assume in his argument the point that is in question. We ourselves cite the Scriptures against our adversaries, but always either *ad hominem*, — because they, though we do not, admit their inspiration independently of the authority of the Church, — or as simple historical documents,

whose authenticity and authority as such documents, but not as inspired writings, reason is competent to determine. But we never assume our Church and her definitions as the authority on which to convict those without of error ; for to do so would be a sheer begging of the question. Undoubtedly, if our Church is right, all her adversaries are wrong. It needs no argument to prove that. We, therefore, take our stand in the argument, either on what our adversaries concede, or on the common reason of mankind, and attempt to prove from the one or the other, or both, that every one is bound to believe and obey the Church. Protestants must not expect us to allow them more than we claim for ourselves. They may need more in-order to make out their case ; but we are not aware that they have any right to special privileges, or to exemption from the common obligations of reason and justice. As there are no concessions of ours which can avail them, they must in their controversies with us take their stand on the reason common to all men, and, since common to all, alike theirs and ours. They must bring their action at common law, not on a special statute. Then they must restrict themselves to those questions which come within the jurisdiction of reason, and which she is competent to decide without appeal. Then they must waive all questions which pertain to the subject-matter of revelation ; for these all undeniably lie in the supernatural order, and therefore without the province of reason.

We frankly concede that Mr. Thornwell has proved that Catholicity is not Presbyterianism, and that, if Presbyterianism is the revelation of God, Catholicity is not. But this amounts to nothing ; Presbyterianism is neither proved nor conceded to be Christianity. He cannot, therefore, assume it against us. We concede him not one inch of Christian ground on which to set his foot. We demur to every argument he adduces or attempts to adduce from the convictions or prejudices of his sect, or from his own conceptions of the word of God. We listen to no arguments, we entertain no objections, we plead to no charges, not drawn from the common reason of mankind. We must, therefore, beg him to descend from his tripod, and meet us as a man with no authority but that which belongs to the reason of every man.

We must, in view of this state of the case, eliminate from Mr. Thornwell's arguments against infallibility, as not to be entertained, all that he urges on the authority of his own religious convictions or prejudices, and confine ourselves simply

to what he adduces on the simple authority of reason. These last, all that is legitimately adduced, consist of an attempted refutation of Dr. Lynch's argument for the infallibility of the Church, and certain philosophical, historical, and moral objections alleged against the Church.

We might well pass over Mr. Thornwell's attempt to refute Dr. Lynch's argument for infallibility, because, if successful, it would accomplish nothing to his purpose. The argument he has to refute is the argument *from* the infallibility of the Church, not the argument *for* it; for the question is not on believing that infallibility, but on denying it. It may, as we have said, be true, and yet the arguments by which we attempt to prove it be unsound and inconclusive. The defect of proof is a good reason for not believing, but it is not always an adequate reason for denying. The thesis the Professor seeks to maintain requires him to deny the infallibility of the Church, or to assert her fallibility, and therefore the burden of proof devolves on him. He asserts that the disputed books are corrupt additions to the word of God, which he cannot possibly prove without disproving the infallibility of the Church, which declares them to be inspired Scripture. But he claims to have won a victory over Dr. Lynch, and his friends have bound the laurel around his brows. We are, therefore, disposed to subject his claim to a slight examination, and to inquire if his shouts have not been a little premature, and if, after all, the victory does not remain with his opponent. If he has succeeded, he has gained nothing for his thesis; but if he has failed, we can conclude against it at once, at least so far as he is concerned.

Mr. Thornwell states Dr. Lynch's general argument for the disputed books to be, —

“ Whatever the pastors of the Church of Rome declare to be true must be infallibly certain :

“ That the Apocrypha [the books enumerated] were inspired, the pastors of the Church of Rome declare to be true :

“ Therefore it must be infallibly certain.”

This is stated in Mr. Thornwell's language, not in Dr. Lynch's, and is by no means so well expressed as it might be; but let that pass. Substituting the names of the books alleged by Mr. Thornwell to be corrupt additions to the word of God for the term *Apocrypha*, we are willing to accept it. To this argument, which he has shaped to suit the objections he wishes to bring against it, Mr. Thornwell's first objection is, that it is “ vitiated by the ambiguity of the middle.” The words,

“pastors of the Church,” may be understood either universally, particularly, or distributively, — to mean the whole body of the pastors, some of them, and every one individually.

Ambiguity of the middle is where the words are taken in one sense in the major, and in another sense in the minor ; but where they are taken in the same sense in both the premises, although in themselves susceptible of several meanings, there is no ambiguity of the middle. In the argument as stated, the words, *pastors*, &c., are, in themselves considered, susceptible of the senses alleged, but as used in the argument they are tied down to one sense. The rule of construction is, to understand all words used in a general or universal sense, unless there be some reason, expressed or implied, in the context or the nature of the subject, for not doing so. There is, in the present case, no such reason in either premise, and therefore we must take the words generally, or universally, in both, — for the whole body of pastors. If so, there is no ambiguity of the middle.

But Mr. Thornwell asserts that Dr. Lynch does use the words in the three different senses mentioned. He accuses him of meaning by them, at one time, the whole body of pastors *collected or assembled* in council, at another time, *a part* only, and finally, *every one* individually ; and alleges as proof, the fact, that in his Letter he predicates infallibility, 1. of the whole body of pastors in their collective capacity, 2. of the Council of Trent, in which only a part were personally assembled, and 3. of each single teacher or missionary.

1. That Dr. Lynch, when he predicates infallibility of the body of pastors in their collective capacity, means the whole body, takes the words, *pastors*, &c., universally, is conceded, but that he means the whole body *assembled in council* we deny. He speaks of them as a body of individuals in their *collective* capacity, not as a collected or congregated body ; and that he does not mean the body of pastors assembled in council is evident from the fact, that he contends that the pastors of the Church had decided the question of the inspiration of the books in dispute long before the Council of Trent, since, to do so, they did not need to assemble in a general council. Thus he says expressly, — “ The doctrines of the Catholic Church can be known from the universal and concordant teaching of her pastors, even when her bishops have not assembled in a general council and embodied those doctrines in a list of decrees.” (pp. 370, 371.) It is evident, then, that Dr. Lynch holds

the pastors of the Church to be a body of individuals, to have a collective capacity, and the faculty of teaching infallibly in that capacity, even when not congregated. If Mr. Thornwell had recognized a difference between *collective* and *collected*, or congregated, he would easily have surmounted this part of his difficulty, without any foreign aid.

2. The acts of the Holy Council of Trent, touching faith and morals, Dr. Lynch unquestionably holds to be infallible, not because he predicates infallibility of a part of the body of pastors, but because they were the acts of the whole Church represented in it, or at least made so by subsequent adoption, as is evident enough from his language. The proof, therefore, that he takes the words in a partitive sense, is inadequate.

3. That each single pastor teaches infallibly in his *collective capacity*, as "member" of the body of pastors, is conceded, but that he does so individually or in his individual capacity is denied; for in his individual capacity he cannot teach at all. Dr. Lynch speaks of his teaching infallibly only in his capacity as member of the body. As member of the body, the only sense in which he is a teacher at all, he participates of its infallibility, and teaches by its authority, and infallibly, not because he is individually infallible, but because it is infallible. Consequently, in representing the single teacher as teaching infallibly, Dr. Lynch does not use the words *pastors*, &c., in a distributive sense.

Mr. Thornwell is unfortunate in his proofs, notwithstanding he had shaped his statement of the argument with special reference to them. He fails to substantiate his objection of "ambiguity of the middle," and consequently all that he says, which is founded on it, falls to the ground. The beautiful argument he had constructed to prove that a Catholic can never know when and where to find the infallible authority, on which he had expended so much labor, and lavished so many rare ornaments, falls to pieces through default of a foundation. Decidedly, it is an inconvenience to build without any thing to build with or to build on. It is worse than being compelled to make bricks without straw.

Mr. Thornwell, after his objection to the form of the argument, proceeds to deny and to refute its major, namely, the infallibility of the Church. His first effort is to refute Dr. Lynch's argument for it. Dr. Lynch contends that "we cannot be called on to believe any proposition without adequate proof"; that, "when Almighty God deigned to inspire the

works contained in the Holy Scriptures, he intended they should be believed to be inspired"; and that "therefore there *does* exist some adequate proof." Thus far all is evident enough, and the Professor brings no objection to what is alleged. We may assume it, then, as conceded, that there *does* exist some adequate proof of their inspiration, that is to say, some authority competent to declare the fact. What is it? "It must be," says Dr. Lynch, "a body of individuals to whom, in their collective capacity, God has given authority to make an unerring decision on the subject." It must be such a body, because it can be nothing else. This body is composed of the pastors of the Catholic Church. Therefore the pastors of the Catholic Church have authority to make an unerring decision, that is, have infallible authority to declare the word of God.

Mr. Thornwell does not deny, that, if such a body exists, it is the pastors of the Roman Catholic Church. On this point he raises no question, and we may regard him as conceding it. He denies the necessity of any such body as Dr. Lynch asserts. He objects, first, to the form of the argument by which Dr. Lynch undertakes to prove it. The argument, he says, sins by an imperfect enumeration of particulars. It is a destructive disjunctive conditional, which must contain in the major all the suppositions which can be conceived to be true, and in the minor destroy all but one. But Dr. Lynch has not included all such suppositions in his major, and therefore, conceding that he has destroyed in the minor all he has enumerated save one, he is not entitled to his conclusion. Dr. Lynch has enumerated four methods:—1. Every individual, on the strength of his own private examination, is to decide for himself,—private judgment; 2. Every individual is to receive books as inspired, or reject them as uninspired, according to the decisions of such persons as he judges qualified by their erudition and sound judgment to determine the question,—the judgment of the learned; 3. We must take the inspiration of Scripture from some individual whom God has commissioned to announce this fact to the world; or 4. From a body of individuals to whom, in their collective capacity, God has given authority to make an unerring decision on the subject. But a *fifth* supposition is possible, says the Professor, namely, "God himself by his Eternal Spirit may condescend to be the teacher of men, and enlighten their understandings to perceive in the Scriptures themselves infallible marks of their inspira-

tion." This supposition Dr. Lynch has "entirely overlooked," "strangely suppressed," and therefore cannot even by destroying the first three suppositions conclude the fourth.

But Dr. Lynch has not "entirely overlooked," "strangely suppressed," this fifth supposition, but expressly mentions it, and gives his reasons for not including it in the number of supposable methods. Mr. Thornwell has generously furnished us the evidence of this. After enumerating the four methods stated, Dr. Lynch says (Appendix, p. 359):—"I might perhaps add a *fifth* method; that each one be informed what books are inspired by his *private spirit*. But I omit it, as, were it true, it would be superfluous, if not a criminal intrusion on the province God would have reserved to himself, to attempt to prove or disprove, when our duty would be simply to await in patience the revelation to each particular individual. You are not a member of the Society of Friends, and your essay is not an *exposé* of the teachings of your private spirit, but an effort to appeal to argument." With this passage before his eyes, we cannot understand how the Presbyterian minister could assert that Dr. Lynch entirely overlooked this fifth method, for undeniably the Catholic Doctor means by the private spirit precisely the same thing the Presbyterian does by God condescending to teach men by his Eternal Spirit. Moreover, the reasons assigned by Dr. Lynch for not including it in the list of supposable methods are conclusive, at least till answered. These reasons are two:—1. That, if assumed, all argument would be foreclosed, either as superfluous or as criminal; and 2. Mr. Thornwell evidently rejects it, because he appeals to argument, and therefore against him it cannot be necessary to include it. These are solid reasons, and Mr. Thornwell should have met them before accusing Dr. Lynch of having entirely overlooked the method of interior illumination, and especially before insisting upon its being supposable.

Mr. Thornwell is apparently disposed to maintain that this fifth method is the one actually adopted, but this he is not at liberty to do. The method is private, not public, and cannot be appealed to in a public debate. In a public debate, the appeal must always be to a public authority, that is, to an authority common to both parties. If the authority to which the appeal is to be made is private, there can be no public debate; if private, interior, immediate, as must be the teachings of the spirit, there can be no argument. Argument in such case would be superfluous and even criminal. When, therefore, a

man resorts, on a given question, to argument, and to public argument, he necessarily assumes that the authority which is to determine the question is public, and denies it to be private. Mr. Thornwell in his essay made his appeal to argument, and wrote his essay to prove that the question he raised is to be settled, not by the private spirit, but by public facts, arguments, and authority. He therefore cannot fall back on the private spirit. Having elected public authority, he must abide by it. If he cannot now fall back on the private spirit, he cannot allege it as a supposable method ; and if he cannot so allege it, he cannot accuse Dr. Lynch's argument of sinning by an imperfect enumeration of particulars, because it omits it.

Mr. Thornwell, furthermore, is very much affected by Dr. Lynch's supposed temerity in restricting the number of supposable methods to the four enumerated. He grows very eloquent, and manifests no little pious horror at what he calls an effort to set bounds to Omnipotence. All this is very well, but he himself excludes the method of private teaching, by writing his book to prove, on other grounds, that the books in question are uninspired, and he does not even attempt to suggest an additional method. Nobody, unless it be himself, seeks to limit Omnipotence ; nobody, to our knowledge, denies that Almighty God might have adopted the private method, if he had chosen to do so. The question is not, as is evident from the whole train of Dr. Lynch's reasoning, on abstract possibilities, but on what is or is not possible *in hac providentia*. Nobody pretends that the private spirit is not supposable because it is metaphysically impossible, but it is not supposable because incompatible with other things which we know must be supposed, and which Mr. Thornwell undeniably does suppose.

The alleged *fifth* method not being supposable, unless Mr. Thornwell chooses to condemn himself for attempting to argue the question, and to confess that all his arguments are senseless and absurd, nay, profane and criminal, the objection raised to Dr. Lynch's major falls to the ground ; and as he does not pretend that the conclusion is not logical, he must grant the conclusion or deny the minor. But he cannot grant the conclusion without conceding the infallibility of the Church, which he seeks to disprove. He therefore asserts that " the minor is lame, and can at best yield only a lame and impotent conclusion." The minor is proved only by removing or destroying the first three suppositions. But this is not done ; for the ar-

guments by which Dr. Lynch seeks to do it apply with equal force against the fourth, which he must retain. But the legitimacy of this reply is questionable. One of the four suppositions must be true, for some adequate proof does exist. If the objections adduced are in themselves considered sufficient to remove the three, they cannot be urged against the fourth, for that would prove too much, namely, that there is no adequate proof. If insufficient, they must then be shown to be so on other grounds, or else we can always reply, one supposition is true, and it must be the fourth, because it cannot be one or another of the first three.

We deny the assertion, that the arguments against the three apply with equal force against the fourth. We begin with Dr. Lynch's argument against the first supposition, — that every individual is to decide for himself on the strength of his own examination. This is utterly impossible ; for the bulk of mankind want the ability, the leisure, and the opportunity to acquire the amount of science and erudition necessary to enable them to come to an absolutely certain conclusion on the subject of the inspiration of the Scriptures. This is evident to every one who considers, — 1. The controversies which have obtained respecting the canon ; 2. The nature of the questions to be settled, and what it needs to enable one to decide respecting the fact of the inspiration of ancient books on intrinsic grounds ; 3. That every one is required to believe the truth on the subject, not only after a life of inquiry, and historical and scientific investigation, but from the moment of coming to years of discretion ; and 4. The actual condition of the generality of mankind in relation to science and erudition. These considerations are amply sufficient to disprove the first supposition ; for every one is commanded to believe, and the proof, to be adequate, must be adequate in the case of every one, — of the ignorant slave and rude savage, as well as of the learned and gifted few, — of the boy or girl in whom reason has just dawned, as well as of the scientific veteran or the gray-haired scholar.

The Professor replies : The learning asserted to be necessary, if necessary at all, must be so because the fact of inspiration in general is not determinable without it, and therefore must be as necessary in the body supposed as in the individual deciding for himself. But the body must acquire it either by investigation or by inspiration. If by investigation, it has no advantage over the individual, and whatever proves his inability applies with equal force against his ability. If by in-

spiration, then it must have the same learning to be able to determine the fact of its own inspiration, and the people who are to receive its decision must also have it in order to be able to judge of its inspiration. Hence the Professor sums up triumphantly, — “When you shall condescend to inform me how the Fathers of Trent could decide with infallible certainty upon the Scriptures, without the learning which is necessary, in your view, to understand the evidence, if they themselves were uninspired, or how, if inspired, they could, without this learning, either be certain themselves of the fact, or establish it with infallible certainty to the people, who, without your learning, must judge of the inspiration of the Holy Council, — when, consistently with your principles, you resolve these difficulties, one of the objections to your argument will cease.” (p. 51.)

This is the argument in all its force. Its substance is, whatever difficulties there may be in the way of the method of private judgment, precisely the same difficulties are in the way of the body of individuals supposed, and can no more easily be overcome by it than by the individual himself. This is the common Protestant reply to our objections against the method of private judgment, and is tantamount to saying, that a man has just the same difficulties to overcome in simply declaring what he believes and always has believed as in determining by personal inquiry and examination what he ought to believe; or that it is as easy to ascertain and verify the truth we are ignorant of as it is merely to express with precision the truth we already possess and always have possessed from the first moment of our existence!

But let us examine this famous argument, which, in one form or other, is the great, and virtually the only, argument by which Protestants seek to evade the force of the objections of Catholics to their scheme of proof. Dr. Lynch asserts that a certain amount of science and erudition is necessary to enable an individual, on the strength of his own examination, to come to an absolutely certain decision on the fact of the inspiration of an ancient writing, whose inspiration is determinable, not on extrinsic, but mainly on intrinsic grounds. Then, says the Professor, the same amount is necessary to enable an inspired individual to judge of the evidence of his own inspiration. But this conclusion can follow only from the assumption, that the evidence of inspiration must be the same for the inspired and the uninspired. If you make the evidence mediate in the

uninspired, you must also make it mediate in the inspired ; and if immediate in the inspired, then also immediate in the uninspired. But it is not mediate in the inspired ; for, unquestionably, he who inspires immediately evidences the fact to the one he inspires. How, then, contend for mediate evidence in the uninspired ? Grant this reasoning, and the author condemns himself. The evidence is immediate, and yet he has written a book to settle the question by argument and erudition, both of which are mediate. He has, on this hypothesis, evidently proved nothing ; for he has offered inappropriate evidence, and must be mistaken when he says that he has proved the books enumerated to be " corrupt additions to the word of God."

Again ; the Professor asserts, that, if the learning alleged be necessary in the particular case, it is so because the fact of inspiration is determinable in no case without it, that is, that a thing cannot be true in the particular unless it be true in the universal, — as if one should say, some men cannot be black, because all men are not black ; or, some are black, therefore all men are black ! We presume Mr. Thornwell's servant is a black man ; therefore, he himself is a black man. The principle the Professor adopts is, not only that what is true of the *genus* must be true of the *species*, but, also, that what is true of the *species* must be true of the *genus*. Thus, man is an animal ; but a goose is an animal ; therefore, man is a goose ; — or, a goose is an animal ; but man is an animal ; therefore, a goose is a man. But the principle, if adopted, carries us farther yet. It is the denial of all *differentia*, — the fundamental error of Spinozism or pantheism. Thus, under the *genus* substance, God is substance ; but a moss is substance ; therefore, God is a moss, or reverse it, and a moss is God ! Is this a principle to be adopted by a Professor of " the Evidences of Christianity " in so respectable an institution as the South Carolina College ? Has the Professor yet to make his philosophy, as well as his theology ?

But, evidently, there is a difference of species ; for the Professor would take it as unkind, nay, uncivil, in us, if, because he comes under the genus animal, as does every man, we should insist on including him in the species *goose*. It cannot, therefore, follow, that, because a thing is true in the particular, it must be true in the universal. Consequently, Dr. Lynch may assert that a certain amount of science and erudition is necessary to decide on a particular fact, by a particular agent, on particular grounds, and yet not be obliged to concede that the

same amount is necessary in every case, whoever the agent, and whatever the grounds on which he is to decide. The amount alleged to be necessary may not be necessary in the case of the inspired themselves to determine the fact of their own inspiration ; it may not be necessary in the case of the eyewitnesses of the miracles by which the inspired evidence the fact that God speaks to and by them ; it may not be necessary to those who receive the fact immediately from the inspired themselves, or on the authority God himself has commissioned to declare it ; and yet be indispensable in the case of a single individual who has, on the strength of his own examination, to decide whether a book written some two or three thousand years ago is or is not an inspired composition ; as it needs no argument to prove.

The knowledge, be it more or be it less, necessary in the case, to determine what books are and what are not inspired, must be possessed by the body supposed, as well as by the individual, we concede ; and if that body is destitute of it and has it to learn, it must learn it either from investigation or inspiration, we also concede ; otherwise we deny it. But the body asserted in the hypothesis is, by the very terms of the supposition, already in possession of the truth, and of all the knowledge necessary to declare it, and, in deciding the question, has only to declare solemnly what it already holds and has held from the moment of its institution. Therefore, it has to acquire the knowledge neither by investigation nor by inspiration ; for it has not to acquire it at all. Unless, then, the Professor chooses to maintain that to declare what one already holds directly from our Lord or his Apostles is the same thing as for an individual ignorant of it to learn it by the examination of historical documents and scientific investigation, he must concede that the parity he seeks to establish between every individual's deciding the fact of inspiration on the strength of his own examination, and the Church, or body of teachers supposed, doing it on the authority of our Lord and his Apostles, from whom it received it immediately, has no foundation except in his own fancy, and that the conclusions which depend upon it fall to the ground.

The Professor's reasoning is vitiated by his supposing a *body* of individuals totally different from that supposed in the hypothesis he is arguing against. The body he supposes is no body or corporation at all ; but a simple aggregation of individuals who at any given time compose it. Between such a body and

the Apostles there must needs be all the distance of time and space that there is between the Apostles and the individuals themselves. It would and it could possess only what the individuals composing it should bring to it, and they could bring to it only what they acquire in their individual capacity. "The mere fact of human congregation," as the Professor rightly contends, could confer no power, beyond the aggregate power of the individuals congregated. Hence the aggregate body, or collection of individuals, as well as the single individual, would need to obtain, either by investigation or inspiration, the knowledge necessary to come to an infallible decision. It needed no learned professor to tell us all this, which is by no means beyond the reach of any man of ordinary sense. Indeed, we feel humbled when we find learned men bringing such objections to us, — humbled for ourselves, that they can think so meanly of our understandings as to suppose us capable of holding any thing against which objections so obvious even to a child may be urged, and humbled for them, that they should imagine, that, in bringing such objections, they are telling something recondite, or that it is possible that such objections can have any power to demolish that lofty and spacious edifice, the Church, founded upon the rock, firmly built and cemented, which has withstood all the assaults of wicked men and devils for eighteen hundred years, and against which the gates of hell shall never prevail, not even to loosen a single stone or to detach a single tile.

But *this* body, this aggregate of individuals, is not *the* body supposed by Dr. Lynch, and to prove that this has no advantage over the individual is nothing to the purpose, for nobody, certainly no Catholic, denies it. The Professor's argument is a sheer paralogism, of that species which consists in proving what is not supposed in the question, and which is not denied by the adversary, — a sophism for which the learned Professor has a peculiar fondness, and into which he falls with remarkable facility. The body supposed by Dr. Lynch is the Church teaching; for he says, "the pastors of the Catholic Church claim to compose it." But the Catholic Church, as a body or corporation, the only sense in which it is alleged to have anyt aching faculty at all, is not an aggregation of individuals who at any given time compose it, — a body born and dying with them; but the contemporary of our Lord and his Apostles, in immediate communion with them, and thus annihilating all distance of time and place between them and us.

She is, in the sense supposed, a corporation, and, like every corporation, a collective individual possessing the attribute of immortality. She knows no interruption, no succession of moments, no lapse of years. Like the eternal God, who is ever with her, and whose organ she is, she has duration, but no succession. She can never grow old, can never fall into the past. The individuals who compose the body may change, but she changes not ; one by one they may pass off, and one by one be renewed, while she continues ever the same ; as in our own bodies, old particles constantly escape, and new ones are assimilated, so that the whole matter of which they are composed is changed once in every six or seven years, and yet they remain always identically the same bodies. These changes as to individuals change nothing as to the body. The Church to-day is identically that very body which saw our Lord when he tabernacled in the flesh. She who is our dear Mother, and on whose words we hang with so much delight, beheld with her own eyes the stupendous miracles which were performed in Judea eighteen hundred years ago ; she assisted at the preaching of the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, when the Holy Ghost descended upon them in cloven tongues of fire ; she heard St. Peter, the prince of the Apostles, relate how the Spirit descended upon Cornelius and his household, and declare how God had chosen that by his mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of God and believe ; she listened with charmed ear and ravished heart to the last admonition of "the disciple whom Jesus loved,"—"My dear children, love one another" ; she saw the old Temple razed to the ground, the legal rites of the old covenant abolished, and the once chosen people driven out from the Holy Land, and scattered over all the earth ; she beheld pagan Rome in the pride and pomp of power, bled under her persecuting emperors, and finally planted the cross in triumph on her ruins. She has been the contemporary of eighteen hundred years, which she has arrested in their flight and made present to us, and will make present to all generations as they rise. With one hand she receives the *depositum* of faith from the Lord and his commissioned Apostles, with the other she imparts it to us. Such is the body supposed, between which and the individual Mr. Thornwell must establish the parity he contends for, or not establish it at all. What has this body to do, in order to decide what books are, and what are not, inspired ? Merely to declare a simple fact which she has received on competent authority, —

merely what our Lord or his Apostles have told her. What needs she, in order to do it with infallible certainty? Simply protection against forgetting, misunderstanding, and misstating; and this she has, because she has, according to the hypothesis, our Lord always abiding with her, and the Paraclete, who leads her into all truth, and "brings to her remembrance" all the words spoken to her by our Lord himself personally, or by his inspired Apostles, — keeping her memory always fresh, rendering her infallible assistance rightly to understand and accurately to express what she remembers to have been taught. Here are all the conditions requisite for an infallible decision; and all these must be supposed, because they are all asserted in the hypothesis.

Now we demand what parity there is between such a body, which has only to state what it believes and always has believed on the inspiration of Scripture, and which has the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost to state it infallibly, and an individual who has nothing but certain writings before him, and who has to determine, by the examination of documents and scientific investigation of the intrinsic evidences, whether they are inspired or not, — a fact which, since it is supernatural, lies out of the order of nature, and is therefore only extrinsically provable. Who so blinded by passion, by pride, by prejudice, or ignorance, as to pretend, that such a body, supposing it to exist, can no more come to a certain conclusion, is in no better condition for coming to a certain conclusion, on the fact of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, than an ignorant slave on our plantations, or a rude savage of our forests? Who is he? Indeed, it is the learned Presbyterian minister, the "Professor of Sacred Literature and the Evidences of Christianity in the South Carolina College"! It is evident to any man of ordinary sense, that such a body can decide the question infallibly, and equally evident that the ignorant slave or the rude savage cannot.

To the dilemma, therefore, in which the Professor affects to have placed his Catholic opponent, we reply: — The Council of Trent could, uninspired, but simply assisted by the Holy Ghost, decide with infallible certainty upon the inspiration of the Scriptures, without the learning necessary in the case of the individual deciding for himself on the strength of his own examination, *because it had only to give an authoritative expression to the actual faith of the body of pastors it represented*, — and it could establish the infallibility of its expression

to the people who were to receive it, because, to do so, it had only to establish that it did express the universal faith of that body, easily collected from its being received by the whole body as soon as made known. The other part of the dilemma falls of itself. We do not assume, nor are we obliged to assume, that the Fathers of Trent were inspired. Inspiration is needed only where the truth to be promulgated is unknown and has to be revealed ; where nothing is to be done but infallibly state the truth already revealed and believed, the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, without inspiration, suffices.

We have here shown that the difficulties suggested are resolvable on Catholic principles ; the Professor must therefore concede, according to his promise, that one objection to Dr. Lynch's argument ceases. But this one objection is his only objection to that argument, so far as it bears against the first-named method ; and since this is removed, the argument, thus far, is not refuted. If not refuted, it, at least against the Professor, is sound, and, then, the first method is destroyed, and Dr. Lynch is entitled to his conclusion against it.

There remain to be considered the second and third suppositions. The second, that of relying on the judgment of the learned, the Professor passes over in profound silence, and therefore yields it up as indefensible. It is remarkable, however, that Mr. Thornwell should do so ; for it is really the method actually adopted by the majority of Protestants, and abandoning it is virtually abandoning Protestantism itself. Undoubtedly, Protestants assert private judgment ; but the private judgment on which they actually rely is not the private judgment of each individual, but the private judgment of those assumed to be learned and wise and prudent. Protestantism must never be taken at its word ; for one of its essential properties is, to profess one thing and to do another, or to give us the name without the thing, — the sign without the thing signified. Whoever knows Protestants at all knows that they take their opinions, not on their own private judgment, but on the authority of their masters. Whenever they do not do so, we find them becoming downright Rationalists, or absolute apostates from Christianity ; and it is never, only as grouped around some leader, swearing by the words of some master, that we see them retain any thing of the form of religion, or present any compact appearance. The people are aware of their own inability to decide for themselves what they ought to believe, and they only decide what heresiarch they will follow, — what

master they will have. Thus they say,—“ So said Martin Luther, so said John Calvin, or George Fox ; so teach Edwards and Dwight, Owen and Gill, Wesley and Swedenborg, Murray and Ballou, Channing and Fourier, Emerson and Parker.” It is not in himself the poor Protestant confides, but in some leader who seems to him, for his learning, wisdom, and sound judgment, worthy of confidence. If here and there a bold, energetic individual starts up with perfect confidence in his own judgment, and has the courage or the audacity to proclaim, as the truth of God, his own personal conceits or convictions, he either founds a new sect, or a new party or faction in the sect to which he pertains ; as we see in the instances of Muncer and George Fox, Brown and Sandeman, Wesley and Whitefield, Erskine and Irving, Southcote and Pusey, Campbell and Bushnell, Channing and Parker. If each judged for himself, we should see no sects, parties, or groups ; each would stand alone, on his own two feet, acknowledging no master, and no fellow, saying always *I*, never able to say *we*.

This must needs be. How, except by relying on such men as Mr. Thornwell, could the great body of Presbyterians, for instance, come to any conclusion on the question discussed in the volume before us ? In fact, they do not attempt to obtain a conclusion by any other means. “ Mr. Thornwell is a godly man ; he is a great and learned man ; he has investigated the subject ; he won't deceive us ; and we will believe what he says.” Here is the fact, disguise it as you will, and Mr. Thornwell knows it as well as we do. We must, therefore, regard his passing this method over in silence as a tacit confession that in his judgment Protestantism is not defensible.

Nevertheless, we cannot be much surprised that Mr. Thornwell passes this method over in silence. It is not a method to be avowed. Protestant ministers would have a short lease of their power, if they were to avow it. They would be pressed with a multitude of questions, which it would be very inconvenient to answer. “ After all,” — the justly indignant people whom they have led might say, — “ this private judgment you preached was only a pretext, a bait to catch gudgeons. You never meant it ; you only meant that we must submit our judgments to yours ! Is it true that you monopolize all the learning, all the wisdom, all the judgment, in the world ? What guaranty can you give us, fallible men as you confess yourselves, that you yourselves are not deceived,— nay, that you are incapable of deceiving us ? You deceived us, when you prom-

ised us the right of private judgment. What reason have we to suppose you do not deceive us in other things also ? ” Such questions might be put, and, if put, it is obvious that it would be very inconvenient to answer them.

The first method is disproved ; the second is abandoned ; only the third remains. This, that of a single individual duly commissioned by Almighty God to announce the fact of inspiration to the world, the Professor does not attempt to defend as true, or as one which he does or can hold ; but he maintains, that, on Catholic principles, it is probable, and therefore Dr. Lynch is entitled only to a probable conclusion, — not sufficient for his purpose, because he must conclude with absolute certainty. The Professor concludes, that, on Catholic principles, this hypothesis is probable, from the fact, that, on Catholic principles, it is a probable opinion that the Pope is infallible. But his argument involves a transition from one *genus* to another, and therefore concludes nothing. The single individual asserted in the hypothesis is commissioned in his individual capacity to announce the fact, and it is in this capacity that he is to do it. But such a commissioned individual is not the Pope, or Sovereign Pontiff. No Catholic holds the Pope in his individual capacity to be infallible. He is infallible, as we hold, and as we presume Dr. Lynch also holds ; but only in his capacity of Supreme Head of the Church, in which sense he is included in the fourth hypothesis, as joined to the body of individuals asserted, inseparable from it, and essential to it. Concede, then, the infallibility of the Sovereign Pontiff, nothing is conceded in favor of the third method ; for in the sense in which he is infallible he is the Church, or essentially included in the fourth method ; since the head is not without the body, nor the body without the head.

The third method, then, is not the method. Then no one of the first three. Then the fourth is ; because some method of proof does exist, and it can be no other. Mr. Thornwell, therefore, has not refuted Dr. Lynch's argument. If he has not refuted it, against him, it stands good. Then the method of proof is the body supposed. But this body has authority to make an unerring decision on the subject of inspiration, that is, to declare unerringly what is or is not the word of God, therefore infallible in declaring the word of God. But this body is composed of the pastors of the Catholic Church. Therefore the pastors of the Church are infallible in declaring the word of God, the proposition Dr. Lynch undertook to

prove. It would seem from this, that the learned and logical Professor's shouts of victory were decidedly premature. It is clear, also, since we are not considering what is or is not possible in the abstract, but *in hac providentia*, that the whole controversy turns between the first method and the fourth; for the private spirit is not admissible, and the Professor does not defend the second, and cannot, and would not if he could, defend the third. It is, then, either private judgment or the Catholic Church. So the Professor virtually concedes or maintains. What, therefore, he further adduces in his Fourth Letter, namely, that it is as easy to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures as the infallibility of the Church, cannot be entertained. There does exist some adequate proof; this is conceded. It evidently cannot be the method of private judgment; for it is absolutely impossible for a field slave, for instance, ignorant of letters, and with no time or ability to learn, to be able to decide for himself, on his own examination, whether *Tobias* or *Ecclesiasticus* is or is not an inspired composition. But, if not private judgment, it must be the infallible Church, and therefore the Church and its infallibility follow from the necessity of the case. This necessity overrides every possible objection. Bring as many objections as you please, and we dismiss them, as proving, if any thing, too much, and therefore nothing. *Quod nimis probat, nihil probat.* *

Thus far we have confined ourselves, after stating the question, to showing that the Professor has not refuted Dr. Lynch's argument for the infallibility of the Church. This has been perfectly gratuitous on our part, for the burden of proof is on the Professor. But having vindicated Dr. Lynch's argument for the infallibility of the Church, we are now able to conclude it against Mr. Thornwell from the necessity of the case, the strongest argument that it is possible to use. Infallibility overrides all objections; and consequently, the Professor, let him do his best, cannot prove the fallibility of the Church. Here, then, we well might rest; but we find our author rather an amusing companion, and we should be sorry to part company with him so soon. We hope, therefore, to be able, in an early number, to consider the direct proofs of the fallibility of the Church, which he has attempted to bring. In the mean time, we recommend him, since he must hold his logical reputation dear, to make himself acquainted with Catholicity, before attempting again to write against it, and review also his logic, before he again asks his opponent to reason in syllogisms.

ART. V. — *Le Protestantisme comparé au Catholicisme dans ses Rapports avec la Civilisation Européenne.* Par M. L'ABBÉ JACQUES BALMES. Paris: Débecourt. 1842 — 44. 3 tomes. 8vo.

WE have not placed this work, by the erudite and eloquent Balmes, at the head of our article for the purpose precisely of reviewing its diversified contents and dwelling on its many peculiar merits and attractions. Adapted in a special manner, from the subject of which it treats, to meet the wants, and by its style and composition to suit the taste, of the present day, we should, indeed, be happy to draw from its varied pages, and prepare for the delight and useful entertainment of our readers, some of those striking views and deep thoughts, rapidly unfolded reasonings and brilliant passages, with which it everywhere abounds; but we can, for the present, only throw together some thoughts suggested by its first hasty perusal, and add, in the spirit, though not with the polished pen, of the author, a few facts and reflections concerning the practical results of Protestantism on the well-being of the lower classes of society; — not with any the less poignant grief for the misfortunes of our fellow-beings, because these results lead us to appreciate all the more feelingly the unmixed benefits which have ever flowed from Catholicity, over the humbler as well as upon the higher walks of life. A very incomplete sketch is all that we pretend to draw; nevertheless, those who follow us, while we trace the bare outlines of one of the many subjects designed by Balmes's master hand, may obtain some faint idea of his general plan, and occasionally, perhaps, catch a glimpse of the enlarged and complete portraiture of his volumes. The work itself will prove eminently useful, and serve as an ever-ready prompter of new views, to those who may desire to carry out through other departments the comparative study of the social features of Protestantism; it contains much, also, untouched by us, which will render broader and deeper the contrast between the blessed influence of the unreformed Church of God upon the lowliest of the faithful, and the unblest consequences entailed upon its followers by that sorrowful delusion styled the Reformation.

The Reformation began by holding out to Christendom flattering prospects and promises of a new order of things,

such as would, upon the realization of its designs, present to the world a social Utopia. Full time and ample opportunities have been enjoyed for a fair trial of the experiment. The Protestant world may now be presumed to have some evidences to show that it has not all along relied on false promises. Some instalment of the good fortune to be conferred and entailed upon mankind should now be forthcoming. Or if the space of three hundred years is not really allowance enough for working out into effect designs so surpassingly beneficial to society, when accomplished, may not the present generation be permitted, without too much presumption or irreverence, to look around for some tokens of assurance that the pledge given long ago is about to be redeemed, and that its rich portion will not the less surely come one day, for having been so long deferred? Some faint streaks of gray dawn along the horizon might tell, that, though "long-expected morn delays," still the night is not to last for ever.

The comparative study of the social well-being of the people, which in the religion of Him whose kingdom is not of this world can be only of secondary importance, rises in the face of Protestantism, in consequence of its having held out these prospects and promises, into a matter of even fearful magnitude, and grows into a question of the absolute truth or falsehood of the Reformation. On man's temporal and temporary prosperity hangs an issue of no less than vital consequence to the system of amended religion. Upon this ground the reforming scheme was started; — first with an eye to the things of Cæsar, and then to the things of God. The Catholic order *reformed* or reversed is to "seek" the "*adjicienda*" or temporalities, and hope and confide in Providence that "the kingdom of God and his justice" will be "added thereto," as circumstances and occasion require. In accordance with this idea, the Reformers seized a favorable opportunity of calling the attention of men to their social footing, — with which they were easily made discontented, — and then requested them to look to the groundwork of their faith, upon which, they were told, every thing to be complained of depended. If this dependence or connection be disproved by the existence of equally bad effects after the assumed cause — the faith — has been reformed, — the Reformation is proved to be grounded on a falsehood. "An imposition on the Christian family" is its real title and character, if the religious change be accompanied by not only equally

bad, but worse and more deplorable effects. This was not foreseen or dreaded in the outset, and the course then pursued was one which steadily tended to make men consider religion more closely in its relations to the happiness of this world than that of the other. The determination was to reform Christianity into a satisfactory and comfortable way of living here, rather than to furnish Christians with any new or surer means of attaining to life hereafter. The reformed creed was of course thus strengthened in the mind, with all the convincing force, and its belief was sunk deeply in the heart by all the weight, of earthly considerations. Protestantism may be supposed to have obtained its view of Christianity and "sighted" religion reformed, not while patiently bearing the cross up the road that leads heavenward, but while wandering, "on pleasure bent," down the pathways that wind round the social conveniences and branch out variously into the temporal affairs of men. The promises held out by the Reformers to those whom they sought to gain over, and the measures they adopted to render their movement popular and acceptable, all look in this direction. A practice was found fault with and abolished; and *then* the doctrine which upheld it was rejected. Whatever appealed more directly to those usages, ways of life, and restraints which go far towards making up the outward burden of a people's religious and civil duties, was seized upon with a helping hand and accommodated dexterously to the uneasy shoulder, by being lightened of its weightiest articles; the doctrines connected therewith—in the manner, you might say, of network or lacing—narrowing and shortening themselves conveniently to suit the change.

This line of proceeding—whether adopted blindly or with foresight of its consequences, it matters not to the people—was well calculated to bring about in their incautious and deluded minds a conformity to the doctrinal opinions of those pleasant friends of humanity, who seemed, meanwhile, solely intent on changing the condition and altering the mode of life and manners of society. Their whole course of operations seemed to say to the people, Every thing good, comfortable, nice, and respectable will be yours, only the old religion must first be reformed. In confirmation of this, it may be generally observed, through the whole history of the Protestant sects, that they act perfectly in character against the Church; drawing invariably their best materials for a plea against her doctrines from the situation and conduct of individ-

uals, or the outward condition of communities. There appear, indeed, to be no other desires in their warm hearts, and no further thoughts in their enlightened minds, than such as would fain enable man to compass and "gain the whole world," — without ever pretending to any special mission concerning the *quid prodest*, or "what shall it profit a man," of the Gospel. The intentions and designs of the Reformation movement, the objects first aimed at, and last to be obtained by all possible means, may also be pretty safely deduced from the eulogies of Protestantism upon itself. It would really seem to follow, from the tone of all these exultations, that if the secular enlightenment, social well-being, and prosperity of the people in this world have not been consulted by the Reformation in a distinguished manner and to an eminent degree, there is little else left on which Protestantism would deign to be congratulated. Does it not seem everywhere tacitly conceded, through this business of innovation and improvement, that in the matter of fitting people for the world to come, by penance and mortification, by constant discipline and searching austerity, by voluntary and vowed self-denial and detachment from this world, the old Church answered full well enough, and needed no reformation or improvement?

But then, it is said, Christendom was in so unsocial and unelevated a condition after the Dark Ages! The dignity of the race, the self-respect and independence of the people, the free impulses of the human mind, and the unbounded right of every man to self-management and free choice in all things, were surrounded by so many restraints and restrictions, all obstinately looking to some mode of existence not precisely like this worldly life, that a fundamental change was demanded by the social position of Christendom. There seemed clearly implied in the ideas according to which the Church directed human affairs a dread, or a vague suspicion, about the soul-saving effect of trusting man fully to himself and to his own ideas of social comfort in the advancing position of nations from barbarism towards refinement. And what heart, beginning to be hopefully elated with the advance already effected, could bear with this diffidence and cautiousness? Of that worldly-wise eagerness and ambition requisite to lead on the nations rapidly and by the shortest path to the eminence — now appearing almost in view and easily attainable — of human perfectibility in a social golden age, the Church seemed

to possess little or nothing. Her "Ages of Faith" — really Dark Ages in the progressionist's view — had strangely confirmed her in a habit, natural enough in her "Ages of Persecution," of devoting, now even more fearfully than then, the larger share of her time and efforts to the spiritual man, only looking after his physical well-being, which was bettering itself fast enough, as after a relative and secondary concern; and who was there, tasting the first fruits of her hard-earned civilization, that languished not to see her course liberalized and reformed? Every thing in the moderate and measured proceedings of the Church towards the people betrayed her strong and almost offensive recollection of the stern barbarism and sensual grossness of those nations, which it had cost her much prudent toil, it is true, to bring gradually to the point which now had been reached. But was not every one, who had conceived high ideas of what could and might be done from the elevation to which the Church had now led him, panting for some less tame leadership? Fifteen ages of every variety of texture had unrolled themselves before the Church, and received, together with the unfading sign of faith, such outward finish as their materials would bear. Should the sixteenth century, rich with all the accumulated treasures and wisdom of the past, suffer the slow progress and course of events to continue still to be regulated by that moderator and sanctifier of past ages? Should it not rather, on the contrary, subject the Church to the impress of the present and succeeding ages of light? After hundreds of years of obstinately sustained labor and toil and struggle to accomplish her business with mankind, through unnumbered difficulties created by worldliness and irreligion, and through intricate cases suggested by the flesh against the welfare of the soul, — none of which would oppose her again in more enlightened times! — some prospect of a long respite from such complicated cases dawns at last. Will not the Church now bend unreservedly to the work of man's happiness in this world, and provide fearlessly for his social elevation and enlightenment, in accordance with his opinions and desires? Amid the peace and prosperity into which, in spite, it may be, of all his own resistance and endeavours, she has now introduced the Christian, can she not even for a moment relax from that all-engrossing concern about his future life? The light and splendor, gathering under her guidance through many centuries, is now freed from the last passing cloud, and streams from the sixteenth far down through

bright vistas opening into succeeding ages, and still, "What doth it profit a man?" is the calm expostulation of the Church with the admirers of the brightness in which she moves! But ardent and exalted imaginations are overpowered by the sight of so much profit to be realized for men in their social interests and relations. An earthly paradise blooms out before their eyes; *Reformation* beckons them on; man, they are sure, may now dare trust to himself in this broad daylight,—now think and act for himself, and make his way into the social Eden that opens before him; and they step out of the ranks, leap all circumvallations, pass every outpost, and bear onwards their own banner rapidly and precipitately down the illumined way, and far into regions of progress and improvement not yet filled with light. Religion was made for man, they now reflect;—should not, then, Christianity, under which civilization has gradually advanced thus far, tend to still higher civilization at once, leave the tardy to their unearthly thoughts, and join the explorers also, and outstrip the Church,—the Church, that still delays, endeavouring to make all things, whether they advance or whether they recede, conform as of old to the views of her mission, and abide by her unchanging standard and fixed ideas?

Thus felt and reasoned the proud and the disaffected in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Church had in her civilizing labors done so much for social well-being, that they had come to regard social well-being as the supreme good; she had carried society forward so far, that they felt its absolute perfection might be easily and speedily realized, if she would only turn her attention solely to that end. But as she would not hearken to their advice, deviate from the course she had marked out from the beginning, or hasten her steps according to their wishes, they resolved on her reformation, and, instead of submitting themselves to her direction and control, to subject her to theirs. The Reformation they resolved on they made. It has now gone through three centuries in search of a social Utopia,—with what success let Christendom in the nineteenth century answer.

But it is important, in seeking this answer, that we bear in mind the different positions which the Church and the Reformation respectively occupy with regard to social matters and the people. As the Church still perseveres in maintaining that these things have only a relative and secondary importance, she will not of course be very loud in her claims upon society for

whatever very acceptable consequences may have followed her constant pursuit of the one thing necessary. When her faithful members are hated by the world, or find its prosperity a snare, or suffer persecution for her sake, she not only reminds them that true prophecies are sure to be fulfilled under every system of social progress, but that the beatitudes from the same source are as truthful as any philanthropic axiom. Utilitarian piety it cannot be her object, since it is by no means her interest, to encourage. A sadly deficient means would it prove of securing in all ages and nations unity and universality of belief, to insist upon its close connection with worldly success, comfort, and prosperity, — ever and everywhere, in fact, the most variable and least general of all human conditions. Besides, tastes vary so much among men, ages, and nations, even on this point, that, were such an argument for embracing and holding her faith insisted upon, “the history of the variations of social views, as well as social movements, among Christians,” would then furnish the best memoirs for Church history; whereas the Church now principally traces by these the annals of what is called religion outside of her pale. There is no likelihood, then, it would seem, that the Church will be too forward in claiming great merit for the good things of this world which she may have given to the nineteenth century.

The Reformation, on the other hand, it may be expected, will, consistently enough, seek to hold up prominently before the world, as the fulfilment of the Reformers’ promises, and as the proof of their truthfulness and success, the largest possible amount of good realized in this world through the blessed Reformation. As the very unsatisfactory and deranged state of society from which it had its origin founded the character of its mission, moulded its essential features, and shaped its course, how can it be otherwise than unfailing in attention to its great merits and various achievements for society? To rehearse or point out in the Church those faults, defects, and failures in every thing concerning social happiness which first called forth and still employ this beneficial agency, must consequently claim an equal share of attention. We should also consider that Protestantism must of necessity, not only indulge occasionally, but be continually steeped, in self-applause, or else die by stopping the breath which from the reformer must carry with them pretensions to singular excellences and marked superiority. A system which thus writes its own name must

be sure of its own capabilities, if real, or, if successfully deceptive, live on self-delusion. Together with a high idea of its own accomplishments and qualifications, the Reformation must be moved with great pity, if not contempt, for the object that stands in need of its zealous labors. The more it considers itself in this contrast, the more it must be encouraged to think well of itself. The lower the Church that needed to be amended is sunk in the eyes of mankind, the higher must be the key in which the Reformers are extolled for their undertaking ; so that the meed of praise awarded to Protestantism is commensurate with the obloquy cast upon the Church, and all sectarian greatness finally resolves itself, through this analytical process, into a successful diffusion of the belief of the very great evils, of a social and secular bearing, with which Christendom was oppressed previously to the dawn of the Reformation. All the good there is in the present state of society must, therefore, be considered by the Reformation as its own production. To waive this, or allow it to be disputed, would have fatal consequences. For, if such evils as are assumed to have existed are discovered to have had only an imaginary existence, Protestantism can be only an imaginary reformation. If the social degree, which was thought by the Reformation to be so low as to disgrace Christianity, was really so high that nothing on earth could then have reached it save a divinely guided institution, to reform means, first, to defame the success of God's work among men, and then to pretend to better success. If greater evils have arisen, and are daily springing into being, since the Reformation, than were ever discerned before, Protestantism appears as one of those delusions that delude only to deform. Not leaving well alone is generally attended with bad consequences ; and the Reformation will be found to have been the destroyer of much that was very well, and the author of as much more that is very evil.

But circumstances, artfully taken advantage of, tend to screen every failure of the Reformation beneath benefits still accruing to society from the very state of things so much calumniated at the time of its rise. And, fortunate at least in this, Protestantism manages, through all its failures, to obtain from the Catholic influences it could not entirely destroy some specious appearance of success, by pretending to be connected, as their efficient cause, with all those social advantages which are only parallel with it in time. Nothing is more convenient for reformers than to declare that they have produced all the good in the

midst of which they live, and to maintain that every thing worth mentioning, which has happened *since* the reformation, is really *due to* the reformation itself, — *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. This is the sophistry, which, when prepared to suit party or sectarian prejudices, looks like argument in the Protestant declaimer's favor, but which, when plainly stated, is perfectly ridiculous and absurd. Suppose, for instance, that the accident of the Reformation had never happened, you will be told, that then, from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth, the sun would never have once risen or set, and that the men of 1516 would, perhaps, long before 1848, have been completely transformed into a generation of fools. Truly ! But the colleges and the universities in which even the Reformers themselves were taught in their boyhood all they knew, — the golden age of literature, which had already so far advanced, — printing, which had already been invented, — America, which had already been discovered, — poetry, painting, sculpture, which had already attained a perfection not yet surpassed, — Christendom already begemmed all over with those time-honored and unrivalled cathedrals, hospitals, and city-like asylums for the afflicted, — the wisdom, the legislation, and military achievements of so many long-renowned nations, — chivalry, learning, benevolence, already organized for hundreds of years, in innumerable bodies spread over the whole Christian world, and counting by crowds and enlisting by thousands the noble, the ardent, and the gifted in their cause, — not to mention, *hors de propos*, in the presence of Reformers, holiness and its connections, — what would these not have grown into, in the course of the last three centuries, if the cause which produced them had remained in all its force and activity ? No matter, is the reply ; if the Reformation had not taken place just then, some other catastrophe would have swallowed them all up at once. So the Reformation must receive the thanks of all Christendom for all modern civilization and enlightenment, arts and sciences, inventions, improvements, intellects, and all !

This species of sophistry, gravely carried out, under various forms, leads many who are deluded by it to place to the credit of the Reformation, not the good it has hindered, but the good which it fortunately could not hinder, and which exists in spite of it, and is really due to Catholicity alone. For it is no sophistry to say, that the cause that alone had given so much real good to the world has been the best and only pre-

server of its own works, and that the Church, if not interfered with, would successfully have continued what it had always sufficiently performed. Moreover, if conjectures well founded on analogy can ever be allowed, we may venture to say, casting our eyes now over the once Catholic, happy, and civilized Africa and Western and Central Asia, that, had reformation after reformation been as fortunate in expelling the influence of the Church from the European as from the Mohammedan world, the heresiarchs of the sixteenth century would have been men as uncultivated as they became irreligious, and the history of our nineteenth century—had it then found an historian with a pen—would have been written in some unchristian and uncivilized language, which is not, thanks be to the Church of God! our mother tongue. Still, it is not uncommon to hear the improvements and advancement effected in various departments in latter times, and occurrences which, in the necessary course of the world, could not have been expected at an earlier period, but which the course of three hundred years would have brought round at any rate,—though, in all likelihood, without any cost to humanity, if the Reformation had not come along with them,—all boldly and unblushingly attributed to that same Reformation, a phenomenon which had no greater connection with such progress than its having been permitted by Providence to appear and go on just at this period of time, lest mankind might have become too happy in this world, and have felt less disposed to look on it in its Christian light, as only a place of trial and probation.

The real worth of Catholicity and Catholic influences, as proved by experience to be the most efficient elements of civilization, can, in fact, be despised or denied by no Christian of the present day, who does not owe to the very nest he would fain soil every feather of his own boasted plumage, be whatever it may the attire of knowledge, civilization, or Christianity in which he struts through the world. For the study of the last three hundred years, after an ordinary acquaintance with the fifteen preceding centuries, must convince any impartial mind, that whatever there is really valuable and beneficial to mankind in what we now possess, beyond what was possessed at the opening of the sixteenth century, is nothing but the growth of the seeds then long sown and cultivated, and can in no sense be said to be the fruit of the Reformation. The impartial student will be inclined, on the contrary, to maintain that the true fruits of Protestantism are not that por-

tion of the promising and duly expected harvest which has hung, through sunshine and storm, and ripened on some of the boughs, but whatever has been rudely shaken off in unripeness from as many other branches of the tree of Catholic civilization, which was flourishing in such luxuriant richness and with such goodly promise before the Reformation storm arose. Of a continually augmenting caravan of precious things, some rich remnants have reached us ; but what would have been our store, had no despoiler waylaid or intercepted its course ! Follow the march of united Christendom through one thousand five hundred years of overpowering brilliancy of success, — look at its unshrinking contests with every enemy, and its triumphs over Gnostic sensualist and Platonic refiner, Manichæism in its Eastern originality and its Western diluted form of a hundred heresies, — over the Jewish slaveholder of white Christians and the Moorish invaders of Christendom, — over Mohammedanism, and over the Goths, with their predecessors and followers from every rugged clime, — and then fix your eyes and heart on its accumulated trophies and treasures, on its still unbroken front and godlike array, as it stands glittering on the borders of the sixteenth century, on its way to us, and conceive you never possibly can how this nineteenth century is only what it is, without allowing the Reformation to have possessed a superhuman power for evil. From what eminence, into what depth, has not the illustrious brotherhood of civilized men, separated by the evil genius of reformation, been sunk and plunged ! The wisdom of fifteen generations flung to the winds, the social experience and social erudition, the science and art of benevolence, tried and approved for a millennium and a half, despised and unlearned, and the world now presenting the deplorable spectacles everywhere beheld !

And sad, nay, heart-rending, indeed, is the present condition, the social condition, of the Protestant world. Raise the veil which an artificial civilization hangs over the face of society, fix your attention on those who form the bulk of every community, the laboring classes, the working population, — in the unchristian language of the day styled “the masses,” as if they were only huge blocks of brute matter, — and what is it you behold ? Is it the social Utopia, the earthly Eden, promised, to gain which was the real end and aim of the Reformation ? Alas, no ! You discover that pauperism, with its concomitant evils, during these Reformation times, has taken such gigantic strides as to have outstripped all calculation, and more than

fulfilled the worst predictions. The noblest hearts of the present generation are saddened, and the wisest heads are puzzled, at the sight. Governments, political economists, associations, and philanthropic schemes of every kind, struggle with ardor, but almost without hope, against the headlong course of this torrent, which is loosing the very foundation-stones of the social edifice, and threatening to submerge — unhappily, not alone — every vestige and remnant of Protestantism in the flood of evils which the Reformation let loose upon itself and the world. “*Mala res, spes multo pejor.*”

If we had no other evidence, the number and variety of plans and schemes for bettering the condition of the great mass of society would suffice to prove most abundantly, in a matter-of-fact and utilitarian age like ours, that the necessity which calls them into being must be great in the extreme; while the invariable abandonment of the most promising systems, after a short trial, and the constant search for better plans and more efficient schemes, prove with equal clearness, that, as yet, no means that can be called availing or encouragingly effectual have been found or devised. We every day read or hear of new theories for social reform, and improved systems for ameliorating the condition of the indigent and for the elevation of the lower classes of the people. Every day brings forth some amended legislative enactment on the subjects of education and of the poor, and old, rejected reports are superseded by new committees of inquiry on these matters. We have, in an interminable succession from all quarters, poor-laws, poor-rates, school-rates, factory-bills, relief-bills, plans, theories, and proposals amended and altered, and then amended again, put in operation for a time, found ineffectual, and then rejected, to give place to another plan, theory, system, enactment, or reform, — the afflictions of suffering humanity still continuing, meanwhile, in full force, neither amended, rejected, nor relieved, but increasing. Owenism and Fourierism, and every species of philanthropism, are now tried by amateurs in benevolence, as similar experiments, not long ago, were essayed by amateurs in faith and religious reform, from Luther's *ism* even down to Parker's *ism*; and we now have any number of sects of the philanthropic species, bickering and debating about reformations in workhouse systems, almshouses, and pauper laws, and about new-found means of training and cultivating the never properly understood human being, from college and university bills down to reports about schools of industry, farm-


schools and industrial schools, infant schools and ragged schools. In one thing only all seem agreed, — that there exist, even in the so-called most enlightened and liberal nations, an immense amount of ignorance, vagrancy, and abandonment of the young, the most appalling destitution and misery among a large portion of the working classes, as well of the peasantry in the country as of paupers in cities and towns and counties, and a rapidly increasing mortality amongst all these classes, and consequently new maladies spreading amongst all other classes, — and, to heighten the whole, that there is a horrid and pestilential demoralization and immorality in the masses, as they style them, and a most frightful abundance and increase of crime.

This fearful state of things, all agree, cannot be attributed to any present and temporary cause, since it could not have suddenly reached such a pitch, but must have been going on, though less observed, for a great length of time, until at last its wide-spread extent and aggravated nature have revealed its horrors to the most inattentive and alarmed governments as well as individuals. Of more than one nation may be said truly what the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1847, says, — “that the destiny and very existence of the nation depend on the satisfactory adjustment of these great questions”; or that, if these great objects are left unattained, it will become one of the many nations of whom it is sadly said, — “They were a great people in their day.” All agree, that the onward course and increase of the evil are rapid and portentous, and by this admit that as yet no remedy, or even palliative, has been found or effectually applied, — nothing to arrest or direct its course, — since all the systems and theories, plans and reforms, of single individuals, organized bodies, or legislatures and governments, have proved thus far unavailing; and the daily call is still for more efficient systems, better plans, and newly reformed reforms.

This is the unavoidable conclusion that is forced upon us by all we see and hear and read of, — from the most authentic records and reports of human suffering and crime, and from the official accounts given of their own achievements by social reformers, political economists, and philanthropists, whether in fashionable saloons or private studios, in sectarian Bible-Society rooms or government cabinets, Every number of every English review we meet with confirms every part of this statement. The evil has long been

going on and accumulating, — therefore we must say it arises from no present calamity or pressure. It is wide-spread, and therefore must own some very common and general origin. It exists and has been in existence under various forms of government, particularly the liberal and enlightened, — therefore you cannot attribute it to imperfect political organization. It cannot owe its origin to want of liberty, since it thrives and grows most rapidly in this the reign of freedom and liberty ; — want of mercantile or manufacturing progress cannot have engendered it, as these now go on literally by steam, and commerce has nowadays its prince-merchants, and the intercourse of trade has opened colonies and markets in every part of the habitable and almost uninhabitable globe ; — want of knowledge and science and advancement in the age cannot have produced it, for these are by no means “the Dark Ages.” No ; this age, in which the misery and abasement of man have reached their lowest depths, is *the age* which by progress, science, improvements, and inventions has out-topped all past ages.

Where, then, can we find the origin and cause of this distressing state of things, so independent of man’s advancement in the arts and sciences, in inventions and in politics, in trade and in commerce, as to go on ever increasing side by side with the increase of all these things ? What cause can it be that follows all these from mother country to colony, and has been so long working onwards, in spite of all the philanthropy and liberality of the last two or three centuries, that now, in the meridian height of the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, it has attained its very highest pitch ? It is certain that absolute ignorance of human nature, and want of knowledge of the human heart, must have presided at its cradle, and allowed it to grow up to this giant-like form ; for these alone can account for the inefficiency and uselessness of all the elaborate measures, immense means, and multiplied reforms now put into operation for its removal, hindrance, or relief. There has been, therefore, and there still is, in all this matter, a sad want of the light and direction of Him who knows and loves all that he has made, and who alone can beneficially govern, by his revelation, that human nature which he created, relieve and solace those human beings whom he has placed in this world, and the depths of whose heart he alone can search. But whence can have arisen this want ? Assuredly, there has been no suspension of the ordinary opera-



tions of Divine Providence in governing and ruling mankind. What Divine agency, then, has been interfered with to produce and perpetuate this lamentable state of things? There is, besides the ordinary providence of God, only one other Divine agency that we know of, and therefore it must be that; namely, the agency and influence of his blessed extraordinary providence, which we name the true Church of God, and fondly style our Holy Mother. It is this which has been interfered with, — not with impunity. This interference, the cause of all our woes, has been called the *reformation of the Church*, and passes under the general name of Protestantism!

What, then, since the evil evidently flows from this interference, has suffering humanity to expect from Protestantism? When, in a moment of passion and excitement, an evil deed is perpetrated, he who commits it may be blind to its awful guilt, and form no idea or have no foresight of its dire consequences; yet, though unforeseen by him, and though slow and long in reaching their accomplishment, these consequences are still the fruits of his evil-doing, and can and must be traced back to him. Such is the case with the notorious heresiarch of the sixteenth century, and his associates. It matters not, then, whether they foresaw and intended it, or not. The fact is, their doings checked and threw back the onward vigorous career of Catholic civilization, and thus interrupted the successes of those beneficent institutions that for fifteen hundred years had procured, were then providentially procuring, and would of course have continued the longer the more effectually to procure, the welfare and the relief of the indigent, the helpless, the infirm, — indeed, of every class of suffering humanity that was or would be an object of the extraordinary dispensations of Providence. They destroyed by their doings, which they styled the work of reformation, myriads of such institutions, disbanded legions of those enlisted for the welfare of the poor and the safety of the world, killed the spirit that built the hospital and filled it with guardians, and never so much as thought of providing a substitute. They caused much of the time and means which God had destined to the glorious works of benevolence, during the last three hundred years, to be diverted to another purpose, by making it necessary, through their malice, to employ them in self-defence against innovators and their machinations, or in the protection of those of the faithful they were waylaying and striving to seduce from the faith.

In this they inflicted an injury, not only on themselves, but also on those who remained true to the Church; though the sufferings of these have been light in comparison with those of their own deluded followers. By their so-called reformation they withdrew a portion of the Christian community from the Church, and have kept them for three centuries deprived of that hallowed influence and protection which alone, for fifteen hundred years, had succeeded, through every species of danger, difficulty, and trial, in saving, comforting, and relieving humanity. If, then, the consequences of these doings stand out so frightfully apparent in the present state of the suffering portion of mankind, it is clear that we are not to expect that the hand which, under pretext of reformation, has inflicted the wounds, will heal them by another reform, and it must be conceded, that, after all the attempts of philanthropy, socialism, and governments, there is no hope but in *unreformed* things, in going back, in being restored to the provident and loving care of the Church of God. If suffering humanity has a ray of hope yet unextinguished, it comes from looking forward to this restoration. If, indeed, faith is the vivifying principle, the soul, of the Christian body, if charity is inseparable from the life which that soul imparts, and if benevolent works show the warmth and activity of that life, it is not strange that true faith, real charity, and genuine works of Christian benevolence should all go off the scene together. So the body's activity ceases with its life, and life ends when the soul departs.

But why has not this doctrine, so plain and undoubted, been equally soon and strikingly apparent in the present matter? The reason may be easily given. It is impossible to suppose that the impulse given by Catholicity in the direction of benevolence, though checked at once, should at once be entirely stopped by the loss of faith. It is natural that it should have gone on for a time, till, growing weaker and fainter, it should finally die away. A good habit acquired by an individual or community, though the means by which it was acquired and strengthened have ceased to operate, does not all at once cease to facilitate the performance of a good work. The recollections, the traditions of a people once Catholic, — even its monuments, though in ruins, — long preserve, un-effaced by innovation, some of the beneficial influences of the Catholic spirit. The wayward, disobedient, and rebellious boy, who has spurned parental authority, and gone to make, as

he thinks, a better home for himself, will long, in spite of himself, feel the influence of the instruction and the care of the parent whom he has rejected, and of the happy homestead which he has lucklessly abandoned. If, then, among those who have rejected the faith effects like those produced by the principles of faith are still visible, they proceed, not from the error that has been embraced, nor yet from living faith, but from that rejected faith which still outlives its rejection, at least in some of the lessons it taught.

It is plain and evident, moreover, that no portion of mankind, though segregated from the direct influence of the Church, can escape the indirect influence of her Heaven-guided example and proceedings. Do you think that the sects, if by any possibility they could have got rid of this indirect influence of the Church in matters of doctrine, would have halted or limped long in carrying out at once their principles to the full conclusion they all reach in time? No; if Deism, Rationalism, and Transcendentalism did not bloom out fully the first season on every branch of the Protestant tree, it was only because the air and the soil around it retained still some of the effect of the long culture and watering of the Catholic Church. Even the boldest innovator had not courage enough to protest against and reform away all that the old Church taught and teaches; because she is there still, unimpaired, beaming inside and outside with truth, and fulminating error; and error gets out of the influence of truth only by growing bolder the farther it gets from it, and then getting farther from it the bolder it grows. Say the same of the moral and the same of the benevolent effects of faith, and their diminution and destruction. It is not surprising, then, that even after three hundred years there should be found out of the Church some traces of that Catholic agency which had been active and fruitful for the preceding fifteen hundred years. The light shed by the sun during some ten or twelve hours lingers on still even when it has set, until it gradually grows fainter and more dim through the decreasing twilight. If there be ever any good and congenial souls out of the Church, who, rare as diamonds, seem to have some glow of Catholic charity, they are indeed like gems in darkness issuing rays they have treasured from a sun long set.

Now it is not wonderful that much should be mistaken for a time as the effect of Protestantism, which was in reality only the effect of old Catholicity, which Protestantism could not yet efface. Hence the difficulty of seeing at once in

practice, and as clearly as in principle, that as the body without the soul is dead, so indeed does Christian charity go down into the grave where faith has been buried by the Reformers. We say Christian charity, — for we do not pretend to say that the charity or benevolence that a pagan may have, and the world had before the Church came, natural kind-heartedness, may not exist still in those out of the Church. Philanthropy and Co. are its incorporation. But we do mean to say, that, among those who have left the faith and the Church, whatever there is besides this in individuals, whatever there is beyond the creation of this in institutions, is all due to the faith of the Church, — which leaves, even after her rejection, the sweet odor of benevolence where she once was, and copies of her great models, which can indeed be badly copied, but not originally conceived or designed by any but herself.

Should you now tell us that it follows from what we here say, that, if the influence of the Church once died out completely among them, and she took back all her own from those who reject her, the world separated from the Church would be in these matters much in the same state in which she found the pagan world of antiquity, we would only answer, that to be without the Church before she came, and to be without the Church after rejecting her, is in both cases to be equally without the Church, and so far in the same state ; though to reject her implies more guilt, but not less misfortune, than never to have had her, and therefore may leave people, if not in precisely the same state, in one a little worse. There are, also, some people, nowadays, who seem to discover a strong tendency to the spirit of pagan times in the spirit of the age that is, and who contend that the knowledge or opinions of evangelical truths retained by the sects would have profited them little without the Church, or at least without her indirect influence and practical illustration of them. This view finds, undoubtedly, much in the present to confirm it. Indeed, the sects seem themselves to have some suspicion of its truth, and to believe that they find a defence of themselves, not in proving their superiority to pagans, but in proving that they have not fallen below them. Thus the late Robert Hall, the distinguished Baptist minister of Bristol, England, says in defence of Protestantism : — “ Look at the sects and parties into which professed Christians are unhappily divided. Where is there one to be found which has *innovated* on the rules of heathen life, by substituting vice in the place of virtue ? ” In general terms this is undoubtedly true, and we con-

cede the praise it implies. *We* have never intended to represent the uncatholic world as *worse* than the pagan.

But if the view here taken be correct, and the Christian body expires with the departure of Christian faith, whence, you may ask, comes the system of public establishments, — poorly managed, indeed, — now, in one form or another, spread over the whole civilized world? Since, as is well known, there were no such establishments before the time of the Church, we can safely answer, that they would not exist now, were it not for Catholicity and her countless institutions, the embodiments of her charity. The embodiment may be imitated by those who are not Catholics, but the essence is to be found only in the Church. Before Christianity, — which being a fact is the Church, — there were, indeed, kind-hearted individuals, but society had nothing else for the suffering but words of compassion. Public beneficence was unknown, unless there may have been, as in an Eastern kingdom, such an exception as a hospital for old horses! The founding of public establishments of benevolence never entered into the systems of administration of the nations of antiquity. What has been done in the way of public charitable establishments by the government in Protestant countries certainly cannot be due to Protestantism; for it furnished nothing of the kind for a model. Indeed, wherever they have been founded, it has been, not by Protestantism, but in spite of it; for the world in founding them has had to go against the sect, and give up prejudice against the Church, at least so far as to imitate, as best it might, Catholic institutions, rebuild what the sect had destroyed, and thus far rehabilitate Catholicity in spite of heresy. Protestantism originate such establishments! Why, the wonderful success and happy results of the Church's time-honored and countless monuments and means of charity were the very things which pointed out to Protestant governments the only likely way of making up in some measure for the horrid deficiency everywhere felt in the Protestant world, and which the Reformation had created by its rejection of Catholicity and its charitable foundations. The selfish nature of private opinion would never even have dreamed of such lovely things, if the benign and beautiful forms of benevolence everywhere called up by the inspirations of Catholic charity had not gleamed like a bright vision across her weary and slumbering eyelids. Such monuments no more belong to Protestant charity than the religious and Gothic architecture of

certain sectarian meeting-houses in this and other cities owes its origin to Protestant genius. Both the one and the other are but poor attempts at copying what always sprung, fresh, glowing, and spontaneous, from the fine mind and big heart of glorious old Mother Church, even in the so-called "Dark Ages," as well as in the earliest times.

But what, in fact, has been the success even of these institutions, borrowed along with much practical experience from the ancient Church, and now maintained and directed by *reformed* governments and Protestant associations? We see what it has been, everywhere, in the present frightful condition of the lower classes in all Protestant countries. Millions, appropriated to build and sustain every species of them, fail utterly to purchase what the prayers and faith of the Catholic Church have in all ages abundantly called forth without bribe or salary; and the truth beams out to all eyes not wilfully closed, that it is not enough to build and furnish a hospital or poor-house, an asylum or a farm-school, and hire men and women to watch over them for a livelihood. More reliable means than can be secured by "cash payments" must be obtained, or institutions of public beneficence will only serve to aggravate the evils they are intended to cure. Take men and women of sound minds and expansive hearts, apprenticed from earliest youth to meekness and benignity; school them in austerity and self-mastery, discipline their will and understanding by prayer and deep meditation, and fire them with the resolution to consecrate their whole being, to employ the whole course of their lives, and to devote their undivided energies to the cause of charity and deeds of benevolence; give some of them hospitals for their homes, the sick and suffering for kindred and friends, to minister to those they love with the warmth of divine charity for their only thought and pleasure; send others abroad to the abodes of the weak and the afflicted, the infirm and the destitute, and let them look forward to no happiness but such as is measured and fashioned by their present tenderness and kindly care; give others still for their families the groups of poor children they gather around them, and allow them to spend their lifetime with no thought on earth but that of moulding those young hearts to goodness and true worth,—of forming them for heaven;—do this, reformers, if you can, and you will have secured for humanity an amount of solace, succour, and relief which all your millions can never purchase through the agency of mercenary superintendents and overseers.

But until this be done, look, for a proof of the value of uncatholic schemes, on the sad picture presented to the world by even the first of Protestant nations, that fortunate and enlightened empire, where Protestantism, seated on the throne, has reigned for these three hundred years supreme, established and seconded by the law of the land. And what, in fact, is the condition of the lower classes in Great Britain? What has the establishment and the "united wisdom" of the nation, with all its "commissioners," "committees," and "boards," been able to effect to supply the loss of Catholic faith animating British charity in the good old times of "Merry England"?* Popular education was to have beatified the people; but, unhappily, on the one hand, popular education—out of the Church—has not been found to be all that was expected, and on the other, no means have been found of obtaining its general diffusion, even such as it may be. The possession of the elements of secular knowledge is now admitted by many to be in itself an equivocal benefit, as no inference in its favor can be drawn from the prison statistics, which so elaborately set forth the numbers of those who can or cannot read and write.† A "most powerful and original thinker" confidently presumes that any man, who looks, in the right state of his senses, at the manner in which children are still brought up, after all reforms, in many parts of the land, — England, — will be convinced that parents are

* "Without being intensely selfish, our countrymen, whether at home or abroad, as well as their sons or brethren of America, have the spirit of enterprise so strong in them, that they are but too apt to forget the claims of humanity and justice, nay, even the true welfare of their offspring, in the prosecution of it. This love of enterprise is at once a virtue and a vice of the Saxon race, the source of many of their most glorious achievements and of their worst crimes. There are but too many Englishmen who, like Lot, seeing that the land is good, would be content to be settlers in Sodom and Gomorrah, provided that their capital would but return cent. per cent.; and thousands more who, in the present ecstasy of a profitable gain, are much of Vespasian's opinion, expressed in the words of the satirist, *Lucri bonus est odor ex re qualibet.*" — *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1847.

We cannot admit that this is a characteristic of the Saxon race, for it was not so in old Catholic times, and that it is so now is due only to the Reformation, and its enlightenment. The Reviewer would do well to meditate Sir John Denham's couplet in *The Progress of Learning*: —

" 'T is happy when our streams of knowledge flow
To fill their banks, but not to overthrow."

† *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1847.

“bringing up their children *a nuisance on the face of the earth.*” * Many others seem to agree with Dr. Millingen, † that the education imparted to the masses will not “diminish the sum of human frailty.” Popular education, if anywhere among the reformed, must assuredly in Scotland produce very salutary effects towards increasing the comfort, morality, and elevation of the lower classes. We look into the number for May, 1847, of the *North British Review*, printed in Edinburgh, and read : —

“Mr. Symonds, the Government Commissioner, thus describes the filth of our Scottish towns : — ‘The wynds in Glasgow comprise a fluctuating population of from fifteen thousand to thirty thousand persons. . . . Thieving and prostitution constitute the main sources of the revenue of this population. *No pains seem to be taken* to purge this Augean pandemonium, this nucleus of crime, filth, and pestilence, existing in the second city of the empire. These wynds constitute the St. Giles of Glasgow ; but I owe an apology to the metropolitan pandemonium for the comparison. A very extensive inspection of the lowest districts of other places, both here and on the Continent, never presented any thing half so bad, either in intensity of pestilence, physical and moral, or in extent, proportioned to the population.’

“Before a committee of the House of Commons, the same gentleman said, — ‘It is my firm belief, that penury, dirt, and misery, drunkenness, disease, and crime, culminate in Glasgow to a pitch unparalleled in Great Britain.’”

What the pitch is there, we may soon see. Meanwhile, the Scottish Reviewer adds, from his own knowledge : —

“Much talk there has been, but nothing has yet been done, either to stay or to abate the evil. The moral and physical virus is going on accumulating and concentrating in the poorer parts of *all our Scottish towns*, one day to burst forth in fearful retaliation upon the classes by whose sufferance and apathy these things are so. Not Ireland, but our own neglected towns, threaten one day to become the pest-houses of Great Britain.”

Farther on we read : —

“A little while ago, the schoolmaster *abroad* was to do *every* thing for the poor man. It was only needful to count the proportions at school, or enumerate the readers and writers and arithmeticians, to know the measure of the well-being of the

* John Foster, *On Popular Ignorance*.

† *Mind and Matter*, &c. London, 1847.

people. But did we succeed in coaxing, bribing, or persecuting all the children in all the wynds, lanes, and closes of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, and Paisley to school, and in securing to them, to the full measure, the Scottish education of mere letters, or, if you will, of intellectual superiority to the boors of Norfolk, what would they be the better? Man is not only what the schoolmaster makes him, but much more what the daily and hourly, the thousand nameless influences of the sights and sounds of his home and neighbourhood make him; and to oppose only the schoolmaster, or even the schoolmaster and pastor [reformed], to the constant daily and hourly influences and training of dwellings and neighbourhoods, divested of *all that can cheer or elevate human beings* [true faith?], is to oppose the force of a torrent by a few twigs!" "To Glasgow and to Edinburgh," further reports Mr. Symonds, "justly belongs the bad preëminence" — in physical degradation.

Let us now view the educational state of the agricultural districts of England. Take Norfolk county as a fair specimen.

"The county of Norfolk," says the *North British Review*, as cited above, "is a rich agricultural county. It contains not less than seven hundred and fifty parishes. The average population of these seven hundred and fifty parishes is little more than five hundred souls; and its parish churches [reformed!] lie so close to each other, as to appear at every turn of the road or of the coast. In such a state of ecclesiastical sufficiency, one would have expected the intellectual and moral returns to have been amongst the highest in the kingdom, and that Norfolk would have been a great moral and intellectual garden. What says the inspector of the Church of England? 'Very few adults of either sex can read or write. An opinion prevails, that those who remain of the preceding generation more commonly possessed those acquisitions. A female has officiated as clerk in a parish for the last two years, none of the adult males being able to read. In another parish, the present clerk is the only man in the rank of a laborer who can read. In another, of four hundred souls, when the present school was established, two years ago, no laborer could read or write. A Dissenting minister, addressing a small congregation, was lately interrupted by a cry of "Glory be to your name!" He immediately repressed the cry, explaining that such language could be used only to the Deity. The answer was, — "Then glory be to both of you!" 'This,' says the inspector, 'I have too much reason to believe, is a *characteristic* fact, the suppression of which would, therefore, disguise the truth.'"*

"The intellectual emancipation of the laity was one great result of the Reformation"!†

* *Minutes of Committee of Council on Education*, 1840-41.

† *London Quarterly Review*, June, 1847.

Perhaps their temporal comforts have, nevertheless, been looked to. Mr. Perry, who, during a period of more than seven years, journeyed over a large portion of England, in the capacity, as he informs us, of travelling agent of an association of philanthropists, draws the following picture of "the general state of the peasantry in most of the strictly agricultural counties of England":—

"Our improvements in agriculture, as a science, are capable of being profitably carried to an extent far beyond what they have yet been. But hitherto they have, in many instances, *been purchased at a price which humanity shrinks from contemplating*. The soil has been made more productive, but those who till it have not the means of enabling them to enjoy its fruits. Farm-houses have everywhere been greatly improved, but a large proportion of the farm-laborers live in wretched and cheerless hovels. Rents have risen in an extraordinary manner, but poor-rates have increased to an amount which heavily taxes these rents. . . . Nearly two hundred and forty years ago, England had so many poor, that her legislature saw it to be necessary to make a legal provision for them; but never, till within the present century, could it be said of England's sturdy peasantry, that, *as a class, they were pauperized*; and never, perhaps, in the annals of any nation, is the fact recorded, that the very means and causes which led to an aggrandizement of its aristocracy, such as no country save this ever witnessed, had the effect of *morally and physically deteriorating the condition of its industrious population to a level to which no Christianized and civilized state on the face of the earth at this moment presents a parallel*." *

Mr. Perry advises the land-owners "to retrace every wrong step which they or their fathers have taken." But, Mr. Perry, will any thing avail to give them, as you desire, "some other resource than the poor-rates, the moment their labor is even temporarily suspended" (p. 40), unless they retrace the first great *faux pas* of their fathers? These poor-rates, you have informed us before, began "two hundred and forty years ago"!—some fifty years after the Reformation. "We hold it to be demonstrable that the condition of the working classes generally has much improved within the present century, as compared with the last." †

We can form, then, an idea of the central portion of the Reformation times;—they were worse than the present. The *Westminster Review* treats us to a view of the first and earliest

* *The Peasantry of England*. London, 1846.

† *Westminster Review*, April, 1847. *Theories of Population*.

portion of these glorious times, in comparison with this, their latest period, in which we now live.

"There is the recorded fact, that seventy thousand outlaws, vagrants, paupers, and others, who, in 1846, would have been relieved in *workhouses* in England, or provided with *Indian meal* in Scotland, or set to works, reproductive or otherwise, in Ireland, or, at the worst, shut up in well warmed and ventilated penitentiaries, [O philanthropic Reformation !] were, under the government of Henry VIII., summarily disposed of by the hangman. He had sixty thousand men in jail at once. Under the reign of the most merciful of his three children and successors, Harrison says, the average of executions was still four hundred per annum." *

In England, not long ago, one million workingmen, on the brink of starvation, struck work, as a quaint writer has it, "because no work was to be had," rose in insurrection, and left a dark marginal note on the page of "progress" in manufactures. "The physical condition of the working classes," says the author of *England and the English*, 1833, "is more wretched than we can bear to consider"; and he shows, from the documentary evidence on "the Factory Bill," that "the strongest boys employed in factories become crooked in their limbs, and maimed, in a short time, by constant work, day and night, — the form and limbs of young females crippled by seventeen hours a day hard work, all the year through. The weakest children are made, through poverty, to do the drudgery of mules and dogs." Nothing can equal the shameless abandonment of the female peasantry of England, if we may believe the same author.

A postscript to the *Westminster Review* for April, 1847, states that about seventy thousand children are now in immediate contact with pauperism in those dens, styled workhouses, in England. In the year 1845, says the *London Quarterly Review* for December, 1846, "there were taken into custody by the metropolitan police, 14,887 persons of both sexes, under twenty years of age. . . . But this is not a full statement of the annual mischief; much escapes the vigilance of the law; much falls somewhat within the limits of crime; much, however pernicious, cannot be ranked with offences against the queen's peace." These are the poor children, born in hatred of Popery, whom the *Quarterly* compares in boldness, pertness, and dirtiness to London sparrows, though looking, he humanely thinks, pale, feeble, and

* *Ibid.*

sadly inferior to them "in plumpness of outline." What a contrast to the superstitious little Papist rooks, that, well-fed and sleek, used to chatter and swarm around the cathedrals, abbeys, convents, and monasteries in *monkish* times ! Nevertheless, they are emancipated, and live under the light, and share the benefits, of the "glorious Reformation."

As to the mining population, we read in the *North British Review* for November last, — "Certain it is, that till about the commencement of the present century, colliers were kept in a state of perpetual bondage, and, from the first moment of their existence, were considered as belonging to the property which gave them birth"; and that "the work of the *females* consisted in carrying the coal from the place where it was excavated to the bottom of the pit, whence it was taken to the surface." From a work by Mr. Bald, who has been nearly half a century at the head of the mining in Scotland, we may copy the following, cited by the Reviewer : —

"The mother sets out first, carrying a lighted candle in her teeth; the girls follow; and in this manner they proceed to the pit-bottom, and, with weary steps and slow, ascend the stairs, halting occasionally to draw breath, till they arrive at the hill or pit-top, where the coals are laid down for sale; and in this manner they go for eight or ten hours, almost without resting. It is no uncommon thing to see them, when ascending the pit, weeping most bitterly from the excessive severity of the labor; but the instant they have laid down their burden on the hill, they resume their cheerfulness, and return down the pit singing.

"The execution of work performed by a stout woman in this way is beyond conception. For instance, we have seen a woman, during the space of time above mentioned, take on a load of at least one hundred and seventy pounds avoirdupois, travel with this one hundred and fifty yards up the slope of the coal below ground, ascend a pit by stairs one hundred and seventeen feet, and travel upon the hill twenty yards more to where the coals are laid down. All this she will perform no less than twenty-four times as a day's work."

The Reviewer adds : —

"This extract presents no overdrawn picture, no exaggerated statement. In some respects, indeed, it falls short of what a coal-bearer's work was within the last ten years. It is utterly impossible for language to convey to a stranger any thing like an adequate idea of the immense toil which those poor women had to undergo. It was reckoned nothing extraordinary at a Lothian colliery, where bearers were employed, for a woman to carry on her back from

thirty-five to forty hundred weight of coal each day, a distance of between three and four hundred yards, the greater part of the road not higher than four and a half feet, and in some cases a considerable portion of it covered with water."

With regard to the determination to abate the danger of explosion, the Review (p. 39) says : — " The question must be brought to this issue," — the reformed doubt, — " Whether is capital or human life to be sacrificed ? " and humanely adds : —

" It will, no doubt, be a hard thing, if the proprietors of these coal-fields shall be compelled to carry on their operations under such restrictions as may for a time render them unproductive and unprofitable, or even suspend the working of them altogether ; but it would be a harder thing still, if they must be worked as at present, with the chance, nay, the certainty, of every few months converting hundreds of homes into places of perpetual desolation and woe." *

Mr. Thomas Beggs, who is extolled in the *Westminster Review* for his sound views and most comprehensive grasping of the subject of education and the improvement of the working classes, makes use, in his lately published work, *Lectures on*

* We pass over, for want of space, in sketching the condition of reformed England, the horrors of the old convict system of penal settlements, the egregious "solecism of founding infant empires in crime," — settlements which really pertain to England, and of which the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1847, in an article entitled, " What is to be done with our Criminals ? " — a fearful question for British statesmen, since crime increases in their country at the rate of twelve per cent. *per annum*, — says, that the only real difficulty in presenting the arguments against the system is " that of giving any tolerable expression to them ; of knowing in what dialect of civilized man, by what periphrases of decency, to bring the atrocities which recent documentary evidence has disclosed before the minds of our countrymen. It is impossible to read them, much less to write them, without feeling the cheek alternately burn with shame or blanch with horror." But transportation to New South Wales or Van Diemen's Land being suspended, in what a condition must the Australian colonies be left, on their way to become, as they *will* become, vast nations, perhaps extensive empires, — immense moral wildernesses, sprung from the wild luxuriance of the Reformation stem ! Alas ! wherever England sends out and establishes her colonies, she plants the seeds, nay, often transports the full-grown tree, of her own corrupt — reformed — civilization ; as the old Phœnicians established, wherever they opened a colony or a factory, the idolatrous worship of the Tyrian Hercules ; and who can tell down through how many generations of their posterity it will perpetuate the curse under which she now groans and writhes in agony ?

the Moral Elevation of the People, of a very appropriate figure, in our present view, to bring before the minds of his "reformed" readers "the moral elevation of the people" of England. He portrays as gloomy and horrid a picture as his fancy can well furnish, of the state and condition of some ill-fated country, whose "priests are elevated as hierophants," where "the fate of the human mind is emphatically sealed," where "fanaticism and superstition brood over the minds of the people," where "barbarism and sensualism prevail, and hang their heavy cloud over the tomb of intellect, virtue, and knowledge." Is there, kind reader, any such country in any civilized region of this sublunary world of ours? Hear Mr. Thomas Beggs, whom we must presume to be well informed, at least, as to the condition of his own country. Writing of England in our day, he says:— "*In extensive districts this mental darkness hangs over our population. The ignorance of our people is a stain upon our character as a nation, and the time has come when there will be much danger in neglecting it.*"

What is well known to have ever been a glaring calumny, when applied to the most retrograde Catholic people in the most unfavorable times, we are, then, forced to admit to be plain truth with regard to England, irradiated with all the pure light of the Reformation shed upon her people since its first dawn to its meridian splendor in this present day! The Reformation, then, it seems, has alone been able to realize that state of things which had nowhere existed, even in fancy, but among the Reformers. They alone, in the sixteenth century, were frightened at the imaginary social monsters, which, strange to say, they have now produced. But this is not the first time that it has happened that the spectre which disordered the imagination of the parent has become visible to every eye in the form and features of the child.

Could we persuade ourselves, while going over these scenes of degradation and wretchedness, that "perfect clearness," as Carlyle says, in the evil "were equivalent to a remedy," we would continue our painful task with less reluctance. But we have said enough to disclose the workings of the Reformation on the lower classes in England. With these workings before their eyes, political economy and philanthropy are startled at the practical results of their creed of truths, and their benevolent impulses. They now cast at one another the cause of the cruelty and inhumanity which confessedly fall, between them both, on the "masses." "It has been of late the fash-

ion," says an economist in the *Westminster Review* for last April, "to decry the truths of political economy as the creed of inhumanity. The inhumanity is with those who would substitute the weakness of the heart for the soundest axioms of experience. We throw back the charge of cruelty upon the pseudo-philanthropists of the day." "A bad political economy," says the *Edinburgh Review* for last October, "has been, directly and indirectly, the cause of half the crimes of Europe."

Public opinion seems to many the only powerful agent competent to effect any thing really beneficial to society. The efficiency of the provisions of the penal code, the maintenance of any law, the certain detection and punishment of crime, the verdicts of jurors, the truthful observance of an oath, the value, in a word, of all the great social safeguards, depend chiefly upon public opinion, or, if you please, the healthy state of the general conscience. And what can procure this better than religious private opinions and interpretations? Now it seems, from the *Edinburgh Review* for July last, that a lamentably perverted sentimentality is extensively diffusing itself among the people, which may soon render it problematical whether *any* penal code really calculated to answer its object can be devised,— "a sentimentality which weeps over the criminal, and has no tears to spare for the miseries he has caused, — which transforms the felon into an object of interest, and forgets the innocent sufferers from his cruelty or perfidy." With regard to other equally important matters, the same Review, for October, 1847, says, public opinion on the subject is still *a making* in England. The able writer in the *Westminster*, quoted above, now confesses that "his faith in the *progress of opinion* has been lessened, and his confidence in the improvement of human institutions shaken, — that the world moves, indeed, as was said by Galileo, but that it moves in a circle. In the physical sciences a steady advance appears to be maintained; but in the moral we alternately advance and recede. Like the course of the earth as a planet, our path is in a prescribed orbit, which we never leave, and in which we are perpetually returning upon the same track." "To attempt," he adds, "to counteract prevailing hallucinations by a few words of plain sense, is to lift up a voice in the wilderness, which no man regardeth." And yet "the study of our social condition, with the view of bettering the mode of existence of the poorer and

more numerous portion of mankind in the civilized countries of Europe, is one of the most striking and cheering *characteristics* of the present century. Widely different as may be the opinions of some of the principal writers on these subjects, — Malthus [!], Sismondi, Degerando, Senior, Quêtelet, Sadler, and others, — the discussion, nevertheless, of the matters of which they treat serves at least to kindle *sparks of light*, which, if not revealing the whole truth at once, *may guide us to the track where we shall eventually discover it.*"* It would be attained sooner by studying Balmes, and the true history of Catholic institutions.

Even M. Michelet† is touched to the heart by the unsolaced suffering and helpless wretchedness to which he beholds the poor man of the present day so pitilessly abandoned. He would not be so impolite as to say, in the face of the enlightenment of this *siècle*, that there is no help for him save and except where he found it before, — that is, under the blessed guardianship of the Church. But he really insinuates as much in his gallant review of the whole case. All the evils the poorer classes now labor under must be charged, according to M. Michelet, to the transfer made some time ago of the direction and care of schools, hospitals, alms, and the protection of the poor from the Church to the lay power. The Church, you see, *wilfully* gave up the trust and the office, and therefore is blamable for these really heart-rending consequences. The Church, so actively and successfully engaged through former ages in these occupations of a humane character, modesty-stricken, one day retired from the world, piously disburdening herself on reformers, governments, and philanthropists of every thought and further concern about all these matters of the poor, and of charity, and of benevolence, which would only tend to mix her up too much with worldly distractions. We see and feel the consequences.

Now we agree perfectly with M. Michelet, that the disappearance of the Church from the stage where suffering, sorrow, wretchedness, and the thousand ills that flesh is heir to were struggling in the embraces of compassion, benevolence, and heaven-born charity, through a contest always more favorable, *duello mirando*, to the messengers of heaven than the evils born of earth, was indeed contemporaneously followed

* *Westminster Review*, April, 1847. Art. *Theories of Population*.

† *Histoire de la Révolution Française*, Tome I. Paris, 1847.

by the reappearance on the scene of misery in a thousand shapes, overpowering the slight opposition thrown before it, and stalking fearful and gigantic amid the powerless and puny forms of reformation, philanthropy, and all their thwarted and bustling little train. But before this last act there was an intervening act, which comprises an important feature of the drama, and this has been left out. Wherever the Church is seen to retire in any measure from the exercise of the corporal works of mercy, history presents us with a *tableau*, of which M. Michelet has transferred to his canvas only an isolated figure, suppressing those historic groups whose presence alone can account for the attitude, and explain the position, in which he portrays his modest and world-forsaking Church. She is indeed to be seen, as he represents her, wending her way from the asylums of misery and misfortune, to other scenes, or into the peaceful shades of retirement; but then history shows us, behind her retiring footsteps, a savage and threatening crowd, — with reform upon their banner, — dismissing by one door of these asylums their old guardian and keeper, in a condition of worldly nakedness and wounds well suited to excite modesty in that meek personage, and inspire thoughts of retirement from such company. Meanwhile the inmates of these despoiled abodes are thrust out by the opposite gateway, with a pittance of out-door relief to buy a new home for them in the world. Lazarus, indeed, scarce beyond the reach of his novel protectors, breaks out into menacing gestures and expressions of rage; but his anger is directed at the invaders of his happy abode and the despoilers of his ancient guardian, — not, as M. Michelet seems to think, at the expelled and retiring benefactress, whose fate he well knows he always has shared and always will share through weal and through woe.

The change which, as history shows, soon comes over the abbey halls where Lazarus once had a home, and the successors of the poor man's friend now bestowing all their tenderness on hounds and hunters, and other such variations of scene, appearing in the background of the picture, — all this should be more than enough to elicit M. Michelet's as well as Lazarus's detestation. But no! he first philosophizes over the robbery of the poor man's friend, and then pities the poor man, but blames his friend, for the mutual position they now hold. If M. Michelet had the moral courage of Montalambert, he would tell all this pitiful tale in a few words of plain French,

giving us to understand his idea to be, that, without the Church, the poor, the afflicted, and the wretched have nothing to expect, but still again and again poverty, affliction, and wretchedness. This, too, he might say *avec connaissance de cause*, — for the experiment has been tried, *et que voulez vous faire !*

If, according to the sentiment of Dr. Vaughan, in his letter to the *Morning Chronicle*, Sept. 10, 1847, applauded by the *Edinburgh Review*, "government should be thankful to see its province daily reduced to a smaller and still smaller compass," that is, by voluntary efforts on the part of the people, what can present higher claims upon the attention, or more fully entitle itself to the thankfulness, of governments, than the admirable workings of Catholic faith in the direction of benevolence? The Catholic Church possesses peculiar qualifications — qualifications which no other body does or can possess — for rendering those voluntary efforts not only common and almost universal among individuals, but perpetual in associations which are willingly formed and sustained in her bosom, and of a twofold efficiency, through the self-imposed character of disinterestedness, and the professedly tender and meek spirit of the unsalaried staff and officials of her volunteer corps of benevolence. Legal enactments in the nature of poor-laws and poor-rates were never demanded of the government, until, along with the rejection of the Catholic Church, most of those means and appliances for the relief of the suffering and indigent, which Catholicity had abundantly supplied, were necessarily lost, and some substitute for them was required, not indeed by the diminishing, but by the daily increasing, number of sufferers.

We have in what has been said the proof and the acknowledgment, that as yet nothing has been devised to supply the place of what was taken from the people by the loss of Catholicity. It is impossible at the present day to deny, and no one pretends to deny, the almost hopelessly sad state to which the bulk of the lower classes are now sunk, in those countries which glory the most in the benefits of the Reformation. After three centuries of extraordinary progress and prosperity, Dr. Vaughan very appropriately presents to us a Protestant government, much in the attitude and bearing of a step-mother addressing a sadly conditioned family bereft of their natural parent, — "Since your mother is no more, I should be thankful to you if you would manage to provide for your own wants."

We have taken Great Britain for our example because she is the model Protestant country, and because surely it is in her, if anywhere, we may see the real workings of reform, and collect its genuine fruits. If even in Great Britain Protestantism has been able to produce only a moral and physical state of the population unheard of, prior to reforming times, in any civilized nation, and from which she herself starts back with horror and alarm, surely we may say that she has utterly failed in realizing the social Utopia she promised. In a foregoing article we have proved, that, under a political point of view, she engenders only tyranny or anarchy, oppression or the Reign of Terror. If, then, as we now see, in a social point of view, she brings in her train, not the increase, but the destruction, of social well-being, she must stand condemned of impotence to produce the good she proposed, and, as we said, of a superhuman power to produce, in its most aggravated forms, the very evil she declaimed against and promised to redress. May we not, then, say, that there has been enough of reform, and ask, if, after the failure of its experiment, tried, under every advantage, for three hundred years, suffering humanity does not point to the absolute necessity, not of a further reform, but of a *restoration* of that which has been *reformed* away?

ART. VI. — *Oraison Funèbre d'O'Connell, prononcée à Rome, par le R. P. VENTURA, Théatin, June, 1847.*
Le Propagateur Catholique : New Orleans.

OF the illustrious subject of Padre Ventura's Oration, which our friends of the *Boston Pilot* have republished in English, and which every body has read, it cannot be necessary that we should speak. We could not say more than the learned and eloquent Théatin has said, were we to try; and we have no disposition to say less. Nor can it be necessary to speak of the general character and merits of the Oration itself, — a political manifesto addressed by an eminent tribune of the people to all Christendom, and intended to have an immediate bearing on the movements for political reforms in Rome and Italy. Padre Ventura is a distinguished man, and perhaps one of the most popular and effective pulpit orators of the day. With his general tone, doctrines, and aims we

should be sorry not to sympathize. We go with him, heart and soul, in his love of liberty, his hatred of oppression, and his war against tyrants and tyranny.

But if he has been correctly translated, either in French or English, — of which we cannot judge, not having seen the original Italian, — he makes use of some expressions in his Oration, and especially in the Preface to his second edition, in which he defends its doctrines and makes his own eulogium, to which, as at present advised, we are far from being prepared to assent. As we understand him, he contends, that in the present posture of affairs in Europe, the true policy of the Church is to abandon the governments, appeal to the people, and form an alliance between religion and liberty. Such a policy, he appears to maintain, is necessary to the preservation of the Church, and will be to the advantage of both liberty and religion, — the former gaining sacredness, order, and stability, and the latter an infusion of popular energy, which will enable the Church to bring once more under her influence the populations now disaffected with their rulers, and with her, because they believe her to be leagued with them to oppress. This seems to us to be his general doctrine, and we are unable to distinguish it from the policy contended for with so much zeal and eloquence by De Lamennais and his associates, after the French Revolution of July, 1830, in the brilliant columns of the *Avenir*.

We confess, in the outset, that any talk of an *alliance* of religion and therefore of the Church with any thing outside of her, as necessary to her existence or her efficiency, scandalizes us not a little. The phrase itself offends us ; for it is impossible to use it so that, to large numbers, at least, it shall not convey a false and mischievous meaning. We can readily believe, that, in Padre Ventura's mind, and in the minds of his Roman hearers and readers, it conveys, under existing circumstances, only a sense which is sound and worthy of all acceptation; but in France, in England, and in this country, it inevitably bears a meaning which it seems to us no good Catholic can accept, as may easily be gathered from the misconstructions which have almost universally been put upon the conduct of the Holy Father in the salutary reforms which he has introduced into his more immediate temporal dominions. The Church we have been accustomed to regard as sufficient for herself, and as under no necessity, for her own preservation or efficiency, to make common cause with any

power outside of her. Whatever is good and worthy to be sought she includes in herself ; and we cannot understand what there is outside of her with which she can form an alliance, without proving herself in some measure unfaithful to her celestial Spouse. Her energy, the only energy she needs, which comes from Him who said, *Ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus*, appears to us to be fully equal to her necessities, and therefore the infusion of popular energy contended for we cannot but regard as quite superfluous.

Moreover, we are at some loss to understand what is meant by forming an *alliance* between religion and liberty. To call for the forming of such an alliance seems to us to imply, what is not true, that religion has heretofore been divorced from liberty, and has remained alone, or formed an adulterous union with tyranny and oppression. An alliance presupposes, also, that the allies are separate and independent powers ; but we are not aware of any such power as liberty, separate from religion, and independent of it. Religion is the origin, ground, and condition of liberty. Where religion is, there is liberty ; where religion is not, whatever of license there may be, there is not liberty, and cannot be. The two are in their nature inseparable, and indistinguishable even, save as the effect is distinguishable from the cause, the property from the essence, the stream from the fountain. How, then, form an alliance between them, ~~since~~ they are already in their very nature so intimately united ? How form an alliance between the sun and its rays, or the rainbow and its tints ?

That there has been, and is, a party throughout most European nations clamoring for liberty as separated from religion, we are not ignorant ; but they clamor for what has and can have no real existence, under that sacred name. That this party has made and still makes war on the Church, that it has believed and still believes, or pretends to believe, that the Church is the enemy of liberty, and that to become free it is necessary to overturn the altar as well as the throne, is lamentably true ; but who that loves religion, and is imbued with the lessons of the Gospel, can advocate an alliance of the Church with these, or pretend that to accept and support, not, indeed, their means, but the end they are really seeking, would be to accept and support the cause of liberty ? That which the enemies of the Church, the desecrators of all holy things, and the blasphemers of God clamor for, is not liberty, and can by no ecclesiastical alchemy be transmuted into liberty. There is

with these not merely a mistake as to the means, agencies, or influences by which the end is to be gained, but a mistake as to the end itself. With what in them is religion to form an alliance? Or what energy have they from which she could profit?

Perhaps, however, we take the word *liberty* in too refined a sense, in a sense too metaphysical or too spiritual; perhaps Padre Ventura uses the word in a more outward sense, and means by it simply popular institutions. There is throughout the greater part of Europe a deep disaffection on the part of the people towards their civil rulers, a demand for change, and especially for the introduction and establishment of popular forms of government, as the only efficient means of protecting themselves against the oppressions of their governors, and of securing their social well-being. Does the eloquent and enthusiastic Théatin mean by the policy he contends for, that the Church should refuse to sustain the actual governments in their measures of repression, often essential to their very existence, side with the populations, and encourage and direct the movements for the realization of the end they are seeking?

This, we own, has a specious appearance and a plausible sound, but, republicans as we are, we are not prepared to accept it. We have here the same difficulty we began by suggesting. Where the end proposed is distinctly religious, and is sought from religious motives, the Church may, undoubtedly, side with those who are seeking it, bless their efforts, and make common cause with them; for their cause is hers, and she does but use them for the accomplishment of her own purposes. But where the end is not itself distinctly religious, and is not referred to a distinctly religious end,—is not to secure the freedom and independence of the Church, and to enable her to pursue freely, without let or hindrance, her divine mission of teaching, saving, succouring, and solacing mankind, but to procure a merely temporal or earthly good,—we see not how she can make common cause with those who are in pursuit of it, without implying that heaven makes a compact with earth. The Church may, and assuredly does, promote men's earthly well-being, but never save as incidental to her promotion of their spiritual and eternal interests. The temporal follows the eternal, but does not precede it, and is not sought by it. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be *added* unto you" (St. Matt. vi. 33), is the principle on which the Church proceeds,

and the invariable law which she prescribes to her children. The heavenly is gained only by being the direct and sole object of pursuit ; but the earthly only by not being so sought, and, indeed, only by not being sought at all. "He that will save his life shall lose it, and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it" (St. Matt. xvi. 25). We know no exceptions to this rule.

Now these European populations seeking popular forms of government are not seeking these as a religious end, nor, indeed, for a religious end ; but solely with a view to their own social or temporal well-being. They have not in view the interests of religion ; they are not disposed to struggle for the freedom and independence of the Church, or to remove a single obstacle in the way of her fulfilling in them, or for them, her divine mission ; they have in view only their own earthly interests. These they may, — in so far as they violate no law of God, omit no moral or religious duty, — no doubt, lawfully seek ; but the Church cannot, while they seek them only in reference to an earthly end, make common cause with them, without an abandonment of her own principle of action, and in some measure compromising her divine mission. Moreover, it is not a sound view to identify even civil liberty with popular forms of government. Freedom is possible under any and every form of government ; and so is tyranny. Republics can tyrannize and oppress as well as monarchies, and we see among ourselves, that, under the most democratic institutions on earth, three millions of the population out of twenty can be held in abject slavery. Wherever the government is wisely and justly administered, whatever its form, there is civil freedom, and wherever it is not so administered, there is not civil freedom ; and the chances of a wise and just administration are not in proportion to the more or less popular form of the government, but to the more or less influence which religion has over the nation. Wherever the Church is free, and is able to exert her legitimate influence, the government will be as wisely administered as with human frailty can be expected ; but where she is not free, or where her influence is not exerted, there is and can be no guaranty of such administration, whatever the contrivances of statesmen, or in whose hands soever may be placed the reins of government.

As long as the European populations place their temporal well-being before their spiritual and eternal, not even the Church can emancipate them, and secure them the blessings of civil

liberty. Political changes will prove unavailing, and the evil which is now concentrated in the court would only be diffused through the mass, and for one tyrant give a hundred. No siding with the people, no consecration of their banner and blessing of their cause, will deliver them from oppression, unless they in themselves seek liberty, not for an earthly, but for a heavenly end, — unless they place the Church first in their affections and obedience, and seek freedom for her sake, instead of their own.

Undoubtedly, if the Church were to proclaim common cause with the movement for popular institutions, the great body of those who are seeking them would applaud her, and rally under her banner, because they could rally under hers without deserting their own. She and they would certainly come together ; not by their going to her, but by her coming to them. They would, no doubt, hail her as a welcome ally, and drink many a toast to her health, so long as she claimed to be *only* an ally ; but the moment she should seek to restrain their lawlessness, to compel them to observe discipline, or claim the right to command their forces, they would raise the cry, *À bas l'Église, vive la République !* and she would find herself under the disadvantage of seeming to them to oppose the very cause she had sanctified and the very banner she had blessed. The alliance would secure her an infusion of popular energy, while she obeyed the popular passion, and exerted herself only to carry out the popular will ; but no longer. For a moment, she would seem to be strengthened by the alliance ; but having by it made a concession to the people, and told them that they were justifiable in their cause, she would in reality only be weakened by it.

But it is said, the populations have become hostile to the Church in consequence of their belief that she is unfriendly to civil liberty, and unless she espouses the cause they have so much at heart, they will neither submit nor listen to her. There may be some truth in this, but we cannot accept the conclusion, that therefore she must disabuse them by espousing that cause. An astute politician in old pagan times might have reasoned with equal justice, — The bulk of the pagan people believe the Church is opposed to what they hold to be religion, and will not submit or listen to her teaching ; it is necessary, therefore, that she disabuse them by offering incense to the idols. No matter whether the idol be Jupiter, Venus, or civil liberty, an alliance with its worship is alike inadmissible. It is not for those without to propose conditions to the Church, nor

is it for her to make concessions to them. She proposes the conditions ; if we abuse our free-will and reject them, and destroy our own souls, the responsibility rests on us, not on her.

It is, undoubtedly, desirable to disabuse the populations of their error ; but it cannot be done in the way proposed. The Church cannot, in order to disabuse them, consent to take the law from them. The policy recommended would procure, not their submission to her, but hers to them. They who submit to the Church for the sake of any temporal good do not submit to her at all, nor do they become in reality any more or better Catholics than they were before. The European populations, to a considerable extent, no doubt, place the melioration of society and the establishment of political liberty before every other object. But this is a grave error on their part, — an error to be corrected, not sanctioned. For the Church to make common cause with them were only to confirm them in it. Nay, this very error is one of the chief obstacles to the realization of the social improvement and civil liberty they demand. Their eagerness overleaps itself, and fails of its aim. The Church can do nothing for them, save in proportion as she is able to disabuse them of this error, and bring them to place God and heaven before all things else. As long as they entertain their present false view, the Church cannot rely on them, — cannot work with them, without falling herself into error, — and they are out of the condition of either effecting or receiving their emancipation. The Church can really aid only those who love and obey her, — submit themselves to her instructions and authority.

Padre Ventura appears to hold that the evil in the present dispositions of the European populations is, not in their overweening attachment to a merely temporal good, but in their mistake as to the methods of gaining it. He approves the end aimed at, and only dreads the attempt to obtain it without religion, and by violence. The error of Jacobinism was, then, it would seem, not inherent in itself, but in its attempt to gain its object under the banner of philosophism, and by war and bloodshed. But we are inclined to believe that Jacobinism could not march under any other banner, or reach its end by any other means. It would, we must believe, be the same thing, though divested of its red cap and sea-green coat, and decked out in the drab-colored suit and broad-brimmed hat of the Quaker. It is not alone the horrors of the revolution that is to be dreaded, but also the revolutionary spirit ; for if the

spirit itself be fostered, the horrors sooner or later will inevitably follow. We have never heard of a *peaceful* subversion of an old government, and institution of a new one in its place. "Peaceful agitation" may suffice to carry a specific measure, when nothing is necessary for carrying it but to collect and concentrate the scattered rays of opinion already existing; but it will prove impotent, where fundamental or organic changes are demanded, unless backed by a threat of force in the last resort; and even then rarely, if ever, without an actual collision of forces. A whole people, wrought up by agitators to the highest pitch of enthusiasm for political changes, will soon begin, let leaders and chiefs say what they will, to sharpen their pikes, if obliged to wait longer than their impatience judges to be necessary. It is too late to think of controlling a people when once so wrought up, and if so wrought up for an object which is merely temporal, in vain will you talk to them of God and religion. Not in the moment of passion or debauch does the voice of the preacher reach the heart, and startle the conscience from its slumber. None but a religious people can be controlled by religious motives; and no truly religious people can be wrought up to a pitch of enthusiasm for a temporal object adequate to the purpose of the *peaceful*, any more than of the *violent*, revolutionist. Whenever, then, you agitate for civil liberty as such, prepare to fail, or prepare for the horrors of rebellion and bloodshed, the reign of terror, ay, and the military despotism which is to supplant it.

Finally, we cannot understand how the Church can raise the banner of Democracy, and call upon the faithful to rally under it. She prescribes no particular form of government; in her view, all forms of government, when and where legitimately established or legally existing, are alike sacred and obligatory. She commands the administrators of governments, whether they be kings, nobles, or the people, to administer the government wisely and justly, in subjection to the law of God, for the public good. This is as far as she ever goes. How, then, can she side with the people in their movements for popular forms of government? Is she to change her policy, pursued without deviation for eighteen hundred years, and at this late day propose a particular form of government as an article of faith? Or because kings now are tyrants, is she to preach up democracy, and when democracy becomes a tyrant, to be obliged to preach up monarchy? There is in the demand, it strikes us, quite too much of short-sighted human policy, pur-

suing a course to-day which it must retrace to-morrow, or which seeks to gain a temporary object at the expense of an eternal principle.

But if we oppose the policy which seems to us to be recommended in the Oration before us, it is not because we oppose liberty, or are the friends and apologists of the crowned tyrants or imbeciles of Europe. We have no sympathy with the policy of the principal European courts. That policy is opposed to the freedom and independence of the Church, without which no people can be free, and no government wisely and justly administered. We abhor and detest it, because it is hostile to freedom of conscience, and would enchain the word of God, — because it would subject the spiritual to the temporal, and rob Almighty God of his own. Let there be a crusade preached against them in behalf of the freedom and independence of the Church, — let the populations be summoned to break the cords with which these infidel governments bind the Lord's Anointed, and we will be first among the foremost to bind on the cross, and march to the battlefield, to victory or immortality. In securing this, the highest of all liberties, and the source and guaranty of all liberty worthy of the name, the people would be emancipated from their tyrants, to the full extent compatible with human infirmity. Civil freedom would be secured for all. "If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed." It is, therefore, the freedom of the Son, the freedom wherewith he makes free, that we should first of all — nay, alone — seek, and all other freedom shall be added thereto. Seek God alone, and you find what you seek, and, over and above all, the good you did not seek. Give all to God, and he gives all back to you in a hundred fold.

We wish the Church to go as far against the governments of Europe as Padre Ventura does ; but for her own emancipation, which includes every other emancipation. We would have her go, as she always does, to the extent of her power, for her own liberty ; but not for Liberalism, whether conspiring in secret with Free-masons and Carbonari, marching openly with Swiss Radicals to the destruction of states and the desecration of temples, or assuming the Quaker garb of peaceful agitation. Then the end proposed would be distinctively religious, and the Church might well consecrate the banner and bless the armies of the warriors enlisted ; for they would be her own soldiers, her own sons, not foreign allies or mer-

sy turn on the exactness or inexactness of our statement of Catholic teaching; in other words, to abandon the defensive and assume the offensive. This undoubtedly is creditable to him as a strategist, but it can be of little avail. It is not difficult either to see through his manœuvring, or to meet and thwart it. Too much art sometimes defeats itself, and fails, when a simple and natural method would lead on to victory.

As far as proving us to have been inexact is proving the truth of the theory of development, the method of the Reviewer is legitimate enough, but no farther. Perhaps we might be inexact in our statement of Catholic teaching, and yet that theory not be true; and if so, proving us in the wrong would not be proving the Reviewer in the right. If we are right in our statement of that teaching, the theory is most unquestionably false; but we are much mistaken, if we may not be decidedly in the wrong on the points on which the Reviewer labors to prove us so, and yet the theory be wholly inadmissible. To all he alleges against us, possibly we could reply, *Concedo, quid inde?*

But it is necessary to bear in mind that the doctrine which the Reviewer ascribes to us, and against which alone he brings his heavy artillery to bear, does not happen to be ours or any body's we ever heard of. It is his own invention, and he has the exclusive right to it. If we understand him, he asserts that we maintain, or would persuade his readers that we maintain, that the whole Christian doctrine has been *explicitly* believed from the first, not only by the Church, but also by all the faithful, and that nothing can be defined of faith which has not been so believed from the beginning by every one, whether simple or learned, a rustic or a doctor. But this is a grave mistake. We hold no such doctrine; we have said nothing, fairly interpreted, to authorize the supposition that we do, but enough to warrant the assertion that we do not, as the Reviewer cannot be unaware, if he has done us the honor to read the articles on which he professes to comment. We are exceedingly humbled that any one should suppose us either so ignorant or so disingenuous as to deny, what every Catholic of ordinary intelligence knows, that large portions of Christian doctrine are believed by the rude and simple only *implicitly*, or that there are many things not explicitly believed at all times and in all places, by every one of the learned even. To say that we do not deny this would seem to us very much like saying that we do not deny that a triangle is not a circle.

The doctrine we have opposed to the theory of developments is, that the revelation made to and through the Apostles was an explicit and perfect revelation of the whole Christian faith, — save, as Suarez maintains, certain things which in the times of the Apostles had not yet happened, and which were formally revealed in the explicit revelation, as the particular in the universal, or the part in the whole, — and that this revelation was explicitly and completely delivered over by the Apostles to their successors, and has been at all times explicitly held and believed by the Church. This is the doctrine we have set forth as that of all our theologians, and this is the precise doctrine to be disproved, before we can be convicted of inexactness in our statement of Catholic teaching. But, thus far, the Reviewer has not disproved this doctrine, nor has he succeeded in adducing a single authority, respectable or otherwise, against it. Some of the authorities he cites, undoubtedly, disprove the doctrine he is pleased to tell his readers is ours; but to disprove what we do not hold is not precisely to disprove what we do hold. Neverthe-

ple in effecting those reforms, in emancipating them from the tyranny under which they groan, may emancipate herself from the secular power, and secure her freedom and independence. Therefore he would urge upon all Catholics who are afraid of revolutions not to oppose the popular movements, but to seek to bring them under the influence and direction of religion. This we suppose is his real thought, and this in the main is sound and just. We wish, however, that for our sakes here, where our greatest danger is from radicalism, from an exaggerated democracy, he had been a little more careful to mark the place of religion as that of sovereign, and not have presented her in the character of an ally. The error, in this view of his meaning, into which Padre Ventura falls, if he errs at all, is in supposing that popular governments will be more favorable to the freedom and independence of the Church than are the existing governments of Europe. For ourselves, we have full confidence in the Church; but we have as little in the intelligence and virtue of a people bent only upon the acquisition of temporal goods, as we have in infidel and licentious kings, and half-mad and imbecile emperors. The government in the hands of the people, unless they are profoundly religious, will be hardly less hostile to the real freedom and independence of the Church, than in the hands of royal tyrants and their minions. We have seen enough of popular governments to be aware that the people, as well as the king, need a master, and a master, too, that is under the special protection of Almighty God, and able at all times and in all places to command with Divine authority.

ART. VII. — *The Dublin Review*, No. XLVI., Art. VI. London: Richardson & Son. January, 1848.

THIS is the first part of an attempted reply to the papers we have published against Mr. Newman's theory, especially to the article in this journal for last October, entitled *The Dublin Review on Developments*. We have read it, as far as it goes, with attention, and as little prejudice as possible; but we have found it exceedingly unsatisfactory. It is written after the manner of an Oxford student or an Anglican controversialist, rather than after the manner we are accustomed to in Catholic theologians. The author evades the real questions in debate, and seeks to make up a foreign issue, not necessarily involving either the truth or the falsehood of the theory to which we have objected. He evidently wishes to abandon the defence of the theory to itself, and to make the whole controver-

ed to, he must defend it in that sense. No evasion, no manœuvring, will avail him. He must come at last to one or the other, or forfeit all claims to be considered a fair and honest controversialist.

And why should he hesitate to do it? He either holds the theory in the sense of the propositions we have given, or he does not. If he does, is it necessary to tell him that he must defend it in that sense, and that to defend it, as he seeks to do, in some other sense is nothing to his purpose? If he does not, can he not say so, and tell us precisely what it is he does mean to defend under the head of developments? Why not meet the question directly, fairly, honestly, like a good Christian? Is not truth his object? Would it be just to conclude that he loves his theory more than truth, or that he would rather play the sophist than acknowledge that he has erred? Is there any hardship or humiliation in saying that we have been in the wrong? Who is there that has not erred? and what more manly, when convinced that we have erred, than to say so, frankly, and without a wry face? Out upon the contemptible pride that would make us blush to confess our errors! It is a privilege, a precious privilege, to be allowed to confess our errors; for by doing so we may make some reparation for the injury they may have done.

In looking over the Reviewer's article, we cannot perceive that he has made the least advance, either in proving what we objected to, or in disproving what we asserted to be the Catholic doctrine. He remains where we placed him last October. He introduces no additional authorities, adduces no new arguments, and fails utterly to vindicate to himself those of his own authorities which we turned against him. In the very few instances in which he may appear to some of his readers who are not also our readers to have done something, his apparent success is due solely to his keeping the true issue out of sight, to his misrepresenting our doctrine, and his representing what we adduced to prove one point as adduced to prove another, to prove which we did not adduce it or rely on it. This is especially true of his reply to our exposition of the long extract from Suarez. Some of his assertions are so extraordinary as to transcend the bounds of sophistry, and, unless he retains the old Tractarian habit of using words in "a non-natural sense," are downright — misstatements. His boldness, not to say unscrupulousness, surprises us not a little. If he believes he has truth on his side, how can he believe it necessary to resort to sophistry, to misrepresentation, and misstatement? All men of ordinary morality prefer, when they can, to maintain their cause by fair and honorable means; and whenever one resorts to other means, he raises a suspicion that his cause is weak, and that he feels it to be so.

Thus far we have simply stated what the Reviewer must do in order either to refute what we maintain or to defend what we oppose, and given our estimate of the character and value of his reply as far as it has proceeded. A more particular examination we reserve till we receive the concluding portion of his article, in which we shall rejoice to find something definite and to the purpose. We hope in that we shall find what it is he really wishes to defend, and be relieved of our present uncertainty, whether it is the theory we oppose, or something else, to which we may or may not object.

There are, however, a few incidental topics introduced by the Reviewer, of no great importance in themselves, indeed, which we wish to dispose of now, that we may have nothing to divert our attention hereafter

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The Reviewer complains that we expressed a regret that the task of replying to us had not been committed to some learned Catholic doctor, and adds, rather tartly, — "Surely, what a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to write, a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to answer." Unquestionably; yet a certain layman and recent convert may be *competent* to write what another may not be competent to answer. The question is not as to the liberty, but as to the competency. But the Reviewer mistakes the source of our regret. We did not wish for a Catholic doctor because we thought ourselves entitled to an opponent of a higher grade than the Reviewer; we did not dream of instituting a comparison between him and ourselves, for we have long been of Dogberry's opinion, that "comparisons are odorous." We wished the doctor in the place of the recent convert, because we wished the truth to be elicited and the controversy brought to a speedy and satisfactory termination; because the learned Catholic doctor would have studied, not to darken, but to elucidate, the subject; because he would have understood his authorities, perceived the precise points on which the controversy turns, and have spoken to them directly and logically; because it was error, not defeat, we dreaded, — truth, not victory, we desired. The Reviewer's second article, we are sorry to say, has served only to justify and increase the regret we expressed.

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from the main issue. The Reviewer represents us as mistaken in regarding his former article as intended to be a reply to us. He did not profess, he says, to reply to us. That he did not profess to do so in just so many words is true; that he did substantially, we thought, and we still think, we had reason for supposing. He placed our article at the head of his, and gave as his reason for doing so his "wish to offer a few comments on" it, which, according to our understanding of editorial usage, is equivalent to expressing an intention "to offer a reply." Moreover, he assigned as his reason for commenting on our article at all, the fact that we had included in the censure we bestowed certain gentlemen besides Mr. Newman, and "these had a right to be heard in their own defence." This either was a reason, or it was not. It would not be respectful to say it was not. If it was, the purpose of the Reviewer was to defend these gentlemen from the censure in which we had included them. But we had included them in no censure except that which we bestowed upon Mr. Newman's theory, and in that only so far as they embraced it. The only possible way of defending them from that censure was either to show that they did not embrace the theory in the sense in which we censured it, or by defending the theory itself against us. The Reviewer did not defend or attempt to defend them in the former way, and therefore must have attempted to do it in the latter way; which was to attempt a reply to us. That he waived Mr. Newman's Essay and Mr. Newman's name is true, but this amounted to nothing; because what we objected to in Mr. Newman was not his name or his book, as a mere book, but the theory we found in a book bearing his name. That he did not undertake to defend that theory as Mr. Newman's, we grant; but he either did undertake to defend it against us as the theory of certain other gentlemen, and therefore to reply to us, or he made an unwarrantable use of our name. If he proposed simply to defend some other theory, a theory we had not assailed, and against other opponents, what in the world had we to do with the matter, and by what right did he make an article of ours the subject of his comments?

The Reviewer complains that we expressed a regret that the task of replying to us had not been committed to some learned Catholic doctor, and adds, rather tartly, — "Surely, what a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to write, a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to answer." Unquestionably; yet a certain layman and recent convert may be *competent* to write what another may not be competent to answer. The question is not as to the liberty, but as to the competency. But the Reviewer mistakes the source of our regret. We did not wish for a Catholic doctor because we thought ourselves entitled to an opponent of a higher grade than the Reviewer; we did not dream of instituting a comparison between him and ourselves, for we have long been of Dogberry's opinion, that "comparisons are odorous." We wished the doctor in the place of the recent convert, because we wished the truth to be elicited and the controversy brought to a speedy and satisfactory termination; because the learned Catholic doctor would have studied, not to darken, but to elucidate, the subject; because he would have understood his authorities, perceived the precise points on which the controversy turns, and have spoken to them directly and logically; because it was error, not defeat, we dreaded, — truth, not victory, we desired. The Reviewer's second article, we are sorry to say, has served only to justify and increase the regret we expressed.

The Reviewer complains, also, of the tone in which we wrote, and thinks we too frequently and too severely referred to his various disqualifications for the task he had undertaken. He may be right in this. We are subject to infirmity as well as other men, and are neither infallible nor impeccable. But we speak plainly, without reticence or circumlocution, on principle. We write usually with earnestness, but if with severity, it is the severity of truth and argument, never that of passion. We may have expressed too frequently our conviction of the Reviewer's disqualification for his task, but we certainly expressed it far less frequently than we felt it. The Reviewer, we can believe, is an amiable, and in some respects a learned, man; but, if we may judge from his articles against us, he is a stranger to severe mental discipline, and has failed to digest the materials collected from his various reading. He has looked over, perhaps through, some valuable tracts on Catholic theology, but he does not appear to have mastered them. As a writer, he seems to us to retain the principle said to have been avowed by the Tractarian school to which he formerly belonged, of seeing how much one may say in a given direction, so plainly that every reader shall be morally certain of his meaning, yet so adroitly as never, in express words, to commit himself, or render it possible to reproduce his meaning without changing his phraseology,—a principle of writing very necessary to men occupying the position of Tractarians, seeking to reform or essentially modify a church whose authority they acknowledge, but as unnecessary as disingenuous in a Catholic. We had no unkind feelings towards him, and we aimed to be respectful; but we could not always feel respect, and we are poorly skilled in the art of expressing what we do not feel. Moreover, we regarded ourselves as defending Catholicity against a novel theory, which, if admitted, would subvert it, and we did not and could not treat him as we would and should have done, if the subject in dispute had been only one of those scholastic questions on which Catholics are free to differ. When the foundations of the faith are attacked, we cannot stop to consult the delicate sensibilities of those who attack them, however unconscious they may be of what they are doing.

The Reviewer, again, accuses us of unfairness; but as we are not conscious of having treated him unfairly, and as he points out, as we can see, no instance of unfairness on our part, we must consider this charge—a development. We aimed to be fair, and we had no motive for being otherwise. We did, indeed, take the liberty of giving to the points he made a little more precision than he had given them, and of holding him to the strict logic of the case; but in this there was no unfairness, and we did it for his sake much more than for our own. We thought then, and we still think, that if he and his friends would define their views to themselves, study to give precision to their statements, and adhere to the strict rules of logic in developing them, or, in other words, if they would adopt the rigid scholastic method of our theologians, instead of retaining the loose rhetorical method they learned at Oxford, they would immediately abjure their theory, and wonder how they could ever have entertained it. But a charge of unfairness from the Reviewer is rather amusing. He has himself no fairness; he does not treat us, in a single instance, with common justice. We have discovered no instance in which he states our doctrine correctly, no instance in which he reproduces one of our arguments without perverting it, none in which he has treated with ordinary civility a single authority we have introduced. He meets

fairly not a single point we have made, treats all our arguments with contempt or with silence, and his own citations are frequently made with an unfairness which would surprise us even in a Protestant controversialist. Yet he talks of our unfairness, and takes great credit to himself because he presumes it to be *unintentional* unfairness.

The Reviewer thinks he has detected a contradiction in our assertions with regard to the Developmentists. We denominate them a school, and yet represent them as disagreeing among themselves. Therefore we assert them to be a school and not a school,—a flat contradiction. We deny the consequence. A school is where a certain number of persons adopt the peculiar principles of some master, and is not destroyed by their disagreeing among themselves as to certain matters which do not involve the truth or falsity of those principles. We call the Developmentists a school because they adopt the principles as to development set forth by Mr. Newman. And this they can be, we should suppose, although they may differ among themselves as to the fact whether this or that particular dogma is to be considered a development, or as a dogma explicitly contained in the Apostolic revelation. If the Reviewer thinks otherwise, he is welcome to his opinion; the matter is not worth disputing about.

We were not quite exact, it seems, in our references. The Reviewer complains of two of them,—one to Tournely, the other to Melchior Cano. The one to Tournely is correct. The Reviewer will find it *De Locis Theologicis, De Censuris*, Art. 2, where we referred him. The edition is that of Paris and Venice, Pezzana, 1765. The reference to Cano, the Reviewer says, is wrong as to the chapter, and omits the book. The first part of the charge is not true, according to our edition of the *De Locis Theologicis*. The second part is true. By an inexcusable blunder in transcribing for the press, we omitted to specify the book, and did not discover it till it was too late to rectify it. We of course were mortified, but our regret was not so great as it might have been, for we had given the title of the chapter, and so accurately marked the position of the passage, cited, that the Reviewer could have had no serious difficulty in finding it, if he knew where to look for his own citations from the same author.

But the Reviewer himself is not immaculate in this matter of references. He referred us to Moehler, Vol. I. pp. 66, 67, Robertson's Translation, without specifying the edition: and having only the American edition, in one volume, we had no little difficulty in verifying the citation. He referred us to Bellarmine, *De Purgatorio*, I. 15, meaning, we suppose, Book I. and chapter 15; but, unhappily, that book, in our edition of Bellarmine, contains only eleven chapters in all! Of his references to Cano, more than one half were incorrect, according to our edition of the work referred to, and he did not name the edition he used. These errors will offset our blunder. They were all in his former article, yet we did not think it worth our while to point them out. Part of them, we presumed, came from his using a different edition of the works cited from the one we used, and the remainder were pardonable oversights in a periodical writer. In such matters it is well for every one to practise generosity, for every one in turn may need it. After all, these are small matters. We have never doubted the ability of our contemporary to make quotations, and we always presume that he makes them at first hand, unless he informs us to the contrary. Whether he can or cannot say as much of us is a matter of no moment. Having never set up to be a scholar,

making no pretensions to learning in any department whatever, we are free from the ambition of acquiring, and from the fear of losing, the reputation of scholarship. Indeed, all these incidental topics we have touched upon look to us as mere trifles, and unfit to engage the attention of two grave Reviews, and we assure the Dublin Reviewer that we can waste no more time upon similar topics, and if he continues to introduce them, he must pardon us if we pass them over in silence.

. Our notices of recent publications sent us by our friends, the booksellers, are again crowded out for the want of room. But we cannot refrain from recommending, in the warmest and most unqualified terms possible, *The Lives of the Modern Saints*, now in course of publication in England, of which Edward Dunigan, of New York, is the American publisher. They are got up in a neat and even elegant style, and furnish the very kind of reading we have long been anxious to see placed within the reach of the faithful generally. We trust the Catholic public will appreciate the enterprise of the publishers, and give it a cordial and a liberal support.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1848.

ART. I. — *The Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament proved to be Corrupt Additions to the Word of God. — The Arguments of Romanists from the Infallibility of the Church and the Testimony of the Fathers in Behalf of the Apocrypha discussed and refuted.* By JAMES H. THORNWELL. New York : Leavitt, Trow, & Co. Boston : Charles Tappan. 1845. 16mo. pp. 417.

MR. THORNWELL begins his argument against the Church (Letter IV.) by asserting, in substance, that we are unable to prove her infallibility, or, if able, only by a process which supersedes the necessity of an infallible church to determine what is or is not the word of God. "It is just as easy," he says, "to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures as the infallibility of any church." The evidence for both "is of precisely the same nature." The infallibility of the Church — "the inspiration of Rome," as he improperly expresses it — "turns upon a promise which is said to have been made nearly two thousand years ago ; the inspiration of the New Testament turns upon facts which are said to have transpired at the same time. Both the promise and the facts are to be found, if found at all, in this very New Testament." You must prove its credibility, or you cannot prove the promise ; and if you prove its credibility, you prove the facts. Therefore "you cannot make out the historical proofs of Papal infallibility without making out at the same time the historical proofs of Scriptural inspiration." Consequently, if you contend that the proofs are insufficient for the inspiration, you deny their sufficiency for the infallibility, and then cannot assert your infallible Church ; if you say they

are sufficient for the infallibility, you concede their sufficiency for the inspiration, and then do not need your infallible Church to determine what is or is not the word of God. (pp. 57 – 65.)

But Dr. Lynch proves, as we have seen in our former article, and as is sufficiently evident without proof to every one of ordinary reflection, that it is morally impossible to determine, with absolute certainty, what Scriptures are or are not inspired, except by the infallible Church. To assert, after this, that the infallible Church itself is provable only by proving Scriptural inspiration, is only asserting, in other words, that no adequate proof of what is or is not inspired Scripture exists. But some adequate method *does* exist, as Dr. Lynch proves, and Mr. Thornwell concedes. This method, if not private judgment, is the infallible Church, as he also virtually concedes; for private illumination is not a method of proof, since, if a fact, it is not a fact that can be adduced in evidence; and the other two methods supposed, namely, the judgment of the learned, and the single individual commissioned by Almighty God to announce the fact of inspiration to the world, he either abandons or cannot assert. The method, then, is either the infallible Church, or private judgment. It cannot be private judgment, if the objections urged against it be conceded. To attempt, without answering these objections, to show that equal objections bear against the Church, is, for the purposes of the argument at least, to concede them, and therefore to prove, if any thing, that no adequate method of proof exists, which is not allowable. As long, then, as private judgment remains unrelieved of the objections which declare it an impossible and therefore an unprovable method, the argument proves too much for the Professor as well as for us, and consequently nothing.

This answers sufficiently Mr. Thornwell's reasoning, as far as it is intended to bear against Dr. Lynch's argument for infallibility from the necessity of the case. But we have a higher purpose in view than the simple vindication of Dr. Lynch, or the formal refutation of Professor Thornwell, and will therefore waive this reply and meet the reasoning on its intrinsic merits. Mr. Thornwell's conclusion rests on two assumptions: — 1. That, in order to establish the infallibility of the Church, Catholics are obliged to establish the credibility of the New Testament; and 2. That the credibility of the New Testament, when established, is all that is needed to establish Scriptural inspiration, — that is, to settle the question what

Scriptures are and what are not inspired. Both of these assumptions we deny.

1. In order to establish the infallibility of the Church, it is not necessary to establish the credibility of the New Testament. All that is needed to establish the infallibility is the miraculous origin of the Church. If she had a miraculous origin, she was founded by Almighty God; for none but God can work a miracle. If founded by Almighty God, she is his Church and speaks by his authority; therefore infallibly; for God can authorize only infallible truth. In order to make out the miraculous origin of the Church, we are not obliged to recur to the New Testament at all; we can do it, and are accustomed to do it, when arguing with avowed unbelievers, without any reference to the authority of the Scriptures, either as inspired or as simple historical documents. We do it by taking the Church as we find her to-day, existing as an historical fact, and tracing her up, step by step, through the succession of ages, till we ascend to her original Founder. The extraordinary nature of her claims, uniformly put forth, and steadily acted upon from the first; her various institutions, professing to embody facts, which could not in the nature of things have sprung from no facts, or from facts pertaining exclusively to the natural order; the external history which runs parallel to hers; the relation held to her from the beginning by the Jewish and pagan worlds, and by the various heresies in each succeeding age from the Gnostics down to the followers of the Mormon prophet; — all these combined prove in the most incontestable manner her supernatural character, and triumphantly establish the fact that her Founder must have had miraculous powers, and she a miraculous origin.

Undoubtedly, the infallibility of the Church turns, in the argument, upon a promise made nearly two thousand years ago; but it is not true that the promise must necessarily be found only in the New Testament. A promise may be expressed in acts as well as in words, in the fact as well as in its record. The promise we rely upon is expressed in the miraculous origin of the Church, and is concluded from it on the principle, that the effect may be concluded from the cause, if the cause be known. In the natural order, God, in giving to a being a certain nature, promises that being all that it needs to attain the end of that nature. So in the supernatural order, in creating a supernatural being, he promises it all the powers, assistance, means, and conditions necessary to enable it to dis-

charge its supernatural functions, or to gain the supernatural end to which he appoints it. In supernaturally founding the Church to teach his word, he therefore promises her infallibility in teaching it; because the function of teaching the word of God cannot be discharged without it.

2. But even if we were obliged — as we are not and cannot be — to assert the credibility of the New Testament in order to make out our historical proofs, it would not be that credibility which would suffice to establish Scriptural inspiration, nor should we be obliged to make out any facts from which Scriptural inspiration could be immediately concluded. As all we have to make out is the miraculous origin of the Church, and as this is made out, if the fact of the miracles of our Lord is established, all that, in any case, we could need to do, in regard to the credibility of the New Testament, would be to make out its credibility so far as requisite to establish this fact. We do not want the New Testament to prove the miraculousness of the facts, for that follows from the facts themselves; nor to accredit as teachers or witnesses those by or in favor of whom Almighty God performs the miracles, for that follows from the miraculousness; we can, at most, need it only for the purpose of proving that the miracles, in their quality of simple historical facts, actually occurred. For this simple historical testimony is sufficient, and consequently the simple *historical* credibility of the New Testament, as far as needed to authorize us to assert that the miracles actually took place, is all that it can even be pretended that we must make out. The New Testament is not one book, but a collection of books by different authors, each resting on its own independent merits, and the proof of the credibility of one does by no means establish the credibility of the rest. The most we can need for our purpose is the historical credibility of one of the Four Gospels, say the Gospel according to St. Matthew; for that Gospel records all the facts necessary to establish the miraculous origin of the Church. Consequently, all the credibility of the New Testament we can, in any case, be required to establish, is the *historical* credibility of St. Matthew's Gospel.

This Gospel may be perfectly credible as an historical document, without being inspired. The facts to be taken on its authority, though supernatural as to their cause, are within the natural order as to their evidence, and as easily proved as any other class of historical facts. They fall under the senses, and require in their witnesses only ordinary sense and ordinary

honesty. To the trustworthiness of their historian, who, in recording them, has only to give a faithful narrative of what has transpired before his eyes, or of what he has collected from the testimony of eyewitnesses, nothing beyond the ordinary human faculties can be requisite. Hence, many Protestants maintain the credibility of the Evangelical history, and yet deny the inspiration of the Gospels. We have by us a learned and elaborate work, in which the author, who, for learning and ability, ranks second to no Protestant theologian in the country, maintains, on the authority of the Pentateuch, the inspiration of Moses, and the divine origin of the Mosaic law, and yet denies the inspiration of the Pentateuch itself. Indeed, if none but inspired documents could be cited as credible authority for historical facts, human history would need to be closed at once, and Mr. Thornwell would find himself shut out from all means of establishing the *historical* objections he urges with so much zest, in the volume before us, against the Church; for, undeniably, he can cite no inspired Scripture for them. It is not prudent for an author to take a ground which must prove more fatal to himself than to his opponent.

This fact, namely, that we need only the historical credibility of the New Testament at most, seems not to have sufficiently arrested Mr. Thornwell's attention; or if it has, he must have too hastily concluded that the same order of credibility which is sufficient for the miracles is also sufficient for the inspiration. He proceeds, apparently, on the assumption, either that simple historical credibility is sufficient to establish the inspiration of the Scriptures, or that we need supernatural credibility to establish the miracles. Thus, he asks:—

“If the books of the New Testament are to be received as credible testimony to the miracles of Christ, why not on the subject of their own inspiration? Are you not aware that the great historical argument on which Protestants rely in proving the inspiration of the Scriptures presupposes only the *genuineness* of the books and the *credibility* of their authors? They assert it [their own inspiration], and [if credible] are to be believed. . . . I had thought that the only difficulty in making out the external proofs of inspiration was in establishing the credibility of the books which profess to be inspired. It had struck me, that, if it were once settled that their own testimony was to be received, the matter was at an end. But it seems now that . . . it is still doubtful whether, in the way of private judgment, a man could ever be assured that *credible* books are to be believed on the subject of their origin.” — pp. 62, 63.

This reasoning involves a transition *a specie ad speciem*. Credible books are certainly to be believed within the order of credibility which they are proved or conceded to possess, but not within an order which transcends or rises above it ; for nothing can transcend itself, and the conclusion must be in the order of the premises, or the argument is a fallacy. The credibility of the New Testament which we assert, or which it is contended we are obliged to assert, is simply historical credibility, or credibility in the natural order ; but the credibility the Professor needs, to establish the *inspiration*, is credibility in the supernatural order ; for inspiration pertains, undeniably, to the supernatural order, both as to its cause and as to the medium of its proof. Therefore we may receive the books as credible testimony to the miracles, and not on the subject of their own inspiration.

Mr. Thornwell evidently reasons on the assumption, that we cannot assert the credibility of the New Testament in relation to the miracles without asserting it in relation to the inspiration. That is, a witness cannot be credible at all, unless he is universally credible, and he who receives his testimony in one order binds himself to receive it in every order ; if he receives it in one respect, he must in every respect ; in matters of fact, then also in matters of opinion ! But this is too extravagant for any man in his sober senses seriously to maintain. If this were once admitted, there would speedily be an end to human testimony, and our Presbyterian friend would find himself in a sad plight ; for his sole dependence is on private judgment, and he can pretend to nothing better than human testimony for his religious belief. No witness, unless absolutely omniscient, is or can be universally credible ; and as no man is absolutely omniscient, it follows, if no one can be credible under one relation without being credible under every relation, that no one can in any respect be credible at all. But we cannot concede this. Every day, in every court of law, in all the practical affairs of life in which there is an appeal to human testimony, we act, and are obliged to act, on the supposition, that a man may be credible in relation to some things without being credible in relation to all things.

Every body knows that a witness may be perfectly credible in testifying to facts which fall under the observation of his senses, and yet be deserving of no credit in relation to his opinions, his judgments, his views, or his explanations of the causes of the facts to which he testifies. Nothing hinders, then, a

man from being a credible witness to the facts recorded in the New Testament, even though he should assert and believe himself inspired when in point of fact he was not ; for in testifying to the facts he testifies to what has come under his senses, while in asserting his inspiration he is merely giving an opinion, or offering an explanation of certain facts or phenomena of his own internal experience. The erroneous opinion or explanation does not impair his credibility as a witness to the facts, if his error is one which he may innocently entertain. That a man can innocently believe himself divinely inspired when he is not can hardly admit of a doubt. A man so believing is, by the very terms of the supposition, uninspired. He is then, since inspiration is a supernatural fact, necessarily ignorant of inspiration, unacquainted with its phenomena, and destitute of the necessary criterion for determining what it is or what it is not. What more natural, then, than that he should mistake certain phenomena of his own experience, otherwise inexplicable to him, for those of inspiration, and thus honestly believe himself inspired, when in reality he is uninspired ?

The Professor argues on the assumption, common to all enthusiasts, that no man can honestly mistake the origin or cause of the phenomena of his own internal experience, and therefore, that, when one says he is inspired, we must believe either that he actually is inspired or that he is a liar, a *wilful* deceiver, whose word is to be received on no subject whatever. There is no reason for this assumption. He who is inspired, undoubtedly, knows the fact, and is as incapable of being deceived in relation to it as he is of deceiving others ; but from this it by no means follows that a man who is not inspired must always know that he is not. Inspiration is, sometimes, at least, necessary to enable us to determine what is *not* inspiration, as well as to determine what is. He is little versed in the natural history of enthusiasm, who has yet to learn that honest men, men of rare gifts and inflexible principles, whose word on any subject within the range of sensible observation we would not hesitate a moment to take, not unfrequently labor under the impression that they hold immediate intercourse with the Almighty, are inspired, or divinely illuminated, when such is far from being the fact. Witness, for instance, Jacob Boehmen, George Fox, and Emanuel Swedenborg. These men are not inspired, nor are they liars. They do not *intend* to deceive, and are not even deceived themselves as to the facts of their internal experience, from which they infer their inspiration ;

they are deceived only in their opinions, their judgments of those facts, the explanations of them which they adopt, or the origin and cause which they assign them. Who dare pretend that this destroys their credibility in relation to simple matters of fact, evident to their senses? They do not mistake, they only misinterpret, the facts of their own consciousness; and who may not do as much? All men, however trustworthy they may be as witnesses to sensible facts, unless supernaturally protected from error, are liable, as is well known, to err in their judgments, in their explanations of phenomena, — in relation to the origin and causes of things, and in relation to the origin and causes of their own internal experience as well as of other things.

The Professor falls into the common mistake of Protestants, that the inspiration of a genuine book, by an author proved to be historically credible, may be concluded from its own declaration. We say he falls into this mistake; for we cannot suppose that he falls into the still grosser one of supposing that we can prove the miracles only by a supernaturally credible witness, since that would deny that Christianity itself can be proved, — nay, that any thing supernatural is or can be provable, and therefore that man is or can be the subject of a supernatural revelation. If the miracles cannot be proved without a supernaturally credible witness, the supernatural credibility of the witness will in turn demand another supernaturally credible witness to establish it, and this another, and thus on *ad infinitum*. We should need an infinite series of supernatural witnesses in order to establish the supernatural. But an infinite series is an infinite absurdity.

As we cannot suppose the Professor ignorant of the absurdity into which he would fall, if he contended for the necessity of any thing more than ordinary historical credibility to establish the miracles, we must suppose him to hold that ordinary historical credibility is sufficient to establish the inspiration of the Scriptures, in case they declare their own inspiration. But the inspiration of a genuine book, historically credible, cannot be concluded from its own declaration; because inspiration, being a supernatural fact, falling in no sense, as do the miracles, within the natural order, can be proved only by a supernaturally credible witness, which a merely historically credible witness is not. Before, from the declaration of the book, the Professor can conclude its inspiration, he must prove its author a credible witness to the supernatural. But no witness is a credible wit-

ness to the supernatural, unless he is himself inspired or divinely commissioned. The witness is not credible, unless competent. In ordinary cases, a witness may be competent, and not credible; but in no case can he be credible, if incompetent. No witness, unless inspired or divinely commissioned, is competent to testify to the supernatural. The witness is not competent, unless he can intellectually attain to or take cognizance of that to which he is to testify. But no witness can intellectually attain to or take cognizance of the supernatural, — which, by the fact that it is supernatural, transcends all natural intellect, — without something more than natural intellect; that is, without supernatural illumination or assistance, — precisely what is meant by being inspired or divinely commissioned. Therefore the Professor cannot conclude the inspiration from the mere historical credibility of the witness, and must prove the author to be inspired, or divinely commissioned, before, from its own declaration, he can conclude a given book is inspired Scripture.

Now, since in making out our historical proofs the most which it can be pretended that we must do is to make out the historical credibility of the books of the New Testament, or the credibility of their authors, in their quality of author, merely in relation to the natural order, it is not true, even in case we must appeal for our facts to the New Testament, that we cannot make out the historical proofs of the infallibility of the Church, without making out at the same time the historical proofs of the inspiration of the Scriptures; for we are not obliged to assert the credibility of the New Testament in relation to the supernatural, the sense in which it must be asserted in order to be credible authority for its own inspiration.

Nor, waiving this, do we, in making out the credibility which we are supposed to be under the necessity of making out, establish any facts from which the inspiration of the New Testament can be immediately concluded. The Professor himself says the Protestant argument “presupposes the *genuineness* of the books and the *credibility* of their authors.” In addition, then, to the credibility of the authors, it is necessary, in order to establish the inspiration, to establish the genuineness of the books; that is, that they were actually written by the persons whose names they bear, and have come down to us in their purity and integrity. Now this, even if we must make out the credibility of the New Testament, we are not obliged to make out. An historical document may be authoritative without being genuine. If it contains a faithful narrative of facts as

they occurred, it is sufficient for the ordinary purposes of history. That the Gospel according to St. Matthew, for instance, does contain such a narrative, is provable, without proving its inspiration, in the usual way of authenticating historical documents, by the nature of the narrative itself, the quality of the facts recorded, the circumstances under which it was published or first cited, the estimate in which it was held by those best qualified to judge of its authority, the manner in which it was treated by those who had an interest in discrediting it, and by reference to various contemporary or subsequently existing monuments, especially public institutions implying, founded upon, or growing out of, the facts which it professes to record. In this way we could accredit this Gospel as an historical document, even if it had come down to us without the author's name. Indeed, ancient historical works in general derive but little authority from the *names* of their authors, and, other things being equal, the works of Herodotus, Livy, and Tacitus would have no less authority than they now have, even if they had been anonymous productions. As the genuineness of the book is an essential element in any method of proof of its inspiration, except that by the infallible Church, and as we are under no necessity, prior to the Church, of proving it in the case of a single one of the books of the New Testament, it follows that we are not obliged, in making out the historical proofs of the infallibility of the Church, to make out at the same time the historical proofs of the inspiration of the Scriptures.

We can now easily expose the fallacy of Mr. Thornwell's pretended dilemma. Assuming what we have just disproved, he says to Dr. Lynch, in his peculiarly sweet and delicate manner : —

“Now, Sir, one of two things must be true ; either the credibility of the Scriptures can be substantiated to a plain, unlettered man, or it cannot. If it can be, there is no need of your infallible body to authenticate their inspiration, since that matter can be easily gathered from their own pages. If it cannot, then your argument from the Scriptures to an Indian or negro in favor of an infallible body is inadmissible, since he is incapable of apprehending the premises from which your conclusion is drawn. You have taken both horns of this dilemma, pushing Protestants with one, and upholding Popery with the other, and both are *fatal* to you. Now, as it is rather difficult to be on both sides of the same question at the same time, you must adhere to one or the other. If you adhere to your first position, that all human learning is necessary to settle

the *credibility* of the Scriptures, then you must seek other proofs of an infallible body than those which you think you have gathered from the Apostles. A circulating syllogism proves nothing; and if he who establishes the credibility of the Scriptures by an infallible body, and then establishes the infallibility of the body from the credibility of the Scriptures, does not reason in a circle, I am at a loss to apprehend the nature of that sophism. If you adhere to your other position, that the *accuracy of the Evangelists* can be easily substantiated, then your objections to private judgment are fairly given up, and you surrender the point, that a man can decide for himself, with absolute certainty, concerning the inspiration of the Bible. Take which horn you please, your cause is ruined; and as you have successively chosen both, you have made yourself as ridiculous as your reasoning is contemptible." — pp. 64, 65.

This argument evidently involves a transition from one genus to another. The Professor confounds in the first part of his fancied dilemma the historical *credibility*, and in the second the *accuracy* of the Evangelists in their account of the miracles, with the *inspiration* of the Scriptures, and then concludes as if they were all facts of the same order; which is a sad blunder, and little creditable to the "Professor of Sacred Literature and the Evidences of Christianity in the South Carolina College." Dr. Lynch does not say that it requires "all human learning to settle the *credibility* of the Scriptures" in any sense in which he can need their credibility prior to the Church; he simply maintains that all human learning, and perhaps more too, is necessary to settle, with absolute certainty, by private judgment, on intrinsic grounds, the *inspiration* of ancient writings, — which is a generically distinct proposition. The "accuracy of the Evangelists," which he asserts can be substantiated to the Indian or negro, is not the *inspiration* or the *supernatural* credibility of the Scriptures; but their accuracy as historians of the miracles, or that the miracles which they record actually transpired. As this accuracy does not presuppose or necessarily imply the inspiration or the supernatural credibility of the Scriptures, nothing hinders Dr. Lynch from adhering to both of the positions he has assumed, "pushing Protestants with one, and upholding Popery with the other," however inconvenient it may be to his Presbyterian adversary.

"He who establishes the credibility of the Scriptures by an infallible body, and then establishes the infallibility of the body from the credibility of the Scriptures, reasons in a circle," if the *credibility* in both cases be taken in the same sense, we concede; if in *different* senses, we deny. But Dr. Lynch does

not establish the infallibility of the Church from the credibility of the Scriptures at all ; or if he does, it is not from their credibility in that sense in which he contends that their credibility can be proved only by the infallible body. The only sense in which he can be said to establish the infallible body from the credibility of the Scriptures is their simple historical credibility ; the sense in which he asserts the infallible body as necessary to prove their credibility is their credibility as inspired writings. As they can have the former without having the latter, we may, without any *vicious* circle, take the facts we need to prove the infallible body from their historical credibility, and then take the infallible body to prove their inspiration, or supernatural credibility, although we are, as we have shown, under no necessity of doing so. Does the Professor deny that we can do so ? Does he contend that this would be to reason in a *vicious* circle ? What, then, shall we say of his own reasoning for the inspiration of the New Testament ? If he denies the distinction we have made, the historical credibility of the New Testament and its inspiration are one and the same thing, — convertible terms. Then we retort his argument. He says the infallibility of the Church “ turns upon a promise which is said to have been made nearly two thousand years ago, — the inspiration of the New Testament turns upon facts which are said to have transpired at the same time. *Both the promise and the facts are to be found, if found at all, in this very New Testament.*” Here it is positively asserted that the facts which prove the inspiration can nowhere be found but in the New Testament itself. Then they must be taken on its credibility. But credibility and inspiration, according to him, are one and the same thing, convertible terms. Then he must take the inspiration of the New Testament to prove the facts, and then the facts to prove the inspiration. If this be not to reason in a circle, we are “ at a loss to apprehend the nature of that sophism.”

Now one of two things must be true ; either this reasoning is valid, or it is not. If it is, Mr. Thornwell cannot make out the inspiration of the Scriptures ; for “ a circulating syllogism proves nothing.” If it is not, he fails to refute Dr. Lynch, and then is refuted by him, as we proved in our former article. In either case, he is refuted. “ Take which horn you please, your cause is ruined.” Although the Professor says “ it is rather difficult to be on both sides of the same question at the same time,” yet he contrives to surmount the difficulty. He

assumes that this reasoning is not valid, by urging, in spite of it, his own argument for Scriptural inspiration, and that it is valid, by urging it against Dr. Lynch. We may, then, reply to him in his own choice language: — "Take which horn you please, your cause is ruined; and as you have successively chosen both, you have made yourself as ridiculous as your reasoning is contemptible."

But even this is not the worst. Mr. Thornwell's conclusion rests on the assumption that the Scriptures declare their own inspiration, that their inspiration "is a matter" which "may be easily gathered from their own pages." "They assert," he maintains, "their own inspiration, and, if credible, are to be believed." But, granting that they declare their own inspiration, we have shown that it does not necessarily follow that they are inspired, because, to render their own testimony sufficient for that, they must be proved to be supernaturally credible, since inspiration is a supernatural fact, provable only by a supernaturally credible witness, and the only credibility, if any, which the Professor can claim for them is simple historical credibility. He binds himself to reason from our premises, because he says we cannot make out the historical proofs of the Church without making out at the same time the historical proofs of inspiration. Consequently, since the *historical* credibility of the Scriptures is all that we, at most, can be obliged to make out, it is all the Professor can have as the principle from which to reason against us. This is conclusive against him. But waiving this, waiving the objection to the order of credibility, and granting — what we do not concede — that we must make out the genuineness of the books it is pretended we must cite, still he cannot conclude Scriptural inspiration, *because no one of the books whose historical credibility we need or can need declares its own inspiration.* We have shown, that for our purpose it suffices, in any case, to establish the credibility of one of the Four Gospels as an historical document. But no one of the Four Gospels declares or intimates that it is inspired Scripture, or even asserts the inspiration of any other of the Scriptural books. Consequently, the Professor has not even its own declaration for the inspiration of Scripture, and must be mistaken in saying that Scriptural inspiration is a matter which "may be easily gathered from" the pages of the Scriptures themselves.

But, adds the Professor, "you [Dr. Lynch] have yourself admitted that the teaching of the Apostles was supernaturally protected from error, and if their oral instructions were

dictated by the Holy Ghost, why should that august and glorious Visitant desert them when they took the *pen* to accomplish the same object when absent, which, when present, they accomplished by the *tongue* ?" (p. 62.) The question is irreverent and impertinent. We have no right to demand of the Holy Ghost the reasons of what he does or does not do. It is competent for him, if such be his pleasure, to inspire men for one thing and not for another, to inspire to teach and not to write, to enable them to accomplish a given object by one method and not by another method ; and the Professor cannot say that he does not, because he sees no reason why he should. The Holy Ghost may have reasons not known to the learned Professor of Sacred Literature, &c., in the South Carolina College.

Dr. Lynch admits that the teaching of the Apostles was supernaturally protected from error, and we must prove that it was, or not prove the infallibility of the Church ; but that it therefore necessarily follows that they were *inspired* as authors, or even as teachers, we neither admit nor are bound to admit. To be inspired is, undoubtedly, to be supernaturally protected from error, but to be supernaturally protected from error is not necessarily to be inspired. Every Catholic believes his Church supernaturally protected from error ; but no one believes her to be inspired. As all Catholics make this distinction, Dr. Lynch's admission is no admission of inspiration even in the teaching of the Apostles. Inspiration is necessary only when the mission is to reveal truth ; when the mission is simply to teach a revelation already consummated, supernatural assistance, without inspiration, is all that is needed. If the mission of the Apostles was simply to teach a revelation which they had received through their personal intercourse with their Master, while he was yet with them in the flesh, — and prior to the Church, this certainly is all that we can be required to establish, — they had no need of inspiration, either as teachers or as writers, in order to be supernaturally protected from error. To concede or to assert such protection, then, is not to concede or assert their inspiration. We certainly cannot be required to make out for the Apostles any thing more than we claim for the Church, and, since all we claim for her is supernatural protection from error in teaching a revelation already consummated, this is all that we can be obliged to make out for them.

Nor does the inspiration of the Apostles or of their writings

follow immediately from the facts on which we must rely in order to prove the infallibility of the Apostles, or their supernatural protection from error. The facts on which we do and must rely are the miracles. These do not of themselves prove the inspiration, but simply the divine commission of him by or in favor of whom Almighty God works them, on the principle asserted by St. Nicodemus :— “ Rabbi, we know thou art come a teacher from God ; for no man can do the miracles which thou doest, unless God be with him.” The divine commission follows necessarily from the miracles, and the supernatural protection from error, or the infallibility, follows necessarily from the divine commission. But the inspiration does not, because the teacher may be commissioned to teach, and may teach infallibly, without being inspired. Even Apostolic inspiration, then, cannot be immediately concluded from the facts on which we must rely ; then, *a fortiori*, not the writings of the Apostles. We say *immediately*, for to say it can be mediately is nothing to the purpose. We ourselves hold that the inspiration both of the Old Testament and the New can be mediately proved, that is, through the teaching of the Church, proved by the miracles to be supernaturally protected from error.

But the Professor continues, — “ The Apostles themselves declare their writings possessed the same authority with their oral instructions. Peter ranks the Epistles of Paul with the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which were confessed to be inspired ; and Paul exhorts the Thessalonians to hold fast the traditions they had received from him, either by word or epistle.” (p. 62.) That the Apostles anywhere declare their writings possess the same authority with their oral instructions, we have not found in any of the writings attributed to them with which we are acquainted ; and if they did, it would not be sufficient, for the question at this moment relates, not to the authority, but to the inspiration, of the Scriptures, and it is not yet proved that even the *oral* instructions of the Apostles were inspired.

The Epistles of St. Peter and of St. Paul are not admissible testimony, because they are not included in that portion of the New Testament whose credibility we can, in any case, be obliged to make out. We can have no occasion for their testimony, prior to the Church ; and as the Professor binds himself to the testimony we must use, or to what necessarily follows immediately from it, he cannot use it. The question now before us is, not whether he can or cannot, without the Church, prove

the inspiration of the Scriptures, but whether he can prove it from the facts we must prove in order to prove the infallibility of the Church.

St. Paul was not one of the twelve ; his vocation was subsequent to the establishment of the Church ; and in no case can it be necessary for us even to establish his divine commission in order to establish the miraculous origin of the Church, from which her infallibility immediately follows. But even if the Professor could cite the authority of St. Paul, he would be obliged to make out, before his citation would avail him any thing, — 1. That St. Paul's oral instruction was inspired ; 2. That the Epistle to the Thessalonians is genuine ; 3. That the Epistle to which he refers in it was *the* Epistles which we now have under his name ; and, 4. That these Epistles are possessed by us precisely as he wrote them. Here are four facts not easy to make out, and which the Professor must make out for himself ; for we are under no obligation to make them out for him, and they do not follow necessarily from any thing we are bound to make out.

The divine commission of St. Peter as one of the Apostles, we, of course, are obliged to make out ; but — *ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia* — when we have done that, we have, in fact, made out our infallible Church. Let this, however, pass for the present. Though we are obliged to make out the divine commission of St. Peter as one of the twelve, we are not obliged to make out his inspiration, or the authenticity or genuineness of the Epistles attributed to him. The Epistle the Professor cites is no authority till its authenticity and genuineness are proved, and it happens to be precisely one of those books of the New Testament whose authenticity and genuineness Protestant theologians, at least many of them, call in question. But granting its genuineness, it avails nothing till the Professor proves that the Epistles of St. Paul to which it refers are those we now have, and that we have them as St. Paul wrote them ; for the Professor is not merely to prove that there were inspired writings, but he is to prove what writings now possessed by us are or are not to be received as inspired Scripture. But even suppose this done, it does not follow that these Epistles are inspired. St. Peter does not, as the Professor asserts, “rank them with the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which were confessed to be inspired,” but simply with “the other Scriptures.” What Scriptures these were, whether inspired or uninspired, the Professor may or may not have some

means of knowing, but St. Peter, in the writings attributed to him, nowhere informs him. That the Scriptures of the Old Testament were confessed to be inspired, we know from tradition and the Church, but not from the New Testament. From the New Testament alone we can prove neither that the books of the Old Testament were inspired, nor of what books the Old Testament consisted. St. Paul tells us, indeed, that "all Scripture divinely inspired is profitable," &c., but he nowhere tells us what books or portions of books are divinely inspired Scripture. It is not true, then, that the inspiration of the Scriptures can "be easily collected from their own pages." Then the whole argument of the Professor falls to the ground; for even if their own testimony were to be received, it would still be necessary to have the infallible body to prove their inspiration, since they themselves do not assert it.

We are not surprised that Mr. Thornwell should strive earnestly to convict his Catholic opponent of reasoning in a vicious circle. He must, as a Protestant, do so. Protestantism would abnegate herself, should she once concede that it is possible for us to prove the infallibility of the Church, without having recourse to the supernatural authority of the Scriptures. It is with the Protestant, therefore, a matter of life and death. If he fails, it is all over with his cherished Protestantism. Her friends must follow her in long and sad procession to her final resting-place, howl their wild requiem, and leave the nightshade to grow over her grave, and return to their desolate hearths, with none to comfort them. What, indeed, is the essential principle of Protestantism, in so far as she pretends to be distinguished from the open and total rejection of all supernatural religion? What is it, but the assertion that the Bible is the original and only source or authority from which Christianity is to be taken? Every body knows that this is her essential, her fundamental principle, in every sense in which she can even pretend to be a religion. To admit it to be possible for us to establish the infallibility of the Church without the Scriptures, or without their supernatural authority, would be to surrender this principle, and with it Protestantism herself, as far as she can claim to be distinguishable from infidelity.

All Protestants know this, and hence they always assert that we do and must reason in a vicious circle. It would be so convenient, it is so necessary, for them, that we should, they have for so long a time so uniformly and so confidently asserted that we do, that it is hard for them now to admit, or even to

believe, that we do not and need not. Like inveterate storytellers, they appear to have come at last, by dint of long and continued repetition, to believe their own falsehoods, — the last infirmity of the credulous and the untruthful. Indeed, we can hardly doubt that the great body of Protestants really do labor under the hallucination, that we must, in order to establish the Church, first establish, in the usual Protestant way, the authority of the Scriptures as inspired documents ; and as we contend that the infallibility of the Church is necessary to prove their inspiration, that we must prove the inspiration by the Church, and the Church by the inspiration, — a manifest vicious circle. But as a circle proves nothing, they think they may well say, that in proving the Christian religion we have and can have no advantage over them. Grant, say they, we must prove the credibility of the Scriptures before we can conclude their inspiration, from which we take our faith, you must prove the same credibility before you can conclude the infallibility of the Church, from which you are to take yours, and you have and can have, prior to the Church, no means of proving that credibility which we have not.

When the credibility is once established, our difficulties are ended, for the inspiration is easily collected from the express declaration of the Scriptures themselves ; but the infallibility of the Church is not. We have the express authority of the divinely accredited witness, but you have only your own interpretations or constructions of certain texts, in which you may err ; and if you do not, you cannot assert that yours is the church intended, without making a full course of universal history for eighteen hundred years. How much simpler is our method than yours ! With how many difficulties you encumber yourselves from which we are free ! You have to make out all that we must make out, and in addition the fact of an infallible church, and the further fact that yours is it.

You may tell us that we may mistake the sense of Scripture, that our method is encumbered with difficulties, that it does not give us absolute certainty, and that something easier and surer is desirable. Be it so, what then ? You have nothing to say, for you have nothing better to offer us. Suppose the Church ; what do you gain ? You must take it from the Scriptures, and the Scriptures themselves from the same authority that we do, that is, private judgment. You must take it also from the Scriptures by your private interpretation of them ; and you must take the fact that yours is the Church from your private

interpretations of history. Every step in your process of proof must be taken by private judgment, and we should like to know how private judgment is more certain in your case than in ours, — why it is to be condemned in us, and commended in you. Be it that it does not yield absolute certainty; what then? Absolute certainty, — who can have it? What presumption for such frail and erring mortals as we are to pretend to it! We do not need it. It is not in accordance with the intentions of Providence, nor compatible with our moral interest, that we should have it. “The true evidence of the Gospel is a *growing* evidence, sufficient always to create obligation and assurance, but *effectual* only as the heart expands in fellowship with God, and becomes assimilated to the spirits of the just. . . . Our real condition *requires* the possibility of error, and God has made no arrangements for absolutely terminating controversies and settling questions of faith, without regard to the moral sympathies of men.” (pp. 74, 75.) With such certainty as we have we study to be satisfied. It is not the characteristic of wisdom to aim at impossibilities, or of honesty to profess to have what it has not.

Thus they reason, and must reason, wise and honest souls! who assert that the Bible is the original and only source of Christian doctrine, and who define faith, with Professor Stuart of Andover, to be a species of probability, more certain, perhaps, than mere opinion, but less certain than knowledge, or ring the death-knell of their own system. If it be possible in the nature of things or the providence of God to bring an unbeliever to Catholicity without first converting him to Protestantism, they must for ever shut their mouths, or open them only to give vent to their mortification and despair. But, happily for us, the reasonings which demand the principle of universal skepticism for their postulate are not apt to convince, and the assertions of men who deny all infallible authority, and confess to their own fallibility and want of certainty, are not absolutely conclusive. It is possible, after all, that these learned Protestants are mistaken, nay, laboring under “strong delusions,” and that we poor benighted Papists have the truth. At worst, the authority on which we rely can be no more than fallible, while that on which they rely must be fallible at best. At worst, then, we are as well off as they can be at best.

But are these Protestants, who would have us regard them as full-grown men, strong men, the lights and support of the age, aware, that, in all this argumentation on which they pride

themselves, and which they hold to be our complete refutation, they are merely reasoning against us from their own principles, and not from any principles common to them and us? Their reasoning, undeniably, rests on the assumption of the Bible as the original and only source, under God, of Christian doctrine, — a fundamental principle of Protestantism, and which we no more admit than we do the other fundamental principle of Protestantism, namely, private judgment. They are very much mistaken, if they suppose that we merely object to their rule of private judgment, if they suppose that they and we occupy common ground till we reach the limits to which the Bible extends, and that our only controversy with them, as far as the Bible goes, is one of simple exegesis, and after that merely a controversy in relation to certain points of belief not to be found in the Bible. Our main controversy with them is prior to the Bible, and relates to the origin or fountain and authority from which the faith is to be drawn.

Protestantism, taking it according to the professions of its most distinguished doctors, is resolvable into two principles, if principles they can be called, namely, — 1. The Bible is the original and only source of Christian faith; and, 2. The Bible is to be taken on and interpreted by private judgment. These are its two rules. It is nothing to us whether these two rules are or are not compatible one with the other, and we do not inquire now whether the latter does or does not necessarily and in fact absorb the former, and reduce Protestantism to sheer Transcendentalism in principle, for that is a matter which has been already sufficiently discussed in our pages; but we say, what every body knows, that Protestantism professes these two rules as fundamental, and that they are essential to its very existence, and one of them as much as the other. Now we, as Catholics, reject and anathematize both of these rules, as Protestants ought to know. Consequently, for them to urge an argument against us which assumes either as its principle is a sheer begging of the question, or an assumption of Protestantism as the principle from which to conclude against Catholicity. Yet this is precisely the method of argument adopted in the brief summary of their reasoning which we have given.

This is not lightly said. Mr. Thornwell's whole reply to Dr. Lynch is a striking illustration and proof of it. Dr. Lynch states certain objections to private judgment; Mr. Thornwell replies, You cannot urge those objections, because,

whatever their weight, they bear as hard against the Church as against us. What is the proof of this? You must take the Church from the Scriptures, or not take it at all; and if you take it from them, you must do so by private judgment, for you cannot use your Church before you get it; and as you can get your Church only subsequently to the Scriptures, you must take the Scriptures themselves on private judgment, or use a circulating syllogism, which proves nothing. But the proof that we must take the Church from the Scriptures? Why, you must take it from the Scriptures—because you have nothing else to take it from. But the proof that we have nothing else to take it from? The Professor has no possible answer, but the assumption of the Bible as the original and only source of Christian faith. Consequently, at bottom, whether he knows it or not, he simply assumes one principle of Protestantism as the principle of his answers to objections urged against the other. That is, if we consider Protestantism in its unity, he attempts to prove the same by the same; if in its diversity, he reasons in a vicious circle,—proving private judgment by his Bible rule, and his Bible rule by private judgment! And yet Mr. Thornwell has the simplicity to accuse Dr. Lynch of using a circulating syllogism.

Undoubtedly, it is very convenient for Protestants, when hard pressed as to one of their principles, to resort to the other; but as both rules are denied, and are both directly or indirectly called in question in every controversy they have or can have with us, they would do well to bear in mind that the arguments they thus adduce are as illegitimate and worthless as if drawn from the very principle they are brought to defend. We really wish that our Protestant friends would study a little logic, at least make themselves acquainted with the more ordinary rules of reasoning and principles of evidence. It would save us some trouble, and themselves from the ridicule to which they expose themselves, whenever they undertake to reason. It is idle to attempt to convince a man by arguments drawn from the principle or system he is opposing, or to pretend to have refuted him by reasons which derive all their force from principles which he neither admits nor is obliged to admit. In reasoning, each party must reason from principles admitted by the other, or from principles proved by arguments drawn from principles which the other does not or cannot deny. Our Protestant friends ought to know this; for Mr. Thornwell very considerably informs us (p. 72) that they

are not "prattling babes and silly women," but "bearded men."

Protestants seem to have inquired how it would be convenient for them that we should reason, and to have concluded, because, if we should reason in a given manner, it would be just the thing for them, that we of course do and must reason in that manner. If we admitted their doctrine as to the Bible, we undoubtedly should be obliged to reason in the manner they allege. If the road from unbelief to Catholicity lay through Protestant territory, if we could convert the unbeliever to the Church only by first converting him to Protestantism, as Mr. Thornwell virtually contends, we should, of course, be obliged to make out the divine authority of the Scriptures, if at all, in the way in which Protestants attempt to do it, and then many of the objections we now urge and insist upon against private judgment we should be obliged to meet as well as they ; but, surely, some other proof that such is the fact should be brought forward than this, that, if it be not so, then Protestantism must be false ; for the conclusion is not one which we are not able to concede. In reasoning with Protestants, we are generally civil enough to take them at their word ; and as we find them professing to hold the divine authority of the Scriptures, we draw our arguments against them from the Scriptures, because it is always lawful to reason against a man from his own principles ; but in reasoning against unbelievers, we make no appeal to the Scriptures, unless it be sometimes as simple historical documents, proved to be such by general historical criticism, in which character we can legitimately appeal to them. The assertion, that we are obliged, by the nature of the case, to take the Church from the Scriptures, is altogether gratuitous, and even preposterous. It rests, as we have seen, on the assumption, that the Bible is the original and sole authority for Christian faith. This is what Mr. Thornwell holds, what as a Protestant he must hold. The Bible, then, occupies the same place in his system that the Church does in ours ; for this is precisely what we say of the Church. The Bible is for him the original and sole depositary of the faith, — its keeper, witness, teacher, and interpreter. He must, then, establish the divine authority of the Scriptures, as we the divine authority of the Church ; for only a divine authority is sufficient for Christian faith. To do this, as we have already established, he must have a supernaturally credible witness. Prior to and independently of the supernatural authority of the Scriptures, then, he must obtain such

witness. This he can do, or he cannot. If he cannot, he cannot establish the divine authority of the Scriptures. If he can, then we also can ; for prior to the Scriptures, we stand, at least, on as good ground as he. But such a witness is all we need for the divine authority of the Church. Then either the Professor cannot establish the divine authority of the Scriptures, or we can establish the divine authority of the Church without the Scriptures. Where now are the Professor's assumption, and his triumph about reasoning in a circle ?

Again. The divine authority of the Scriptures is itself an article of faith, because a supernatural fact, and a revealed fact, if a fact at all. This can be proved without the Scriptures, or it cannot. If it cannot, then it cannot be proved at all, for the Scriptures can authorize no article of faith till their own divine authority is established. If it can, it is false to say the Scriptures are the original and only authority for faith, for here is an article of faith not taken from them, but from some other source and authority. Or in another form : Either the supernatural witness supposed can be obtained, or cannot. If the Professor says the latter, he abandons his Protestantism, by confessing to his inability to establish the divine authority of the Scriptures, from which alone he is to take it. If he says the former, he also abandons his Protestantism ; for then he concedes the possibility of another authority for faith than the Scriptures, which Protestantism does and must deny, or deny itself. The Professor may take which alternative he pleases ; in either case, he must surrender his Protestantism, as far as at all distinguishable from sheer infidelity.

Thus easy is it to overthrow the strongest positions of Protestants, and we confess that our only practical difficulty in refuting Protestantism lies precisely in its weakness, nay, its glaring absurdity. Our arguments against it fail to convince, because too easily obtained, and because they are too obviously conclusive. People doubt their senses, and refuse to trust their reason. They think it impossible that Protestantism, which makes such lofty pretensions, should be so untenable, so utterly indefensible, as it must be, if our arguments against it are sound. We succeed too well to be successful, and fail because we make out too strong a case. Indeed, Protestantism owes its existence and influence, after its wickedness, to its absurdity. If it had been less glaringly absurd, it would long since have been numbered with the things that were. *Ilium fuit.* But many people find it difficult to believe it to be what it appears ; they

think it must contain something which is concealed from them, some hidden wisdom, some profound truth, or else the *enlightened* men among Protestants would not and could not have manifested so much zeal in its behalf, — forgetting that Socrates ordered just before his death a cock to be sacrificed to Æsculapius, that Plato advocated promiscuous concubinage, and that Satan, notwithstanding his great intellectual power, is the greatest fool in the universe, — a fool whom a simple child saying *credo* outwits and turns into ridicule. But they may be assured that it is not one whit more solid than it appears, and that the deeper they probe it, the more unsound and rotten they will find it.

Protestants would do well to study the Categories, or Prædicaments, and learn not to condemn proper and necessary distinctions. They should know that they cannot conclude the supernatural from the natural; and that the historical credibility of the Scriptures does not, of itself, establish their divine authority in relation to the supernatural order. Historical credibility suffices for the miracles; and miracles accredit the teachers, but not immediately the teaching, whether oral or written. The teaching is taken on the authority of the accredited teacher. Consequently, between the miracles and the divine authority of the Scriptures the authority or testimony of the teacher must intervene, and whether it does intervene in favor of the Scriptures or not is a question of fact, not of reason.

Hence it is easy to detect the falsity of Mr. Thornwell's general thesis, that "it is just as easy to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures as the infallibility of any church." The inspiration of the Scriptures and the divine authority or infallibility of the Church are both supernatural facts, and therefore provable only by evidence valid in relation to the supernatural. In order to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures, the Professor must prove their divine authority; for he is to take their inspiration from their own testimony, which is not adequate, unless supernaturally credible. But to prove the divine authority of the Scriptures, he must prove the divine commission of the Apostles. The supernatural is provable in two ways, — by miracles, and by divinely accredited or commissioned teachers. The miracles accredit or prove the divine commission of the teachers, but, as we have just seen, not the divine authority of the writings. This must be taken on the authority of the teachers themselves, and the Apostles are the only teachers supposable in the case; because all, whether Church or Scriptures, as a matter of fact,

comes to us from God through them. Consequently, the Professor must establish, in some way, their divine commission, or not establish the divine authority of the Scriptures, and therefore the supernatural credibility of their testimony to their own inspiration.

This we also must do, or not be able to assert the infallibility of the Church. The divine commission is a point common to us both ; both must make it out, — he without the authority of Scripture, and we without the authority of the Church. If he can make it out, we can, and if we can make it out, he can ; for we both, in relation to it, stand on the same ground, have the same difficulties, and the same, and only the same, means with which to overcome them.

The divine commission of the Apostles is made out, if at all, by the miracles historically proved to have actually occurred. These, thus proved, accredit the teachers, that is, the Apostles, as teachers come from God, therefore commissioned by him ; and if commissioned by him, what they teach, as from him, must be infallibly true, because he cannot authorize the teaching of what is not infallibly true. Thus history proves the miracles, the miracles prove the divine commission, and the divine commission proves the infallibility. Thus far, we and the Professor travel together. But — and this is the point he overlooks — when we have gone thus far, and obtained the divinely commissioned Apostles, we have got the infallible Church ; for they are it, in all its plenitude and in all its integrity. Has the Professor got his inspired Scriptures ? No. He has not yet got even their divine authority, and does not as yet even know that there are any Scriptures at all, much less what and which they are ; and he can know only as these divinely commissioned Apostles inform him, that is, as taught by the infallible Church, — precisely what we have always told him, and what he ought to have known in the outset.

Does the Professor answer, that we have not yet proved the present existence of the infallible Church, and that ours is it ? Be it so. We must, of course, establish the fact of communion between us and the Church of the Apostles, or not be able to assert the infallibility of our Church. But the Professor has also to establish the fact of his communion with the same Church, before he can assert the divine authority of the Scriptures ; for he is to assert it on her authority, and this he cannot do until he proves that he has her authority. The simple question, then, between us is, whether it is as easy for him to

establish the fact of the communion in his case, as it is for us to establish it in ours. He must prove, not only that it is *possible* in his case, but that it is as *easy* in his as in ours, or abandon his thesis.

As yet, the Professor has only the point in common with us of the divine commission, or infallible Church, of the Apostles. The authority of this Church he must bring home to the sacred books with absolute certainty, and with so much exactness as to include no uninspired and to exclude no inspired Scripture. He must bring it home, not merely to some books, but to all whose inspiration is to be asserted ; and this not in general only, but also in particular, — to each particular book, chapter, verse, and sentence. This, in the nature of the case, he can do only by proving the genuineness of the Apostolic writings, and the identity, purity, and integrity of all those books which, though not written by the Apostles themselves, are to be received as inspired on their authority. This he must do before he can establish the divine authority of the Scriptures, and be able to conclude their inspiration from their own testimony, in case he has it.

This is what the Professor has to do, in order to make out the fact of Apostolic communion in his case ; but all we have to do, in order to establish it in ours, is to prove historically the continuance in space and time of the Church of the Apostles, and its external identity, or its identity as a visible corporation or kingdom, with our Church. Now which is the easiest ? Is it as easy to prove the authenticity, purity, and integrity of some sixty or seventy ancient books, written in different languages, and transcribed perhaps a thousand times, subject to a thousand accidents, as to establish the external identity of a visible corporation or kingdom, extending over all nations, the common centre around which, in one form or another, revolve all the significant events of the world for eighteen hundred years, and no more to be mistaken than the sun in the cloudless heavens at noonday ? We are to prove, we grant, the external identity of our Church with the Church in the days of the Apostles, — a thing, in its very nature, as easy to be done as to establish the continuance and identity of any civil corporation, state, or empire, ancient or modern. But the Professor has to do as much as this, and more too, in the case of the Bible, and of each separate book, chapter, and sentence in the Bible, — a thing morally impossible to be done, as all the attempts of Protestants to establish the divine authority of the Scriptures sufficiently prove.

But even if this were done, the Professor would not have established the inspiration of a single sentence of Scripture, as Scripture. The divine authority of the Scriptures does not prove their inspiration, unless they themselves declare it ; for the Professor must gather their inspiration from their own pages. He can assert no book to be inspired, unless, if it be a genuine Apostolic writing, it clearly and unequivocally asserts its own inspiration, and if it be not an Apostolic writing, unless it is clearly and unequivocally declared to be inspired by some book whose divine authority is established. And even this would not be enough for his purpose ; for he must not only make out the inspiration of certain books, but he must establish by divine authority what books are, and what are not, to be received as inspired Scripture. He must bring divine authority to say, These, and these only, are to be so received. This last is impossible, for it is well known that Scripture nowhere draws or professes to draw up a list of the inspired books. This of itself is conclusive against the Professor. The former, also, is impossible, for none of the Apostolic writings, unless it be the Apocalypse, whose authenticity many Protestants deny, assert their own inspiration, and, with this exception, and some portion of the prophetic books, what is received as Scripture is nowhere in Scripture asserted to be inspired. Hence there are amongst us Protestant Doctors of Divinity, who, while professing to acknowledge the authority of our Lord and his Apostles, and the general historical fidelity and authority of the Bible, deny entirely its inspiration.

The Professor, therefore, must be decidedly mistaken in saying that "it is just as easy to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures as the infallibility of any church." His meaning is, that, in the nature of the case, it must be as easy to prove the inspiration as the infallibility, which we see is by no means the fact ; because, on no hypothesis, can he prove the inspiration of the Scriptures without first proving the infallible Church, and the historical identification of the Church in space and time is a thing infinitely easier to make out than the authenticity, identity, purity, and integrity of ancient writings. The latter can be done, if at all without a continued infallible authority, only with extreme difficulty, and by a few gifted individuals, who have ample opportunities and learned leisure for the purpose. The other is a thing easily done. It is, making allowance for the greater lapse of time between the two extremes, as easy to prove that Pius IX. is the successor of St. Peter in the gov-

ernment of the Church, as that James K. Polk is the successor of George Washington in the Presidency of the United States ; and the fact of the succession in the former case as much proves that the Church of which Pius IX. is Pope is the Church of St. Peter, that is, of the Apostles, as the succession in the latter case proves that the United States of which Mr. Polk is President are the same political body over which George Washington presided. Even the allowance to be made for lapse of time dwindles into insignificance, the moment we consider the more important part in the affairs of the world performed by the Church than by the United States, or by any temporal state or kingdom of ancient or modern times.

To identify and to establish the purity and integrity of an ancient book, which has been subject to all the accidents of two or three thousand years, is by no means an easy task ; but the identity in space and time of an outward visible body, "a city set on a hill," the common centre of nations, and spreading itself over all lands and conducting the most sublime and the most intimate affairs of mankind, everywhere with us, at birth, baptism, confirmation, marriage, in sickness and health, in joy and sorrow, in prosperity and adversity, in life and death, — taking us from our mother's womb, and accompanying us as our guardian angel through life, and never leaving us for one moment till we arrive at home, and behold our Father's face in the eternal habitations of the just, — is the easiest thing in the world to establish through any supposable series of ages. You may speak of its liability to corruption ; but far less liable must it be, even humanly speaking, to corruption than the Scriptures, and indeed, after all, it is only from its incorruptness and its guardian care, that even you, who blaspheme the Spouse of God, conclude the purity and integrity of the Scriptures. Far easier would it be to interpolate or mutilate the Scriptures, without detection, than for the Church to corrupt or alter her teachings, always diffused far more generally, and far better known, than their pages. If publicity, extent, and integrity of the Christian people are to be pleaded for the purity and integrity of the sacred text, as they must be, then *a fortiori* for the purity and integrity of the Church's teaching.

But passing over all this, supposing, but not conceding, that the Professor could make out the inspiration of Scripture, it would amount to just nothing at all ; for the real matter to be determined is, what is or is not to be received as the word of God, and till this is determined, or an unerring rule for de-

termining it is obtained, nothing is done of any practical moment. To prove that the Scriptures are inspired, and therefore contain the word of God, is only to prove *where* the word, or some portion of the word, of God is, not *what* it is. Between *where* and *what* there is a distance, and, unless some means are provided for bridging it over, an impassable gulf. We are not told *what* the word of God is, till we are told it in the exact sense intended by the Holy Ghost, and this is not told us by being told that the word of God, or some portion of it, is contained in a certain book. How will the Professor tell us this ?

The controversy turns on the means of evidencing the word of God to the Indian or negro. Suppose the Professor goes to the Indian or negro, with his copy of the Holy Scriptures ; suppose, *per impossibile*, that he succeeds in proving to him that the several books were dictated by the Holy Ghost, and in the exact state in which he presents them. What is this to him ? He cannot read, and the book is to him a sealed book, as good as no book at all. What shall be done ? Shall the Indian or negro wait till he has learned to read, and to read well enough to read, understandingly, the Bible, — which is out of his power, — and also till he has read it through several times, and some five or six huge folios besides, to explain its unusual locutions, and its references to strange manners and customs, and to natural and civil history, before hearing or knowing what is the message sent him by his Heavenly Father ? What, in the mean time, is he to do ? Is he to remain a heathen, an infidel, an alien to the commonwealth of our Lord ? If he needs the Gospel as the medium of salvation, how can he wait, as he must, on the lowest calculation, more than half the ordinary life of man, without peril to his soul ? If he does not need it, what do you make the Gospel but a solemn farce ? Suppose he does wait, suppose he does get the requisite amount of learning ; what surety have you, even then, that he will not deduce error instead of truth from the book, and instead of the word of God embrace the words of men or of devils ?

The pretence of Protestants, that they derive their belief, such as it is, from the Bible, is nothing but a pretence. If not, how happens it that, as a general rule, the children grow up in the persuasion of their parents, — that the children of Episcopalians find the Bible teaching Episcopalianism, Presbyterian children find it teaching Presbyterianism, Baptist children Baptist doctrine, Methodist children Methodism, Unitarian chil-

dren Unitarianism, Universalist children Universalism ? Why is this ? The Professor knows why it is, as well as we do. He knows it is so, because their notions of religion are not derived from the Bible, but from the instructions of their parents, their nurses, their Sunday-school teachers, their pastors, and the society in the bosom of which they are born and brought up, and that, too, long before they read or are able to read the Bible so as to learn any thing from its sacred pages for themselves. He knows, too, that, when they do come to read the Bible, — which may happen with some of them, — they read it, not to learn what they are to believe, not to find what it teaches, but to find in it what they have already been taught, have imbibed, or imagined. All Protestants know this, and it is difficult to restrain the expression of honest indignation at their hypocrisy and cant about the Bible, and taking their belief from the Bible, — the Bible, the precious word of God. The most they do, as a general rule, is to go to the Bible to find in it what they have already found elsewhere, and it rarely happens that they find any thing in it except what they project into its sacred pages from their own minds.

To hear Protestants talk, one would think they were the greatest Bible-readers in the world, and that they believed every thing in the Bible, and nothing except what they learn from it. It is no such thing. Who among them trusts to the Bible alone ? Where is the Protestant parent, pretending to any decent respect for religion, who leaves his children to grow up without any religious instruction till they are able to read and understand the Bible for themselves ? Has not every sect its catechism ? A catechism ! What means this ? With “ the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible ” on their lips, have they the audacity and the inconsistency to draw up a catechism and teach it to their children ? Why do they not follow out their principle, and leave their children to “ the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible ” ? Do you shrink, Protestant parents, as well you may, from the fearful responsibility of suffering your children to grow up without any religious instruction ? Why not shrink also from the still more fearful responsibility of teaching them your words for the word of God ? You tell us the Bible is your sole rule of faith, that there are no divinely appointed teachers of the word of God, and you sneer at the very idea that Almighty God has provided for its infallible teaching ; and yet you, without authority, fallible by your own confession, draw up a catechism,

take upon yourselves the office of religious teachers, and do not hesitate to teach your own crude notions, your own fallible, and, it may be, blasphemous opinions, training up your children, it may be, in the synagogue of Satan, keeping them aliens from the communion of saints, and under the eternal wrath of God ! How is it that you reflect not on what you are doing, and for your children's sake, if not for your own, you do not tremble at your madness and folly ? Who gave you authority to teach these dear children ? Who is responsible to their young minds and candid souls for the truth of the doctrines you instil into them ? O Protestant father, thou art mad ! Thou lovest thy child, art ready to compass sea and land for him, and yet, for aught thou knowest, thou art doing all in thy power to train him to be the eternal enemy of God, and to suffer for ever the flames of divine vengeance !

But the catechism. — Who gave to you authority to draw up a catechism ? Would you teach your children damnable heresies ? Would you poison their minds with error and their hearts with lies ? Do you reflect what it is you do when you draw up and teach a catechism ? You deny the authority of the Church, yet here you are, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, Ranters, Jumpers, Dunkers, Socinians, Unitarians, Universalists, all of you, doing what you make it a crime in her to do, — drawing up and teaching a catechism, the most solemn and responsible act of teaching that can be performed ; for in it you demand of confiding childhood simple and unwavering belief in what you teach ! But the catechisms, you say, are for the most part drawn up in the language of the Holy Scriptures. Be it so. Who gave you authority to teach the Holy Scriptures ? What infallible assurance have you, that, in teaching the words of Scripture, you are teaching the sense of Scripture ? Is it a difficult thing either to lie or to blaspheme in the words of Scripture ?

We confess that we can hardly observe a due measure in our feelings or in our language, when we regard the profession and the practice of Protestants, when we consider how they lie unto the world and unto themselves, and how many precious souls, for whom our God has died, they shut out from salvation. One must speak in strong language, or the very stones would cry out against him. The Professor, whom we have supposed going with his Bible in his hands, and holding it out to the rude savage or poor slave, ignorant of letters, saying, “Read this, my son, and it shall make you wise unto salvation,” — would

he wait, think ye, till his tawny son or black brother had learned to read and become able to draw his faith from the Bible for himself, before instructing him? Be assured, not. He would hasten to instruct him without delay in his Presbyterian Catechism, the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Five Points of the Synod of Dort, or some modification of them. Never would he trust him to the Bible alone. So it is with all Protestant missionaries, and so must it be. No matter what they profess, in practice none of the sects place or can place their dependence on the written word to teach the faith without the aid of the living preacher. They all know, or might know, that they use the Bible, not as the source from which the simple believer is to draw his faith, but as a shield to protect the teachers of one sect from those of another; and that they assert its authority only as enabling each preacher to find some plausible pretext for preaching whatever comes into his own head. They place their dependence, not on a dead book, which when interrogated can answer never a word, which lies at the mercy of every interpreter, but, *nolens volens*, on the living teacher, and do without authority, and against their avowed principles, what they condemn us for doing, and what we do at least consistently and in obedience to our principles.

There is no use in multiplying words or making wry faces about the matter. Whatever men may pretend, if they have any form of belief or of unbelief, their reliance is on the living teacher to preserve and promulgate it. The thing is inevitable. And since it is so, it is absolutely necessary, if we are to know and believe the word of God, that we have teachers duly authorized, divinely appointed to teach that word, so that we may not believe for the word of God the words of fallible men or of devils. Therefore, even if we could establish the inspiration of the Scriptures, as we cannot without the Church, the Church would still be indispensable, for without her we should still have no infallible means of knowing what is the word of God.

We have here refuted the Professor's thesis in all its parts. We have shown him that he has no logical right to urge it; that if he is allowed to urge it, he cannot prove it, but that we can easily prove the contrary; and, finally, that if he could prove it, it would avail him nothing. We hope this will be satisfactory to him and his friends. He has been, even his friends must confess, singularly unsuccessful; but the fault has not been altogether his own. He has done as well as any Protestant could do. But it is an old and expressive proverb,

if a homely one, that "nobody can make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." Nobody can make any thing out of Protestantism, and her defence must needs baffle the finest intellects. She is utterly indefensible. No man can construct an argument in her favor, or against the Church, that is not at bottom a mere fallacy. Logic as well as salvation is on the side of the Church, not with her enemies, and Protestantism is as repugnant to sound reason as she is to the best interests of man. Whoever espouses her must needs render himself an object of pity to all good men and good angels. Mr. Thornwell has naturally respectable abilities, even considerable logical powers, and some vigor of intellect. He wants refinement, grace, unction, but he has a sort of savage earnestness which we do not wholly dislike, and manifests a zeal and energy, which, if directed according to knowledge, would be truly commendable. But all these qualities can avail him nothing, for Protestantism at best is only a bundle of contradictions, absurdities, puerilities, and *inepties*. How a man of an ordinary stomach could undertake its defence would be to us unaccountable, did we not know to what mortifications and humiliations pride compels its subjects to submit. Pride cast the angels, which kept not their first estate, down from heaven to hell, and perhaps we ought not to be surprised that it degrades mortal men to the ignoble task of writing in defence of Protestantism.

The refutation of the Professor's thesis gives us the full right to conclude the infallibility of the Church from the necessity of the case, with Dr. Lynch, and therefore to assert it, whatever objections men may fancy against it; because the argument for it rests on as high authority as it is possible in the nature of things to have for any objection against it. Nevertheless, *Deo volente*, we will examine in our next Review the Professor's moral and historical objections to the Church, and dispose of them as well as we can,—we hope to his satisfaction.

ART. II. — *Admonitions to Protestants. No. III. The Necessity of Revelation.*

YOU have seen, my brethren, that we are bound in eternal justice to worship God, that is, to render unto him the tribute

of our whole being ; for he is our Creator, and we are his, not our own. We are bound, then, to worship him in the way and manner which he himself prescribes ; for if the right to prescribe the worship we are to render unto him, or the way and manner of rendering it, belonged to ourselves, we should have something we could call our own, and which we should not be bound to render unto him. But as we have nothing of our own, and as none but God can have any right to us, or claim of property in us, it is his alone to prescribe to us the worship he demands, and when, where, and how he wills it to be rendered. We have nothing more to say in relation to it, than we had in relation to our creation. We are simply to ascertain what he wills, and to do it.

There are two, and only two, ways in which God can make known to us the worship he demands, and the way and manner in which he requires it to be rendered. These are the light of natural reason and the light of supernatural revelation. Certainly, we can know only in one or the other or both of these two ways. By natural reason we can know only what falls within the reach of natural reason, and if we are to know any thing more, it can be only as it is supernaturally revealed to us. It is impossible to conceive any other than these two ways in which God himself can make us acquainted with his will. What he does not teach us through natural reason, he must teach us through a supernatural revelation, or not at all.

Reason is unquestionably the gift of God, and its light is divine, — is from God, the source of all light. What is really prescribed by reason is as much prescribed by God himself as what is prescribed by revelation. For aught we do or can know from reason itself, God might, if he had chosen, have made natural reason sufficient for all the instruction we need, and if he had done so, there would and could have been no necessity for a supernatural revelation. Why he has not made natural reason sufficient we know not, and have no right to ask. He is under no obligation to render us a reason for what he does, and the creature has no right to say to the Creator, “Why hast thou made me thus ?” He had — reason herself declares it — the sovereign right to make us as he pleased, and to clothe us with such attributes as seemed to him good. *Why* he has made us as he has we can have no right to inquire, and we must restrict ourselves at all times to the question, *What* has he made us, and with what attributes has he endowed us ? That he has made us reasonable beings we know ; that he has

made the reason with which he has endowed us sufficient of itself to serve as our only guide, we know is not the fact, for there is nothing which reason more unequivocally asserts than her own inability to prescribe the worship of God satisfactory to herself.

Now here, my brethren, is a singular fact, and one which may well arrest your attention. You must either deny reason, as you have already seen, or else acknowledge yourselves bound to worship God ; and you must also deny reason, or acknowledge that the worship you are bound to give is a worship which exceeds the ability of reason to prescribe. While it is certain, then, that it belongs to God and to him alone to prescribe the worship he demands, it is equally certain that he does not prescribe it through natural reason. Then either he does not prescribe it at all, or he prescribes it through supernatural revelation. If he does not prescribe it at all, that is, if we have no supernatural revelation, if we are left to our natural reason alone, we are in the sad condition of owing a duty which we are unable to pay.

Do not rashly infer from this, my brethren, that you are to discard reason. The necessity of revelation is not grounded on the denial of reason, but on the plainest and simplest dictates of reason herself. We do not need revelation because reason is a false and uncertain light. Reason, as far as her light extends, is a true light, and to deny her is no less to blaspheme God than to deny revelation. Those advocates of revelation who begin their arguments for it by doing their best to destroy the authority of reason act as foolishly as the astronomer who should put out his natural eyes in order the better to see through his telescope. Reason is always to be presupposed, as grace always presupposes nature ; for if there were no nature, there could be no recipient of grace, and if no reason, no subject of revelation. Revelation, if made at all, must be made to reasonable beings, not to brutes. But because reason is presupposed, because her light is necessary to render man capable of receiving a revelation, it is not necessary to conclude that he can know all without a revelation that he can know with it. The telescope would be of no service to a man who had no eyes ; but it would be idle to infer from this that he could see with a telescope nothing which he could not by his natural eyes without one. To assert the necessity of revelation is not to deny or even to disparage reason, for its necessity is asserted on the authority of reason, to enable us to do what reason declares

herself unable to do. If we respect reason, we must respect her just as much when she declares her own inability as when she declares her ability, and certainly it is as reasonable to believe that reason knows as well what she cannot do as what she can do. We must, then, trust her when she declares her own inability to prescribe the worship due to God, and the way and manner in which he requires it to be rendered, as well as when she declares that we are bound to render unto him the tribute of our whole being.

You must acknowledge reason, my brethren, and if you do, you must concede her inability to prescribe the worship we are to render. Then you must concede that God imposes upon us, through reason, an obligation which we by our natural light and strength cannot fulfil, — that reason demonstrates that God commands what exceeds our natural ability to perform. Here is the great and terrible fact which always and everywhere rises up to confound the Rationalist, he be of what school he may, — the grand real or apparent contradiction which runs through all human life, when abandoned to the simple guidance of nature alone. If it were not for this fact, the Rationalist, that is, the man who asserts the sufficiency of natural reason, though he would stand below the plane of revelation, might be consistent with himself, and assert his Rationalism or Naturalism without falling into any self-contradiction. There would then be nothing in our natural condition which would exact any thing above nature, or that would or could indicate the necessity of the supernatural. Then they among you who are accustomed to say that Catholicity and Rationalism, what they term Liberalism, are the only two self-coherent and self-consistent systems conceivable, would be correct, and the Catholic from reason alone could never construct an argument against the Liberalist. But this fact, that reason discloses an obligation which we by reason alone cannot fulfil, refutes them, and convicts Liberalism of inconsistency with itself. By reason alone it is impossible to construct a self-consistent system. Do your best, Rationalism will be eternally at war with itself.

It is undeniable, my brethren, that reason, as it actually exists in all men, is either too much or too little for Rationalism. It goes too far, or not far enough. It goes too far in the assertion of principles, unless it could go farther in their practical realization. As it now exists, it can neither bring its conception of principles down to its power of intellectual real-

ization, nor its power of intellectual realization up to its conception of principles. Nothing can be more sublime than its statement of general principles, nothing more mean than its practical application of them. It measures the distances and magnitudes of the planets, but it cannot tell us *what* the planets are. It bids us worship God, but when asked, What is the worship of God? it stammers out some vague, incoherent reply, which it instantly recalls in order to stammer out another not one whit more clear, coherent, or satisfactory. It commands us to be good and to do good, and when called upon to define what it is to be good and to do good, it answers, with one of your famous ministers, Why, goodness is — goodness, and to be good and to do good is — to be good and to do good! — an answer of which it is heartily ashamed as soon as given. It is all-powerful in the abstract, but all weakness in the concrete, — strong in generals, but exceedingly feeble in particulars.

But the Rationalist replies, — God is just, and therefore can demand of us only what he has given. You must, then, show that he has given us more than reason, before you can conclude the insufficiency of the worship which is possible by reason alone. If he has given us only reason, he can justly demand of us only such worship as with reason alone we are able to give. So, indeed, it would seem; but, unhappily, reason herself declares the contrary. Reason clearly and unequivocally declares that we are bound to render unto God the tribute of our whole being in the way and manner he himself prescribes, and then equally clearly and unequivocally declares that we cannot do this by her light alone. Question her as you please, put her to the torture as you will, she remains firm, will abate nothing of the obligation, and make no retraction of her own insufficiency. Here is the difficulty. If we take reason as our guide, we must follow her in one branch of her teaching as well as in another. But this is not in our power; because her teaching, when taken by itself alone, is not consistent with itself, and to follow it throughout would require us both to do and not to do at one and the same time, which is not possible. You cannot, if you have only reason, follow reason in all things, if you would, — for reason, taken alone, contradicts herself. What, then, are you to do?

Suppose you say, All which can be required of us is to render unto God such worship as reason is able to prescribe. Practically, this will be that each one is to render unto God

such worship as seems to each one to be right in his own eyes. It must come to this at last, whether it please you or not. Reason declares all men to be equal, and that no one man or body of men can make their private convictions and sentiments binding upon another. Man has no right to legislate for man; for one man can, in so far as man, claim no preëminence over another. But at the same time that reason forbids one man to impose his faith or worship upon another, it declares, with perfect clearness and distinctness, that there can be but one true faith, but one true worship. God is one and immutable, and all men, since all are equal, hold and must hold one and the same relation to him. The relation being one and the same for all men, the obligation which grows out of it must be for all men one and the same obligation, and therefore one and the same must be the worship which is its fulfilment. Hence all men are bound to render unto God one and the same worship. This is what reason teaches all men, and each particular man; for reason is one and identical in all and in each.

But whenever it comes to the practical question, What is this worship? men differ, vary one from another, and if left free to offer each the worship which seems to himself the true worship, there will be as many different worships as worshippers. Yet truth is one, always and everywhere one and the same, and consequently the worshippers can differ one from another only by all but one differing more or less from the truth. In so far as they differ from the truth, their worship is not true worship, but false. This is undeniable. But reason, although unable to say what is the true worship, is yet abundantly able to say that the true worship is the only worship God demands or will accept. Then reason cannot pronounce that worship the acceptable worship which merely seems right to each one in his own eyes. She will have no *seeming* about it. She will have the thing itself, — the reality. She tells us that we must worship really and truly, in the way and manner Almighty God himself prescribes, or we do not worship at all; for, though unable to prescribe the true worship, she condemns every worship which is not really and truly the worship Almighty God demands, and declares unequivocally that no mere seeming worship, no false or even partially false worship, is or can be the worship he does demand.

If you take the ground, that the worship demanded is not the worship which, in itself considered, is really and strictly true worship, but the worship which appears to be such to the wor-

shipper, you must accept as true worship all the worships which have heretofore obtained or which now obtain amongst men, and maintain boldly that all the abominations, all the foul and filthy rites of heathenism, from which reason and humanity turn with horror and disgust, were offerings well pleasing to God ; for you cannot doubt that these have all appeared to some of their adherents to be true worship. All you can say with regard to them is, that they do not appear to you to be such offerings, and therefore they are not true worship for you ; yet for those who hold them to be true worship they are so ! The worship of God, moreover, as you have seen, includes the whole province of morals. Insist, then, not on what is strictly true in itself, on what is really right, independent of the views or notions of the actor, but merely on what appears to each one to be true and right, and you will make right and wrong vary with the varying notions of each individual. You will then have no invariable standard of right and wrong, and practical ethics will depend solely on individual convictions, sentiments, prejudices, caprices, or idiosyncrasies.

Can reason, my brethren, assent to so monstrous a conclusion ? Does she not assert the immutable and eternal distinctions between right and wrong ? Does she not abhor the doctrine, that right and wrong vary as vary the internal states of individuals ? Does she not assert, in tones too clear and distinct to be mistaken, that right and wrong depend on an eternal and immutable law, which is one and the same at all times, in all places, and for all men, and that the actor, so far from making the right, or from determining by his own notions or feelings the precepts of this law, is himself right only in proportion as he conforms to it ? Assuredly she does, and therefore must be able to declare in all cases what is the law, and therefore what is the right, independent of the actor, or be unable to rest satisfied with her own declarations.

The moment you substitute the individual's view of a subject for the truth itself, you practically deny all truth and all falsehood, all right and all wrong, and make them merely relative matters, one or the other according to my mode or manner of seeing, feeling, or thinking. What is truth in relation to one is falsehood in relation to another ; what is falsehood in relation to you may be truth in relation to me ; what is right for you is wrong for me, and there is nothing true and right for all men, — than which nothing is more repugnant to right reason.

Yet, my brethren, absurd as this is, false and dangerous as

such a doctrine must be, not a few among you actually adopt it. Not a few among you, claiming, perhaps not without good reason, to be the Protestants of Protestants, the Reformers of the Reformers themselves, the more consistent and advanced portion of the Protestant world, without the least apparent misgiving, contend that truth and falsehood, right and wrong, have only a relative existence. Truth, they assert, is unknown and unknowable, and that is truth or falsehood for each which he esteems to be such. What I hold to be true is true for me ; what you hold to be true is true for you. The same is to be said of falsehood ; the same of right and wrong, just and unjust. But on this ground, where is the right or the reason for one to approve or to condemn any thing in another, except his mode or manner of seeing ? and where is the authority for saying one man's mode or manner of seeing is better than another's ?

But it does not appear that the persons who maintain this abominable doctrine, even while asserting that all religions, all codes, and all systems are equally true and good for those who sincerely receive them, are less censorious or belligerent than other members of the community. We find them, in fact, making war upon all systems of philosophy, upon all forms of faith and worship, and upon all codes of morals, private or public, which differ from their own. They find nothing to approve. They look upon all things as out of joint. Every thing hitherto has gone wrong. Man has never yet been man ; society has never yet had a social constitution ; religion has remained from the outset a degrading and a debasing superstition ; the light of reason has never hitherto dawned on the world ; the human heart has slumbered and slept from the beginning ; nothing has been properly understood ; nothing has been rightly done ; and the human race can make no progress, can take no step forward in the fulfilment of its destiny, unless it retraces its past career, undoes all that it has thus far done, and begins its work anew. And yet, consistent souls ! the moment you press them to adduce their authority for this sweeping charge against all the past, they tell you that there is no universal and invariable standard of right and wrong, just and unjust, truth and falsehood, and that these all depend entirely on the views or notions of each individual ! Their doctrine is, that every man is right who believes himself right, and yet in practice their hand is against every man who does not believe and act with them !

Nevertheless, my brethren, these persons are by no means

among those in your ranks the least respectable for their learning and ability. They are, for the most part, the great men of the Protestant world. The inconsistency you remark in them you may remark in the greatest and most renowned in the world's history, who forsake the Church and take reason alone, or even the Bible interpreted by private reason, for their guide. No man ever yet trusted himself to such guidance without arriving at conclusions which reason herself was eager to disown. The fact itself is undeniable. It is the standing reproach of all your divines, and, indeed, of all speculative men, from Plato down to Charles Fourier and Robert Owen. This is a remarkable fact. Whence comes it? Whence comes it that we can never abandon ourselves to the guidance of reason alone without falling into unreason? There must be some cause for this; and it is too universal, too uniform, too invariably reproduced in every department of human life, to be the result of any cause merely local or transitory. The cause must be in human reason itself, as it actually exists; in the fact, that human reason in its actual state, if taken alone, involves an inherent contradiction. Do your best, you cannot otherwise explain this remarkable fact.

This fact, or rather contradiction, is not confined to reason alone; it runs through all human life which is abandoned to simple nature. Let human nature act according to its present laws, give to each faculty its natural exercise, to each tendency its natural gratification, to the whole the natural objects it craves, and it is never farther from having attained its good, its destiny. This you have seen in the first *Admonition*, in the fact to which your attention was called, that pleasures do not please, wealth does not enrich, honors do not ennoble, knowledge does not enlighten. All men experience this in a degree; the sages and philosophers of all ages proclaim it, and from it proceed the deep and painful tragedies of human life. All your popular literature, expressing the tone and temper of the age, bears witness to it, and by its low wail or its wild lament confirms it. Take, for example, one of your popular novels from the school of George Sand, or that of the Countess Ida of Hahn Hahn, and study its heroine. What is she? She is young, beautiful, cultivated, full of life, sentiment, emotion. Nature has lavished upon her every perfection, art every accomplishment, society every luxury. She is well-born, rich, learned in all languages and in all lore, — intellectual, sprightly, witty, profound, quick of apprehension, patient of investigation. In a word, she has

all nature at her feet, in her hand, in her head, and in her heart. Alas ! she is the most miserable of beings. Life for her is aimless, joyless. A thousand tragedies are daily, hourly enacted in her own sensitive heart. She sighs for what she has not. She wants some object to love, — some one that can love, as she would be loved, in return. Above and over all she has or is floats an ideal, that lures her on and will not let her rest. She must realize it. She goes forth, visits the court and the camp, the palace and the cottage, the gay saloon of wealth and fashion, the low haunts of vice and crime, and the humble shed of toiling, drudging poverty, in pursuit of him who is to be the realization of her ideal. Where is he ? She finds him, — no ; he is not the one, and she dismisses him with disgust. She takes another, another, still another, with no better success. No one comes up to her ideal ; no one realizes or can realize it. Alas ! she is doomed to suffer eternally the torture of an unrealized ideal. With all the world to choose from, she can choose no one that can fill the deep wants of her capacious heart. What is the meaning of all this ? Do not say these novels are all mere idle romance, all mere fiction. You know better. Your novelists, immoral as they may be, dangerous as their productions certainly must be, are among the most distinguished and even truthful of your writers. Unscrupulous they may be, but they are persons of broad sympathies and large experience. They are no closet dreamers. They write out from the deep, rich, and living nature within them to the deep, rich, and living nature around them. Hence their popularity. In showing you their heroes and heroines running over the world seeking in vain the realization of their ideal, the object which can fill the heart, they but show what every one abandoned to nature experiences, — but proclaim the universal secret of an irreligious age. This heroine, — what is she but poor human nature, abandoned to her own light and strength ? Nay, is not this virtually what they themselves tell you ? Is it not their boast, that they draw from nature, and paint her as she is ? And what, then, is the moral they teach, but this, that human nature abandoned to nature is too much or too little for herself ?

You, my brethren, ought to take an especial interest in this mysterious fact, this inherent contradiction of nature, this strange disproportion between the ideal and the power of realization, the abstract and the concrete. You are the children of what you call the “Glorious Reformation.” You walk in

the midst of its effulgence, and you boast that for you there shines a warmer and a brighter sun than for other men. You claim to be of the "Movement party," the advanced and advancing portion of mankind, and you are long and loud in your boasts of the progress you have made. You hold that the present age has far outstripped all its predecessors, — is, as it were, a model age, in which all that nature, under intellectual, moral, or industrial relations, can give is possessed to an extent never before heard of, never even dreamed of. Have we not, you say, proved that mind is omnipotent over matter? Have we not annihilated distance, subdued the elements, made the winds and flames of fire our obedient servants, and the lightnings our messengers? Yet is it, my brethren, precisely in this very age that human discontent and human despair are at the flood, that the disproportion between the ideal and the power of realizing it becomes more glaring and more mournfully oppressive than in any former period of the world's history. Whence happens this? Whence comes it that this should occur in this very age, when men have the most of nature and the least of religion? Whence comes it that it should more especially occur in Protestant nations and with those individuals who wander farthest from the Church, and try hardest to live according to nature, without recourse to the supernatural? That it is so is undeniable. Nothing can surpass the uneasiness, discontent, dissatisfaction, discouragement, despair even, of the uncatholic world in this present age. How explain this fact, without acknowledging that human nature, despoiled of the supernatural, or abandoned to herself, is without her necessary complement, without proportion, and inherently in contradiction with herself?

This contradiction, which runs through all human life and marks at once man's greatness and man's littleness, characterizing him as a being "darkly wise and rudely great," appears to be peculiar to the human race. In all the animal tribes a due proportion appears to be observed, and the destiny of each individual is sufficiently indicated by its natural tendencies: Give the animal the objects to which it naturally tends, and it shows itself satisfied, and appears to have found its good, realized its ideal. Why is it not so in man? Why is he an anomaly in creation? We know the Creator observes a due proportion in all his works, and that he makes all things by weight and measure. How is it, then, that there is this want of proportion in man? Why is it that he, when he has pro-

cured the objects to which he is invited or impelled by his nature, is not satisfied, is not contented, as is the ox, the robin, or the bee, but is even more dissatisfied than before ?

It is true that some seek to explain this fact by regarding it as a promise or prophecy of our immortality ; but this explanation does not meet the whole difficulty, clear up the whole mystery ; for immortality may be conceived as lying in the natural order, as the continuation of our present existence, without any essential change ; and it is so that some entire Protestant sects actually do conceive it. The future life to which many of your number look forward, if they look forward to any, is only our natural life endlessly continued, and they expect their good from nature in that life as much as they do in this. But if our future life is to be a natural life, it offers no complement to our present life, and must present the same disproportion between the ideal and the actual, the same contradiction which now so tortures the hearts of all who are abandoned, or abandon themselves, to nature alone.

Others, again, attempt to overcome this painful disproportion by laboring to bring the ideal down to the actual, and persuading themselves that all these general principles and notions which transcend the power of the practical intellect are mere illusions. The wants the soul experiences, even when possessing the best and all that nature can give, are merely the effects, they tell us, of early prejudice or education, and would never be experienced, if men were only properly trained from their infancy. How far it is possible by skilful training to reduce men to the category of mere animals, it is not easy to say. That much to that effect might and would be accomplished, under the direction of your able philosophers, is highly probable ; but it can hardly be believed that these philosophers would be able to obliterate all traces of the peculiarly human nature. The germs of a moral and rational nature would most likely still remain, for to stifle their growth is not precisely to annihilate them. But it is not easy to believe that these wants and these general notions originated either in prejudice or in education. It is hard to conceive how a prejudice could have existed without something to create it, and in favor of that which had, and prior to it could have, no prototype in human experience. Education, again, may develop, but it cannot create, — perpetuate, but not originate. Education implies educators, and these could not develop what did not previously exist, or impart what they did not themselves possess. If they

only developed what already existed ingerm, the phenomena in question did not originate in educatn. If they imparted something new, whence did they themselves obtain it? The earth stands upon the back of the huge trtoise; but what does the huge tortoise stand on?

Before the educators appeared, mankind either had this experience, or they had not. If they had, the appeal to education explains nothing. If they had not, they must have had an experience the reverse of it. Instead of the disproportion now experienced, they must have experienced only proportion; instead of wants that cannot be satisfied, only satisfaction; and instead of general conceptions which transcend the power of the practical intellect, their practical understanding would have kept pace with their general conceptions. How, then, could these educators, who had only human authority, and only the power of an absurdity, an error, at best, an illusion, not only gain credit against all previous experience, but even succeed in changing the whole current of the universal experience of mankind? Who can believe it? Certainly, my brethren, nobody but your modern philosophers could believe a thing so incredible, — a doctrine which asserts the existence of effects without causes, and even *against* causes!

The singular contradiction to which your attention is called is not, as you have seen, confined to any one element of human nature or of human experience. It is not simply a fact of the world of sentiment or of feeling. According to its nature, it is found in reason as well as in sentiment, and the natural reason is no more satisfied with natural reason than our instinctive and sensitive nature is with the natural objects it craves. Yet the contradiction in the order of reason results from elements which cannot be abstracted without abstracting intellect itself. It results from the fact, that the general principles or notions of reason transcend the power of the practical understanding, or our power to raise our actual knowledge to their level. But take away these principles or notions, and reduce the general to the level of the particular reason, and you take away the particular reason itself, and therefore all actual understanding. Without the general, the particular is inconceivable; and if man had not these general principles, notions, or conceptions, which it is contended are mere illusions, he could have no practical intellect, and no practical knowledge whatever. He could then be no subject of the education supposed. Could you by education give to a horse, an ox, a dog, or a pig, an experience

corresponding to what is now the universal experience of mankind ?

Philosophers may speculate as they will, and suggest such conclusions as they please, but this much is certain, that human nature, as we now find it in all men, has more or less than its complement. It undeniably wants proportion, and cannot be naturally harmonized throughout, either with itself or with the world in which it is placed. But the Creator does and must observe a due proportion in all his works, and skilfully adapt one thing to another part to part, and means to ends. To maintain the contrary would be to implicate his wisdom and perfection. He is infinitely true, and as true in his works as in his words. No work of his can lie ; nothing, as it comes from his hands, can deceive, or in the remotest degree tend to deceive. Man's natural inclinations, instincts, desires, as he came from his Maker, must have been truthful, and have indicated the end to which he was appointed. His whole nature, whether able of itself to attain that end or not, must have had its face turned towards it, and, if followed, could never have led from it. But take man as he now is and the reverse of this is the fact. Nothing is more certain than that he recedes from his true good just in proportion as he follows his natural bent ; and never is he farther from his destiny, if destiny he has, than when he is most successful in securing the ends towards which he is naturally attracted or impelled. His nature, taken as sufficient of itself, constantly cheats him, — lies to him in every word and in every organ through which it speaks. It fulfils never a single promise which it makes, and his whole natural life is illusory and false. Here is the mournful fact asserted and confirmed by universal experience.

But, my brethren, this cannot have been so in the beginning. We know God must have made us for some end, which is at once our destiny and our good ; because wisdom must, or believe its nature, act to some end, and goodness to a good end. It is the part of folly to act without acting to an end, and of evil to act to a bad end. God is infinitely wise and good, and therefore must have assigned an end infinitely wise and good to all and each of his works. If the end is wise and good, the gaining of our true end is one and the same thing as gaining our true good, and whenever we gain an end without gaining our true good, we may know that it is not the end which was appointed us, or for which we were intended. We must not only have been intended for an end, but we must have been, as we came

from our Creator, endowed, naturally & supernaturally, with the ability to gain it; for God cannot appoint a being a destiny without giving him the means of fulfilling it. The being must be placed on the plane of his destiny, between which and himself there is a due proportion. But it is clear from the facts of experience, that man does not now stand on the plane of his destiny, that he has no natural destiny, because he cannot follow his natural bent without receding from his true good. Then, whether man had originally a natural destiny or not, it is certain that he has fallen from the plane of that destiny, whatever it was, and is now out of his normal condition. Certain it is, that his nature is now turned away from it; for he never finds his destiny in following the direction his nature indicates, which could not have been the fact in his normal state, whether his destiny was in the natural order or in the supernatural.

No man can analyze the facts of human experience without finding them prove incontestably that our destiny, whatever it be, lies above the level of our present natural powers. Our race, then, must have once possessed powers, natural or supernatural, which it does not possess now, and therefore powers which it must have forfeited or lost. The facts of experience, as well as universal tradition, bear witness to some great catastrophe, to some terrible revulsion which man at some remote period must have suffered. The soul appears to every sensitive observer to retain traces of a lost grandeur, and to be filled with an undying regret for what once was, but is no longer, hers. She appears to be tortured by her reminiscences. Even before illumined by faith, she regards herself as expelled from her early home, as an exile from her native country, and a sojourner in a strange land. She bears with her a secret memory of a lost paradise, for which she sighs, and in her recollections of which, dim and fading though they be, she contrasts whatever she finds in the land of her exile. What is the poetry of all nations but the low wail or lament of the soul over her lost Eden, — the music in which she expresses the wearisomeness of her banishment, and her longing to return and dwell again in the sweet bowers of her early youth, of her childhood's home? Here, in these reminiscences, which play so important a part in the Platonic philosophy, and which the Athenian knew not how to interpret, is the secret of that weariness and disgust which the soul experiences in the midst of all this world can give, of that deep regret a ceaseless sorrow which nothing earthly can charm away. Earthly goods and

pleasures are not congenial to her nature ; they are not the food she was originally fitted to live upon or to relish ; the table the world spreads before her is not that which was spread for her in her Father's house ; the embraces lavished upon her are not those of her chaste Spouse, and she receives or returns them only with a feverish shame.

The traditions of all ages and nations assert the fact of the primitive fall of man, and these traditions cannot be lightly dismissed, or their authority disputed, by any one who has learned to philosophize, or who knows how to weigh testimony. They could not have existed without a substratum of truth, certainly known at first, or warranted by evidence as wide and constant as human experience ; and in either case they are the testimony of mankind, the highest testimony we can have, except the supernatural testimony of God himself. All religions and religious institutions, in whatever age or on whatever side of the globe they are found, imply, and expressly assert, that man has fallen from his primitive state. The idea of redemption, restoration, expiation, atonement, is the grand central idea of them all. They all are based on the assumption, that a *reparation* of some sort, to be effected in some way, by this or that agency, is essential. There is to this absolutely no exception. There never has been a religion which did not assert the necessity of *sacrifice*, and never has the human race been able to believe that a worship without a sacrifice, without the altar, the victim, and the priest, could be true worship. Thanksgiving and praise, prayer and adoration, are indeed regarded as proper and necessary in all religions, but no religious worship is ever regarded as complete, as including the one essential thing, that has not the victim to offer in expiation, or in reparation of human delinquency.

What means, my brethren, this victim, held by all religions to be indispensable? Reason, while it teaches us to render unto God the tribute of our whole being, teaches us that this is all that is his due. We can owe him only what we have received from him, and can be bound to render him no more than we are and have. Yet this victim is something more, and in offering him the worshipper confesses that he owes to God what he is not and has not. Whence comes this, but from the conviction, on the part of the worshipper, that he has not retained, and has ceased to possess, all that he originally received, and that what he now is cannot be the equivalent of what he was when he came from his Maker ? The victim is always

offered, because we feel that more is due than the tribute of our whole present being, and therefore is an acknowledgment of a loss on our part, or in other words, of a fall. Sacrifice is, then, a confession of the fall, — that we have wasted our patrimony, spent our substance in riotous living, and owe more than we can pay, — a confession, in a word, of our insolvency. Hence it is that all those individuals who deny the fall deny the necessity of the victim, and reject the idea of sacrifice as a vulgar superstition. Hence, also, the universality of sacrifice proves the universality of the belief in the primitive fall, that man has fallen from his original state, and now lies below the level of his destiny, without the ability to attain to it.

Even your modern philosophers and reformers who assert the sufficiency of human nature for itself are far from being able to exclude the idea of the fall. Even for them human nature is not in its normal state. The Fourierist who boasts of his new social science, and tells you attractions are proportional to destinies, confesses that man as he now is cannot be trusted to follow his natural bent. Robert Owen and Fanny Wright hold that a preparatory discipline, to overcome the wrong direction heretofore given to human nature, is necessary before trusting man to his natural instincts. All your reformers, whether religious, moral, social, or political, are loud in their declamations against human depravity, and look upon man's nature as warped out of its right line, as turned away from its true good. Indeed, the very idea of *reform* implies the idea of a fall, — that man is in a lapsed state, out of his normal condition, — and nothing is more amusing than to hear your reformers deny that man has fallen, extol his innate goodness, the purity and excellency of his nature, and at the same time berate all the past, and condemn him and all his institutions as worthless. How little, in their insane zeal, do they suspect the glaring contradiction into which they fall !

It makes nothing against the testimony of these, so far as the present argument is concerned, that they seek to explain the depravity they cannot deny, and against which they declaim, without admitting the fall in the Christian sense. Whatever explanations they attempt, they concede the fact that man has been perverted, turned away from his true good, — that his nature is in an abnormal state, and does not now operate according to its original intention. This fact once admitted, all is admitted. They may ascribe it to what cause they please ; they may pretend that it originated in the separation of the indi-

vidual from the unity of the race, in false systems of religion, morals, politics, society, in priestcraft, political tyranny, and oppression, but, in doing so, they only confirm it ; for this separation from unity, these false systems, this priestcraft, tyranny, oppression, they must regard as abnormal, and therefore as effects of causes which could not be active in our normal state. They at best leave the fact itself unaffected, and do but bring the cause a step or two nearer, or remove it a step or two farther off.

Nor any better will they succeed in getting rid of the fact itself, who allege as its cause that man was originally created imperfect, and never intended to attain his destiny, but to be always attaining it. These, your modern sect of progressists, contradict themselves, because, while they assert progress, they demand reform. But reform and progress are fundamentally repugnant one to the other. Progress looks forward, and proposes a perfection never yet attained to ; reform looks backward, and seeks to regain a perfection which has been departed from or lost through corruption. The idea of indefinite progress contradicts also the idea of destiny. An indefinitely progressive being can have no destiny, because destiny implies a definite end, and indefinite progress no end. It is a contradiction in terms to assert that a being is destined to eternal progress. Progress consists in going towards an end ; but if there be no end but the progress, there is no end at all, and then no progress. It is incompatible with the essential idea of God to suppose that he creates beings in an imperfect state as to their nature. Being himself perfect, his works must be perfect, and then each creature must, as it comes from him, be perfect in its kind, possess all that pertains to its nature, and therefore be incapable of any other progress than that which consists in going to its end. It is no slight confirmation of this, that those of your philosophers who maintain the doctrine of indefinite progress generally end in atheism, as Condorcet, Hegel, Saint Simon, Pierre Leroux, or in a pantheistic nihilism, which is the same thing. Moreover, the assertion, that man was created imperfect in his kind, and intended to be eternally progressive, is not in its nature provable by reasoning, and, if provable at all, can be so only by a supernatural revelation, or by history. The first is not supposable, because the doctrine itself is invented chiefly for the purpose of getting rid of the necessity of revelation ; and the last cannot be asserted, for to do so would be to recognize the authority of history, and history, if its authority is conceded,

teaches the contrary, as you have seen in the foregoing *admonition*.

The progressists, it is true, assume that the savage state was the primitive state, and one of your preachers the other day edified his audience by giving an account of Adam taken from the New Zealander ; but he forgot to adduce any proof that the New Zealander is the type of the primitive man. There is not a single historical fact which proves or tends to prove that the race began in savagism and has reached civilization by a gradual progress or development. If the primitive man was a savage and progressive, how happens it that one of the characteristics of savages is, that they are stationary, that they never show the least sign of progress, and that no savage tribe ever by spontaneous efforts emerges from the savage state ? In all known instances in which a savage people has become civilized, it has been by the religion, the arts, or the arms of a people already civilized, — a fact in no way reconcilable with the progressist theory. The teachings of history, the study of savage tribes, their language, manners, habits, and religions, lead to the conclusion, not that the savage is the germ of the civilized man, but that he is the civilized man corrupted, deteriorated, cut off by some terrible calamity from the communion of the higher life of nations, and despoiled of the glory he once had. The language of savages almost uniformly presents a language, not in the process of formation, but in the process of decay ; and their religious notions and institutions are reminiscences, or rather travesties, of doctrines and worships which belonged to a people in wisdom, science, virtue, and polish far above them. Moreover, the traditions of all nations belie this modern doctrine of progress. They all point to the past as the most perfect state, and sages and philosophers and poets all refer their contemporaries to “the wisdom of the ancients.” Whence comes this ? If the race was constantly advancing, if its progress were historically verifiable, how, in the face of fact, of uniform experience, and authentic history, could all the world have the contrary conviction, and no one till some twenty or thirty years ago ever venture to assert, “The golden age is in the future, not in the past ; Paradise is before, not behind you.”

It is in vain, my brethren, to attempt to explain the facts of human experience by the doctrine of progress. Every man has in himself the living witness that it is not the law of progress, but the law of sin, that he obeys. If man is constantly

advancing from his rude and feeble beginnings towards a less and less imperfect future, and the evils he complains of only mark a given stage in his progress, result only from his ignorance, his imperfection, his want of development, or more perfect development, what is the meaning of conscience? To deny conscience would be to deny reason, and so long as you recognize conscience, you must attribute the evils your philosophers profess to deplore, not to imperfectly developed nature, but to moral delinquency, to the fact that we are averse to our true good, and in order to attain to our destiny must deny ourselves and mortify our natures.

This established, you must come back to the fact asserted by universal tradition and by all experience, that our nature, as we now find it, is not in its normal state. As it now is, it is full of contradictions. Reason imposes an obligation which we are unable by reason alone to fulfil. From our nature we learn that it was intended for an end above its present capacity, and we know that it could not have been so in the beginning. We know, then, that our nature has fallen, and fallen, too, whether you assume, with the Church, that it was never intended to have a natural destiny, that it was from the first appointed to a supernatural end, or whether you assume it to have been intended for a merely natural end. There is, then, now necessarily a question of redemption, of reparation.

The justice of God required him, when he appointed us to a given end, to establish a proportion between us and that end, or, in other words, to furnish us with the necessary means to gain it. If the end was supernatural, he must give us supernatural graces to obtain it; if natural, the natural ability of gaining it. But he did not bind himself, nor was he bound in justice, to renew the supernatural graces or the natural powers, if we by our own fault forfeited them. His justice is satisfied in once bestowing them. But his demands against us do not cease because we by our fault lose the ability to comply with them. If we have lost the original graces, if we have debilitated our nature, so that we can no longer fulfil the destiny to which he appointed us, it certainly is not his fault. Then he is not bound to restore them. As he gave us all that was needed to gain the end he assigned us, and as he has a right to exact from us, and must exact from us or deny his own eternal justice, all that he has given us, he must continue to demand the fulfilment of our obligation, and demand precisely the same that would have been his due in case we had lost nothing. This is the plain and simple teaching of reason.

Here, then, we are by nature. We have forfeited or lost the ability, whether natural or supernatural, which we once had to gain the end to which we are appointed, and can no longer render unto God what we owe him ; for we owe him, not only what we now are, but all that we now are and all that we have lost. Now, before we can worship God in the manner he must prescribe, we must in some way be able to recover what we have lost, and render unto him all that we were originally bound, because originally able, to render unto him. How is this to be done ? It must be done, or we do not fulfil the obligation which we know by reason we are under ; if we do not fulfil that obligation, we cannot attain to the end for which we were intended ; and if we do not attain to that end, we fail of obtaining our true good, for our good is identical with our destiny. You see the difficulty, my brethren ; and how is it to be overcome ?

The question is the question of questions. It is terrible to feel that reason imposes an obligation which it cannot instruct us how to fulfil, to find ourselves with broad conceptions which we know not how to realize, with a sense of duty hanging over us which we cannot practically fulfil, — to hesitate between probabilities, to balance between uncertainties, to find the darkness increase as we advance, and finally to lose ourselves in doubt and bewilderment. But it is far more terrible to feel the burden of sin oppressing us, to know that we have wilfully disobeyed God, broken his law, forfeited his gifts, and are sinking down under his wrath with no power to rise, atone for our sins, and reconcile him to us. The burden of sin, of a debt you have contracted, are bound to pay, and have wilfully thrown away the means of paying, is of all burdens the heaviest. The soul, once become conscious of it, finds it intolerable, and in her fright and anguish shrieks out, What shall I do to be saved ? Reason herself, if exercised, is sufficient to enable, sufficient to compel, the soul to ask this fearful question ; but what is and must be our condition, if we ask this question, and hear no answer but echo mocking us in the distance ? Every man knows, without supernatural revelation, that he is in a fallen state, that he is but a wreck of a true man, and that he has personally sinned, and owes in eternal justice a debt he cannot pay, that he has squandered the means of paying, — that he has fallen below his destiny, — that there is for him as he is no destiny, no good, for ever ; but though by his natural light he can see this, he can by it see no help, no deliverance, no

issue. Justice is inexorable ; natural reason knows no mercy, no pardon ; nature can furnish no victim. The blood of bulls and goats has, and can have, no power in itself to purge the conscience, and wash away the stains of sin. There is to the eye of reason no deliverer, no protector, no shield between us and the divine vengeance which we have justly incurred. What can we do ?

Every man abandoned to nature and the guidance of natural reason alone does and must find himself in this situation, the most painful, the most terrible, that can be imagined. It is certain, that, in this situation, unless God helps us, there is no help for us ; that, unless he points out to us the way of deliverance, and grants us supernatural assistance, there are no means of our restoration, and no possible chance of our worshipping him as reason declares we are bound to worship him, or to gain the end, the good, to which we were appointed, and which was originally within our reach. Hence the necessity of supernatural revelation, and, perhaps, of supernatural assistance besides.

But it must be conceded, my brethren, that we cannot conclude the fact of supernatural assistance from its necessity, because the necessity is a necessity of our own creating, and our inability is the result of our own fault. If we were in our normal state, and if we had never been corrupted through sin, we could undoubtedly conclude the fact from the necessity, that what we did not possess naturally which we needed, either to fulfil our obligation or to gain our end, would be supernaturally supplied, and placed within our reach, so that we might avail ourselves of it, if we chose. But having forfeited what was once naturally or supernaturally supplied us, we cannot now, because we need it, conclude that it must be restored to us, and we still able to avail ourselves of it. Here is the sad condition in which we all now naturally are, and out of which by reason and nature alone there is clearly no issue.

Are we, however, left in this condition ? Has not God, in fact, had compassion on us, and has he not made us a revelation of his mercy ? Has he not provided redemption for us, and made it possible for us to regain our original standing, to cancel our obligations, to render him the worship which is his due, and to attain to the good which he originally intended us ? These are important questions, my brethren, and well worthy of your serious attention. If they can be answered in the affirmative, there is hope for man ; his face may resume the

smile of gladness, and a well of joy may spring up in his heart. If not, there is for us nothing but the blackness of despair, unfailling sorrow, and ceaseless remorse, — weeping and gnashing of teeth for all men. Turn not lightly from these questions. Engrossed with the world, with its cares, its follies, its gayeties, its dissipations, you may for a moment silence the voice of reason, and disregard the admonitions of conscience; but a day must come, for it comes to all men, when the record of your lives will be unrolled before you, and you will see yourselves as you are. May that day come to you ere it is too late !

ART. III. — *The Church, — as it was, as it is, as it ought to be. A Discourse delivered at the Dedication of the Chapel built by The Church of the Disciples, March 15, 1848. By JAMES F. CLARKE, Pastor of the Church. Boston : Benjamin H. Greene. 1848. 8vo. pp. 36.*

THE Church of the Disciples is a *reformed* Unitarian church, founded in this city, in 1841, under the auspices of the late William Ellery Channing, by James Freeman Clarke, to meet the wants of the disaffected among Unitarians, or persons who thought or felt that it was time to attempt something better than the Unitarianism of such men as Worcester, Bancroft, Ware, Norton, and Dewey. It is confined to a single congregation, and not unlikely will expire with its founder. It is a sort of syncretic church, founded, as it would seem, on the principle, that the true church must meet the wants and command the assent and the love of all men, and that to do so it must receive into its bosom the peculiar views of all who *profess* to be followers of Christ, from the Catholic to the Parkerite. The aim of the church is, not to exclude error, but to include truth ; and if it take in all doctrines, whether true or false, it will have all truth, if also all error ! The founder, it will be seen at a glance, is a prudent man, and a profound philosopher.

The Discourse before us was delivered at the dedication of a very neat and pretty chapel, which the Church of the Disciples has recently erected, by its founder and pastor. The text is St. Matt. xvi. 18, — “On this rock will I build my Church,” — and the design is to set forth the necessity there was

of founding a new church, and also the principles on which it was proper to found it. The author considers the Church — what he means by the Church it is not easy to say — as it was, as it is, as it ought to be, historically, critically, and prospectively, — thus assuming, by turns, the character of the historian, the critic, and the prophet. His subject, he tells us, “ becomes more and more interesting every year.”

“ The tendency of the age draws our minds toward it ; for in all things the present century tends toward union, harmony, synthesis, as plainly as the last century tended to division, individualism, analysis. We see this in the material world, in those inventions which make the inhabitants of the Atlantic coast a neighbour to the dweller on the Andes. We notice it in science, in the universal disposition to look at the analogies and harmonies of the Universe, and to trace one Plan running through the thousandfold varieties of Nature. In industrial life we seek for Combined Labor, where formerly Division of Labor was the watchword. So in religion, the Church Question, that is, the question of *Christian Union and Coöperation*, is beginning to have an especial interest. Men are growing weary of an excessive Individualism. They feel the loneliness of a merely independent thought and action. They say with the Poet,—

‘ Me this unchartered freedom tires.’

“ They feel also the need of sympathy and support under the responsibilities of life. So some would turn back to a Mother Church, and sit at her feet, and rest their overstrained conscience by accepting duties from her hands, instead of seeking them for themselves. They find a pleasure in limits instead of liberty. Others, again, taking up this *Church Question*, on the other side, seeking a larger union than that of any existing denomination, would make a new Church out of the whole Human Race. All Christian Churches which exist are so inadequate, that they will not allow that they are even *steps*, by which to reach a better, but regard them rather as impediments and stumbling-blocks, to be removed as soon as possible.” — pp. 4, 5.

The fact, that “ the Church Question ” is every year attracting more and more the attention of thoughtful men, is undeniable ; but that this question is simply the question of “ *Christian Union and Coöperation* ” is not quite so certain. Prior to the question of union and coöperation among Christians is the question, how, on what conditions, by what agencies, men are to become Christians. No one is a Christian by natural birth, or can be one, unless born again, spiritually regenerated. Men

must be Christians before they can unite and coöperate, and the Church question, we had supposed, is the question as to the necessity and office, or, in a word, the mission, of the Church in making them Christians, — in imparting to them the Christian life, and furnishing them with the requisite means to live it. This is the important question. Union and coöperation can never be wanting among Christians, if truly Christians, and plans and measures for their union and coöperation are superfluous. All we want is good Christians, and if we have them, there is no further question. Is the Church indispensable to the birth, growth, and training of Christians, or is she not? This is “the Church Question.”

The following is Mr. Clarke’s exposition of his text, which, if not ingenious, is at least original.

“Jesus is reported to have referred to a Church, *by name*, only on two occasions, — once when speaking of difficulties between brethren, when he says, ‘Tell it to the Church’; and again in our text. Here he places the Confession of Peter, — the deep conviction which Peter had and uttered, that his Master was God’s Christ; he places this as the solid foundation on which *his Church* should rest. He therefore believed that his disciples were about to constitute an Association, — a united body, whose principle of union would be faith in him; and his prophetic mind looked down the far distances of the future, and saw this Association deepening its roots and spreading abroad its branches until the birds of the air — the wandering and homeless spirits — should find a home in it.” — p. 5.

The Rock is not Peter, nor the truth which Peter professed, but Peter’s subjective conviction that “his Master was God’s Christ.” This original interpretation is necessary to be maintained. If Peter is the Rock, the Catholic Church is the only church to be admitted; if the truth Peter professed is the Rock, the Church must be built, whoever the builder, on the *truth*, — on the proper Divinity of our Lord, — and then it must exclude all error, and all who deny that Divinity, and, consequently, the Church of the Disciples and its founder. It was necessary to make the Rock subjective conviction, that is, not the truth itself, but men’s views of it, or it would be absurd to include within the Church doctrines and opinions which contradict one another, and are incapable of being harmonized.

The ordinary reading of the text makes our Lord the builder. “Thou art Peter, and on this Rock will *I* build my Church,

and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” But Mr. Clarke corrects this reading, and tells us that it should read, “Thou art Peter, and on this Rock I *believe* my disciples are about to constitute an Association, and I foresee that in this Association wandering and homeless spirits will find a home.” Mr. Clarke could not give any other interpretation to the text, without condemning himself and his associates; for if he should acknowledge that our Lord builds the Church, he would be bound, in order to be his disciple, to join that Church, instead of building one for himself on his own convictions or fancies. Consistency requires him to maintain, that not the Master, but the disciple, is the builder. The Scriptures may teach the reverse, but what of that? What is the value of private interpretation, if we may not interpret the Scriptures to suit ourselves? What is the use of liberty, if we are not free to explain the authorities on which we rely in harmony with our doctrines? If our authorities are against us, is it not a proof that they are wrong? Would you have us convict the Scriptures of error? Then you must permit us to explain them in accordance with our own convictions. Do you hint that these convictions may be wrong? What! the founder of the Church of the Disciples be wrong? If his convictions are erroneous, he has no moral right to entertain them. Would you deny him the right to his own convictions, that is, a man’s right to his own, and thus trample on the inalienable rights of the mind? Perish the thought! Therefore, —

“Instead of asking whether Jesus founded a Church, ask whether he did not evidently foresee that his disciples would unite together in an Association, the object of which should be to spread his gospel from land to land. This question is easily answered, — answered by his sending them out two and two, by his parables of the mustard-seed, and of the net, and by a multitude of his discourses. Jesus foresaw that this would be the case, he intended that it should be the case, — for such an Association was a necessary means to his end, and such an Association lay as a necessity in the very nature of the gospel.” — pp. 5, 6.

Mr. Clarke, as making the Church the work of the disciples, who found it on their own convictions, makes the Church subsequent to its members.

“And when it came, it came as a necessity. The apostles and disciples did not found a Church, but they found themselves in a Church. They were driven together by outward persecution, —

they were drawn together by an inward impulse. Read the first chapters of the Book of Acts and see how the Church of Christ was formed. Those disciples and women who had attended Jesus in his journeys, and constituted his family, *kept together* after his resurrection. One great thought filled all their minds, one commanding truth ruled their lives. They had known Jesus, and the memory of his life and truth filled to overflowing their intellect; the influence of his wonderful character was stamped upon theirs for ever. Another and more mysterious influence had changed them inwardly, — had given them courage for cowardice, — heroism for weakness, — a commanding eloquence in place of a stammering timidity. ‘*We cannot but speak of the things that we have seen and heard.*’ Herein lay the necessity of the Church. The Church at first was an *Ecclesia docens* very literally, a missionary Church altogether, a Church devoted in every member and person to preaching Christ, the Saviour, the Redeemer of men.

“Men under the law of such a necessity as this must keep together, must work in union, — how could it be otherwise? Gathered out of a social life composed of the hard bigotry of the Pharisee, the cold skepticism of the Sadducee, or the desperate sensuality of Heathenism, — and finding within their souls such a faith in an entire salvation from sin, — a new life of love, — free, earnest, ennobling, — having such a sympathy, and such a common aim, — here was laid the basis of the most noble friendship. Well might each repeat to the rest what Christ had said to them all: ‘Behold my mother and my brethren. For whosoever will do the will of God, the same is my mother and sister and brother.’” — pp. 6, 7.

Our readers must not be startled at the assertion here, that “the apostles and disciples did not found a Church.” They must not expect the author to be consistent with himself, or careful to make it appear that our Lord did not err when he believed his “disciples were about to constitute an Association.” His meaning probably is, that, although in point of fact they did constitute an Association, it was not voluntarily, intentionally, but from the pressure of outward and inward necessity. The point, however, to be noted is, that the disciples living the Christian life precede the Church, and the Church, instead of being necessary to the generation and support of that life, is merely its effect. The Church, then, derives its life from the union of its members; not its members theirs from union with it!

But the founder of the Church of the Disciples proceeds on the principle, that no view is to be excluded. Hence he says: —

“The favorite idea with the first Christians of the work of the Church was this: that it was to replace Christ’s body,—it was to be the earthly body by which his ascended spirit should still speak, teach, and act in the world, still heal the sick, raise the dead, cast out devils, and bless mankind. Every Christian was a living member of this body while in communion with the rest, and his life was received from Christ,—‘he lived by faith in the Son of God.’ The Lord’s Supper was the bond of union and brotherhood. ‘The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? For we, being many, are one bread and one body, for we all are partakers of that *one* bread.’ Hence the argument for mutual toleration. As the foot and hand and eye and tongue have each a different office, yet all are necessary to the integrity of the body, so may the various tendencies of character and opinion among Christians be controlled toward a common aim by that living faith in Christ which is the principle of life in all.” — pp. 7, 8.

This, if it means any thing, means the reverse of what preceded it. “Every Christian was a living member of this body while in communion with the rest, and his life was received from Christ”; that is, the Christian receives his life from Christ through communion with his body. This makes the body anterior to the members, and supposes the members live by virtue of their union with the body; which is according to analogy. The human body does not receive its life from its members, but they receive theirs from their union with it; and instead of their union with each other constituting the body, they are *members* only by virtue of their union with the body. If Mr. Clarke regards the Church as the *body* of Christ, through which Christ is received, he must conceive it as preceding its members, and them as of it, not it as of them,—a totally different doctrine from the one he began by laying down. But if the members are of the body and it not of them, how can it be maintained that the disciples form, found, or constitute it? By what right do the disciples undertake to form a church of their own, instead of uniting themselves to the body of Christ? Again, if we live by communion with the body of Christ, which is that body? Is it any body calling itself the body of Christ? If not, what are the marks by which it is to be discerned? Does it still exist? If so, why found a new church? If not, if it has failed, what do you make of the promise that the gates of hell should not prevail against it? We forget,—the promises of Christ are of no authority with our friend, unless for him; and he proceeds on the principle, that of contraries both may be true,—a new logical discovery!

Thus much for the origin and foundation of the Church. The author now proceeds to the criticism of the Church as it was and as it is.

"Such was the Church of Christ at first, — simple in its organization, noble in its aim, full of a profound life and an immense energy. Its only Creed was Faith in Christ. Its organization was flexible, enlarging as its wants were multiplied. It was a living, loving, and working Church.

"Now let us pass on. Many centuries go by, and instead of that simple body of earnest believers, we now find an immense and consolidated Organization — a powerful Hierarchy — spread through many lands, but bound together by the cohesive attraction belonging to a sacred order of persons. It had noble Cathedrals, every stone of which was carved with reverence, and laid with religious awe.

'The hand that rounded Peter's dome,
And groined the aisles of Christian Rome,
Wrought in a sad sincerity.
Himself from God he could not free.
He builded better than he knew;
The conscious stone to beauty grew.'

So that we repeat to-day, in these our edifices, the ideas of those Mediæval Christians; and until we can build something to express the Christian ideas of our own age, we cannot do better than repeat theirs. This Church had a solemn ritual, adapted to every part of human life. It met the new-born babe at its entrance into the world, washed from its brow the taint of hereditary evil, and placed those tender feet in the way of salvation. It blessed the marriage vow of love, and invested the earthly tie with the sanctity of a diviner meaning. It opened its solemn Cathedrals, as sanctuaries for the sinner, — it opened a listening ear for the confessions of the penitent, and gave him pardon, — it gave in the Eucharist a present God as food for the soul, — it brought to the sick-bed a sacred comfort, touched the forehead of the dying with the sign of safety, — it laid the dead in a consecrated grave. Did youth grow sick of youthful folly, did the maiden long for more than a virgin sanctity, — it opened its Religious Houses, where in the calm pursuits of piety life might move upward as it moved onward, — upward toward an eternal joy. Thus beneficent and tender toward its children, the Church was awful in its rebuke of the tyrant and the oppressor. It planted its foot on the neck of the despot, and restrained him whom no other force could check. It collected libraries, and opened schools, and taught sciences to a barbarous people, and stood a beacon light of knowledge in a benighted age. Such was the aspect of the Christian Church in its second principal epoch." — pp. 9 – 11.

One would naturally think that a church of which all this is

to be said might escape condemnation. "It met the new-born babe at its entrance into the world, washed from its brow the taint of hereditary evil, and placed those tender feet in the way of salvation." It, then, had all things necessary to salvation. What, then, did it lack?

"For many centuries this great Organization was the efficient instrument of spreading Christian truth through the world. Never realizing its Idea, it often approached it; and its essential defects long lay concealed. But at last it appeared that the Catholic Church, in working out the formula, 'Many members, but one body,' had caused the unity of the body to oppress and destroy the individuality of the members. The Catholic Church in attaining union had lost freedom. And with the loss of individual freedom also went sincerity and depth of intellectual and moral life. Force and fraud usurped the office of reason. The *teaching Church*, instead of convincing men of the truth of its doctrines, cheated them into an outward conformity, or burnt them at the stake for a sincere utterance of their unbelief. Outward pomp and power took more and more the place of inward piety and love. All felt that something was wrong, — none knew how the wrong was to be righted. Then God sent the Reformation, as he sends a storm to purify a stagnant and corrupting atmosphere." — p. 11.

Did not the Church realize her ideal in her Saints? If she did not realize it in all men, was it her fault, or the fault of those who refused to yield her obedience and to use the means she supplied? But "the unity of the body oppressed and destroyed the individuality of the members." We would ask the proof of this assertion, but the founder of the Church of the Disciples is not much accustomed to deal in proofs, and he would most likely treat our demand with silent contempt. As some persons have asserted it, he of course must accept it, or there would be one view excluded by his church, which is bound to include *all* views. But is it not a little remarkable, that, if the Church was as good as he represents her, she should have behaved so improperly, and done such naughty things? Only think of a church that meets the infant on his entrance into the world, cleanses him from hereditary guilt, and places him in the way of salvation, — a church "beneficent and tender towards its children," "awful in its rebuke of the tyrant and the oppressor," "planting its foot on the neck of the despot, and restraining him whom no other force could check," "blessing the marriage vow, and investing the earthly tie with a diviner meaning," listening to "the confessions of the penitent, and giving him pardon," "giving in the Eucharist a *present God as food*

for the soul," "bringing to the sick-bed a sacred comfort," "touching the forehead of the dying with the sign of *safety*," and opening Religious Houses where "life might move upward toward an eternal joy," — only think of such a church oppressing and destroying the individuality of its members, wanting sincerity and depth of intellectual and moral life, suffering "force and fraud to usurp the office of reason," cheating men into mere "outward conformity," and substituting "outward pomp and power" for "inward piety and love"! Does a good tree bring forth corrupt fruit? Or has the founder of the Church of the Disciples interpreted history as he does the Scriptures, — to suit the exigencies of his theory?

"But at last it appeared that the Catholic Church, in working out the formula, 'Many members, but one body,' had caused the unity of the body to oppress and destroy the individuality of the members." *Appeared*. When? Where? To whom? *Appeared*. But was it so in reality? *Appeared*. Is it certain that it did so appear, and not rather that men have said it so appeared, because they wanted some pretext for their hostility to the Church, and could not devise a better?

"The teaching Church, instead of convincing men of the truth of its doctrines, cheated them into an outward conformity, or burnt them at the stake for a sincere utterance of their unbelief." This, if asserted of Protestants, is true enough, — but if of the Catholic Church, it is false; for she has never done any such thing. If she is the Church of God, as she must be, if what Mr. Clarke says in her favor be true, her teaching is the highest conceivable reason for believing, and if men are not convinced by the highest reason, the Supreme Reason itself, the fault is their own. Sincerity in unbelief, where the truth is taught, or the unbeliever has, if he chooses to use them, ample means of ascertaining it, is impossible, and the unbelief marks only a cracked head or a rotten heart. The Church, as Mr. Clarke concedes, believed and taught the truth, all the truth necessary to salvation. Which, then, was in the wrong, she in insisting on it, or the unbeliever in obstinately denying it, in reviling it, trampling it under his feet, and doing all in his power to establish the dominion of falsehood, and therefore of slavery and death?

Mr. Clarke and his friends, aware of the absurdity of the old charges against the Church, dwell much on her unfavorable influence on individual freedom. But the Church, if what she professed to be, that is, the Church of God, taught and commanded by divine authority, and therefore could not oppress or

destroy any freedom, individual or social. Who dare accuse Almighty God of tyranny and oppression? Her authority was legitimate, and obedience to legitimate authority is not incompatible with freedom, but, in fact, is its essential characteristic. The objection brought is, then, a mere begging of the question. You must dispossess the Church of her legitimacy, of her divine commission, and prove her to be but a human institution, like your own Church of the Disciples, before you can allege that her acts were tyrannical and oppressive.

But the fault of the Church, in the eyes of the founder of the Church of the Disciples, is, we presume, that she insists on consistency, and does not acknowledge the moral right of mortals to give the lie to their Creator, that she does not accept the logic which teaches that of contraries both may be true, and refuses to assert the right of her children to disobey her commands, to break away from her communion, and set up new churches according to their own fancies, to revile the Church of Christ, and found the Church of the Disciples. As a Catholic, Mr. Clarke could not have founded a church of his own, built on his own creed, speculations, wild fancies, or even deep convictions, but would have been bound to demean himself as an humble member of the Church founded by Almighty God on eternal and immutable truth. But not to have the liberty to found a church for one's self, to draw up its creed, and establish its liturgy, is to be deprived of individual freedom; and as Catholicity undeniably does not allow this, it is undeniable that she oppresses and destroys individual freedom! Here is her offence. But will the founder of the Church of the Disciples be so good as to inform us how and where he finds his right to found a church of his own, and call it *Christian*? Will he show us where, in Revelation or in Reason, he finds his patent as a churchmonger?

So much for the Church which was; now for the Church that is, or Protestantism.

"In the Protestant Church the principle of individual conscience, personal freedom, and independent religious life again found its utterance. The idea of individual responsibility was revived, and with it came a new moral life, — pure and healthy as the breezes which sweep over the hills on an October morning. This idea was salt, to save the world from corruption. The Protestant Reformation was as necessary to renew the moral life of mankind, as Christianity was at first. Without Christianity, the world was going to ruin. Without the Reformation, the Church was going to ruin.

"I know the defects of Protestantism. They are apparent. In working out the formula, 'Many members, but one body,' Protestantism saves the variety of the members, but loses the unity of the body. *In attaining Freedom, it loses Union.* Hence narrowness, ultraism, bigotry, sectarianism. Hence weakness and inefficiency in every part, according to the law, that 'if one member suffers, all suffer,' — if one member is isolated, and rejected from the communion of the rest, the life of all is weakened and impaired; for each need all, and all need each.

"These evils are now seen and felt by all Protestants. All feel that our disunion will be sooner or later our destruction. Various remedies are proposed, most of them sufficiently superficial. The most common is the sectarian prescription, — 'Let all other sects join mine, — all other denominations be merged in mine.' This we need not dwell upon. It is not only impossible for all Protestant denominations to be merged in one, but if it could be, it would bring only a swifter destruction. If the whole body were the eye, where were the hearing? Nor need we dwell on such shallow devices as the Evangelical Alliance. Two main tendencies have resulted from the divisions of Protestantism; one, a backward tendency toward Romanism, — the other, a forward tendency toward a yet greater Individualism." — pp. 11 – 13.

Protestantism "in attaining freedom loses union." Catholicity failed by excess of union, Protestantism by excess of liberty; neither knew how to hit the exact medium, and to harmonize union with liberty, or liberty with union. This delicate point is left for the founder of the Church of the Disciples, who combines in himself all the science and wisdom of the Catholic and Protestant worlds, and more too. It is amusing to see a right-down hearty egotist, who does not hesitate to set himself up against the whole world, and to tell them that he knows more than they all put together. Indeed, such a man falls only "one step" short of the sublime.

That Protestantism loses union is no doubt true, but that it ever attains to freedom may be denied. Every man who has been a Protestant, and has had sense enough to understand his position, knows full well that Protestantism is subversive of all freedom, individual, social, religious, and moral. Nothing can be more galling than the slavery to which Protestantism everywhere subjects both the mind and the heart of its votaries. The day the Protestant becomes a Catholic is the day of his emancipation. It is then, and then only, that his fetters are knocked off, the collar removed from his neck, and he is permitted to feel himself a free man. All this, no doubt, is unintel-

ligible to our author ; yet it is none the less true on that account. But Protestantism has failed ; its friends feel that their present position is untenable. What shall they do ? Some of them are for going back to Rome, others forward to greater Individualism. Of the tendency of the former the author says : —

“ In individual instances, where our friends and acquaintances join the Romish Church, there may be reason either to be glad of it or to grieve. If they join the Church of Rome because they need its peculiar influence for their own good, if, never having found peace in Christ elsewhere, they do find it there, ought we not to rejoice in such a result ? Why should we doubt that some minds are better fitted to find a personal union with God by the methods of the Catholic Church than by any other ? But there are other cases, for which we may well grieve, in which these methods are accepted as substitutes for an interior faith, and a partisan rancor and proselytizing zeal are the bitter evidences of their wilfulness. In such cases the proselyte is made tenfold more a child of hell than before. The sense of truth is blunted, the conscience is seared, and the inward eye closed against the sight of God and the Saviour.” — p. 13.

The latter class described here, we presume, is intended to take in such converts as devote themselves in earnest to the propagation of Catholicity, and have no toleration for false and heretical systems of doctrine or belief. These must needs appear to the author to be animated by “ a partisan rancor and proselytizing zeal ” quite objectionable. But how can the Church, if obnoxious to the charges he brings against her, supply for any class of persons the most appropriate and successful methods of finding “ personal union with God ” ? Has not the author solemnly assured us that the Church “ oppresses and destroys the individuality of her members,” that she “ loses freedom,” that she wants “ sincerity and depth of moral life,” that in her “ force and fraud usurp the office of reason,” that she cheats men “ into an outward conformity,” and substitutes “ outward pomp and power ” for “ inward piety and love ” ? How, then, can he say, that some minds “ need its peculiar influence for their own good,” find in it a “ peace in Christ ” which they do not find elsewhere, and “ are better fitted to find a personal union with God by [its] methods than by any other ” ? If his charges are true, the Catholic Church is the church of the devil ; and are we to hold that a portion of mankind need the church of the devil, “ the syna-

gogue of Satan," as the means of attaining to personal union with God? It strikes us as absurd, after having brought such serious charges against the Church, to admit that she is or can be necessary or useful unto salvation for any body. To our old-fashioned way of reasoning, the admission surrenders the charges.

But "the main tendency toward Romanism [Catholicity] must be regarded as only an eddy in the stream of the Church's progress. Rome has tried its experiment — and failed." (p. 13.) The Protestant churches cannot go back to her. The tendency to greater Individualism is natural, has much to excuse it, but upon the whole is not to be encouraged. "The Churches have not been without their useful action." "The need of Church union, Church action, is rooted in man's nature." (p. 18.) What, then, shall our Protestants do? They cannot go back; they must not go forward; and to stand still where they are is death. What shall they do?

"This brings us to the third and last division of our Discourse, which is Prospective. *The Church as it is to be.* What will be the elements of the *Church of the Future*?

"We have asserted that our Protestant Churches cannot go back to Romanism, nor forward into Individualism and No-Churchism. Nor can they remain where they are, in their present state of division and opposition. Sooner or later they must come together. The *Church of the Future* must therefore be a *comprehensive Church*, taking into itself as independent but harmonizing elements all the tendencies which now appear embodied in separate sects. But they cannot unite on any narrow ground, nor upon any compromise or concession of their particular ideas. They must become large enough to admit, each its own limitations, each to confess its own narrowness, each to own a peculiar excellence in the others which may meet and supply its own deficiency. They must understand the deep meaning of the Apostolic Idea, — 'Many members, one body.' They must believe in Providence, and if a movement comes, bending the minds of men in one direction, as the ripe wheat bends before the breeze, they must accept in this movement a Providential meaning, instead of rejecting it as a new outbreak of heresy. They must be able to distinguish such a movement, coming spontaneously and universally, from the effects of human wilfulness, brought about by artificial combinations and manœuvres." — pp. 19, 20.

This answer puzzles us. Protestants must, it seems, come together; but in what direction are they to move in order to come together? They must not go backward or forward, for

the one would bring them to Rome, and the other would carry them into greater Individualism, already too great. Shall they move sideways, to the right hand or to the left? But what save a yawning gulf is on either side? Nothing remains, but to sink lower or to rise higher. But surely they are low enough already, and it is difficult to imagine for them, at present, a "lower deep." But if they are to rise higher, how are they to overcome the natural gravitation which keeps them on their present level, or must, if not overcome, however high they may spring up by a sudden jump, always bring them down to it? It would gratify us much to be enlightened on these points.

Our readers must bear in mind, that the problem the author seeks to solve is not, as they might naturally suppose, the problem of salvation. When he tells us Rome has failed and Protestantism has also failed, he has no thought of telling us that either has proved insufficient as a means of eternal salvation. Any religion, or none, suffices for the world to come. The failure is solely in relation to this life, in reference to our proper social organization and comfortable subsistence here. The nineteenth century is too enlightened to entertain the old doctrines of judgment and hell, or to trouble itself with any apprehensions about the future. The atheist Shelley and the saintly Fénelon will as a matter of course fare alike. This century will never believe that God will reward the saint and damn the man of genius or talent, however the latter may abuse his gifts. The problem is simply, How to organize mankind so as to secure on the one hand unity, and on the other liberty, or, more practically, How to govern men without ever restraining them.

Catholicity, it is said, secured the unity, but lost the freedom; Protestantism secures the liberty, but loses the unity. How to secure the one without losing the other is now the question, and a question which, it is assumed, has never yet been answered. The author of the Discourse, who appears to take it for granted that he contains in himself all the wisdom of Catholicity and Protestantism, besides a wisdom surpassing both, undertakes to answer this question, and answers it in what he calls *The Church of the Future*, that is, a church which is not yet, but is to be, and is to have a flexibility, a power of contraction and expansion, which will adapt it to all the future exigencies of the race. But what is to be the principle of this Church of the Future? It is, as far as we can collect, that all errors are to be tolerated for the sake of the truths

they contain. The world has hitherto gone wrong, made a capital mistake ; it has not only sought truth, but it has been intolerant of error. It has supposed it desirable to have truth without mixture of falsehood, and has therefore sought to exclude error from its systems, which has necessarily led to the exclusion of those wedded to the error. Hence these were not left free to follow their own convictions. This capital mistake must be corrected. All systems, however erroneous, contain each an element of truth, and it is for the sake of that element that each is embraced and defended. The true way is to accept all systems, whether true or false, each with all its peculiarities, and it is only in this way that we can expect all men to come together ; for “they cannot unite on any narrow ground, nor upon any compromise or concession of their particular ideas.” The sects “must become large enough to admit each its own limitations, each to confess its own narrowness, each to own a peculiar excellence in the others, which may meet and supply its own deficiency.” It is clear from this that the Church of the Future is to accept and retain all systems, true or false, which mankind have adopted, and each with all its peculiarities.

But this is possible only on condition that the several systems or religions of mankind are only so many particulars under one and the same universal, and therefore, without giving up any thing essential to them, resolvable into a higher unity, as all men may be resolved into one man in humanity. But this is not the fact. These religions are mutually contradictory, and it is an essential property of each to exclude all but itself. The Protestant denies what the Catholic asserts ; the Unitarian asserts the contrary of what is asserted by the Trinitarian. Where is the general doctrine in which the views of both parties can be harmonized ? Every religious system is a general system, on the plane of the highest conceivable unity, and if it is not permitted to exist as a general system, it is not permitted to exist at all. How, then, can all exist together, each in its essential character, without excluding the others ?

The sect, it seems, is to recognize its own limitations, confess its own narrowness, and to become large enough to find an excellence in the others to supply its own deficiency. When this occurs, will it retain its peculiarities, its “particular ideas,” its limitations, narrowness, and deficiency ? Of course not. Then it loses itself in the union of the whole, and you have union without variety,—the very objection you bring against

Catholicity. Moreover, by what agency or process are your sects to become large enough to change their nature, and no longer exclude one another, but each embrace the others as its complement, and this, too, without any compromise or concession? Even suppose the resolution of all into a higher unity to be conceivable in itself, how is it to be practically effected, with only what each now is and has? Equals from equals, if we have not forgotten our arithmetic, give zero for remainder.

Let it be, again, that each sect has an element of truth, yet, inasmuch as it is a sect, it holds this element in a false light, in false relations, and therefore combined with falsehood. Truth combined with falsehood is truth corrupted, that is, error. The characteristic of each sect is, therefore, its peculiar error. To gather all, with their distinctive characters, with their peculiar or particular ideas, into the Church of the Future, is not to found that church on universal truth, but on the agglomerated errors of all the world. It would then be founded, not on the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, but on error, all error, and nothing but error. Was it the fault of the Church "as it was" that it professed to build on truth, — pure, unmixed, universal truth? — and is it the merit of the Church "as it ought to be" that it is to build avowedly on error?

But enough. Nobody disputes that mankind never embrace systems which are purely and absolutely false, or that every system, however erroneous it may be, contains or turns on some element of truth, which the true Church must acknowledge and integrate in her teaching. That Protestantism, for instance, is an attempt to realize a truth, a great truth, if you will, nobody is silly enough to deny; but it does not follow from this that Protestantism has a truth that Catholicity has not. Protestantism may attempt to realize a truth already realized in the Church, and the reason why it attempts to realize it out of the Church may be that it has corrupted it, and turned it, by the false relations in which it holds it, into an error. Strip the doctrine of its false clothing, it may be true, and in the only relations in which it can be true, it may be held by the Church. We know, you assume that the Reformers broke away from the Church because they had attained to a truth which she would not suffer them to maintain in her communion; but it may be that what they called a truth was a truth corrupted, and that she forbade them to maintain it in her communion, not because she rejected the truth, but because she could not tolerate the corruption. If so, Protestantism,

instead of proving the defects of Catholicity, proves only the ignorance, the error, or the malice of Protestants. The Church, notwithstanding the element you find in Protestantism, may still have all truth, in its unity and integrity.

Mr. Clarke assumes that each sect has a special element of truth, which it is its mission to realize, and concludes, therefore, that all sects are necessary for the realization of the whole truth. Would it not be more correct to say that each sect has a special element of truth, which it is its mission to corrupt? Every sect holds what truth it has out of its unity and integrity, otherwise it would not be a sect; but truth so held is error, truth corrupted. All the sects, then, are necessary, not to realize the whole truth, but to corrupt it, and the history of the several Christian sects, from the early Ebionites and Gnostics down to those of Mr. Clarke and Mr. Parker, shows that they have successively attacked and corrupted every article in the Symbol from the *In Patrem Omnipotentem* to the *Vitam æternam*, and developed every possible form of error.

Taking his view of the mission of the sects, Mr. Clarke supposes, that, in order to get the whole truth, it is necessary to collect from each its special element of truth; for he denies the existence of any church which embraces the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But the idea of making up the true religion from the aggregate of false or erroneous religions strikes us as worthy only of the enlightened men and women of the nineteenth century. The true religion must have existed in its unity and integrity before it could have existed in a divided state; for truth is older than error, unless the universe originated in falsehood. But supposing it were true that it exists now only in fragments, scattered hither and thither through all the various sects and parties which divide mankind, where is the diligent Isis to go forth on her painful search, to collect these disjected members of the torn body of Osiris, and to mould them anew into a complete, harmonious, living, and prolific whole? What mortal man who has not already the whole truth is able to do it? And who, if he could succeed in collecting all the fragments, has the plastic power to reunite them, and endow the restored body with life and fecundity?

The error is not in supposing that the various sects revolve each around a special view of truth, but in supposing that truth is divided out among them, and that it nowhere exists in its unity and integrity, as a living whole. The search, if necessary, would be unsuccessful, — for poor Isis did not succeed, and the

moral of the fable should not be unheeded. Truth, once torn and dissevered, can never be recovered or restored, save by the God of truth himself. But the truth has never been so torn and dispersed. We challenge Mr. Clarke or any one else to name, himself being judge, a single truth or excellence in a sect, which we cannot show him integrated in the doctrine and discipline of the Catholic Church, and harmonized with all else that he will concede to be true or excellent. The problem which tortures him, and which no man, nor all men together, can solve, namely, How to reconcile association with individuality, the unity of the body with the freedom of the members, faith with reason, authority with freedom, is solved in our Church, as is proved by the learned and philosophical Father Taparelli, in the article which immediately succeeds this in the present number of our Review, and is no problem for us. If we, as Catholics, do not trouble our heads with such problems, if we do not appear to set any very high value on the truth or excellence supposed to be possessed by the world without, it is not because we are so stupid as not to be aware of them, nor because we are too narrow-minded and bigoted to acknowledge truth and excellence, wherever we find them ; but because Almighty God has himself solved the problems for us, and because we know that whatever truth or excellence there may be without, it can be at best but a pale reflection of that within, — a feeble copy of the rich and glowing originals in our possession.

These poor Protestants, who think themselves so mighty wise, these founders of new churches, who fancy that they have surpassed in knowledge all the world, because they have learned a few things they did not know in their own infancy, would find, if they were able to understand, that we commence, in the Catechism, the instruction of our children at a point far in advance of the most advanced post they, with all their progress, have yet attained to. Our very children would compassionate their ignorance, could they but comprehend it. Even the old pagan philosophers would look down upon them with pity or contempt. Poor men ! they have fallen so far below the ordinary Christian understanding, that they cannot comprehend the simplest Christian instructions ; and are raving, and tearing, and foaming, and sweating, and exhausting themselves in vain to find out what they may read in the first two questions and answers in the child's Catechism, and to sound what God himself founded ages ago, which still exists, and will exist till time is no more. Simple souls ! do they suppose we are such fools

as not to know all they tell us, — that we need to be taught what lies on the mere surface of things? Ah! if they could but for one moment conceive how ridiculous they appear in their pretensions, to men who have been taught by a MASTER, they would not know where to hide themselves.

ART. IV. — *Influence of Catholic Prayer on Civilization.*
*A Dissertation delivered before the Academy DI RELIGIONE CATTOLICA at Rome, by FATHER LOUIS TAPARELLI D' AZEGLIO, of the Society of Jesus, Professor of Philosophy in the Royal College of Palermo. Translated from the original Italian expressly for this Review, from the Roman Journal *Annali delle Scienze Religiose*, edited by Professor Arrighi.*

[We have been so well pleased with the following Dissertation on the *Influence of Catholic Prayer on Civilization*, by the well-known Father Taparelli, that we translate and present it entire to our readers, sure that they will prize it far above any thing which we can offer them of our own. It is an essay which, if studied, will be found to be especially adapted to our times and country, — to teach the truths which we need now more than ever, and to correct the folly and madness of those who are seeking to advance civilization and to elevate the laboring classes by methods which leave out religion, and place reliance on humanity alone. The author is justly distinguished for eminent abilities, solid learning, and genuine philosophical attainments. He is evidently a man of keen insight, and of deep and earnest thought, who has studied in the best human schools, and, what is far better, at the foot of the crucifix, and practised the prayer of which he treats. He is a philosopher and a sincere and devoted Catholic, — knows his age and loves his religion. His Dissertation is one of the ablest that we have ever read; and it is refreshing, in these days of sciolists and shallow pretenders, when so many write and so few think, so many read and so few meditate, to meet with a production which bears at once the marks of mature intellect, of genuine science, and unaffected piety. In a few words, and apparently without intending it, it refutes and utterly explodes all the systems of the Economists, Communists, and Associationists, — the gods of this godless age; and renders ridiculous the loud shout of LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY, in a merely humanitarian sense, which just now comes upon our ears with deafening force, from almost every land. We beg our Catholic friends to read it, and cling still firmer to their religion; we beg our Protestant friends to read and understand it, and learn, before it is too late, to regret that Church which their fathers in their pride and madness rejected. It opens rich veins of thought, suggests trains of reflection, presents striking and original views, valuable at all times, but especially so now, when men

are so generally disposed to reverse the admonition of our Saviour, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you," and to lay down the rule, "Seek first all these things, and the kingdom of God and his justice shall be added unto you," — or if not, it is just as well.]

I.

WHEN, in a divine institution even apparently remote from human affairs, we find certain bearings and proportions to human objects in what they have naturally worthy of praise, so that God appears to coöperate in a measure with man, it is right that such connection be made manifest; not, indeed, as some, perhaps, think, for the sake of begging the applause of those who are called philanthropists, but rather for the sake of adducing new instances to illustrate the infinite wisdom of the Divine Institutor. For his wisdom excites our admiration more strikingly when we behold the vivifying rays which diverge from it as a centre, conveying sudden light and warmth into far distant regions, where their influence was not even suspected. Now, though I am not bold enough to assert that *the influence of Catholic prayer on civilization* has not been remarked by minds accustomed to reflection, I can safely say that many blind unbelievers and many well-inclined Catholics fail to understand the immense control exerted over the universal well-being of society by the institution I have proposed to examine. The Catholic, full of faith and desirous of insuring a blissful immortality, will aim all but exclusively at this in prayer, scarcely deeming worthy of notice any of its temporal advantages, in comparison with its spiritual efficacy. Infidels, on the other hand, whether they look upon prayer as a superstitious weakness of good souls who have more piety than wit, or, *out of condescension*, as *an affair of the heart between man and God*, will surely be far from believing that the exercise of Catholic prayer has any thing to do with the great object they declaim of so frequently, — the general happiness of nations. If, therefore, I can prove that there is so close a relationship between social amelioration and prayer, as used by Catholics, as to show prayer in the light of one of the most efficient means instituted for that end by the Creator, besides having the satisfaction of breathing a new hymn to the wisdom of the Founder of Christianity, I may hope to do some good to virtuous Catholics by pointing out new reasons why they should pray, drawn from the present state of society; and to unbelievers by reconciling them intellectually, at least, to what they call *idle mysti-*

cism. Accordingly, I assert the following proposition :— *Catholic prayer, apparently only designed to obtain graces from heaven, is one of the most active causes of civilization and social welfare.*

It is easy to perceive what grateful admiration a convincing proof of such an assertion is calculated to excite of the Divine Wisdom which established and governs the Church. For is it not a wonderful thing, that a man apparently plain and simple, gathering around him in a remote part of Palestine twelve unlettered fishermen, prompting them with a prayer to God as *our Father*, and teaching them to commemorate his death by breaking a mystical bread, should have cast the germ, which, by its miraculous fecundity, has been a powerful, though not the only, cause of the great change effected in the pagan world by Christian civilization ? Who could refrain from an expression of thankfulness and admiration at such a sight ; — admiration of Him, who, discerning in an instrumentality, which the world would deem utterly unequal to the task, a hidden force, great in its power, though slow in its action, applied it to produce in remote centuries effects far more imposing than its apparent efficacy, — thankfulness to Him, who, directing us to seek first of all things the kingdom of God, prepared for us at the same time, as an addition, the greatest of temporal goods, civil perfection ?

“ The study of the history of the Catholic Church in her relations to civilization,” says Balmes, “ leaves much to be desired, as it has not yet been made the object of those wonderful compilations which have thrown so much light upon it in a dogmatical and critical point of view.”* Now, in order to supply such an omission, it is necessary to consider attentively every part of this wonderful institution of the Almighty, and to investigate, one by one, the evidences of its force, and its results. Studied with such minute inspection, the anatomy of the human body has become, as it has been beautifully expressed, *a hymn to the Creator* ; but that hymn would rise far more sublime and harmonious from the anatomical analysis of the social system of the most noble and perfect of societies, society divinely organized.

Let us, then, endeavour to establish the proposition by proof. Could I hope to be equal to the grandeur of my subject, I might consider myself as making an ample return for the condescension to which I am indebted for the honor of being en-

* *El Protestantismo comparado con el Catolicismo.* Barcelona. 1842. Tom. I. p. 203.

rolled as a member of your illustrious Academy. But as every divine institution, by participating of infinitude, goes far beyond the limited capacity of man, and much more the humble abilities of him who addresses you, I may hope at least, by my goodwill and sincere effort, to show you my gratitude for an honor unmerited on my part, although I do possess its most essential requisite, that of being a devoted CATHOLIC.

The starting-point from which we can fairly move will be the consideration of a well-known truth, that lends my proposition a first and wide demonstration. "Ancient civilization, in most instances, was called to life on the threshold of the temple, by the voice of the priest, under the inspiration of sacred hymns." This truth, as Cantù justly observes, is clearly indicated even by the names of cities of the remotest antiquity. *Heliopolis*, *Diospolis*, *Hermopolis*, *Apollonopolis*, and other names of the kind, recall to our minds a sanctuary around which was built a large city. And this argument, taken from the ancients, is strengthened by modern usage. For do we not frequently hear among ourselves the name of a saint applied to a borough or a town built around his church? In the New World, where the true religion, almost of herself, first really fulfilled what had been fabulously attributed to Orpheus, every *reduction* arose with a sacred name, to the sound of canticles, breathed by him whom the Indian addressed (opportunately for our argument) as *the Father of the prayer*, who in reality inaugurates association at its commencement by bringing all together for morning and evening prayer.*

I am well aware that an argument of this kind will seem weak in my favor, precisely on account of its generality. For if all religions produced these effects, what force can a similar fact have in support of Catholic prayer, of which alone it was intended to discourse? But if we pause for a moment to reflect that every negation (short of *nothing*) necessarily involves a positive element, and consequently every false religion involves some element of truth, it will be understood that if Pagan civilization was occasioned by some remnant of the ancient patriarchal maxims, or even only by those natural ideas of God which Tertullian calls *the testimony of the soul naturally Christian*, these facts also may be adduced as proof of our assertion, provided we can show that the civilizing power of the ancient hierophants was derived, not from falsehoods superadded, but from inherited truths. This, as you perceive, might be easily proved;

* See the *Annals of the Propagation of the Faith*.

but it is scarcely worth while to undertake it, as the abundance of the proofs obliges me rather to condense than to enlarge them.

Let us, then, exclude every common attribute, defining clearly what we mean when we speak of *Catholic prayer*. Considered in its general import, it embraces every elevation of the mind to God, excited by faith, animated by charity, aided by the Sacrifice and the Sacraments, guided by the authority of the Church, and directed chiefly to the end of supernatural eternal happiness, by means of good works. This is, in a few words, the notion of Catholic prayer. When it forms a habit in the heart of the faithful, this habit may be called *the spirit of prayer*. The infidel does not pray; the unbeliever prays, but to obtain those goods towards which nature attracts him, and he prays for them in favor of himself and his friend with energy proportionate to his individual conviction of the existence of a God who governs the world, and of the benevolence of that God towards those who address him. The heretic also prays through his Catholic remembrances; but if his heterodoxy be called to mind, he rejects the Catholic prayer, and is rejected by it, on account of his protesting against the ancient faith. His prayer, therefore, *inasmuch as it is heterodox*, rises from the division of intellects, as *schismatical* prayer from the division of affections. And as these, by departing from Catholic unity, necessarily lose both the firmness of belief and the bond of charity, their prayer, if they should pray, will be weak and unsettled in the mind, will be narrow and irritable in the affections.

There is a vast difference, therefore, between the Catholic prayer, and every other suggested by unfaithfulness or by error. Truth, certainty, love, are principles of activity; external rites and presiding authority are principles of unity; eternal life, to which Catholic prayer chiefly aspires, is a principle of generosity, and of entire sacrifice of paltry worldly interest. As every other religious association is either altogether or in a great measure deprived of these elements, it is evident that they must be deprived also of all the happy effects that accrue to society from the spirit of prayer, exclusively proper to the Catholic Church.

To have a just notion, however, of this influence, it must be borne in mind that two conditions are thereto required, — conditions indispensable in every social organization, — where it is not sufficient that the means of attaining a given object be excellent in themselves, but, moreover, must be such as the will of people consents to make use of. What good can come from a physi-

cian's prescribing the most powerful remedy, if I am unable to purchase it, or will not swallow it? "*The best laws*," says a beastly and filthy, but in practical matters a keen-sighted English lawyer (Jeremy Bentham), "the best laws are those that, without need of watching, sanctioning, or insisting, execute themselves, so to speak, by themselves." If Catholic prayer is to be called a proper *means* to civilize people, we must consider it, not only as *efficacious*, but as *attractive*.

Here, then, are the terms to which my proposition is limited by the foregoing observations. I maintain that the Author and Finisher of faith, wishing to complete through the supernatural order the natural perfection of man, which attains its fulness in perfectly civilized society, gave to Christian society in the prayer which he taught a means of civilization endowed with such *attractiveness* that it will never fall into disuse, a means endowed with such *efficacy*, that, when used, it cannot fail in perfectly compassing its object. Let us begin by demonstrating the first attribute.

II.

It was remarked by a sophist (Rousseau) against his fellow-sophists, that all their moral teachings, devoid of feeling, and of efficacious sanction, leave man inert and dead; whereas the great art of legislation consists, according to Say, *not in willing the effect, but in effecting the will*. For this end, as every one sees, it is necessary to attach to the act prescribed a ready and obvious advantage to the agent. A command thus given urges each individual to work with greater assiduity in seconding the secret intention of the legislator towards the common good, in proportion to the intensity of the individual's desire of the private advantage hoped for, without need of commands and sanctions. If, then, the Divine Legislator wished to obtain the highest state of civilization in Catholic society, he could not contrive a wiser arrangement than that of attaching all advantages to be hoped by individuals to the use of a means eminently calculated to promote general civilization. Now the hope of the Christian, of course, is in prayer. Though all other graces should fail, this will never be denied him; though he should enjoy the possession of all goods, without this they would all dwindle away. Such is the belief of the Catholic. Widely different in this respect from the haughty Stoic, who hopes for the sublimity of virtue from self; from the grovelling Epicurean, who asks nothing from his idle deity; from the fa-

talist, for whom destiny is unchangeable ; from the presumptuous Lutheran, who thinks, that, provided he believe, he holds all good within his grasp ; and from all other enemies of human liberty or divine grace. The Catholic, so long as he remains unshaken in his belief that prayer is *necessary* to eternal salvation, and always a most useful, if not an absolutely certain, means towards temporal good, will ever be induced to pray ; the Catholic, I say, will ever be induced to pray, whether he think of heaven or be stimulated by temporal want. Behold, then, my friends, a first and distinguishing feature of the Catholic amongst all generations of men ! He is a man who feels a perpetual need of prayer, because by himself he can do nothing, because from God he hopes every thing. He is, moreover, comforted in this by the light in which faith presents to him his God, whom in charity he embraces. An ingenious Catholic writer made the remark, that the Catholic religion alone knew how to say to God, “ My Father ” ; * and this, in fact, is the character of Catholic prayer, as is shown by the commencement of that most perfect formulary of prayer, the *Pater Noster*, and explained by the Apostle, where he says that God infused into us the spirit of his Son, crying in our heart, *Abba, Father !* Nor did he make himself only our Father, but elevated in such a manner the spiritual love and intimate confidence of the soul, that she dared even (comforted by the language of the Canticles and of the Apocalypse) to address him as her Spouse. †

What other religion ever dreamed of so intimate a consortship as that which is found amongst us, real, perpetual, and universal ? Is it to be seen in the intercourse of pagan divinities with the fabulous heroes ? But that was exclusive to a few, — *Pauci quos æquus amavit Jupiter*. In the pantheistic union between man and God ? But that unity destroys prayer ; for it is ridiculous to make God pray to himself. Remove those fables, and then find, if you can, in all heathendom, the sentiment of friendship, of tenderness towards God. Such an attribute is peculiar to that *spirit of grace and prayer* promised to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, ‡ who learn therefrom the inimitable language of the children of God, § the sound of which, so new,

* De Maistre, *Soirées*, Tom. II.

† “ Soror mea sponsa.” — *Cantic. Canticor.* “ Ad cœnam nuptiarum agni vocati sunt.” — *Apoc.*

‡ “ Effundam super habitatores Jerusalem spiritum gratiæ et precum.” — *Zach.*

§ “ Dedit potestatem filios Dei fieri.” — *Joan. i.*

so incomprehensible to nature, forced the Catholic mind to create a new word to express its sweetness, — calling it *the unction* of fervid piety.* Let the Catholic read any book of prayer; if he have a heart, and an eye that is accustomed to it, he will discover at once by what spirit it was dictated. If there is *unction* in it, it came from a Catholic hand; if it is wanting in *unction*, — let the words be eloquent, the thoughts sublime, the sentiments touching, if you will, — the *spirit of prayer* breathes not there, it is the production of a foreign pen.

Faith, therefore, affection, necessity, or, in other words, the mind, the will, the moral and material sense, all invite the Christian to pray unto God, whom he believes to be an ever-watchful Protector and a most loving Father. To which if you add the repeated commands of God and the Church, the frequency of private and social example, the invitations repeated to his eye by the pomp of sacred functions, to his ear by the tolling of the bell and the pealing of the organ, the various application of mystic rites to the most solemn moments of our mortal career, — our birth, our youth, our maturer years, our decline and departure, — you will perceive that the prayer of the Catholic not only becomes natural and spontaneous, but is likewise rendered *continuous*, in accordance with the injunction of its Divine Author to *pray always, and never fail*. This *continuity* of mental elevation to God, by its being a distinction of the Catholic, will give all the more weight to what we shall say concerning the *civilizing* efficacy of his prayer. For how much greater the effect of a powerfully efficient means, when its application is continued without ceasing! — more especially as this *continuity* is not an effort of fancy or determination, but a spontaneous consequence of the dogma which shows him God present in all places and active in every creature, and of that affection which everywhere embraces in God a Friend and a Father. Hence those sweet sentiments which pervade Catholic prayer, and that sublimity and those endearments in the symbols and expressions which accompany the rapturous transports of gifted souls, which nature cannot understand, and impiety derides. Does not such derision prove, better than has been or may be done by me, how different from every other prayer is the Catholic prayer, considered in this first aspect of the suavity wherewith it is accompanied? Yes, the Catholic is a *man of prayer*, as his temple is a *house of prayer*, —

* “*Unctio ejus docet nos.*”

Domus orationis vocabitur. Go forth from Catholic cities, and you will find a crowd at the theatre, at the exchange, in parliament, in the saloon of amusement, and in the hall of business; but the temple is empty and closed, except on festive days and solemn occasions. The Catholic prays always; he has even formed of prayer a peculiar state, a profession. There are entire communities whose business it is — *to pray*. The unbeliever, the heretic, scoffs at them. So much the better. He thereby declares that his prayer is another thing from ours, for he is unable to comprehend our assiduity in prayer.

I have, then, unless I deceive myself, adduced more than was necessary to complete the first part of my task; having satisfactorily proved, that, if prayer be a means of civilization, the Catholic is perennially in the act of cultivating civil perfection, even without adverting to the fact, while he thinks of his dearest interests. If he begs of God his kingdom, if he implores peace for himself, life for his beloved ones, help and protection, relief from adversity, escape from danger, recovery from sickness (and who by similar afflictions is not continually urged to pray?), he is impelled to toil in secret at the great edifice of civil perfection, to weave without beholding it the great texture designed by Providence upon the woof of society.

III.

BUT is the Catholic prayer really a means of civilization, and a means more efficacious than that prayer wherewith natural piety may inspire the infidel, or Christian reminiscences the heretic and the schismatic? The affirmative is the true answer. Because the proprieties which belong to it first prepare in the individuals a material fit for society, then unite them in the most perfect form of civilized society. The influence of prayer in civilizing individuals; the influence of prayer in civilizing society; — these are two points that must be made clear, bearing constantly in mind what is meant by Catholic prayer and by civilization. Let us begin with the individuals.

If there be a difficult undertaking in society, it is this first work of preparation, by which individuals, like the materials of Solomon's temple, are disposed to fit and join each other with ease, without need of strokes or the noise of hammers. The numerous causes of this difficulty are serious and evident. On the one hand, the perfection of individuals depends in a

great measure upon social vigilance. And this depends upon the perfection of society ; for, in an imperfect state of society, such vigilance will be weak, as during the Middle Ages, or superfluous and oppressive, as in many societies, ancient and modern. On the other hand, it is difficult for a society to be perfect which is composed of imperfect individuals ; whence the legal saying, that a perfect law is ill suited to a rude people.

Nature, guided by Infinite Wisdom, has met this difficulty in domestic society, which she herself arranged, by leaving to each of the consorts mutual freedom of choice, and the right and duty of education. By free election each of the consorts helps to assimilate the first two individuals. By education both predispose to harmonious cohabitation the rising individuals, fit and ready, at that age, to accustom themselves to its forms. But are these domestic forms proper to public association ? If there be not additional elements of unity, it is easy to understand that every head of a family will inculcate peculiar ideas, peculiar interests, peculiar objects. Would you destroy these ? Then will you destroy the family, or of a certainty its liberty and welfare.

Moreover, by what means can society without tyranny lord it over ideas, interests, objects ? In virtue of what authority will society bind the mind and the heart ? Religion, — Religion alone is able to prepare them for reciprocal attraction by the affinity of moral doctrine grounded upon the authority of her infallible teachings.*

Let us now examine how she undertakes the task, and carries it out. The first difficulty towards ripening the rude for social improvement is, doubtless, the incapacity of the vulgar mind for rational discourse ; an incapacity so well known, that the sages of old, giving it up in despair, closed the gates of the temple against vulgarity, retiring behind the curtain of arcane obscurity with a few chosen proselytes. And modern sophists, after having essayed to spread *philosophy* among the crowd by teaching them to read and write, either, with Voltaire, pettishly give up the *beggarly rabble*† to the Church, or continue to grumble that the bumpkins are unfit for subtle reasoning, in

* Michelet, in his infamous book, *Du Prêtre, de la Femme, &c.*, has lately rendered, without knowing it, a clear testimony to the force of religion on individuals and on the family, where he accuses the priest of dividing the infidel husband from his wife and children. Vide *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Tom. IX. pp. 337 et seq., February, 1845.

† “ Les gredins.”

spite of cheap publications and knowledge-made-easy. Still, these gentlemen would be satisfied with instructing the lower classes in the material sciences, and the forms of common decency ; and could they only render them able operatives, responsible tradesmen, industrious and capable agriculturists, they would hail the rabble as blessed, and call it a philosopher.*

But let the Church come forward and inspire the Catholic with the prayer of *faith* ; what will be her first suggestion, and its earliest fruit ? Every body knows that the root of the spirit of prayer is embosomed in meditation ; he who does not meditate will pray with his lips, but not with his heart.† In fact, for the Catholic, to teach prayer and to teach meditation are words that mean nearly one and the same thing. Now where is the difference between *meditating* and *philosophizing* ? To ponder the truth and certainty of principles, to develop accurately each of their consequences, to measure their practical application, — this is what the Catholic means by *meditation*. To this inward process the Church invites us, when she invites us to prayer, proportioning the means to every capacity. To the rude and unripe she gives the Rosary, or the Way of the Cross, to the instructed the sublime aspirations of the Psalms, or the Itinerary of Bonaventure, Anselm, and Bellarmin. The lessons are different, but the mastery is common to all. All must meditate, because all must pray. Let an experienced director be put at their side to guide them, and you will see how the faithful testimony declaring the words of heaven will give light and understanding to little ones.‡ O, how different is this wise system of tuition in the Church, by whom a *master of spirit*, a *guide*, is prepared for every simple person, from that *Biblical* school which, thrusting into his hands a mute and obscure text, says to the poor creature, “Go, read, and unriddle it for yourself” ! Why is it that they do not follow the same practice in their universities ? Why not place upon the chair an open volume in place of the professor, and bid the scholars to *read* ?

The Church, therefore, the true educator of the people, in order to teach prayer, teaches how to meditate, and teaching

* “*Beatum dixerunt populum cui hæc sunt.*”

† “*Labiis me honorat : cor autem longe est.*”

‡ “*Declaratio sermonum tuorum illuminat et intellectum dat parvulis.*”

— *Ps.* cxviii. “*Testimonium Domini fidele, sapientiam præstans parvulis.*” — *Ps.* xviii.

meditation teaches the people to philosophize, perfecting their natural logic by a perpetual application of the sublimest truths, facilitated by the living voice of *a master of spirit*, that is to say, of *spiritual philosophy*. Is there to be found elsewhere, let me ask, a school of logic so well adapted to the multitude, so well applied to each one, so universally frequented ? *

But this logic, thus perfected by continual use, is no more than an instrument ; an instrument indifferent in itself to form a philosopher or a sophist. What is required in the former in contradistinction from the latter ? It is easily stated. True, certain, and sound principles, with a sincere love of truth to render them prolific in legitimate deductions. He who reasons without *sound principles* builds in the air ; he who reasons from true principles, without *sincere love of truth*, sees crooked and gets lost. If, then, the Church is to form of the faithful a true philosopher by prayer, it is requisite that prayer, besides the instrument of ratiocination, provide him with certified and unshaken truth, and sincerity in the love of research.

Well, these two requisites likewise are precisely the natural results of the spirit of prayer in the Catholic Church. Regard it first in reference to its end. The prayer of the Catholic aspires essentially to the kingdom of God, and to the order of justice through which it is obtained.† Vastly different therein from the faithless idolater and from the carnal Jew, the Catholic is well aware that no temporal good can be prayed for with propriety, if it be foreign to his final end ; ‡ whence, his first glance, when he goes to prayer, is towards his Father who is in heaven, of whom he asks his kingdom, a kingdom of happiness in heaven, a kingdom of order on earth. This petition is essentially coupled with notions of the most sublime metaphysical truths and natural ethical maxims. For He to whom those that pray address themselves is the universal Creator, Preserver, and Provider ; were he not such, they would not pray to him. The occasion of prayer is the conflict between

* “ Solo desde el Cristianismo se encuentran, por decirlo así, catedras de la mas sublime filosofía, abiertas á todos, en todos lugares, para todas las clases del pueblo.” — Balmes, *El Protestantismo*, etc., p. 222. “ Only since the introduction of Christianity are there to be found, so to speak, chairs of the sublimest philosophy, accessible to all, in every place, for every class of people.” But which is the hour of study for those who go to this school, if not that of meditation ?

† “ Querite primum regnum Dei et justitiam ejus.”

‡ “ Non petitur in nomine Salvatoris, quod petitur contra rationem salutis.” — St. Augustin.

the terrible dualism of good and evil, moral and physical, which continually reminds them of the first parents' fall, — that first source of sin, misery, and the weakness of their own powers, — and of the mercy of God the Restorer, the grace where-with he comforts them, the necessity of their coöperation, and of that final reward which, crowning their victories, will justify in full the ways of Providence. The existence and retributive justice of God the Creator, immortality, the liberty of man, his sin, his punishment, his restoration, his feebleness, his elevation through grace, — are not these, in brief terms, the main dogmata of Catholic metaphysics and ethics ?

And these sublime doctrines are not, for the faithful who prays, vague and confused opinions. The authority which teaches them is for him so weighty as to exclude all doubt ; the manner in which such truths are presented is extremely positive and precise ; and as in his conscience it would be a crime to yield even to momentary hesitation in regard to these doctrines, in like manner it would be a crime to introduce amongst them the slightest variation.

I know well that a certain species of *independent* philosophic genius, little favorable to Catholic docility, would here raise the objection, that precisely on this account the Catholic can never be a philosopher, because he defers to authority, and does not draw from reason. But as I am not called upon, lest I stray from my purpose, to prove the extreme reasonableness even of simple believers on account of the authority upon which they lean and the natural evidence of many of the dogmas in which they believe, I will merely remark, that the objection does not affect my argument. For I have not undertaken to demonstrate that every Christian who prays is a subtile ontologist, but merely that with prayer is infused the true philosophico-social spirit, of which popular minds are capable. Now this spirit does not exact a return in all things, and at all times, to the first causes, by the way of rational evidence, which in the usages of social life is but rarely in demand. The philosophical spirit chiefly necessary for the advancement of civilization is that reflective and discursive wisdom which, resting principally on the real order of things, follows out correctly and with intimate conviction its practical consequences ; that, in short, which the knowledge of olden times first styled *philosophy* ; which, entirely in the dark as to oxygen, hydrogen, sublimate, steam-engines, *phenomena*, *noumena*, *differentiation*, and *integration*, was satisfied to look out for the true welfare of man

and the shortest way to get at it. To which philosophy if the Church add with prayer the habit of reasoning with correctness, and undoubted truths to reason upon, nothing will remain to be added by her save a sincere love of what is true.

Now is not this, respected Gentlemen, precisely one of the principal effects, if not the chief effect, of Catholic prayer in the order of this present life? Undoubtedly the human mind has a natural avidity for truth: *Quid enim fortius desiderat anima humana quam veritatem?* (St. Augustin.) But it is frequently withheld from embracing it in its entirety by hearing the true demand a sacrifice of *the agreeable*. The affections, rising in rebellion at such a demand, throw a mist around the intellect, and then induce it, even though furnished with the soundest principles, to dissemble the consequences, to doubt them, to deny them. If, therefore, Catholic prayer tends essentially to *moderate the affections*, it must be looked upon plainly as the restorer of the love of truth, and consequently of correct judgment.

Now is there a Catholic to be found who does not know that *moderation of our affections* is a necessary principle, as well as a spontaneous consequence, of prayer? In what else do Catholics make the remote preparation for prayer consist, save in this tranquillity of the mind relieved from worldly cares, violent passions, and the distraction of business? Does not the Apostle insinuate to the faithful to renounce perpetually or for a time the use of natural rights, and the bonds of legitimate affection,* precisely that they *may be able to pray*? Does it not pass current as an axiom, that "an agitated heart is unfit for meditation"??

But if the tyranny of passion leave no peace of mind to the faithful, what is his first object, while he still makes an effort to pray, if not to get the mastery over it, and calm the fury of the storm? Agitated by his passions, the infidel prays, but only that they may be glutted; the Stoic, if stimulated by them, only grows torpid, but does not pray; the unbeliever writhes in his sufferings, but, expecting nothing of Heaven, he does not pray. When the war of the passions gathers thickest upon him, it is then the Catholic prays with greatest fervor; but he prays to resist them, and praying he does in fact resist them.† And who has not experienced a thousand times what sudden

* "Ad tempus ut vacetis orationi. . . . Qui sine uxore est cogitat quomodo placeat Deo." — 1 Cor.

† "Ne nos inducas in tentationem." "Faciet etiam cum tentatione preventum ut possitis sustinere."

serenity pervades the soul, on breathing merely the invocation, "Save us, O Lord, we perish"?* If the brief delay of the recitation of the alphabet seemed to the pagan philosopher a remedy against anger, what must we say of the divine medicine prepared for the faithful by Christian philosophy in prayer, which not only retards the burst of passion, but softens it down by the return of love, and dispels it by the light of meditated truth?

In all this, as you observe, I have prescinded hitherto from Christian prayer the supernatural graces by which it is always accompanied; but would it be just, while speaking amongst Catholics, to keep the two asunder? Add, then, these graces to what has been said, call them to the aid of the mind in meditation, and you will behold what a dazzling effulgence they throw around it; add them to those truths in which it believes, and see with what firmness it adheres to them; add them to the heart that is engaged in conflict, and you will be astonished at the ease with which it can overcome itself. What wonder, respected Academicians, that, when educated by a tuition so well suited to nature, and so powerful through grace, numerous gifted souls, even though humble and illiterate, should look deeply (the facts are well known) into the mysteries of eternal life? — that the adherence of the Catholic to truth should be such as to lead him to seal it cheerfully in his blood? — that the serenity, the equanimity, the loveliness, of his spirit should be such as to impress upon the rude mould of a rustic, or a herdsman, a perfect image of whatever is true and beautiful in unaffected candor and dignified courtesy, — not such courtesy as teaches which hand is to be raised to the hat, or what posture is graceful in making a bow, nor yet the polished forms of a delicate compliment, but that decency and composure which consist in civility free from all exaggeration, and flowing spontaneously from a well-tempered and peaceful interior?

Should you desire a practical demonstration of the reflections I have proposed in theory, allow me to ask you, Which is in our day the most frequented school, the most reputed mastership of the interior life? None amongst you would hesitate for a moment to reply, "The Spiritual Exercises." This great means, prescribed by numerous enactments of prelates, princes, masters, directors, and missionaries, now as a preparation for Holy Orders, now as a regression from a career

* "Salva nos, perimus. . . . Imperavit vento et mari, et facta est tranquillitas magna."

of scandal, now as the commencement of a Christian life, now as an advancement in the fervor of communities, now as the conversion of whole cities, — this great means, I repeat, seems to have been declared, by the uniform sentiment of all Christendom, the most appropriate to enable the human soul to coöperate with grace, to introduce it, to advance and to perfect it in that habit of spiritual health usually called the *interior life*, which rules and invigorates the whole life of the exterior. Now what are the Spiritual Exercises but a course of Christian moral philosophy fitted to the comprehension of the public? The Catholic multitude assists at them with eagerness, listening, understanding, reflecting, and drawing practical inferences, as we know from constant experience of undoubted facts. What is set forth to them in that holy retirement? They are taught, in the first place, the logic of meditation, hearing the rules first, and then the meditation in practice. The subjects to be meditated upon are a compendious but solid and touching system of morals, natural and Christian, reduced to the rigor of science. For, beginning with the axiom which forms the basis of all practical sciences, “*The action must be determined by the intention, as the means by the end,*” the Exercises proceed to develop to the popular comprehension the duty that binds us to obey the Creator; the woful results which have followed, and still follow, from disobedience; the necessity of a God’s intervention to give us examples of life, doctrines of law, and the powerful aid of his grace. How these fundamental truths of all Christian philosophy are placed within the reach of the public, to what feelings of compunction they give rise, what a reform of conduct they effect, it is not necessary for me to say, while addressing a Catholic audience well informed of the wonders produced by Exercises and Missions. I will merely remark, in accordance with my theme, that this school, where the reasoning powers of the Catholic are so generally sharpened, where his intellect is imbued with the sublimest truths, his will is stirred by the holiest emotions, his plan of action sketched out upon the soundest maxims, is at the same time the great school now frequented by whoever wishes to learn the spirit of prayer, whether he be a philosopher or a peasant.

I have given, respected Gentlemen, a few instances of the moral efficacy of Catholic prayer. Let any other form of worship be presented by earth-born religions, exhibiting equal certainty in its tenets, equal sublimity in its conceptions, equal earnestness in their meditation, equal rectitude of deduction,

equal serenity of mind, equal universality of mastership, and I will confess myself vanquished. But if the infidel, the Moslem, the Israelite, does not rise above the surface of the ground in prayer, — if the heretic, in his pitiful attempt at babbling the Catholic language, floats about unable to find a master or a staple of certainty, becoming finally a mocker of piety because he cannot discover its reasonableness, — let the Catholic be allowed to boast of his prayer as a true means of education in social philosophy, and let us no more hear this admirable mastership decried as the lazy inaction of worthless people.

No ! the interests of humanity are not lost by festivals and days of prayer, in spite of the complaints of greedy economists upon the uselessness of the weekly repose granted to the laborer by the providence of the common Father of all. The day of prayer is a day set apart to form a habit of philosophizing in the vulgar breast, to instil the knowledge of principles, to suggest consequences of practical morality, to model and polish manners. And as no form of human religion will hold so steadfastly to the duty of consecrating the festival to God, so no other religion will ever be equally sure to see the great means of prayer employed by its followers. The Catholic, therefore, prays, and, praying, learns, though he be an illiterate man, to reason, has subjects to reason upon, sincerity of love to reason well, appropriate direction to go on with success, and unceasing impulses to frequent this school.

The individual, having been prepared in this manner, by light of mind and warmth of heart is enabled henceforth to produce those fruits of civilization hitherto unknown to the long and gloomy nights of the frozen regions.

IV.

BUT to render fruitful the germs implanted in the human individual by prayer, let us examine the force of prayer itself, considered, not as an inward schooling of the heart, but as an external bond of social perfection. If I succeed in proving that Catholic prayer, by elevating the intellects of the faithful to the noblest end which a society can propose to itself, unites them mutually by the strongest ties that can be imagined, and harmonizes them by such a mastership that the result is perfect agreement, and nevertheless without any violence, who will deny to prayer the glory of being a most efficient instrument for social perfection ? Now this is easily proved, if I see

aright, provided it be clearly determined what we mean by civil or social perfection.

Human society is a union of men, that is to say, of organic beings endowed with intelligence and volition, for a common object or good. Its perfection, therefore, must consist in a perfect union of perfect men, for a perfect end, to be gained by a perfect operation, intellectual, moral, and material, which elements must be harmonized one with the other in such proportion that the social operation may obtain the highest efficacy in reaching its end. For association is a means whereby Providence designed to render it easier for the individual upon earth to gain that infinite good to which he is destined in heaven. Now the perfection of a means is in being decidedly a means that is conducive to the end, or *efficacious*. Hence it is, that, if in society one of the elements grows out of proportion in comparison with the others, in such a measure as to render difficult the operations of society, — if, for instance, too high a perfection of laws is imposed upon imperfect individuals, or if too feeble authority is expected to govern a numberless multitude, &c., — such want of harmonious proportion will cause to be deficient in the complex what would be the perfection of each element by itself; precisely as the head of the Farnesian Hercules would be defective on the bust of the Apollo Belvedere, or the main-spring of the finest chronometer in the great clock of the Capitol.

Perfect end, therefore, perfect union of perfect individuals in perfect harmony, is briefly the true notion of social and civil perfection. If I be successful in proving that prayer is a most efficient means to bring about this harmonious complex in Christian society, I shall have fully redeemed my promise. Let us try it.

But in order to make the demonstration evident, we must analyze the ideas contained in each of the four above-mentioned elements of civil perfection, — *end, union, individuals, harmony*. Let us examine first the *end*. In what does the perfection of the end of society consist? If society operates only through the associates, if the associates are bound to render their every action subordinate to the object of ultimate felicity, it is evident that perfection of the *end* as it affects society consists in this, that all social action be in like manner subordinate to the great final object. But whereas this last end by itself may be considered either in its purely natural proportions, or as elevated by revelation to the beatific order, *society*

will be perfect in the highest degree, if it rises to this last point, aiming at supernatural felicity.

Who can fail to see at once what efficacy there must be in prayer for perfecting the end of society, as well under its first aspect of natural probity, as under the second of supernatural charity? The thing is so evident, that I would fear to detain you by lengthened proof; especially after having demonstrated the great perfection with which it endows the individual, by moderating the violence of his passions, and by directing his aim towards supreme happiness. Surely it is impossible for a society composed of individuals whose passions are schooled, and whose intent is supernatural, not to order the whole social action towards the highest perfection. I think it unnecessary to delay longer in proving that Catholic prayer produces in perfect individuals a social tendency towards a perfect end.

Let us, then, proceed to consider the other two elements, over which the influence of prayer may seem at first sight less immediate and evident. The second element of civilization is *perfect union* of the individual associates; a perfection which includes numerous parts exceedingly difficult to be held firm, at the same time, by civil society. For the perfection of union becomes the greater, in the first place, as the multitude of associates is increased *in number*; in the second place, it becomes *closer* from the strength of its bonds. These two elements, as every one knows, are apt to clash; for it is exceedingly hard for the many to be intimately united, or for the intimately united, without weakening their union, to become many.

Moreover, the union, having to combine from man to man dissenting *intellects* and *free wills*, depends in a great measure upon a uniform view of the end, upon the subordination of each free will to one common authoritative regimen, and, finally, upon mutual friendliness binding the civil associates.

If, therefore, I can show Catholic prayer to be a most efficient means for bringing about perfect union of innumerable men through mutual friendship, through a common tendency towards the same end under an authoritative regimen, I shall have shown it to be a most efficacious instrument for this second element of civilization, *the union of the associates*. Now who is there but sees, at the first glance, how Catholic prayer in its various forms, just because it is *Catholic*, stretches out to the full extent of universality of time and place? If nearly the whole merit of this prayer depends upon communicating with *all* the faithful, as the Apostles' Creed teaches in the article, *THE COM-*

MUNION OF SAINTS,—and if, consequently, it is lawful to *communicate in prayer* with the faithful *alone*, as the Church constantly commands,—then it follows that the Catholic prayer is essentially a *social* prayer, and that to this prayer *only* such a privilege belongs. The schismatic and the heretic may pray as much as it seems fit to them; this prayer, if schismatical or heretical, will be a fruit and a furtherance of division. The Mahometan may pray, and the Jew; it will be with sword in hand and hatred at heart. The infidel idolater also may pray; he prays for himself exclusively, to the God of a household, a race, a nation. And even though all these should desire to fulfil through prayer the duty of universal human benevolence, they would pray at most with a certain alliance more negative than positive, grounded rather upon not wishing harm than upon conspiring positively towards the common good. The Catholic alone can embrace *positively all* nations in his prayer, because he alone has *positive* doctrine destined to bind all in the alliance of faith; without which *positive* doctrine, it would be a vain pretension to establish amongst men perfect human association. For is not man a *rational animal*? The association, then, will not be *human*, which does not unite intellects. But where do intellects join, if not in truth, to which in concord they yield their assent? Where could they *habitate in unum* apart from truth,—they, capable of resting and rejoicing in truth alone? It will be answered, perchance, that, to constitute human society, any truth of the *practical*, or even only of the *material* order, is enough; for a philharmonic or a commercial society stands by mere consension upon musical entertainment or pecuniary advantage. So be it. But can such a society be called *humanly perfect*, or *perfectly human*, while it excludes from the association the most proper object of the noblest of man's faculties, Absolute Truth,—while it excludes the dearest interest of man's will, Eternal Good?

It is in vain, therefore, that modern philanthropic toleration would fain hope to establish universal association amongst men, removing the discrepancy of intellects by *tolerating every doctrine*. Let us go so far as to suppose that what is impossible could be thus effected,—even that the light of man's intellect and his innate longing after truth could be rendered dormant or dead,—would men be then associated? Ay, associated *inasmuch as they are men*; just as they would be associated, *inasmuch as merchants*, in a universal *commercial copartnership*, by depriving them of all their money, and quenching all desire of

gain. Surely every society of merchants has its *particularity* in this, that it excludes all who do not concur in the *material* of industry and in the *purpose* of profit. Take away these elements of singularity from the associates, and they will be merged again in *universal* society. But can that society be called a society of *commerce* ?

That society, alone, therefore, is *perfectly human*, which unites the intellects of all men in positive doctrines ; that alone can become such, whose tendency and aim are thus to unite them. Now the Catholic religion is the only one that aims at so glorious an end by means of faith and charity. Therefore prayer, the proper language of this religion, is the supremely efficacious *means* of universal association, as the principal *means* of national union is the national tongue.

Yes, every Catholic engaged in prayer must remember naturally the society in which he prays, the common faith by which he is enlightened to pray, the brotherly charity which gently forces him to it, the great general object to which it has reference, namely, *the kingdom of God and his justice,** which is likewise the order of its attainment. Prayer, then, forms in the breasts of Catholics an habitual inclination to consider the association of all men in the arms of the Heavenly Father as the acme of social perfection. *Pater noster*, — *adveniat regnum tuum !*

But what has been said of its *universality* is proper to Catholic prayer under all its forms ; for it still arises from the bosom of social *communion*. Examine its various forms, and you will see how they all press energetically towards this immense unity of place and time, towards which *Catholicity* tends by its name as well as by its spirit. Do you wish to examine its private prayer ? You will see it animated by a universal spirit in those words which form the exordium of the most excellent of all our prayers, *Our Father* ; and in all those other traditional formularies transmitted to ours by by-gone generations, to which by this means ours is carried back and united. Let the Protestant laugh at these prayers thus reduced to formularies ; it is but well that he should pray with private formularies, as he thinks with a private spirit. We, who pray in unity of spirit, cling with all the people of all ages to the same formularies of the same language.

And if such be the spirit of *private* prayer, how much more

* "Querite primum regnum Dei et justitiam ejus."

evidently social will the spirit of *public* prayer appear ! Contemplate, for example, its first, noblest, most solemn act, — I mean the Sacrifice. Could man ever conceive a thing more divinely social than the Catholic Sacrifice, where the *common* banquet, the most natural symbol of closest intimacy, presents all men with superangelic bread, not only specifically, but *individually*, identical with that which during eighteen centuries has been broken and distributed amongst Catholics under the name of *Communion* ? The food, being at the same time the august Victim of the universal sacrifice, recalls the attention of the Catholic to that solemn act on which, during the forty centuries preceding, were fixed the eyes, the hopes, the desires of the Patriarchs, and joins in the most perfect union of persons, of place, and of time, the thoughts, the affections, the external worship of all the just of every age. Where, honored Sirs, can be found, where imagined, in a society lasting through time, extending over space, a more real, more vast, more spiritual unity ?

If we reflect, moreover, as it is proved by the angelic mind of St. Thomas, that in the Church all is ordained towards the Eucharist, — preaching, to instruct the faithful regarding it ; the Sacraments, to predispose them towards it ; the liturgy, to accompany them to it ; the hierarchy, to organize them for its reception, — it will be clearly seen that all these elements must derive from the Sacrifice a participation in its character of universality, as the means receive their characteristic stamp from the end ; and consequently it will be understood how Catholic prayer, of which the Sacrifice is the most solemn, devout, and efficacious act, is a means eminently calculated to join *all* people in social unity. What wonder, then, that the Church bears the mark of *universality* in all her worship, as she bears it in her name ? Behold her hierarchy : it tends to spread its spiritual sway over all the earth, and to be perpetuated through all ages. Listen to her hymns : breathed three or four thousand years ago upon the psaltery of the Prophet-king, or by the lips of the daughters of Israel on the strand of the Red Sea, they are daily reëchoed on the remotest shores from the rising to the setting of the sun, repeated in one universal language by all Catholic tongues. Follow the steps of her missionaries : they are ashamed to let a bark be steered by *the bold offspring of Japheth** to any shore where the standard of the crucified Nazarene does not

* “ Audax Iapeti genus.” — *Hor.*

already rise to sanctify the prayer of the Catholic neophyte. To the Sacraments she administers is joined the idea of a universal society, out of which they are not to be found ; to her solemnities she invites her children, even from far distant regions ; and in an age still semibarbarous, the festal Jubilee realizes at the feet of the Universal Pastor a perfect unity of all known nations, gathered together in prayer at the tomb of their first Father and Master.

We have thus contemplated Catholic prayer in regard to the successive generations and to the number of associates whom it joins together. It would, however, be of little use for the *time* and the *number* to be unlimited, if the *union* were weak. A society in which the force of union is not proportioned to the number soon becomes a confused multitude, and ceases to be a *great society*. Now it is precisely the property of Catholic prayer to bind the immense multitude it embraces with spiritual ties especially, the strongest ties that can be conceived by the human mind.

For, on attentive consideration, the great difficulty of social union is traceable to three serious hindrances ; namely, to the difficulty of persuading each intellect of the intrinsic rectitude of the laws, to the difficulty of disentangling each will from private interests, to the difficulty of composing individual feelings hurt by daily obstacles and offences. Then the difficulty of overcoming such hindrances is not to be attributed so much to the want of persuasive arguments in a well-arranged society, as to the fact that to concentrate the popular mind upon them is as hard as it is desirable.

Now here it is that Catholic prayer obtains a victory over the popular mind, which no political provision could ever gain. It forces the multitude to elevate its desires above the low and wretched sphere of temporal arrangements, personal interest, and private revenge. The Catholic who prays looks towards a Supreme Ruler, in whose hands even the injustice of men becomes an instrument, now of ineffable paternal mercy, now of justice, terrible, indeed, but always holy and unimpeachable ; nor could the Catholic pray without such faith in God, the Supreme Ruler. In this view, how easy it becomes to respect in temporal enactments, though they do not present themselves, humanly speaking, as wise, the Supreme Ordainer, Divine Wisdom,* and breathe, *Fiat voluntas tua !* This is exactly the rea-

* "Obedite sicut Christo."

son why the enemies of public order so frequently reproach the Catholic with servility and cowardice. He knows how to be resigned ; and resignation is the fruit of prayer.

As to private interest, how weakened is its hold upon the soul of a Catholic habituated in prayer to consider as his own highest interest the reign of justice and order ! — especially as in the act of asking any spiritual or material boon, he feels the obligation of its communication imposed as a condition of receiving it : “*Date et dabitur vobis.*” And still more powerfully is he urged to forgive an injury by those words, “*Dimittite et dimittimini,*” which he applies to himself when he prays,* making a condition of the pardon he implores of God the pardon he grants to his brother. To revive so unceasingly in the breasts of a whole society sentiments of obedience and love, and to revive them at the feet of a common Father, in the act of petitioning for what is most ardently desired, and as a condition necessary to obtain it, — what is this but to bind that society with the strongest ties that can join together men of understanding and will ? Hence said the Wise Man, that the Church, the offspring of Infinite Wisdom, is constituted in its nationality by obedience and love ; † — obedience, which extends its reverence as to leaders to all the members of a numerous and indefectible hierarchy, out of the direction of which the Catholic would know not how to pray, and the control of which, extending not only to the action, but to the conscience and the intellect, renders it impossible for the subject, not merely to rebel, but even to truckle and dissemble ; — love, that, pre-scinding every personal and domestic, every civil or national reason, looks chiefly, and by the force of its essential nature, to those great universal reasons which embrace all human individuals, even though enemies and persecutors.

However, some one might raise the objection, that Catholic prayer contributes, indeed, to bind believers in a universal society, but that such a society is a religious, and not a political one, — whereas civilization has reference to the political, and not to the religious, condition of nations ; that all our arguments, therefore, have been beating the air, and fall short of the mark. But such an objection would proceed from the paltry and narrow spirit that animates the bastard philosophy of later times ; which, dissecting human society with the edge of merciless

* “*Dimittite nobis . . . sicut et nos dimittimus.*”

† “*Filii sapientiarum ecclesie justorum, et natio illorum obedientia et dilectio.*”

analysis, doggedly insisted upon carving the moral into as many parts as the knife of the anatomist does the physical man. But who in the nineteenth century can hope to effect that inconceivable separation of the religious man from the moral man, of the moral from the psychological, of the psychological from the physiological, of physiology from physics, of physics from mathematics, of this and all other sciences from metaphysics? If such a one there be, desirous to separate those sciences and to make them run out to their full length each by itself on the isolated part it refers to in human relations, he might as well persuade the young painters engaged at the Academy in studying the nude to change the attitude or light of the model, each one for himself, without making any variation in the original studied by his schoolmates. But as the identical original studied by many cannot be changed for one without being altered to the eye of the others, so an isolated part of humanity cannot be changed without altering the other parts for better or for worse. If, therefore, prayer exerts a powerful influence in perfecting universal society in the religious point of view, it thereby tends to perfect political society; more especially — and I beg attention to the remark — as the perfecting of *the social dispositions* in mankind is vastly different from perfecting *a determined society*. As individuals prepared for association by the use of their rational faculties, by the enlargement of their views, by disinterestedness in their aims, by moderation in their tendencies, are thereby made capable of religious association, so are they of political association.

But what is this talk about universal political association? Can we be simple enough to believe possible this humanitarian association in a mere material order? O, how much could be said against it, did my theme allow a discussion of the subject! Would such a society, I might ask, be governed, or be without a government? If it have no government, whence will it derive its unity? If it have a government, will this be endowed with power irresistible or resistible? Suppose it resistible, there will be no firmness of order. Suppose it irresistible, there will be no guaranty of the liberty of the subject. And, further, by what bond will nations be joined in it? By their interests? But these are in perpetual conflict. By force? That would be despotism. By law? Every one explains it out of his own head. Deprive humanity of the universal religious bond, and you will seek in vain for another universal bond of union, and without such a bond you will labor in vain to form a uni-

versal society. For my part, as I cannot understand society without union, nor union without a bond, nor a bond of intelligent beings without truth, nor perfect truth without infallible certainty, nor infallible certainty out of the true religion, I see no universal society out of the true religion. I see, I repeat it, no universal society out of the true religion ; consequently I can believe in the full growth of social perfection in political society only so far as it is an offshoot of religious society.

Let him who thinks differently, without renouncing Catholicity, explain whether the *non-Catholic* humanitarian society he contemplates is to admit Catholics into its bosom, and to remove the enmity of error against truth, — whether the Catholic is to remain without clergy, the clergy without conversions. Certes, if things proceed according to their present nature, either intolerant impiety must exclude the Catholic from its *humanity*, or the tolerated Catholic must bring over humanity to the faith. In the first supposition, your boasted *universal* society will not be *universal* ; in the second, it will be chiefly *religious*.

If, therefore, civilization has an essential forecast towards universality, if universality cannot be obtained apart from religion, *prayer*, — which is proved to be a most efficacious means to join together religiously *all* men with the universal bond of a supreme end and of a moral order suitable to human nature, with the reasonable bond of *obedience* to an authority which sways *conscience*, with the pleasing bond of *charity* towards a universal society of brethren, — *prayer* is, then, a most efficacious means to promote civilization amongst men. Then the objection mooted against us falls to the ground ; for prayer, precisely because it is a most efficacious means to form the perfection of religious society, is equally a means to form the civilization of the public.

So, then, we have proved the first three parts of our subject ; — perfect *end* ; perfect *union* of perfect *individuals*. It remains for us now to consider the perfection of the harmony wherewith these elements are attuned in Catholic society under the influence of prayer. You perceive the strict limits to which I confine myself. I did not undertake to speak to you of Catholic perfection in general, but only of the influence exercised upon such perfection by prayer. Let us, then, examine briefly in what manner it influences this harmony of the social elements. Let us see how it harmonizes, — 1st, in the *end*, the various degrees of perfection to which it rises ; 2d, in *individuals*, the various conditions into which they are divided ;

3d, finally, how it harmonizes the various *powers* of the individuals with the various grades of perfection in the end. It will thus be seen what harmonic vigor Catholic prayer involves, and how no separate sect can compare with it.

The first element it harmonizes is the *end*, which we have considered as engrossing the ultimate end of man, the proper end of society, and the immediate end of human actions devoted to its attainment. If, then, I succeed in demonstrating to you, that, in the Catholic religion, the order of human actions towards the *ultimate end* produces a living energy in the *social end*, and produces it mainly through the spirit of prayer wherewith it invests the faithful, I shall have demonstrated Catholic prayer to be effective of harmony in the various grades of the end. Now that this effect belongs exclusively to Catholic prayer will appear evident to any one who will inquire into the properties of heretical or infidel mysticism, so apt to degenerate into fanatical pietism or Oriental apathy. This is a beautiful remark of Gioberti, who, comparing the contemplation of the Eastern pantheist with that of the Catholic, shows languor to be the natural fruit of the pantheism of anti-Catholics, activity that of Catholicity. I refer those who desire to see it fully proved, with metaphysical rigor, to his work; or to the valiant Spanish Apologist, who draws out this same truth in another point of view, proving that Catholicity is properly the pure source of the personality and of the lively *activity* of modern civilized societies.* For my part, I will beat a track, not so sublime indeed, but more obvious, — that of facts. Who can deny that religious society is far more active than every other in the social order? The irreligious man essentially tends to individualism, for his moralism is necessarily based upon interest or pleasure. The social operation of individualism is essentially inconstant, like interest, fleeting, like the individual, and miserly, like *egotism*. On the contrary, the activity of individuals in religious society, having chiefly in view eternal life, and regarding temporal wealth as a means of attaining it, through assistance given to want of all kinds, is urged, on the one hand, to acquire wealth, on the other, to make use of it for the advantage of others. Nor do I under the name of wealth comprise merely pelf and provisions. Are we not also to call wealth science to be diffused, works performed in the service

* *El Protestantismo comparado con el Catolicismo*, Tom. II. cap. 23, pp. 59 et seq.

of others, and the ameliorations effected in art ? All human activity, as economists well observe, is one of the chief sources of social enrichment. Now, then, that Catholic society, even in regard to temporalities, possesses this activity in the highest degree, wonderfully disinterested, persevering, indefatigable, is acknowledged not only by Catholics, but also by unbelievers. Moreover, it is as evident that these properties flow, in Catholic society, from the spirit of prayer, as it is sure, that, without prayer, faith and charity, without which there can be neither disinterestedness, unremitted labor, nor Christian perseverance, grow languid and die. Consider all Catholic institutions, where individuals with superhuman generosity sacrifice self to the common good ; you will find that they all receive birth from men rapt in the spirit of prayer, are all sustained by the same spirit, all unsettled or corrupt if failing in the spirit of prayer. What but this spirit wafts legions of missionaries over the stormy waves of the ocean, or bears them across the yawning chasms of the wilderness ? What shuts up in hospitals the sons of John of God, or the daughters of Vincent of Paul ? What leads the Ignorantine or the Somasc to become a child amongst the little ones of Christ ? What leads numberless guilds and confraternities into the dungeon and the jail ? What guides the good shepherd amidst the most revolting wretchedness and depravity ? What, on board of the galley and inside of the bagnio, amongst the victims of Turkish cruelty, strengthened the bearer of ransom and liberty ? What, amidst the sandy wastes of Staoueli, starts colonies of husbandmen in Algeria ?

Of a certainty, if the influence of cause on effect is made evident by the ceasing of the effect when the cause is removed, the influence of the spirit of prayer stands out conspicuously in all these Catholic institutions. For it is an infallible rule, admitted by all, that each individual is found more and more ardent and effective in his operations, as, parity in all else preserved, he is more and more ardent and assiduous in prayer.

And this essential influence of the spirit of prayer on Catholic activity in general explains the cause of a fact constantly observed, namely, that the first and fullest development of arts and sciences amongst Catholics is always an offshoot of the spirit of prayer. Poetry, grown older and more foolish, sang, "*Le donne, i cavalier, l'arme, gli amori*" ; * but the earliest

* "*Ladies, knights, arms, and love.*" (First line of Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*.)

lisings of its infancy were heard in a religious melody.* The notes of music to-day swell with entrancing luxuriousness on the stage of profane theatres, but they owe their existence and their name to a sacred hymn.† The Catholic chisel moulds the yielding marble into forms of Grecian elegance, but its first effort was to sketch a crucifix or a Madonna in plain wood. And crucifixes and Madonnas are the most ancient pictures, altars and basilicas the earliest edifices, missionaries of the Church the earliest travellers, calculators of Easter-tide the oldest astronomers, masters of theology the first philosophers. Everywhere over the lifeless corpse of motionless pagan culture resounded the orison of Religion, recalling it back to life, quickening it with her holy spirit, and marshalling it in the service of PRAYER.

The spirit of Catholic prayer, therefore, endowing with powerful energy the activity of individuals towards the social good subordinate to ultimate and supreme good, produces perfect harmony in the threefold gradation of the *end*. Let us proceed to examine how it harmonizes the second element, — I mean, the multitude.

Wherein must the harmony of this consist? In preserving its *variety* and introducing *unity*, so that in *movement* there may be *peace*. Unity without variety would be *monotony*; variety without unity would be *uproar*; both without movement, void of discourse, would be inert and tedious; and if by movement they did not reach peace, they would be discursive to no conclusion.

The happy tendency of Catholic prayer is, to harmonize the multitude with unity in variety, with repose in movement. For, gathering all the faithful together at the feet of the Heavenly Father, it brings them to a level of such perfect equality as to abolish amongst them all envy of another's greatness. The same table is approached, the same Master is listened to, the same law is obeyed, the same tribunal is respected by the father with the son, the illiterate with the learned, the servant with the master, the subject with the prince; and if, on going forth from the *house of prayer*, civil inequality is seen to come up anew, the recollection of a kingdom where he is highest who

* The earliest Catholic poets we are acquainted with are a Gregory of Nyssa, a Prudentius, a Paulinus, a Damasus, a Prosper of Aquitania, &c.

† The notes of the gamut, as it is well known, take their names from the hymn, "*Ut queant laxis resonare fibris mira gestorum*," &c.

humbles himself most attempts these varieties in a sense of entire tranquillity. And whence, in fact, if not from this deep knowledge of an ultramundane greatness, was engendered in the faithful that aphorism of civil moderation which rendered so easy in other times the political harmony of Christian society, — “Let us be satisfied with our condition” ? In our days, the mania for growing extravagantly rich raises war between the laborer and the manufacturer ; the thirst for office makes the private citizen a slave in antechambers, where he displaces and is displaced in turn ; the soldier wishes for war to be made captain, the pauper wishes for tumults to be made minister. In every corner of society, in short, contrast is so striking, that it has become to the eyes of the utilitarian publicist * the essential element of social unity. The existence of unity in contrast I can understand, if there be a higher power to combine the parts ; but the idea of unity derived only from contrast seems to me incomprehensible and contradictory. True, the stones of a vaulted ceiling hold close together, while they contrast, but the reason of their union is the gravitation which tends to unite them, and the strength of the side walls which inclose them. You have here an idea of religious society. In it variety of interests does not cease to exist ; for without variety there would not be harmony. But all interests are subservient to the tendency towards order, which is the centre of intelligence, and flanked by divine law, which is its rule, and keeps it from varying. But whence, unless from prayer, is this power to respect order and law, when they prescribe limits to interest ?

In proportion, therefore, as the inward spirit reigns amongst Catholics, the harmony is perfect amongst the individuals ; who, serving their distinct personal condition, are nevertheless equalized at the foot of the altar in the simple quality of Faithful ; and moving at the impulse of varied interest, still repose alike in the love of order ; which repose in order is *peace*.

But to obtain perfect harmony, it is not enough that the various orders of the end and the various conditions of individuals be harmonized ; it is requisite, moreover, that perfect harmony be established between the *individuals* and the *end*, of greater or less perfection. And here is the chief glory of the admirable inward operation of the spirit of prayer. For without this spirit such harmony is impossible in political society.

* Romagnosi.

To prove this last assertion, I need only to show clearly what I mean when referring to harmony between individuals and the perfection of the social end. What political economist is ignorant of the great variety of powers in individuals, and of the grades of perfection in the end held in view by society? The acme of the perfection of order admits beneath it many gradations of imperfect order, to which imperfect individuals can easily be induced to rise; but would it be easy to induce all your individuals to gain the topmost grade of perfection? Assuredly not. Hold, then, as a maxim of wise policy, that society will be perfect when those few individuals reach the height of perfection who are capable of it, and the others rise to the point which their capabilities allow. If upon imperfect individuals you seek to impose the burden of supreme perfection, society, by such disproportion of parts, must become imperfect and unsettled.

But what means are to urge with proportions so harmonious the material inertness of our clay to such high perfection? Will you enforce perfection by a universal law? That would be indiscretion. Will you abandon the idea of attaining it? That would leave society imperfect. Will you prescribe for each individual the degree of perfection proportioned to him? But where will you find a political eye, a spiritual thermometer, so exact as to be able to measure the degrees of individual fervor in the attainment of moral perfection, upon which political welfare almost entirely depends? This is precisely the task of the spirit of prayer, which, without need of coercive laws, is to itself the law and the impulse to compliance. This spirit places before each intellect the sublimest grades to which it may aspire. This spurs the heart, this gains from heaven eagle wings; and, as it takes its start from the highest of heavens, it impels all to the uppermost grade, and, as it infuses itself and becomes personified in the heart of each one, so it adapts itself exactly to each one's forces. Hence, while law is satisfied with forbidding evil, counsel invites to the highest degree of good. But what force would counsel have without the inward spirit which gives strength to follow it?

Thus, respected auditors, you behold the marvellous accord produced in Catholic society by the spirit of prayer between the various degrees of individual perfection, and the various degrees of social perfection towards which they tend. No one is here charged with a burden greater than his strength; no one is relieved from what he is able to bear. Hence springs a

wonderful *unity* in the immense *variety* of these successive degrees ; and who will calculate its good results in a truly Catholic society ? How wretched those societies that drew back their lips from this fount of perfection ! Do they need help for the poor ? Then recourse must be had to a tax for paupers, as voluntary alms-giving has ceased. Do they need an impulse to make the poor labor ? Then a workhouse is to be established, for the love of suffering is understood no longer. Do they need a check upon the overflow of population ? Then marriage must be countermanded, for the idea of virginal perfection is out of date. Do they need protection for the widow, education for the orphan, assistance for the sick, refuge from prostitution, instruction for the people ? Laws upon laws, and new laws upon new laws, and salaried officers to see that they are observed, and salaried inspectors to watch over the officers, and freedom of complaint to keep straight the inspectors, and repeated punishment. Alas ! what a complication of social machinery to obtain in a bungling manner, and by compulsion, what would be effected by the spirit of charity spontaneously and to perfection !

But this internal spirit, being individualized itself in individuals, might clash with the universal harmony by some singular melody of its own. It wants, then, prudent direction, and in this we behold the office of him who, being judge and father at the same time, is seated in that tribunal before which alone conscience unveils all its powers, as well as all its weaknesses. The function of impelling each one with discretion of energy to the perfection of which he is individually capable can be exercised only by the Catholic priesthood, and nowhere better than in the act of reconciliation, when the heart, repentant of its faults, wishes to make due reparation. At that moment, when the inward disposition is ready for any sacrifice, what efficacy can be conveyed in a counsel, or a suggestion, even without a command ! But might not this counsellor, himself destined to harmonize the individual in a proportionate degree of social perfection, become isolated from the universal harmony ? This is forestalled by the hierarchical union in which he himself is harmonized. Before being allowed to assume jurisdiction over souls, he must himself make clear the doctrines he follows, the conduct he pursues, and the qualities which distinguish him. On this condition only does he obtain jurisdiction over souls from his prelate, through whom he is joined to the centre of Catholic unity, wherein is harmonized the im-

mense variety of spirits, each of which, according to the measure of grace allotted to each, gives praise to the God of virtue. From this centre are derived rules of direction in the more difficult cases, faculties for loosening the guilty of the more heinous transgressions, dispensing power in exceptions to the more serious obligations, safe doctrines for the discernment of inward motions. This, correcting in the ministers of reconciliation every extravagance of rigor or indulgence, rejecting that counterfeit mysticism which miscalculates the internal operations of grace, and that false science which, without discrimination, denies and derides them altogether, maintains with prudent caution, amongst Catholics, a love for perfection without rigorism, by means of a mysticism free from exaggeration defending them on the right hand and on the left from the extravagance of pietism and illuminism, as well as from the cold indifference of rationalism and skepticism.

Thus the *spirit of prayer*, taken in its widest acceptation, inasmuch as it embraces every species of *elevation of the soul to God*, and every means destined to produce, maintain, and direct it, evidently appears to be a highly efficacious agent of social perfection, even in the civil and political order. For, after having established in the individuals those forms of intelligence, of science, of probity, of energy, without which civil and political perfection can never be obtained, it tends then, from the intrinsic nature and property of Catholic prayer, to join all men together in the vastest society possible, for an end than which there can be none more perfect, with highly disinterested activity, animated by sentiments of brotherly charity and unalterable meekness. And while it urges all individual associates to such high social perfection, it nevertheless maintains, by means of the hierarchic investment of the controlling powers, such harmony of proportions between the Best, to which it aspires, and the various forces whereby it aspires, in individuals, that these, neither wounded by the spur nor yet untouched by it, grow desirous of themselves to soar towards a still higher elevation, as the spirit of internal union with God breathes still more vigorous in their heart.

But I perceive that an important objection might be raised to me by certain prejudiced minds. "How do you dare," they might say to me, "to boast of civilization as an effect of Catholic prayer, while Catholic countries show such an evident penury of civilization? Look at those numerous foreigners who come down to us from the North, so graceful in their ap-

parel, so genteel in their address, so generous in their bearing, and compare them with the roughness of our lower classes. You will then certainly give up the great opinion you have of prayer as a means of civilization. It can well be satisfied with its spiritual utility, without our torturing it, in spite of fact, into an agency to which it does not pretend."

The objection apparently has its force, but it is not difficult to expose it to minds possessing clearness of ideas and knowledge of the world. For that boasted Northern civilization is not really the great thing some people imagine it to be, nor is our roughness so extreme; and if we in aught are guilty, as in many things we are, the cause of our guilt is precisely that we lack on the occasion the spirit of prayer of which I am speaking.

But this Northern civilization shows to us only its brightest features, as travellers are certainly not the dregs of the populace. For who has not heard, especially in these latter days, of the deplorable state of the paupers in countries which are the first to boast of their civilization? We have heard of the praiseworthy efforts made by so many societies in that most civilized of cities, London, to prevent the people from being ground down by excessive labor, eaten up by filth and worms, killed by hunger and exhaustion, infected by the cold damp of the dens which they inhabit, — from being trampled upon by the masters whom they serve, or the dominant sect which persecutes them. And is not this sufficient to make us understand how different that wretched crowd must be from the proud, genteel, and graceful travellers in whom we are wont to see the picture of Northern civilization? What is to be said, moreover, of the astounding ignorance, I will not say regarding religious and moral principles, but even regarding the most glaring facts, in which those wretched beings languish, who, oftentimes shut up during the whole week in the factories where they toil, are found even not to know that there is a Christian church in the world? *

* It is a remarkable fact, that the language of Italy, which we are taught to regard as the homestead of wretchedness and pauperism, does not possess a word to convey the English sense of the term *pauper*. Their *mendico*, or *pezzente*, is any thing but a pauper, and may be described by the graphic Americanism, "fat, ragged, and saucy." Their usual words, *povero*, *poveretto*, *poverello*, and *poverino*, give the idea of a poor little wastling to be immediately sheltered and taken care of. The learned Jesuit renders *pauper*, in the text, by the Latin word *proletarii*, used to designate the meanest of the plebeians of ancient Rome. In pa-

In our country, on the other hand, how much more clement is industry towards the operatives ! how much more equal the condition of men ! how much more generally diffused in the people the notions of religious instruction ! how much more easy, for him who wishes to work, to earn a comparatively comfortable subsistence ! But if you draw a comparison, not between the vulgar and the vulgar, but between the better classes of the two regions, — if, for example, you compare the Catholic matron, the Catholic knight, the Catholic priest, with the Northern lady, the Protestant squire, the Anglican minister, — perhaps in the latter you will meet with more elegance, more gallantry ; but where will you find more sterling honesty, unfeigned sincerity, and efficacious zeal for the promotion of sound civilization, than in the former ? You can find a test of it even in the public press, where it speaks of the Catholic and the heterodox missions.

Much, indeed, is wanting amongst Catholics, especially in the lower classes, towards a better condition of civilization, but this is chiefly owing to the want of a true spirit of prayer, especially in the body of the people. There are many Catholics who, satisfied with exterior formalities, fail to imbue themselves, by meditation, with that spirit which brings to perfection the special philosophy of the Catholics ; hence, in proportion as this is missing, we miss also interior and exterior civilization.

The want of civilization, then, sometimes discovered amongst Catholics, far from proving that prayer is not a fitting means to attain it, is an argument which strengthens our assertion, and renders it evident by fact.

Now, let the political economist and the publicist come forward and decry Catholic mysticism, and the hours, and the days, and the buildings, and the studies, and the persons, and the whole communities, devoted by profession to prayer, and talk of money thrown away, time lost for nothing, idle and worthless people useless to the welfare of society ! Surely there may be an abuse of prayer, even as of the human understanding. Or rather, why should I say it ? No ! there cannot be an abuse of prayer ; for the elevation of man to his God, his supreme good, his perfection, can never be excessive. That which can be abused is the appearance of prayer ; but

gan Rome there were the real paupers of Protestant London. — TRANSLATOR.

prayer which is Catholic, — guided, I mean, by the infallible authority of the Church, — as it tends directly to attain the companionship of eternal society, so does it form indirectly the perfection of temporal society.

ART. V. — 1. *The French Revolution of 1848, — its Causes, Actors, Events, and Influences.* By G. G. FOSTER and THOMAS DUN ENGLISH. Philadelphia : Zieber & Co. 1848. 8vo. pp. 221.

2. *The Falcon Family, or Young Ireland.* By the Author of "The Bachelor of the Albany." Boston : T. Wiley, Jr. 1848. 8vo. pp. 90.

AN extemporary history of the French revolution, intended to reach the public before the events which it narrates have lost their interest, and an ephemeral novel, designed, by gross exaggeration and caricature, to prevent a revolution in Ireland, have seemed to us not unsuitable productions to be placed at the head of some remarks on the events in progress, or just accomplished, in Europe. The history is a fitting type of the recent revolutionary movements, extemporary, irregular, passionate, frothy; and the novel, of the wisdom, judgment, and energy of the party opposed to them.

Our views of revolutions in general are well known to our readers, and we have at present no occasion to repeat them. We have seen nothing in the recent events in Europe that seems to us to call for any modification of the doctrines which we have uniformly contended for, however unpalatable they may be to the visionary politicians of the day. Of course, we, in common with every man worthy of the name of man, abhor despotism; but we abhor the despotism of mobs more than that of kings. The king may be licentious, wicked, and delight to oppress his subjects; but nature ordinarily sets some limits to his power, and the principal weight of his oppression falls upon the higher classes rather than upon the lower. There is for the great body of the people in general such a thing as living under his government. There are nooks and corners where his eye cannot penetrate and his arm cannot reach. But under the mob, unless you join it, and urge it on to harass and oppress, there is no living for you. It is resistless and re-

morseless. Its eyes penetrate every cranny, and its power finds out and uncovers every hiding-place. It leaves a covert for none,—shelter for neither soul nor body,—and is well termed, in our strong old Anglo-Saxon phrase, “Hell broke loose.” We confess, therefore, that we have a lively horror of mobs, and not even a polite Parisian mob, courteously and with inimitable grace and delicacy begging us just to permit it to fusilade us or to cut our throats, is able to inspire us with confidence in them. If we must die under the operation of drugs administered to restore us to health, let them be prescribed by the mediciner with a diploma in his pocket, and a gold-headed cane to his nose,—not by the unauthorized quack. If the regular practitioner kills us, it is his affair and he must answer for it; but if the quack kills us, our death is a sort of suicide, for which we are ourselves responsible. So, if we must be stripped of our rights, robbed of our manhood, and reduced to abject slavery, let it be by the crowned head and the sceptred hand, not by the untitled multitude.

As mobs at best are despots, and as kings can be only despots at worst, we are not prepared to raise the shout of joy merely because a mob in its wrath has deposed a king, burnt a throne, put an end to a dynasty, and resolved the state into its original elements. We judge it prudent to wait a little and see what is likely to follow,—whether any thing for real political and social well-being is likely to be gained. We are no apologists for kings in general, and certainly not for the late king of the French in particular. We have never admired Louis Philippe as a man; we have never admitted his right to the throne he occupied, and we have seen much in his policy to censure, and but little to approve. A mob made him king, and it was not unfitting that a mob should unmake him. Nevertheless, France did exist under his reign,—in some respects even prospered, and began to show symptoms of returning sanity, common sense, faith, and piety. If she could have loyally accepted the Orleans dynasty, and cordially coöperated with it in correcting and improving the administration, instead of exerting herself to embarrass the government, or collecting and concentrating her energies for one bold and vigorous effort to change its constitution, it seems to us that she might have found her condition tolerable, have gradually recovered from the disastrous effects of her previous revolutions, and resumed her place at the head of modern civilization. The very worst way in the world to improve the temper or to facilitate the bene-

ficial operations of a government is to keep it in constant apprehension for its own safety. Assuredly, we have little sympathy with Louis Philippe ; but worse kings have been borne with, and we sincerely hope that France, who in a moment of delirium made him king, may never have cause to regret that in another moment of delirium she has unmade him.

We may be told that the abolition of royalty is in itself a great gain, and that, as friends of liberty, we ought to rejoice in the triumphs of democracy. We trust that it is not necessary for us at this late day to proclaim our love of liberty, or our devotion to the cause of the people. Let those of our countrymen who have more steadily devoted themselves to that cause than we have, or at a greater sacrifice claimed and exercised the highest of all freedoms, reproach us if they will. We are stanch republicans, — for our own country. Not, indeed, because we believe the American people, in civilization, intelligence, morals, religion, to be in advance of the European nations ; but because republicanism is the form of government which Almighty God in his providence has established for us ; because it is here the legal and the only legal form ; and because it has its roots in our national life, and is the only government to which our national habits, manners, and usages are adapted. It is coeval with our national existence, has grown up with us, and is a part of our concrete selves. We are, so to speak, natural-born republicans, and instinctively, without deliberation, adopt republican modes, and act to republican ends. But while these are good and sufficient reasons for maintaining republicanism at home, they are not good and sufficient reasons for asserting its superiority over all other forms for other nations, whose training has been different from ours. The French people, for instance, may even surpass us in religion, morals, intelligence, and refined civilization ; but, trained as they have been under the centralized monarchical system of modern Europe, they are necessarily destitute of those forms of interior life essential to republicanism, and without which it must be something foreign and unnatural. There is a wide difference between their case and ours. We, in order to support and carry on our government, have little else to do but to fall into the established routine ; we are not required to make any effort, to change or do violence to any of our habits of life or modes of activity. All follows in the ordinary course of things. But it is not so with a nation that throws off an old monarchical government, and seeks to establish the republican order.

The new order imposes a new language, new forms of interior as well as exterior life, unwonted modes of action. Nothing flows on spontaneously. All is strange, and no one feels himself at home. You can conform to the new order only as you deliberate, make an effort, force your activity into new channels. All your indeliberate and instinctive action takes a wrong direction. You must be constantly on your guard, and can allow yourself no relaxation, no *abandon*. All your faculties must be strained taught, and every man must be a profound political philosopher and a thoroughly accomplished statesman, or be liable to blunder, and to blunder, perhaps, fatally. It is not the change of one king, or one dynasty, for another, but it is the destruction of the old nation, and the attempt to mould a new nation out of its ashes. It is a fearful change. It requires the whole past life of the nation to be stricken out, and reduces the great body of the people to political infancy, sends them back to the cradle or the nurse's arms, just at the moment when they have the most need to be full-grown men. May we not, then, without forfeiting our claim to be reckoned among the friends of liberty, when we see a great nation trying this change, pause awhile before concluding it to be necessarily the *triumph* of the popular cause?

There are, indeed, politicians among us, and not without influence on public affairs, who will tell us that no danger is to be apprehended; that all is safe as soon as kings are got rid of, and the people take the management of affairs into their own hands; but these politicians will excuse us for saying that their appropriate place is in the nursery, not in the professor's chair, the halls of legislation, or the cabinets of ministers. As long as they consider it a proof of their wisdom to turn up their little noses at the bare idea of an infallible Church, they must not expect us to swallow an infallible people, and especially, if such as they can be its leaders. The people are, no doubt, in general, honest in their aims, but they lack discrimination and forecast, and are, for the most part, the dupes of their leaders or of their own passions. Rarely in what they approve or in what they oppose do they distinguish between the good and the evil they find mingled together, — between the essential and the accidental, the use and the abuse. They know, of course, that such distinction exists and should be made; but they do not know how or where to make it. If a system has worked ill in consequence of its having been abused, or in consequence of matters accidentally connected with it, but not

springing from it, their approved and usual remedy is to sweep it away. The remains of the barbarism which preceded its establishment, and sprang from other sources, disturbed the workings of feudalism, and they cried out, Down with feudalism! Corrupt and courtly prelates basked in the sunshine of royalty, forgot their flocks, and failed to denounce the tyrant, and they exclaimed, Down with the Church! The king abused his powers and oppressed his subjects, and they screamed out, Down with monarchy, and up with democracy! In their eagerness to throw off the evil, they almost invariably throw away the good in juxtaposition with which they find it,—just as your modern philanthropists, in pursuing some special object, trample down more good by the way than they could possibly remove of evil by gaining the end they seek. There is no use in denying or in seeking to disguise this fact, which is obvious to every one who has studied popular movements with the least attention.

Where republicanism is already constituted, as it is with us, and has grown up with the life of the nation, we have no lack of confidence in the capacity of the people, through their representatives, to administer the government as wisely and as beneficially as human governments can be administered; but we have yet to be convinced that wise and good government is sure to follow, the moment the people have thrown off royalty, and taken upon themselves the task of reconstituting the state, and of administering the public affairs. In point of fact, whatever the form of government established or proposed, the great body of the people count for little or nothing in determining its character or its policy. The questions which arise are decided by the few, and the many have simply the liberty to grumble, or acquiesce in silence. The action of the government, whether monarchical or democratical, is determined by the natural or artificial chiefs of the people, and will be wise and beneficial for the public good, in proportion to the intelligence, wisdom, firmness, and disinterestedness of these chiefs. If these chiefs are able and disposed to administer the government for the public good, it will be so administered, and if not able and so disposed, it will not be so administered, whatever its form. The reliance is always on the few, frequently on one man alone; as is evinced by the manner in which moderate republicans now speak of Lamartine, and the radicals of Ledru-Rollin. Save in a sentimental point of view, universal suffrage counts for far less than is commonly supposed. The real con-

stituency of the government is never the numerical majority of the people, but the numerical minority composed of the active politicians of the country. Viewed in the abstract, we confess, the question as to which is the best form of government is not in our judgment of primary importance. Forms of government, as somebody says, are like the forms of shoes, — those are best which best fit the feet that are to wear them. The motives which should decide us in favor of one form or another are extrinsic, not intrinsic. Any form is good, if adapted to the people for whom it is designed ; and any form is bad, if not so adapted. The existing form is always the best ; and we consider it a capital mistake for a people to look upon the form of government to which it is wedded as a thing that can be changed. The nation should always look upon its established form of government as immutable ; as every married couple should always look upon their marriage as indissoluble. If, whenever something unpleasant occurs in their mutual relations, instead of taking each a charitable view of it, and coöperating with the other to overcome it and restore the sunshine of domestic peace, a married couple contemplate and threaten a separation and a change of partners, their union is henceforth constrained and unnatural ; love and confidence take their departure ; each suspects the other ; each magnifies the slightest imperfections or errors of the other into enormous faults or crimes, and both find their condition intolerable. So is it with a nation. The moment the people once get their heads filled with the notion, that their marriage to the state is dissoluble at their will, and that the remedy for their real or imaginary grievances is in throwing off the existing form and adopting a different one, they place themselves out of the condition of being well governed. They have no longer the moral state to judge properly of the acts of the government, or to be satisfied with a single measure it can adopt. The first law of every government, as well as of the individual, is self-preservation ; and how can a government improve its administration, redress grievances, and lighten the burdens of its subjects, if it is obliged to use all its resources solely for the preservation of its own existence ? The people themselves, by demanding political instead of administrative changes, by seeking the destruction of the government instead of loyally coöperating with it for the public good, create the necessity for those repressive measures of which they complain, and which become to them new motives for the change they seek or threaten.

We certainly have no admiration for that centralized monarchical system of government which sprang up in Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which culminated in Louis the Fourteenth of France, but which has lingered on as the dominant *régime* to our own times. Under it the European populations have suffered immense evils, and have received comparatively few of the benefits which it is the purpose of the state to secure for all her subjects, whatever their rank or condition in life. But whence came that system? Was it due solely to the ambition of the kings themselves? And after its establishment, was it the wisest course for the people to seek to exchange it for democracy? Let us dwell for a few moments on these questions.

Europe, after the destruction of the Roman empire, was gradually reorganized on the feudal principle, under the moderatorship of the Church. The constituent elements of the state were the king, the barons, the clergy, and the communes, or free cities. The mutual relations of nations, of estates, and of princes and their subjects, were placed under the safeguard of the Papacy, which, as having the special interests of none, but the good of all, in view, was, even humanly considered, naturally an impartial judge, and a wise and just moderator. Such, in a word, was the feudal system, and, theoretically considered, perhaps as perfect a political system as the world has ever witnessed or ever will witness. But, unhappily for its satisfactory practical workings, the populations placed under it, and the kings and barons constituent elements of it, *personally* retained no small share of the barbarism into which all Europe, except the Church, was plunged by the destruction of the Roman empire and its civilization. The barbarians who invaded and overthrew the empire were gradually converted, indeed, and they received from the Church, with the faith, the germs of her generous and noble civilization; but they for a long time retained but too many traces of their old barbaric habits and dispositions. To overcome these, and bring the populations into personal conformity to Christian civilization, demanded generations of peaceful and continued training. The Church labored for it with supernatural energy and astonishing success; but her labors were repeatedly interrupted by the invasion of new hordes of barbarians and infidels, which continued, with brief intervals, till the eleventh century. The Huns in the East and the Centre, the Saracens in the South and South-west, the Saxons in Germany, the Danes in England and

Ireland, the Normans in France and parts of Italy, prove to the historical reader how long pagan and infidel barbarians continued to invade Christian Europe, and how often the labors of the Church were broken off, how frequently the slow gains of years were destroyed in a moment, and she was compelled to begin her work of civilization anew. The Saxons were not converted till the ninth century ; the Prussians, Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, were pagans in the eleventh century, and the greater part of them in the twelfth. The Saracenic power was not fairly checked till the invasion of Asia by the Crusaders, nor broken till the celebrated battle of Lepanto, in the sixteenth century.

These facts should lead us to expect in the feudal ages no little of unredeemed barbarism alongside of the generous and noble forms of Christian civilization, as the grotesque in juxtaposition with the beautiful ; and we, in fact, do find in them the most wonderful developments of intellectual and moral energy, miracles of Christian meekness, gentleness, love, manifesting themselves in all their sublime beauty in the cathedrals, the public worship, the religious and charitable establishments, and the piety, fervor, and devotedness of individuals of all ranks, from the prince to the peasant, along with an unmitigated personal barbarism that an Attila, an Alaric, a Genseric, a Caled, a Ralph the Ganger, would not have disdained. The huge form of the barbarian was oftener revealed than concealed by the ample folds of the toga. The tiger from the forest or the jungle was but half domesticated, and resumed all his native ferocity at the first lap of blood. Throughout are the feudal ages marked by huge disproportions, by the sublimest virtues and the darkest crimes ; the most winning gentleness and the most brutal violence ; Christian charity in all its supernatural beauty, and savage humanity in all its hideous deformity, brought together in fearful contrast and mortal combat. On their Christian side, we cannot exaggerate their merit ; on their barbaric side, it is hard to say too much against them.

But this barbarism, which disfigured the feudal ages, and which no admirer of feudalism denies or palliates, was not inherent in the system itself. It did not grow out of feudalism, for the tribes possessed it before they came under the influence of that political order ; it did not spring from the Church, because they possessed it prior to their conversion ; it did not spring from both united, for the same reason, and because it yielded in time to their joint action and influence. It was,

therefore, not in the political and ecclesiastical order of the feudal ages, but in the people not as yet brought into harmony with Christianity. The barbarism was in the persons, not in the order. So every one who is able to discriminate and is willing to be just knows, admits, or contends. But the Northern nations converted, the Saracens held in check by the Crusaders, the Church found herself in comparative peace. She resumed and continued her civilizing labors, and by the end of the fourteenth century succeeded in bringing the European populations very generally into comparative harmony with her own civilization. But just at this period, when the ecclesiastical and political order of the feudal times had overcome its chief obstacles, when it had so humanized the persons as to make them see and blush at their former barbarism, the people with their usual discrimination turned round and charged that barbarism to the very order which had so long struggled against it, and which had in good measure delivered them from it. Did not that barbarism for centuries coexist with feudalism and Catholicity? Certainly it did. Then feudalism and Catholicity caused it, and are responsible for it. Then down with Catholicity and feudalism! So began the people to reason, with their characteristic logic, in the fifteenth century, and aided in the sixteenth by the Lutheran insurrection, they were able to strike a death-blow at feudalism, and would have done the same to Catholicity, had she not been an Immortality.

The mistake of the people in confounding with the feudal order the personal barbarism which, in feudal times, existed under it, or rather in spite of it, led to the destruction of feudalism. Feudalism destroyed, centralism necessarily followed. All power was concentrated in the hands of the monarchy, — the principle of Oriental despotism. The people, at the time, had no fear of the royal tyranny and oppression. Between them and the king had stood the barons and the prelates, who had felt the principal weight of royal violence, and from whom the people in turn had suffered the grievances, real or imaginary, they complained of. Their resentments were against these, and not against the king. The barons oppress us, and the prelates do not restrain them. Down, then, with them both, and oppression will cease, all our wrongs will be righted, and we shall be happy, live in clover, under our father the king! Unsupported, but opposed, by the people, the barons could make only a feeble resistance, and feudalism, after a comparatively short struggle, was obliged

to succumb to centralism. The clergy, for the same reason, were unable to maintain their independence, and the Church became enslaved to the temporal power, — in Russia by schism; in England, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, by heresy; in France, and finally in Austria, Spain, and Portugal, by practical Gallicanism. There was then no longer any intermediate power between the king and the people, and the people found, when it was too late, that they had exchanged feudalism for despotism, the rods of Solomon for the scorpions of his son.

It is remarkable, how, after the Reformation, every thing conspired to enlarge and render absolute the monarchy, which in the original reorganization of Europe had been only one element out of four. In Protestant countries monarchy was extolled, because it was the bulwark of heresy. In Catholic countries, for a time, it was opposed, and the old doctrines of liberty were maintained, in the schools and universities. The “divine right of kings” was a Protestant doctrine, and it was against the Catholic Cardinal Du Perron that James the First of England wrote his famous *Remonstrance* in its defence; and hence the first republican reaction against monarchy appears in England, and more than a hundred years before it manifests itself in France. But gradually Catholic kings became ardent defenders of the faith, and even Catholics turned monarchists, and courtly bishops were found to advocate and justify royal absolutism, as a protection against schism and heresy, — hoping, no doubt, by their spiritual action on the monarch’s conscience, to restrain him from abusing his powers, — a sad mistake, for he could banish them at will from court, and deprive them of their revenues.

It was not wholly the fault of the kings that feudalism became converted into centralism, and the estates succumbed to the despot. It was still more the fault of the people, who, when they had emerged from barbarism, and at the very moment when the political and ecclesiastic order, by means of which they had emerged, could begin to operate, free from the causes which previously disturbed it, rejected it on account of the barbarism which had been accidentally connected with it, and wished for a different constitution of the state. If the people had resisted, or not been ready to assent, the kings could never have suppressed the barons, enslaved the Church, and monopolized all power in their own hands. They succeeded, not in spite of the people, but by their coöperation; and the people, if disappointed, had themselves principally to blame. Whatever

the faults or defects of modern centralism, there can be no doubt that it was popular in its origin, and had, if not the formal, at least the virtual, assent of the European populations.

That the people should have been dissatisfied with this new system is nothing strange. They had in their folly and madness thrown off the best, and obtained the worst, of all possible systems of government, and, of course, must have found themselves in no enviable condition. But were they wise in opposing the government of their own choice, and in seeking to replace it by democracy?

To go back to feudalism with its barbarism was out of the question; to go back to it even without its barbarism was impracticable. Restorations are rarely successful, even when the order restored, in itself considered, is better than any other order likely to be obtained. Feudalism, if it had continued, if it existed now, with our advanced personal civilization and refinement, would, in our judgment, be the perfection of government. But having been thrown off, and the ideas of the people all turned against it, its restoration is impracticable and undesirable. With its evils we must give up its good, unless we can secure it by some other method. We blame not, therefore, the people for not going back, or attempting to go back, to feudalism, when they found their new system fail. But had they no alternative but either to remain slaves to monarchical centralism, or to try the experiment of democracy?

The new order established was, briefly characterized, the king on the one side, and the mob on the other. The local organizations which limited and tempered the general sovereignty were swept away, and the people, outside of the monarchy, had no organization, and therefore were not a power. The king was the state, and besides him there was no state. The people out of the state, without political organization, can act only as the mob. What they needed was an organization between them as simple individuals and the monarchy, which should shelter them from its despotism, restrain the exercise of its authority within the limits of justice, and prevent it from infringing the natural liberty of the subject. This, it strikes us, was obtainable without any essential political change, if the people had accepted the new system in good faith. It might have been easily effected by simply emancipating the Church from her thralldom to the state, and suffering her to enjoy her rightful independence of the temporal order; and this could have been effected without any revolution or violent struggle, by the

simple return of the people to their active faith as Christians. Each bishop in his diocese, each priest in his parish, receiving his mission, and exercising his functions, without any intervention, direct or indirect, of the civil government, would have been, though without one particle of political power, a moral sovereign, competent to protect his flock from the oppressions of the monarch, and to secure them against all encroachments upon their rights as men. No king ever was or ever can be powerful enough to resist the clergy in his dominions, if they are independent of him, and are backed by the faith and conscience of the people. The people, then, might, if they had chosen, have compelled their kings to reign wisely and justly, without any political changes, and even without troubling their heads in the least about politics or the constitution of the state, — simply by attending to their faith and duties as Christians.

But this was too simple and easy a method. The people hailed with joy the subjection of the spiritual order to the temporal, the Church to the state, and then denounced the Church because she did not protect them from its tyranny ; they insisted on her subjection, and then demanded of her what she could not do unless independent. But as she did not do it, they arrayed themselves against both the Church and the government, swore the destruction of both throne and altar, and thus compelled the Church and the monarchy, as the condition of continuing to exist, to make common cause against the popular demands, and to postpone to more settled times the redress of political grievances. But the more the Church and the government resisted the popular movement, the more determined and menacing it became ; and from the early part of the eighteenth century, the mob, seconded by the philosophers, a cause and an effect of the popular movement, became every day stronger and more exasperated, and before the close of that century succeeded in overthrowing monarchy, as, led on by the kings, it had succeeded in overthrowing feudalism, and if it failed to overthrow the Church, it was only because she is upheld by a Divine hand. Anarchy, of course, followed, the reign of terror, and military despotism ; reaction, and an insane restoration, which left matters worse than they were at the beginning.

Now the error in all this was not in seeking to get rid of evils, or to ameliorate the social condition. We know no law, human or divine, which sanctions misrule and oppression, or which forbids an oppressed people to labor for liberty and justice.

The error was not here, not as to the end sought, but solely as to the means, — in supposing a fundamental political change, or a political revolution in favor of republicanism or of any other form of government, to be the only practicable remedy, or a practicable remedy at all. We do not maintain that wrongs are not to be redressed, that the people may not demand justice from the hands of their rulers ; nor do we go so far as to maintain that individual kings may not be deposed, and dynasties changed, for good and sufficient reasons ; for these are not the government, but its administrators, and they may abuse their trusts and forfeit their rights ; but we do maintain that it is always a capital error to seek reform or redress by changing the form of government, the fundamental constitution of the state. *That* should be held sacred and inviolable, whether a feudal, a monarchical, an aristocratical, or a democratical constitution ; for each is alike legitimate, where it is the established order. The man who dares attack it is guilty of sacrilege. He who advises its destruction, or its exchange for another, draws his counsel from hell, and the people who drink in his infernal advice, and prepare to act on it, are mad, and rush to their own destruction ; for, whether they know it or not, the principle they adopt and the spirit they follow are, at bottom, opposed to all government, render government, in any form, impracticable ; and without government, there is and can be no society, no people, nothing but isolated individuals or the mob.

We must not lose sight of this fact. It is because the tendency to redress evils by changing the form of the government is, at bottom, no-governmentism, that no popular revolution is ever final, or able to satisfy those who make it. Every popular revolution, if left to itself, necessarily develops in a series of revolutions, each removing society farther and farther from government. Thus, in the old French Revolution, we had first a revolution that brought up the notables, then another that brought up the respectables, and then still another that brought up the *sans-culottes*, — Mirabeau and Lafayette, Vergniaud and Roland, Danton and Robespierre ; and what we should have had next, if the series had not been cut short by the reaction, it is impossible to say, but some lower form of anarchy and terror is certain ; for already, before his downfall, had Robespierre become too aristocratic and conservative for the mob. For the same reason, the policy of concession seldom avails to appease the revolutionary spirit, and to reëstab-

lish order and content. The demands of the people, when made in a loyal spirit, without any thought of attacking the constitution of the state, may often be conceded with advantage both to them and to the government ; but even when just, if they are prompted by the revolutionary spirit, or made under the conviction that the people have the right to overthrow the constitution when they please, and to institute a new government after their own ideas or fancies, the concession is useless, and even worse, if you mean to preserve the constitution unimpaired. Concessions then only stimulate new and greater demands, and weaken the government. The people, after them, if the shadow of government remains, find the same disproportion as ever between their actual and their ideal. They are still restrained, cramped, confined, and are not free in their sense of freedom. They have not reached Utopia, nor recovered the lost Eden. You must yield all the revolutionary spirit demands, grant each new demand as quick as it is made, or else resist it in the outset. Whoso goes an inch with the mob is a lost man, if he goes not with it whithersoever it will. You might as well undertake to guide or stay the tempest, as to attempt to direct or resist the mob, when once you have yielded to it. Who, that suffers himself to be drawn within its vortex, can hope to recover himself and escape from the Maelstrom ?

The great difficulty arises at all times, in our view of the case, from the revolutionary spirit, the tendency to redress grievances by seeking to subvert the political constitution. The evils, however great, can always be remedied, as far as in their nature remediable, without any thing of the sort,—simply by the people accepting the government in good faith, and loyally laboring with it for improvement. But when the revolutionary spirit has once possessed a nation, and all harmony, all sympathy, between the people and the government are destroyed, and the government can sustain itself against its own subjects only by means of the military, there is perhaps little use in its attempting to sustain itself at all. It is no longer in a condition, if this state of things is to become permanent, to perform the legitimate functions of government. It, in fact, has ceased to be government, and is only the slave-master driving his miserable gang of wretched slaves. And such had become the governments throughout the more civilized part of Europe, before the recent events. There had ceased to be any harmony between them and the people. Authority and

the people were antagonistical, and could not work together ; the state was almost universally dissolved, and the monarchs retained their crowns only by means of large standing armies, kept on the war footing, not by any means to defend them against one another, but against their own subjects. The expense of these immense armies, and of the various establishments connected with them, had become enormous, and the people were finding themselves obliged to part with nearly all their substance to pay for being governed, and yet not be governed after all. The governments, instead of stimulating and aiding industry, were crippling it, and large portions of the population were reduced to poverty, to the starving point, and many even below it. Gaunt want was staring the millions in the face. How could matters be worse ? The government, having no strength in the affections or convictions of the people, no moral support in the nation, could hardly do any thing for the public good, however well disposed, and the people, debauched by revolutionary ideas, would do nothing for themselves. Was such a state of things, growing worse every day, to last for ever ?

Now we believe the fault of this state of things to be far more due to the disloyalty of the people than to the governments themselves. We cannot discover any period since the beginning of the last century, when the European governments had even the power to prevent or to remedy it. But however this may be, it seems to us certain that things could not long remain as they were. Matters had come to such a pass, that an attempt to right them, in some way, was necessary and inevitable ; and taking the people as they were, perverted by demagogues, sophists, and the malign influence of secret societies, with the revolutionary fever burning in their veins, and longing for democratic institutions, we see not what better could have been attempted than the fearful revolutions which have actually taken place, or are now taking place. If the people had been loyal, Christian, sober, something better would have been possible ; but as they were, we see not what else was practicable. Monarchy had become anti-national, had ceased to be popular, and could not continue to exist. Without, then, abating any thing of our condemnation of the revolutionary ideas and spirit, without countenancing for a moment the absurd doctrine, that the people have always a natural right to democratic institutions, and that monarchy is in itself an illegitimate form of government, an encroachment upon natural

liberty, or the still more absurd doctrine, that the republican order had become inevitable in consequence of the *progress* of man and society, we are, upon the whole, not sorry that these recent revolutions have been effected, and we accept, without reserve, THE NEW ERA they promise to usher in. Only give to the old order honorable burial, and you may, if you can, dig its grave so deep, that no one will think of disinterring its fleshless remains, and dressing them up anew in the robes of state.

We do not applaud the mob for what it has done, we will not consent to call a few thousands of the Parisian rabble "the glorious French people"; but we accept their work, now it is done, and are ready to resist all attempts to undo it and return to the monarchical centralism which has been dethroned and exiled. Believing, also, that the principal nations of Europe, unless we except Great Britain and Russia, will be discontented and restless, torn and agitated, out of the condition to be well governed, till they obtain substantially republican institutions, we wish the work to continue till such institutions are secured. It is in vain to attempt to change, by any human means, the ideas and tendencies of the people, to arrest the present current of political thought, or to roll back the revolutionary tide. Europe, it seems to us, can be settled hereafter only on a republican basis; and since republicanism must come, sooner or later, we say the sooner the better. Half-way measures and feeble temporizing will avail nothing. Now that the hand is in, let the work be done, wherever it needs to be done, and so done that there will, in our day at least, be no occasion for doing it over again.

And this seems to be the view taken by the friends of order and religion in France. The bishops and clergy, as far as we have seen, without a single dissentient voice, have given in their adhesion to the republican order, resolved to give it a fair and honest trial, and to live or die with it. The politicians of all parties seem also to have done the same. The conviction appears to be universal, that if France is ever to find good government, and be restored to domestic tranquillity and peace, it must be as a republic. This requires no sacrifice of principle or consistency. Government is for the public good. When circumstances no longer controllable by human means have disabled an existing government from securing that good, and rendered constitutional changes necessary and inevitable, a new *régime* the only practicable one, it is the part of wisdom,

of all sound politics, as well as of duty, to accept it, and to make the best of it. The wise and consistent statesman, when he cannot control circumstances, conforms to them, — for government is an affair of human prudence, — and takes care never to ruin himself or his country for the sake of an abstraction.

It is because we judge it the part of wisdom to accept this republican order, and to labor to render it permanent and beneficial, that we have begun our remarks on the recent events in Europe by condemning the causes which have made them necessary and inevitable. If we are not much mistaken, European society can hereafter be settled only on the republican basis. Whether it can be settled even on that may be regarded as problematical ; but if not on that, it can on none. Republicanism is now the last hope of Europe. If that fails her, her civilization must go backward, and she become ere long the counterpart of Asia. For the reason that, in the fifteenth century, we would have sustained feudalism against the tendency to centralism, and in the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, centralism against the democratic tendency, we would now sustain republicanism against any tendency to overthrow it, whether in favor of socialism or aristocracy. Our principle is, to sustain the existing constitution of the state, whether it conforms to our abstract notions or not ; because in politics every thing is to be taken in the concrete, nothing in the abstract.

But if we maintain in principle that the change from feudalism to democracy is a progress, — if we say, with the beardless philosophers of the day, that the people, in seeking it, have been obeying a divine instinct, and declare the revolutionary spirit which has been followed throughout wise and sacred, — we cannot with any consistency maintain this new order, or resist the tendencies that may be manifested for additional changes. Moreover, a people filled with the revolutionary spirit, holding, as a sound maxim in politics, that the evils they may have to endure in the social state are to be remedied by the subversion of the existing government, whether by violence or peaceful agitation, and the substitution of some other form, is incapable of sustaining a good and permanent government, whatever its constitution ; for no government can prevent or redress all evils, and at best there will be much that can be overcome only by the Christian virtues of resignation and patience. Every government, if government, must sometimes

restrain, must make its authority felt, and compel submission ; for in every society, as long as the world stands, there will be turbulent and rebellious spirits, whom authority must tame. Men's views, too, of the policy the government should adopt will often conflict, and it will be impossible for the government to satisfy them all. Impossible, therefore, must it always be to maintain a fixed and permanent government, if its subjects feel that it is right and proper for them to overthrow it whenever they choose. The old governments have fallen, not for the want of physical force, but because they no longer had any moral support in their subjects. No matter what is the physical force at the command of the government, it cannot long sustain itself, at least in a condition to perform its proper functions, unless it has the moral force of the nation with it. This is even more true of republican government than of any other. The virtue of loyalty is far more essential to a democracy than to a monarchy, — though a democracy is less fitted to inspire it. In vain will you labor to sustain your republic, if the people are disloyal, if they hold themselves under no moral obligation to support it, and free to abolish it whenever they fancy it will be for their interest or their pleasure to do so. It has then no moral support ; and the moment the people find, or imagine they find, themselves a little incommoded by it, they will begin to agitate for a change, and force it to take measures of repression or concession, which, sooner or later, must prove its ruin. The brief history of our own governments, especially of the government of the State of New York, would confirm this conclusion, if it needed confirmation.

It is true, that our popular politicians tell us that mere humanitarian principles will be always a sufficient guaranty against frequent and unnecessary revolutions. The people, they say, will always, from affection and interest, sustain the government of their choice, and we may always rely on their *vis inertiae* and indisposition to change. For, add they, in the words of Mr. Jefferson, "All experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer evils, while they are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." But times have altered since 1776. When Mr. Jefferson drew up the Declaration of American Independence, his appeal to experience was warranted ; for up to that time mankind had very generally held the doctrine, that to support the constitution of the state is a sacred duty binding upon all the citizens, and that to labor in any way to subvert

or abolish it is a crime, and a high crime. But from the fact, that mankind have shown under this doctrine the disposition asserted, we cannot safely conclude that they will continue to show it under the contrary doctrine. Mr. Jefferson could appeal only to the experience of mankind under the moral operation of the anti-revolutionary doctrine. Since his time, the revolutionary doctrine has been in vogue, and very widely received, and we do not find the people now so indisposed to change as they were then. They have, in fact, become greedy of change, and ready to embrace every novelty that is proposed with a little earnestness and eloquence. Mr. Jefferson, perhaps, did not sufficiently reflect that the prevalence of the revolutionary doctrine would very naturally tend to weaken, if not destroy, that indisposition of the people to abolish the forms to which they were accustomed, on which he relied as a protection against its dangerousness.

Affection and interest are great words. But affection, when not founded in principle, and sustained by a sense of duty, is mere steam from the marsh ; and what is or is not interest is a matter not always easy to determine. If it be a duty to sustain the existing constitution, there is no difficulty in determining the questions of duty which may come up. But interests are the hardest things in the world to settle. Men often mistake their own interests, and after it is too late find out that they have blundered. Their views of what is or is not their interest vary, too, with their age, with their pursuits, or their social position. The Haves and the Have-nots are far from agreeing as to their respective interests. No man will believe his interest is consulted, when he finds himself thwarted, or his neighbour succeeding, and his own plans miscarrying. Interests themselves do often really conflict, and it is impossible for the government to harmonize all so as to satisfy each. The wise statesman, therefore, can never rely on the mere sense of interest ; but must, while he seeks as far as possible to promote all interests, make his appeal to the sense of duty, — to loyalty.

But no people, holding themselves free to abolish their existing form of government whenever they think proper, can regard themselves as under a moral obligation to sustain it. An obligation from which we may absolve ourselves whenever we choose is no *moral* obligation, and, indeed, no obligation at all. The obligation to support the government and the right to abolish it are not compatible, the one with the other, and no sophistry can make them so. The revolutionary spirit and doctrine

to which we owe the recent events in Europe are, then, incompatible with the existence of government itself, and therefore as incompatible with the existence of republican government as of monarchical government. This is wherefore we have opposed them, and venture, even in the moment of their victory, to denounce them. We accept the victory as *un fait accompli*, and wish the people to reap from it the fruits of real social and political well-being. But to applaud the forces which have won it, to sanction the spirit and doctrine which made it necessary, although they have gained it, would be to render the victory barren of good fruits, — nay, worse, prolific in new disorders. The work of demolition must cease, and that of construction must begin, and the principles which must govern the builders cannot be those which governed the destroyers. If you knock away the foundation as you raise your superstructure, you raise — a castle in the air.

But we have dwelt long enough on general considerations. What is likely to be the result of the recent events in Europe? France is now decidedly a republic. Will she be able to establish and maintain the authority of the state and the freedom of the subject? This is a matter about which we do not wish to speculate. We have found nothing in our historical reading which leads us to augur her success. The historical precedents are all against her. But we cannot pretend to fathom the designs of Almighty God, to whom belong the ordering of all events and the determination of their issues. Whether he has designed the revolution in mercy or in judgment to the nations, we can know only as he himself is pleased to make it manifest; but whichever it be, it is ours to be silent and adore, for his judgments are as adorable as his mercies. That the French people will find it an easy task to reconstitute the state, which the revolution of February dissolved, and reestablish and maintain order, the indispensable condition of liberty, we presume nobody with a grain of political philosophy or experience will pretend. The ideas and passions, the schemes and wishes, which have destroyed the old government, and reduced French society to its original elements, are opposed to all government, and if not abandoned, must be as fatal to the republic as they have been to the monarchy. The revolutionary party is in pursuit of Utopia, and has no stopping-place within the limits of practicable government. It must be arrested, or it will subvert the new institutions before they get fairly into operation. But to attempt to arrest them by physical force, by measures of re-

pression, will only renew between them and the new government the very relations which rendered the old government impotent for good, and its longer existence impracticable. Under Providence, then, the solution of the problem must turn on the fact, whether the radicals, represented by such men as Ledru-Rollin, that second edition of Danton, Louis Blanc, Blanqui, Albert, and company, are a large, or only a small, minority of the French nation, and on the courage, firmness, and energy of the party opposed to them. If they are only a small minority, confined principally to a few localities, and the friends of order show them from the outset that their opposition is disregarded, and their advice will not be asked, they may be held in subjection till the new government is so firmly established as to render their attempts to subvert it impotent and ridiculous. But if they are a large minority, — absolutely so, by their numbers, or effectively so, by their organization and concentration, or by the uncertainty, hesitation, fears, and anxieties of their opponents, — they will have little difficulty in defeating all attempts to reconstitute the state, and in prolonging the reign of anarchy. How the case actually stands in France we have no certain means of knowing, and cannot pretend to decide.

The majority of the National Assembly appear to be well disposed, and to entertain moderate views ; but they evidently lack experience, and have marked out to themselves no clear and definite line of policy. They are apparently trusting for their success to the chapter of accidents. Their determination is, indeed, to give France a republican government ; but they are evidently afraid that the sincerity of their attachment to republicanism will be suspected. This renders them uneasy, deprives them of that calmness, sobriety, and independence, that naturalness and at-home feeling, so essential to their success, and gives the radical minority an immense advantage over them. The radicals have no fears of this sort. Strong in the fact that they represent the revolution, embody its spirit, and obey its tendencies, they march with a bold and confident step in the path of destruction. In settled times, when the revolutionary spirit has not penetrated the body of the people, when the subversion of an old government is looked upon as an exceptional measure, to be justified only on the ground of invincible necessity, the party adopting moderate counsels and cherishing a conciliatory spirit is sure to rally around it the great body of the nation. But when the principle of revolution aspires to obtain a legal recognition, and is held by the great

body of the people to be the proper basis of the state, — when all old ideas are confounded, and the general wish is to erect the social fabric, not only after a new fashion, but on a new and untried foundation, — extreme counsels are most likely to prevail, and the party in favor of carrying out the revolution is pretty sure to succeed. We shall, therefore, by no means be disappointed, if Ledru-Rollin turns out to be a stronger man than Lamar-tine. The Mountain triumphed over the Girondists, the *sans-culottes* over the respectables, in the former revolution, and why shall they not do the same in this? They assuredly will, unless the moderate party take their ground at once, declare boldly that the revolution must be arrested, and that a contrary set of maxims from those which prepared and effected it must now be adopted and acted on. The state cannot be constituted on the revolutionary principle, nor recognize the right of the people to abolish the government; for every state must have as its basis the right of the state to command, and the duty of the citizen to obey. Whether the moderate party have the courage to face the revolution in the moment of its victory, and recognize a solid basis for authority, the event must determine. We fear, however, that, captivated by fine phrases about *fraternity*, they will attempt to conciliate the revolutionary party by compromise, and thus destroy themselves, and prepare the triumph of disorder or of despotism.

The moderate party will certainly not be able to succeed, unless they recognize and secure the absolute freedom of religion, and that, too, not in the sense of radicals, who consider religion to be free where every body is free to despise it and nobody is free to profess and practise it. The spirit of radicalism is the spirit of despotism, and seeks always, by an effective majority, which for its purpose need be only a small numerical minority of the whole population, to rule as absolutely as did the centralized monarchy just overthrown. It simply substitutes the despotism of the effective majority for the despotism of the monarch. It demands an absolute government, and all absolute governments are despotisms, and seek to sweep away, or to subject to themselves, whatever interposes or is capable of interposing an obstacle to their governing according to their own arbitrary will. Radicals out of place are revolutionists, and seek to overthrow all authority; in place, they are despots, and seek to suppress all freedom. In making the revolution, they have aimed, not at guaranties for liberty against the abuses of power, but to get possession of power for themselves, in order to use

it for their own interest, plans, purposes, or theories. They will, therefore, seek to reconstitute the state so that none but themselves can get into power, and so that, when they are once in power, they can use it as they please, without any restriction on their own will.

Now we may be certain, that, as far as depends on them, the radicals will establish the sovereignty of infidelity, and the subjection of religion ; the latter, because they wish to rule according to arbitrary will, which they know they cannot do where religion is free and independent, — and the former, because they are themselves infidel, and because the subjection of religion to the state is itself the sovereignty of infidelity. This they will assuredly attempt, and this the moderate republicans must defeat, or fail in establishing a free government. A free government is a government of law, not of mere will or arbitrariness. Where the government is one of mere will, whether of one, of the few, or of the many, there is not one particle of liberty. The will of the people has no more right to prevail than the will of the monarch, when it is not just ; and it never is just, when not subjected to religion ; and it never is subjected to religion, when it subjects religion to itself. It is therefore absolutely necessary that religion should be free and independent, if the government is intended to be a free government. Do the moderate republicans understand this ? They are, unquestionably, determined to maintain order against the radicals ; are they equally determined to maintain *liberty* against them ? They must not look upon radicalism as dangerous only by its tendency to an excess of freedom, for it is still more dangerous by its tendency to despotism ; not, indeed, the despotism of one man, but of the ruling faction, or what we call the effective majority.

We are not now pleading the cause of religion for her own sake. We are addressing politicians, who, whether moderates or ultras, cannot be expected, in these days, to have any respect for religion on her own account. But this, though a terrible misfortune for them, cannot harm religion herself. The Church of God does not depend on the French National Assembly, and is safe, let them take what course they please. Men may wage war against her, if they choose ; they may suppress her religious orders, invade her pious retreats, break up her establishments of charity and mercy ; desecrate her altars, burn her temples, and insult her virgins ; exile or behead her Sovereign Pontiff, slaughter her bishops and priests ; drive her from the face of day, and compel her to offer up the Most

Holy Sacrifice in caverns, crypts, and catacombs. Such things have been, and may be again. But in the very moment when the maddened multitude shall fancy her dead, and begin to sing and dance over what they imagine her grave, she shall step forth from her hiding-place, plant her foot on the tyrant's neck, give the word to the nations, and resume the empire of the world. We are quite at our ease, so far as she is concerned. We fear only for those who shall dare do her violence. The nation that restrains her freedom is smitten with the curse of God, and nothing it can do shall prosper, except only to its own confusion and ruin.

But it is not precisely this consideration we wish to press upon our French republicans. The government they are about to establish is likely to be a centralized democracy. They are, whether aware of it or not, merely substituting one form of centralism for another. For the same reason that the freedom and independence of the Church was necessary under the monarchical centralism, will it be necessary under the democratic. It was needed under the former as a moral barrier to the encroachments of power on the natural liberty of the subject; it will be equally essential for this purpose under the latter; for the danger to be apprehended from this democratic centralism is less a danger to the authority of the state than to the liberty of the citizens. The citizen has no liberty, where the sovereignty of the state is not limited; and under a centralized democracy, the only possible limitation of the political sovereign is the freedom and independence of the Church. The immediate danger to be guarded against is not the weakness, but the strength, of the state; for the weakness of the state is to be apprehended only from its too great strength. The republic will fail, if it fails, from its tyranny, by attempting to rule according to mere will, by interfering with too many of the relations of life, and leaving too little space for the free movements of the individual. The danger is of its attempting too much, and of its becoming an all-pervading despotism, which no people can endure. The only possible protection against this, in the actual state of France, is in the absolute freedom and independence of the entire spiritual order, which necessarily restricts the government to matters of simple human prudence.

The subjection of the spiritual order to the temporal was not only the capital crime, but the capital blunder, of the old monarchical *régime*. The prince, by subjecting the Church in

his dominions, obtained, indeed, free scope for his arbitrary will ; but, ruling by arbitrary will, he provoked the opposition of his subjects, and could derive from her no aid in reducing them to obedience. By depriving her of power to resist, he deprived her of power to assist him ; by rendering her unable to protect the people in their obedience, he rendered her unable to restrain them in their disobedience. In his strength he despised her, in his weakness she could not come to his aid. The same was it with the people. They had aided in her subjection, that she might not resist their revolutionary movements ; and when they felt the weight of the tyranny they had helped to create, she had no power to relieve them. On either hand, the policy was suicidal, as in the long run must be all unjust policy. Let the National Assembly of France look to it, that the republic does not repeat the capital blunder of the monarchy.

There are several staunch Catholics in the National Assembly, men of sterling worth, patriotic and religious, the enemies of all despotism. These, we know, will do all they can to secure the freedom of religion ; but we fear their exertions will end in a bold and manly protest. The tendency is now to do by the state a large portion of the work which is properly and legitimately the work of the spiritual order. The enemies of the freedom of religion are undeniably in the ascendency. The infidel party have every member of the Executive Committee, not excepting Lamartine, who, unless we are misinformed, has latterly fraternized with the enemies of Christianity. They have, in the Minister of Instruction and Worship, M. Carnot, a man after their own heart, and one who has proved himself the insidious enemy of religious liberty by denying the freedom of education. We confess, therefore, that the chance of religion being suffered to remain free in France, free as she is here, which is all we ask, appears to us exceedingly small. Yet there are men whose judgments are entitled to far more respect than ours, who think differently, — men who believe that these popular revolutions are designed by Providence to eventuate in the entire emancipation of the Church throughout Europe. That many worthy people have acquiesced in or aided the popular movements in the hope of such a result is no doubt the fact. Perhaps they have been right, and we are wrong. We hope it is so. Hope is sometimes a better counsellor than fear ; and it may be that Almighty God has designed these revolutions in mercy to the nations, to be a judgment

upon the infidel governments which oppressed his Church, and the means of operating her entire freedom and independence,— of securing to her, for the first time in the world's history, an open field and fair play for the exertion of her divine energies. O, if so, then indeed will they usher in a *NEW ERA*, an era the most glorious in the annals of mankind. Reassure us on this point, guaranty us for Europe that freedom of the Church which she has in our own country, and we will join the sympathizers, and our exultant shouts shall rise loudest among the loud.

The movements of the Italian people seem likely to result in the independence of Italy, and the retreat of the Austrians over the Alps. This, we hope, will be the case; for, excepting Russia, Austria, since the days of Joseph II., has been the most cruel enemy of the freedom and independence of the Church. Nominally Catholic, she has been hardly less hostile to religious freedom than was the French Convention, and right glad shall we be to see her pride humbled and her power diminished. But how far the Italian people will gain any thing by their movements, beyond certain sentimental advantages, is not yet quite clear to our dim and conservative vision. An Italian confederacy is talked of, but it appears to us a dream that will soon dissolve. The Italian people are not one people, nor are they united by one and the same national feeling. Since the fall of the Western Empire, they have never really existed as a single state, consolidated or federative, and we cannot see what is to serve as the basis of the confederacy proposed, if it is to be any thing more than a mere mutual alliance, or mutual league offensive and defensive, between the several Italian states. We demand for the foundation of a federative state some common bond of nationality, of national habits, associations, or recollections, and where we find no such bond, we conclude the federation to be impracticable. If brought about in a moment of enthusiasm, or of patriotic exaltation, it may last till the enthusiasm subsides; but will hardly remain after the collapse, and the people have resumed their wonted feelings, and fallen into the old routine of affairs.

Then who is to be at the head of this confederacy? Charles Albert? Yes, if he chooses, so long as the work of driving out the Austrian remains to be done. But after that work is completed? You have then republican jealousy and animosity, Tuscan, Lombard, Venetian, Sicilian, Neapolitan, and Roman jealousies and ambitions against him, and not easy to be concili-

ated with Piedmontese supremacy. The Pope? He refuses; and if he did not, would the other nations of Europe consent that the common Father of the Faithful should add to his authority as Pontiff that of temporal president or prince of one of the most powerful European nations? If they did consent, how long could he maintain his position, if his parliament or congress should insist on his adopting some measure, as temporal prince, which he could not approve, or which would be incompatible with his relations, as Sovereign Pontiff? If his temporal authority is absolute, we know that his subjects will be constantly rebelling; if it is limited, the recent conduct of the Roman people teaches us what he would have to expect, if he should cross their wishes. Some Mamiani or Cicerouachio would be preferred to him as leader, and exile, imprisonment, or death would await him, unless he humored and complied with what might be the crotchet in their heads for the moment. If the Italians can form a federative state and maintain it, — a state which secures order and liberty, — we shall be glad; but we have seen nothing in their recent or past conduct to assure us that this is possible. Instead of manifesting due regard for the Holy Father, however much they may scream, *Evviva Pio Nono!* the tendency, as far as we can see, is to subject the Church to the state. We refer not now to their clamor against the Jesuits, — although their scandalous persecution of that illustrious Order is sufficient to make all reasonable men distrust them, — but to the recent measures proposed by the *liberal* ministry of Sardinia, which are in open violation of the concordat with the Church, and would bring, if adopted, the whole body of the clergy of both orders under the surveillance of a lay commission, and subject every pastoral of a bishop to a lay censorship. Only one step more needs to be taken, — that is, appoint a number of infidel laymen to write the pastorals of the bishops and the sermons to be preached by the clergy, and you have the Church in the condition desired by your Michelets and Quinets. The Italians may be firm Catholics at bottom, but some of them have, we must confess, a queer way of manifesting their faith and piety. We say frankly, that the aspect of affairs in Italy seems to us even less promising than in France.

But the revolutions in Germany strike us more favorably than those of either France or Italy. The Germans seem to us, after Pius IX., to be the only Europeans who in these days have retained their senses and given proofs of a little statesmanship. Lamartine is a poet and an orator, a master of fine

sentiments and fine phrases, — a great and well-meaning man, if you will ; but that he is a statesman, that he comprehends the problems of the state and the proper constitution of its powers, he has yet to prove. The other Frenchmen whose names the revolution has brought up are, as statesmen, too insignificant to command a second thought. But there have certainly been some sound heads at work in Germany, and we shall be somewhat disappointed, if “the thick-headed Dutchmen,” as we call them, do not redeem the political character of the nineteenth century.

The Germanic revolutions have stopped short with a modified constitutionalism, somewhat after the English model, it is true ; but this is not the feature in them we most admire. The great thing, and which, we think, will turn out to be the great event of the age, is the reconstruction of the German Empire, destroyed by Napoleon in 1806, or the reconstitution, on an improved plan, of the whole of Germany into one grand federative state. The important feature in the movement is the adoption of federalism as the counterpoise of centralism, the characteristic principle of feudalism, and that which has made and still makes the glory of our American government. The French may fancy that they are adopting, in substance, the American system ; but they are mistaken. They do not adopt it all. Their system is democratic centralism. They merely exchange their centralized monarchy for a centralized democracy, — one form of despotism for another, — and thus, as we say, only “jump from the frying-pan into the fire.” But, although there is a tendency amongst us — resulting from foreign influences — to this centralized democracy, our political system is a federative democracy, dividing the powers of government between the general government and the several State governments. It is this division that gives to our government all its strength and permanence, and its admirable practical workings. Destroy this division, break up your Federal Union, and restore to each State all the powers of government, or absorb all the powers in one grand central government, and order and freedom would not remain a week ; anarchy or despotism would instantly ensue. This is wherefore we look for no good results from the French revolution. Their old revolution effaced the provinces, and destroyed the conditions of a federal republic ; and a centralized democracy is a despotism, except where the great body of the people are Catholic, really Catholic, and the Church is independent.

But the Germans, having providentially the requisite conditions of a federative state, adopt all the essential features of our American system. The plan proposed by the Diet at Frankfort unites all Germany in one federative state, dividing the powers of government between the federal government, or empire, and the several particular states already existing, and guaranties through the empire to the people of the several states certain rights or liberties in face of the local governments. The idea is grand and sound, and when adopted and perfected in detail, as we doubt not it will be, it will, after ours, be the most perfect system of government, in our judgment, that is now practicable. It will secure order and efficiency, on the one hand, and the freedom of the subject, on the other, — placing the nation at once under shelter from despotism and from anarchy. It appears to us practicable ; for the empire still lives in the traditions and recollections of the German people, and its introduction requires no violent change in their habits, and no sharp separation of their present and future from their past. We permit ourselves to hope that something will be gained for European politics by this Germanic movement, and if it succeeds as well as it ought to succeed, we may expect great results from it. The restoration of Polish nationality, and the reconstitution of the Polish kingdom or republic, must follow ; the farther advance of Russia will be effectually checked ; Hungary will gain her independence of Austria, and, if she retains her faith, take possession of the East of Europe, compel the Turks to raise their camp and depart, plant the cross anew on St. Sophia, and re-consecrate the city of Constantine.

We intended to offer some reflections on Irish affairs ; but we have exceeded our limits, and must seek for that another occasion.

In what we have said, we have aimed to settle certain principles, which should guide us in judging of the recent events in Europe, and in our efforts to turn them to the account of liberty and social well-being. These are stirring events, and it were easy to grow eloquent over them, — quite easy for us, for we should have only to repeat the phrases our young enthusiasm supplied us with eighteen years ago, on the occasion of the French revolution of July, 1830. But mere words cannot charm us as they did then ; and we look now to things, and not to fine phrases, though the fine phrases of a Lamartine. We have heard many a time the big words, “**LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY.**” Nay, we have sometimes pronounced them.

They are not difficult words to pronounce ; to secure their true import is the difficult thing. The European populations have proved themselves able to pronounce them ; whether they are able to understand and realize their meaning, time must show. If these recent events secure an increase of political and social well-being, — if they secure to the people, the great body of the toiling, and suffering, and *uncomplaining* people, some alleviation of their burdens, and some chance to enjoy the fruits of their labor in peace, — we shall be thankful for them, and half ready to pardon the miserable demagogues and phrasemongers who have brought them about.

The views we have presented we have deemed worthy of the consideration of our own countrymen. This country is in a position to exert great influence on the reorganization of Europe, and it is important that it should exert an influence in favor of true freedom. To do this, we must let foreigners understand that the democracy of our newspapers is not the democracy of our institutions, but the democracy which we keep for electioneering purposes ; and that they must beware how they take it to be the principle of our national growth and prosperity. If they imitate us in that, they will only imitate us in what we have borrowed from them, and which only serves to disturb the working of our own indigenous system, — to peril its existence.

And not for foreigners only are these views necessary. Foreigners do not comprehend our American system of politics, and they almost invariably imagine that the democratic element is the only legitimate element that we recognize, that in which our whole political order takes its rise, and in accordance with which it is to be interpreted. Consequently, all the influences which operate upon us from abroad tend directly to convert our mixed government into pure democratic centralism, which is to genuine republicanism what despotism is to monarchy. Moreover, the same influence is exerted by our thousands of fanatics and philanthropists, in great part home-born and home-bred, who no sooner get a crotchet into their heads than they agitate to transfer it, forthwith, to the statute-books. It is necessary, then, that we be on our guard. Our fathers established no system of absolutism, democratic or monarchical. They divided the powers of government between the general government and the State governments, and, by dividing, limited them ; which made liberty possible. All power, indeed, emanates from the people, and is exercised by them, through

their representatives, but only in a legally fixed and determinate mode, as binding on the people themselves as on their public servants. The people exist and can exercise their power only according to law ; and thus our government is a government of law, and not of mere will, and therefore a free government. Let us look well to it, that, in our admiration of European revolutionists and French centralism, we do not suffer this admirable system of government to be corrupted, to grow into a centralized democracy, and we, ere we apprehend danger, find ourselves in a worse condition than that from which the Old World is now making such terrible efforts to redeem itself, and, we fear, making them in vain.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Dunigan's Popular Library of Instruction and Amusement.* Illustrated by J. G. Chapman. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848. Nos. I. to III.

WE cannot better introduce this new serial publication by Messrs. Dunigan, our enterprising New York agents, than by copying and adopting as our own their advertisement.

"Dunigan's Popular Library. Published the first of every month. The cheapest and handsomest books yet offered to the public. A series of small books of Moral Tales, original and translated, by the most approved writers. Elegantly and profusely illustrated, from original designs by our most distinguished artist, J. G. Chapman. The 'Library' will be emphatically a series of 'Little Books for Little People,' and also for children of a larger growth ; with every attraction to please the eye and heart ; presenting to the minds of youth practical examples of goodness and virtue. These volumes are published at prices so cheap as to place them within the reach of all.

"The series will commence with the charming *Tales of Canon Schmid*. As a writer for the young, the venerable Canon is without an equal, or even a rival, all over Europe. Among the young, his name is a household word. His delightful little stories are the joy of every fireside in Germany, France, Belgium, and Switzerland. Nothing can be more suitable for families, schools, premiums, gift-books, &c."

The three numbers published are *The Redbreast*, *The Forget-me-not*, and *Anselmo*, each from the German of Christopher von Schmid, and to those who have read any thing from this distinguished benefactor of the young, they need no recommendation. As an author of moral tales, Canon Schmid is unrivalled. Our

youngest child that is able to read at all reads them with intense delight, and so do we ourselves. They are works of the very highest order of genius, of the purest morality, and the sweetest and most genuine piety. Every Catholic parent should procure them for his children, and every Catholic should be sure to purchase a copy for himself, whether he be old or young. Nay, though they are purely Catholic, no Protestant who can admire genius, pure and beautiful morality, and tender, sustaining, and joyous piety, can fail to read them with pleasure and profit. They are Catholic, could have been written only by a Catholic; but they are not controversial, and have no conceivable resemblance to the multitude of tales or novels intended to prove the Catholic Church or faith against Protestantism. The author does not appear, in any of the stories we have read, to be aware of the existence of heresy of any sort. He writes for the moral and spiritual improvement of the young, to illustrate and enforce the Christian virtues, and the practical duties of every-day life, and to eradicate or check their opposite vices. His stories are admirably conceived, with remarkable truth and simplicity, and told with inimitable grace and delicacy, and with an unction that comes only from the Holy Ghost.

The illustrations by Chapman are very happy, highly creditable to that distinguished artist, and they are beautifully executed. Thus far the series is got up in a style that is exceedingly gratifying to the taste. The publishers appear to have spared no expense to make the series worthy of their reputation and acceptable to the public; and Catholics will be wanting in their duty, if they do not give them a liberal support.

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2. — *A History of England, from the first Invasion by the Romans to the Commencement of the Reign of William the Third.* By JOHN LINGARD, D. D. A new Edition, corrected and considerably enlarged, in Thirteen Volumes. New York: Dunigan & Brother. London: C. Dolman. 1848. Vols. I. and II. 16mo.

THE merits of Dr. Lingard's History of England are well known and generally admitted. The author is a distinguished Catholic divine, and he has studied to give an impartial and truthful narration of facts. In studying to be impartial, to show that his Catholicity has not biased his judgment or distorted his vision, he may occasionally remind one of the Indian's tree, "which was so tall and so straight as to lean a little over the other way"; but he has unquestionably given us the only tolerably authentic history of England that has been written. In a literary point of view, it is not unworthy to rank among the very best historical compositions in

our language. This new edition — a London edition, but published also at New York, at the low price of sixty-two and a half cents a volume — is corrected and very considerably enlarged. It is well got up, and the first volume is illustrated with a fine engraving of the author.

3. — *The Primacy of the Apostolic See vindicated.* By FRANCIS PATRICK KENRICK, Bishop of Philadelphia. Third Edition. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848. 8vo. pp. 527.

WE expressed our opinion of this work, on the publication of the second edition; and, moreover, the work is too well known, and its merits are too generally admitted, to require any notice, far less any judgment, of it at our hands. It is admitted, by those who are far more competent judges than we, to have exhausted the learning on the special point it discusses. The reader will find this edition greatly improved as to the arrangement and distribution of the matter, and as to the style. The distinguished author has made it more spirited and methodical, and by his new arrangement of the matter has made his reasoning more clear and convincing. For those who read only English, it is undoubtedly the best vindication of the primacy of the Apostolic See that has ever been written, and it supplies a want which was very much felt in our English theological literature. The high estimation in which the work is held, and the favor with which it has been received, are evident from the fact that a *third* edition has been called for so soon.

4. — *Introduction to a Devout Life.* From the French of ST. FRANCIS OF SALES, Bishop and Prince of Geneva. A new Edition, revised and corrected. Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr. 16mo. pp. 396.

WE have no occasion to say a word in commendation of this work. After *The Following of Christ*, and *The Spiritual Combat*, it is among the most highly esteemed of our ascetical books, and few who aspire to Christian perfection but delight to possess and study it. We hope, however, that when Mr. Lucas publishes another edition of it, he will employ a corrector of the press, and also add, in its title-page or somewhere else, the date of its publication. For aught we know, the edition before us was published a dozen years ago, and, instead of being a *new*, is an *old* edition; and it is shamefully disfigured by typographical errors, often perverting the sense.

5. — *Visits to the Most Holy Sacrament, &c., for Every Day in the Month.* — *Aspirations of Love to Jesus in the Most Holy Eucharist.* — *Rules for Frequent Communion, with a Defence of the same.* — *Meditations for Every Day in the Week; and a Novena for All-Souls' Day.* From the Italian of ST. ALPHONSUS M. LIGUORI. By a Catholic Clergyman. 'To which is added, *A Devout Method of Hearing Mass.* By Blessed LEONARD A PORTO MAURITIO. Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr.

THIS, we believe, is a new edition of the "Visits," although the date of its publication does not happen to be given. Notwithstanding the lumbering title, which is rather a table of contents than a title, it is a most excellent devotional work, and is held in the highest esteem by the masters of devout life.

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6. — *The Constitutions of France, Monarchical and Republican; together with Brief Historical Remarks relating to their Origin, and the late Orleans Dynasty.* By BERNARD ROELKER, of the Boston Bar. Boston and Cambridge: J. Munroe & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 156.

THE compiler of this volume appears to hold Tom Paine's doctrine, that a nation has no constitution unless it has a *written* constitution, which one may fold up and clap in his pocket! He professes to give us the constitutions of France, monarchical and republican, and the earliest constitution he notices is that of September, 1791. Had France no constitution prior to that date? Did she not previously exist as a state? How conceive a state without a constitution,—that is, a state which is not a state? The compiler also tells us, that he takes it "for granted that there is such a thing as justifiable resistance and *legitimate rebellion*." Justifiable resistance to tyranny there undoubtedly may be; but such resistance is not properly rebellion, for the tyrant is necessarily a usurper, and therefore without legal authority. To resist him is not to resist legitimate government, or government in the legitimate exercise of its powers. But a *legitimate rebellion* is a contradiction in terms, and is as much as to say that *law* may be *legally* violated. We very much doubt if "the Boston Bar," generally, are prepared to maintain the legality of rebellion. We believe rebellion is punishable as a crime under the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of every State in the Union. How, then, can it be *legitimate*?

The nation is not held to passive obedience. If its magistrates

usurp powers not conferred on them by the constitution, and tyrannize over the people, the nation has a right to depose them, and to commission new ones. Nobody who has any sense of liberty denies this. But this is not the right of insurrection, rebellion, or revolution; for in such case the magistrates have forfeited their powers, the government has lost its legality, and, as government, ceased to exist. The work then to be done is, not to overthrow, but to establish, government. So long as the government exercises only its legitimate powers, within constitutional limits, every citizen is held in conscience to obedience, and the entire nation has no right to alter or abolish it. This is the doctrine of common sense; it is the *American* doctrine; and let this learned German, Mr. Roelker, attempt to carry the opposite doctrine into practice by force, in any State in the Union, and he will very soon find himself arraigned and punished for treason. We hope he is lawyer enough to know this, and that he has too great an affection for his head, as well as for the peace of the country which has adopted him, to attempt to reduce his doctrine of *legitimate* rebellion to practice.

We have as much fault to find with Mr. Roelker for his religion as for his law. What right has he to sneer at the priests of the Most High God? Suppose the consecrated ministers of religion do have influence in the state. What then? Is that a justifiable cause of revolution? Why shall not we speak of "the faction of lawyers having full swing," and call for a revolution in the state to exclude them from power? How much superior is a lawyer to a priest? How much more conscientious, intelligent, patriotic, and trustworthy? Who gave to miserable pettifoggers the exclusive right to manage the affairs of state, and to provide for the public good? Is there liberty only where these rule, and the sacred ministers of religion are despised, depressed, and enslaved? We have yet to learn that a "faction of priests" is worse than a faction of lawyers, or that lawyers are less factious than priests. We are simple enough to understand by liberty freedom for all classes of the community, and we can see no more liberty in denying to a priest his freedom than we can in denying freedom to a lawyer, a planter, a merchant, or a cotton-spinner. A priest is a man, a citizen, and if he is disposed in his political action to protect the interests of religion, we are not prepared to blame him; for we are foolish enough to believe that it is as important to the welfare of the state to protect the interests of religion as those of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures. Indeed,—let the profound philosophers of the nineteenth century smile at our folly, if they please,—we hold religion to be the *primary* interest of the state, because the primary interest of man, and that it should be provided for first of all.

But, aside from these objections and the fact of its incompleteness,

the volume before us will be found a convenient compilation. It contains the Charters of 1814 and 1830, the celebrated Ordinances of Charles X. which cost him his throne, and the republican Constitutions of 1793, 1795, and 1799. They are a fine commentary on "legitimate rebellion."

THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS.

WE cannot close this number of our Review, without expressing our indignation at the expulsion of the Jesuits from Rome and other Italian states, by the pretended friends of liberty and popular institutions. Many people suppose that the Order has been suppressed, in Rome, by the Papal authority; but this is a mistake. The Holy Father simply advised or requested them to withdraw to a place of greater security, because he felt that he should be unable to protect them from the fury of the mob. Nothing, as far as we have seen, has occurred to indicate the least unfriendliness on the part of the Holy Father towards the Jesuits, or the least want of confidence in them; but many acts and words of his go to show that he holds the Order in high esteem, and its members in warm affection. The expulsion has not been the work of the Papal authority, nor has it been effected by the wishes of the friends of religion and the Church. It has been the work of radicals and liberals,—a class of men inherently hostile, in every part of the globe, to every man who places religion above politics, the spiritual power above the temporal, order above anarchy, liberty above despotism, the state above the mob.

These Italian liberals show us, by their persecution of the Jesuits, what sort of men they are, the nature of that liberty they are contending for, and what humanity has to expect from their movements. Their conduct admits of no defence, of no palliation, and justly excites the indignation of every honest friend of religion and true freedom throughout the world. For ourselves, we are freemen; we were born and bred in a free country; we understand and love freedom; and we scorn to recognize these infidel madcaps as our brethren. *They* the friends of liberty! *They* the men to regenerate Italy! Vain braggarts! base cowards! do they imagine that there is a freeman on earth that does not despise them, hold them in unspeakable contempt? Who are they? Who gave them the right to make war on peaceable men, devoted to religion? What right have they to freedom, which the Jesuit has not also? Are they such fools as to be ignorant that there is and can be no freedom, where any class of our fellow-men, however large or however small, are not free; that freedom is for our neighbours as well

as for us ; and that no man is secure, where every man, unless convicted of crime before the competent tribunal, is not secure in his person, his possessions, and his conscience ? Need they to be told that liberty may be outraged in the person of a Jesuit as much as in the person of an Italian incendiary ?

Nor have these Italian liberals been content with expelling the Jesuits. They have proceeded further, and at this moment hold the Holy Father in a sort of durance, — “honorable imprisonment,” as it is termed, — because he does not choose to violate faith, conscience, and duty, at the bidding of a graceless mob. And we have men amongst us — men passing for Catholics even — who are frantic with joy, throw up their greasy caps, and cheer them on with their loud hurrahs, as the genuine friends of freedom. Stupid dolts ! do these sympathizers not know that the foundations of liberty are never laid in injustice, never established by outraging law and religion, — and that the men who know not how to obey, who will not respect the rights of others, and who demand freedom only for their own selfish purposes, can be only the assassins of liberty ? These liberals, these miscreants, the spawn of hell, who are doing their best to desolate Europe, and replunge the nations, civilized by Christianity, into the darkness of barbarism, deserve the execration of every man who has a human heart under his left breast ; and the man who calls the Church his Mother deserves something far worse, if he but dreams for a moment that there is the remotest possibility that the least conceivable good can be effected, even for the temporal condition of the people, by their exertions. The Almighty does not demand such instruments for the amelioration of the nations, and liberty holds them in utter detestation. In the name of free America, we denounce them. They are a scandal to republicanism ; and we have no words to express our pity for the blindness, or our horror of the principles, of their American sympathizers. No good end is ever gained by diabolical means ; Freedom scorns to be served by the miserable radicals who show their devotion to her by trampling her under their feet. Never will you emancipate a nation, till you have first emancipated yourselves from base passion and unjust prejudice. A free government makes not a free people ; it is a free people that makes the free government. Slaves can be only despots. They must crouch and crawl on the ground, or compel all under them to crouch and crawl. Never will you promote the cause of freedom in your country, till you learn to bow humbly before God, and to reverence his ministers, — till you learn to respect the rights of your neighbour as well as your own, and hold yourselves bound to defend freedom for him as well as for yourselves. Till then, you are slaves in your very souls, and can propagate only your kind. Liberty is from heaven, and she will not be served by men who cherish only the temper of hell.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1848.

ART. I. — *The Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament proved to be Corrupt Additions to the Word of God. — The Arguments of Romanists from the Infallibility of the Church and the Testimony of the Fathers in Behalf of the Apocrypha discussed and refuted.* By JAMES H. THORNWELL. New York : Leavitt, Trow, & Co. Boston : Charles Tappan. 1845. 16mo. pp. 417.

IN the articles already devoted to Mr. Thornwell's book, we have vindicated Dr. Lynch's argument drawn from the necessity of the case for the infallibility of the Church, and proved unanswerably, if any thing can be so proved, that, without the infallible Church, the Protestant is utterly unable to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures. Since, then, he concedes, that, if the infallible Church exists at all, it is the Catholic Church, Mr. Thornwell must either acknowledge its infallibility, or give up the Christian religion itself. Having done this, which has been wholly gratuitous on our part, we proceed to the consideration of the Professor's direct arguments for the fallibility of the Church, or his direct attempts to prove that she is not infallible.

We have shown in our first essay, that the nature of the argument the Professor is conducting does not permit him, even in case we should fail to prove the infallibility, to conclude the fallibility of the Church. He denies that she is infallible, that is, asserts that she is fallible, and it is only by proving her fallible that he can maintain his thesis, that the books which he calls apocryphal are "corrupt additions to the word of God." The question is not now on admitting, but on rejecting, the in-

fallibility of the Church, and the *onus probandi*, as a matter of course, rests on him. He is the plaintiff in action, and must make out his case by proving the guilt, not by any failure on our own part, if fail we do, to prove the innocence, of the accused ; for every one is to be presumed innocent till proved guilty.

We have also shown, that, in attempting to prove the fallibility of the Church, Mr. Thornwell must confine himself to such arguments as an infidel may consistently urge. We have already dislodged him from every position he might be disposed to occupy on Christian ground. He has no magazine from which he can draw proofs against the Church, but the reason common to all men. He can prove the Church fallible only by proving that she has actually erred ; and he can prove that she has actually erred only by proving that she has actually contradicted some principle of reason. It will avail him nothing to prove by reason that she teaches things the truth of which reason cannot affirm ; for reason does not know all things, and things may be *above* reason, and yet not *against* reason. Nor will it avail him to prove that she contradicts his private convictions, or the teachings of his sect ; for neither he nor his sect is infallible. Nothing will avail him but to prove some instance of her contradiction of a truth of reason, infallibly known to be such truth. The simple question for us to determine, then, in regard to what he alleges, is, Has he adduced an instance of such contradiction ? If he has, he has succeeded ; if he has not, he has failed, and we, since the presumption, as we say in law, is in our favor, may conclude the infallibility of the Church against him.

1. Mr. Thornwell's first alleged proof that the Church is not infallible is, that Catholics differ among themselves as to the seat of infallibility. It is uncertain where the infallibility is lodged. Then it is not apparent ; and if not apparent, it does not exist ; for *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*. But this, supposing it to be true, though a good reason why we cannot assert the infallibility as a fact proved, is not a good reason for asserting that it does not exist. A thing may exist and yet not appear to us. Otherwise the stars would not exist when the sun shines, nor gems in the mine before being discovered. The point to be established is not the *non-appearance* of the infallibility, but its *non-existence* ; and if the Professor does not show that non-existence, he fails, for his own *maxim* then bears against him, — *de non apparentibus et non existentibus*

bus eadem est ratio. But what is alleged is not true. Catholics do not disagree as to the seat of infallibility. Mr. Thornwell is mistaken, when he says (p. 76), — “There are no less than three different opinions entertained in your Church as to the organ through which its infallibility is exercised or manifested.” He confounds the three different modes in which Catholics hold that the infallibility is exercised with three different opinions as to its organ, evidently supposing that they who assert one of them must needs deny the other two. All Catholics agree, and must agree, for it is *de fide*, that the pastors of the Church, that is, the bishops in union with the Pope, their visible head, are infallible in what they teach, both when congregated in general council and when dispersed, each bishop in his own diocese ; and the great majority hold that the Pope alone, when deciding a question of faith or morals for the whole Church, is also infallible. The only difference of opinion amongst us is as to the fact, whether the Pope is or is not infallible, when so deciding. But as there is no difference of opinion as to the other two modes, whatever difference there may be as to this, it is not true that there are “three different opinions in our Church as to the organ through which its infallibility is exercised or manifested.”

2. The Church cannot be infallible, because she requires a slavish submission of all her members, bishops, priests, and laity, to the Pope. “The system of absolute submission runs unchecked until it terminates in the Sovereign Pontiff at Rome, whose edicts and decrees none can question, and who is therefore absolute lord of the Papal faith.” (p. 77.) We can see nothing unreasonable in making the Pope, under God, the “absolute lord of the *Papal* faith.” As to the submission, if the Pope has authority from God as the supreme visible head of the Church, it cannot be a *slavish* submission ; for slavery is not in submission, but in submission to an authority which has no right to exact it. Reason teaches that we are bound to obey God, and to obey him equally through whatever organ it may please him to command us, or to promulgate his will. If he has commissioned the Pope as his vicar in the government of the Church, there is nothing repugnant to reason in submission or obedience to the Pope. The Professor must prove that the Pope is not divinely commissioned, before, from the fact that the Church obliges us to obey him, he can conclude that she errs or is liable to err. But this he has not proved.

3. The Church makes the Pope greater than God, — *Il papa è più che Dio per noi altri*, — and cannot assert his supremacy

without asserting his infallibility. But if she asserts the infallibility of the Pope, she denies that she is an infallible Church ; for, during the first six centuries, there was no Pope. (p. 78.) Where the Professor picked up his scrap of Italian, he does not inform us ; but if any one has made him believe that Catholics hold the Pope to be greater than God, he may be sure he has been imposed upon. How can we hold the Pope to be greater than God, when we believe him to be simply the *vicar* of Jesus Christ, receiving all that he is and has from God ? Grant that Papal supremacy necessarily carries with it Papal infallibility, — a doctrine we by no means dispute, — the conclusion is not sustained ; for it is not proved that during the first six centuries there was no Pope. What the Professor alleges as proof is not conclusive. His statements are either false or irrelevant. What he says that is true is not to his purpose ; what he says that is to his purpose is not true. He alleges, — 1. Till the seventh century, at least, the bishops of the Church, not excepting the bishops of Rome, were regarded as officially equal ; 2. According to St. Jerome, wherever there is a bishop, he is of the same merit and the same priesthood, and, according to St. Cyprian, the episcopate is one, and every bishop has an undivided portion of it ; 3. St. Cyprian says to the African bishops in the great council at Carthage, that none of them makes himself a bishop of bishops, and that it belongs solely to our Lord Jesus Christ to invest them with authority in the government of his Church, and to judge them ; and, 4. St. Gregory the Great disclaimed the title of “ Universal Bishop.” (pp. 78, 79.)

To the first we reply, that, not only as late as the seventh century were all the bishops of the Church, not excepting the bishops of Rome, regarded as officially equal, but they are, as bishops, so regarded even now ; and as the fact that they are now so regarded does not prove that there is now no Pope, the fact that they were so regarded during the first six centuries cannot prove that there was no Pope then. The equality of all bishops is a doctrine of the Church. The Pope, as simple bishop, is only the equal of his brethren ; he is superior only as bishop of Rome, of which see the primacy is an adjunct, or prerogative. “ Thus a Roman council, in 378, says of Pope Damasus, that he is *equal in office* to the other bishops, and surpasses them in the prerogative of his see.” *

* Ep. v. Apud Coustant, T. I. col. 528, cited by Kenrick, *Primacy of the Apostolic See*, p. 106, 3d edition.

To the second we give a similar reply. The unity of the episcopate, and that each bishop possesses an undivided portion of it, that is, that the bishops possess or hold it *in solido*, according to the felicitous expression of St. Cyprian, is held by the Church now, and believed as firmly by all Catholics as ever it was. As the belief of this doctrine is not now disconnected with the belief in the Papacy, it cannot follow, from its having been entertained in the time of St. Cyprian, that there was then no Pope. This reply disposes of the citation from St. Jerome, as well as of that from St. Cyprian. But the Professor argues, that, if the episcopate be one, and the bishops possess it *in solido*, there can be no Pope. We do not see that this follows. Unity is inconceivable without a centre of unity, and how conceive the bishops united in one and the same episcopate without the Pope as their centre of union?

To the third we reply, that, according to the fair interpretation of the language of St. Cyprian, in reference to its occasion and purpose, it has nothing to do with the subject. But let it be that St. Cyprian intended to deny, and actually does deny, the Papal authority, what then? Before the Professor can conclude that there was no Pope down to St. Cyprian's time, he must prove either that St. Cyprian is a witness whose testimony we, as Catholics, are bound to receive, or that he is one who could not err. As Catholics, we are bound to receive the testimony of single fathers or doctors only so far as their teaching is coincident with that of the Church. The infallibility attaches to the Church, and to single doctors only in so far as they teach her doctrine. Never, then, can we be bound to receive the testimony of any father or doctor which conflicts with her teaching. The testimony of St. Cyprian does thus conflict, if what it is alleged to be. Therefore we are not bound to receive it, and it cannot be urged against us, as an *argumentum ad hominem*. Then the Professor must prove that St. Cyprian did not err. But, from the nature of the case, this he can do only by proving that he could not err. This he does not do, and cannot pretend; for he admits no infallible authority but that of the written word. (p. 84.) Consequently, let the testimony of St. Cyprian be what it may, it is not sufficient to prove that there was no Pope down to his time.

Moreover, if the alleged testimony of St. Cyprian refers to the Papal authority at all, it refers to it only inasmuch as it denies the right of St. Stephen, his contemporary, whom Mr. Thornwell himself calls the Pope, to exercise that authority.

If St. Cyprian's language does not express *resistance* to the Papal authority, it contains no reference to it. But resistance to an authority proves its existence. There was, then, in the time of St. Cyprian, an actual Pope, that is, a Pope claiming the right to exercise the Papal authority ; and the position of the Professor, that there was no Pope, is contradicted by his own witness. " But not according to the constitution of the Church." That is a question, not of reason, but of authority, and therefore not debatable. The simple question, stated in the terms most favorable to the Professor, resolves itself into this,—whether St. Cyprian is to be believed against St. Stephen, who claimed to be Pope, and the Church, who admitted his claim. To assume that he is is to beg the question. The Professor must, then, give us a valid reason for believing St. Cyprian rather than St. Stephen and the Church, or he proves nothing by St. Cyprian's testimony, be it what it may. But he has given us no such reason. St. Cyprian was fallible, and fallibility is not sufficient to set aside the claim of infallibility.

To the fourth we answer, St. Gregory the Great disclaimed through humility, as savoring of pride, the title of " Universal Bishop," we grant, but this is nothing to the purpose. The Professor must prove that he disclaimed the Papacy and the Papal authority, or he does not prove his position. But this he does not and cannot do ; for St. Gregory the Great, as is well known, on numerous occasions, asserted and exercised that authority ; nay, it was in the exercise of it that he rebuked John Jejunator, Patriarch of Constantinople, for arrogating to himself the title of " Œcumenical Patriarch," a title which even the Bishop of Rome, though Sovereign Pontiff, forbore to assume.

The Professor, it is evident from these replies, fails to prove that during the first six centuries there was no Pope. His objection, founded on the assumption that there was none, falls, therefore, to the ground ; and if it were required by our present argument, we could, and would, prove an uninterrupted succession of Popes from St. Peter to Pius the Ninth.

4. The Professor, taking it for granted that he had proved that the infallibility of the Church, if lodged with the Pope, could not be asserted, proceeds to show that it cannot be maintained, if lodged either with general councils or with the *Ecclēsia dispersa*. But these three ways are all the possible suppositions, and if in no one of these the Church can be infallible, she cannot be infallible at all. But he has not, as we have seen,

disproved her infallibility through the Pope, and, for aught he proves, she may be infallible through her Sovereign Pontiffs. Consequently, as far as the argument to disprove her infallibility is concerned, it is no matter whether she is infallible in either of the other two modes or not.

But she cannot be infallible, if the infallibility be lodged with the general councils; for full two hundred years elapsed from the death of the last of the Apostles before such a council was assembled. (p. 79.) If her infallibility is expressed *only* through general councils, we concede it; but this is no Catholic doctrine; for we all, while we hold the general councils to be infallible, hold also that the bishops of the Church in union with their chief, the Pope, teach infallibly when dispersed, each in his own diocese, as well as when congregated in council.

But the councils cannot be infallible, because the early councils attributed the authority of the canons they settled to the sanction of the Emperor. (p. 80.) As this is asserted without any proof, it is sufficient for us simply to deny it. That the *civil* effect of the canons, or their authority as *civil* laws, depended on the sanction of the Emperor, we concede, — for the Church never assumes to enact civil laws; but that they depended on that sanction for their spiritual effect, or their authority in the spiritual order, we deny, and some better authority than that of one Barrow, an Anglican minister, which is no authority at all, will be needed to prove it.

The infallibility of the Church, continues the Professor, cannot be maintained, if lodged with the pastors of the Church dispersed each in his own diocese; because it would then depend on unanimous consent, and the unanimous consent of all can never be ascertained. (p. 81.) This unanimous consent could not be ascertained, if the pastors of the Church were so many independent and unrelated individuals, like Protestant ministers, we concede; but, whether congregated or dispersed, Catholic pastors are *ONE BODY*, hold the episcopate *in solido*, and through the Pope, the centre of unity and communion, they all commune with each, and each with all. Each is bound for all, and all for each, and each by virtue of this communion can give the unanimous faith of all. All that we need know is that the particular pastor to whom we are subjected is in communion with the Pope; for if he is, we know he is in communion with the head, then with the body, and then with the members. If thus in communion with the head, with the body, and with the members, what he gives as the unanimous faith of the whole

must be the unanimous faith of the whole, or that which has the unanimous consent of all.

5. But the Church cannot be infallible, because she has contradicted herself. "Popes have contradicted Popes, councils have contradicted councils, pastors have contradicted pastors, &c." (p. 83.) This argument is good, if the fact be as alleged. But the fact of contradiction must be proved, not taken for granted. Does the Professor prove it? Let us see. The first proof he offers is, that "the Council of Constantinople decreed the removal of images, and the abolition of image-worship, and the Council of Nice, twenty-three years after, re-established both." (p. 84.) But, unhappily for the Professor, no council of Constantinople, or of any other place, recognized or received by the Church as a council, ever decreed any such thing. There may have been, for aught we care, an assembly of Iconoclasts at Constantinople, collected by an Iconoclastic emperor, which made some such decree; but that no more implicates the Church than a decree of a college of dervishes or of a synod of Presbyterian ministers.

"The second Council of Ephesus approved and sanctioned the impiety of Eutyches, and the Council of Chalcedon condemned it." (*ib.*) But there was only *one* Council of Ephesus, and that was held before the rise of the Eutychian heresy! There was an Ephesian Latrocinium which approved the heresy of Eutyches, but it was no council, and its doings were condemned, instantly, by the Church.

"The fourth Council of Lateran asserted the doctrine of a physical change in the Eucharistic elements, in express contradiction to the teachings of the primitive Church, and the evident declarations of the Apostles of the Lord." (*ib.*) The Professor is not the authority for determining what was the doctrine of the Apostles or of the primitive Church, and cannot urge his notions of either as a standard by which to try the Church. He must adduce, on the authority of the Church herself, the teachings of the primitive Church contradicted by the decree of the fourth Council of Lateran, before he can allege that decree or assertion as a proof of her having contradicted herself. This he has not done.

"The second Council of Orange gave its sanction to some of the leading doctrines of the school of Augustine, and the Council of Trent threw the Church into the arms of Pelagius." (*ib.*) Here no instance of contradiction is expressed. But it is not true, and the Professor offers no proof of it, that the

Council of Trent threw the Church into the arms of Pelagius ; and that council, as a matter of fact, defines the doctrines of grace, which condemn the Pelagian heresy, in the very words of St. Augustine. The Professor would do well to set about the study of ecclesiastical history.

“ Thus, at different periods, every type of doctrine has prevailed in the bosom of an unchangeable Church.” (*ib.*) Not proved, and would not be, even if the foregoing charges were sustained. False inferences and unsupported assertions are not precisely the arguments to disprove the infallibility of the Church. We beg the Professor to review his logic.

“ The Church has been distracted by every variety of sect, tormented by every kind of controversy, convulsed by every species of heresy.” If this means that she has *sanc-tioned* every variety of sect and every species of heresy, we simply reply, that the Professor has not proved it ; if it means, that, first and last, she has had to *combat* every variety of sect and species of heresy, we concede it. But to adduce this as a proof of her having contradicted herself is ridiculous in logic, and monstrous in morals. You might as well argue that the Church was once Lutheran, because she condemned Lutheranism, Calvinistic, because she condemned Calvinism, that St. John was a Gnostic, because he wrote his Gospel to condemn Gnosticism, or that Mr. Thornwell himself is a Catholic, because he anathematizes Catholicity ; nay, that the judge, who, in the discharge of his judicial functions, condemns the crime of murder, must needs be the murderer, and that the eleven were guilty of the treachery of Judas, for they no doubt condemned it. Is this Protestant logic and Protestant morality ?

The Church “ at last has settled down on a platform which annihilates the word of God, denounces the doctrines of Christ and his Apostles, and bars the gates of salvation against men.” (*ib.*) Indeed ! How did the Professor learn all that ?

Here is all the Professor adduces to prove the fact of the Church having contradicted herself, and it evidently does not prove it. Then the argument founded on it against the infallibility of the Church must go for nothing. For aught that yet appears, the Church may be infallible. It is certainly a great inconvenience not to know ecclesiastical history when one wishes to reason from it.

torical difficulties in the doctrine of Papal infallibility," we proceed to consider another class, in his Sixth Letter, which we may term philosophical difficulties. The charge under this head is, that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church — Papal infallibility, as the Professor improperly expresses it — leads to skepticism. (p. 89.) The proofs assigned, as nearly as we can get at them, amidst a mass of speculations sometimes correct enough, but illustrating, when considered in relation to the argument, only the *ignorantia elenchi*, — a favorite figure of logic with the author, — are two, namely, the Church enjoins dogmas which contradict reason, and holds that doctrines may be philosophically true, and yet theologically false.

1. The instance adduced to prove that the Church requires us to believe what contradicts reason is the doctrine of Transubstantiation. It is a principle of reason that we believe our senses. But this doctrine denies the testimony of our senses, and therefore contradicts reason. "Upon the authority of Rome we are required to believe that what our senses pronounce to be bread, that what the minutest analysis which chemistry can institute is able to resolve into nothing but bread, what every sense pronounces to be material, is yet the Incarnate Son of God, soul, and body, and Divinity, full and entire, perfect and complete. Here Rome and the senses are evidently at war; and here the infallible Church is made to despise one of the original principles of belief which God has impressed upon the constitution of the mind." (p. 93.) What is here said about the minutest analysis chemistry can institute, &c., amounts to nothing, makes the case neither stronger nor weaker; for chemical analysis, however minute or successful, can give us only sensible phenomena. It never attains to substance itself. The simple assertion is, that the doctrine of Transubstantiation contradicts reason, because it contradicts the senses. But is this true?

There is no contradiction of the senses, unless the doctrine requires us to believe that what is attested by the senses is false. What is it the senses attest? Simply the presence in the Sacred Host of the species, accidents, or *sensible phenomena* of bread. This is all; for it is well settled in philosophy, that the senses attain only to the phenomena, and never to the substance or subject of the phenomena. Does the doctrine of Transubstantiation deny this? Not at all. It asserts precisely what the senses assert, namely, the presence in the Sacred Host of the species, accidents, or sensible phenomena of bread. Then it does not contradict the senses.

“ But it is a principle of human nature to believe, that, where we find the phenomena, there is also their subject ; that, if in the Sacred Host all the sensible phenomena of bread are present, the substance of bread is also present.” Undoubtedly, if reason has no authority, *satisfactory to herself*, for believing the contrary. In ordinary cases, reason has no such authority, and we are to believe that the sensible phenomena and their subject do go together. But reason cannot deny that God, if he chooses, can, by a miraculous exertion of his power, change the subject without changing the phenomena, and if in any particular case it be certified infallibly to her that he actually does so, she herself requires us to believe it. In the Most Holy Eucharist, it is so certified to reason, if the Church be infallible, and therefore, in believing that the sensible phenomena of bread are there without their natural subject, we are simply obeying reason, and of course, then, do not contradict it. It is no contradiction of reason to believe on a higher reason what we should not and could not on a lower reason. In this doctrine, we are simply required to suspend the ordinary reason at the bidding of an extraordinary reason, which is not, and never can be, unreasonable. Consequently, there is in the doctrine nothing *contrary* to reason, and the Church, in enjoining it, does not enjoin a dogma which contradicts either reason or the senses, though she unquestionably does enjoin a dogma which is *above* reason. The first proof, therefore, that the doctrine of infallibility “ leads to skepticism,” must be abandoned, as having no foundation for itself.

2. The second proof is no better. That certain infidel or paganizing philosophers, in the latter part of the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth century, maintained that propositions may be philosophically true, yet theologically false, we concede ; that this was the doctrine of the Schoolmen, or that it was ever for a moment countenanced by the Church, we deny. Indeed, Leo X., in *Concilii Lateranensis Sess. 8, 1513*, condemns it, by declaring every assertion contrary to revealed faith to be false, and decreeing that all persons adhering to such erroneous assertions be avoided and punished as heretics, — *tanquam hereticos*. It would not be amiss, if the Professor would bear in mind that proofs which are themselves either false or in want of proof prove nothing, however pertinent they may be.

We cannot follow the Professor in his declamatory speculations in support of his charge. His reasoning is all fallacious.

He starts with the assumption, that the Church is fallible, has no authority from God to teach, and then charges her with consequences which would follow, no doubt, if she were fallible, if she had no Divine commission ; for they are the precise consequences which do follow from the teaching, or rather action, of the Protestant sects. If the Church were fallible, a mere human authority, arrogantly claiming to teach infallibly, we certainly should not defend her, or dispute that her influence would be as bad as Mr. Thornwell falsely alleges ; but we do not recognize his right to assume the fallibility of the Church as the basis of his proofs that she is not infallible ; and we cannot accept as facts mere consequences deduced from an hypothesis which we deny, and which is not yet proved, far less receive them as proofs of the hypothesis.

There are in Catholic countries, no doubt, many unbelievers ; but before this can be adduced as evidence that the Church, by claiming to be infallible, leads them into unbelief, it is necessary to prove that she is not infallible. If infallible, she cannot have a skeptical tendency ; because what she enjoins must be infallible truth, and skepticism, when it does not proceed from malice, results always, not from truth being present to the mind, but from its *not* being present. But it is worthy of remark, that the objections to Christianity on which unbelievers chiefly rely are not drawn from the distinctive teachings of the Catholic Church, nor from the Scriptures as she interprets them. They are nearly all drawn from the Scriptures as interpreted by private judgment, and hence, as we should expect, infidelity abounds chiefly in Protestant countries. Protestant Germany, England, the United States, are, any one of them, far more infidel than even France ; and our own city cannot, in religious belief, compare favorably with Paris, infidel as Paris unhappily is. Modern infidelity is of Protestant origin ; Giordano Bruno sojourned in Protestant England ; Bayle was a Protestant, and resided in Holland ; Voltaire, the father of French infidelity, did but transport to France the philosophy of the Englishman Locke, and the doctrines and objections of the English deists, Herbert of Cherbury, Tindal, Toland, Chubb, Morgan, Woolston, and others. Indeed, to England especially belongs the chief glory, such as it is, of infidelizing modern society. France and Germany are nothing but her pupils. Rightly do Protestants regard her as the bulwark of their religion ; for in the war against the Church, against the revelation of Almighty God, she, with her sanctimonious face and corrupt

heart, is the commander-in-chief. It were easy to show, that, aside from the internal malice of unbelievers, the chief cause of infidelity in modern society is Protestantism, which asserts the Divine authority of the Scriptures, and then leaves them to be interpreted by private judgment ; but it is unnecessary. It is becoming every day more and more obvious, that, the more Protestants circulate the Bible, the more do they multiply scoffers and unbelievers.

In Letter VII. we come to another class of objections, which we may term *moral* objections. These are summed up in the assertion, The Church cannot be infallible, because her "infallibility is conducive to licentiousness and immorality." (p. 105.) The proof of this is, first, the unproved assertion, that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church leads to skepticism ; and, second, the allegation that Catholicity and Jesuitism are one and the same thing. The first assertion we dismiss, for we have just shown that the Professor does not sustain it. As to Jesuitism, we hardly know what to say ; for we do not know, and the author does not inform us, what is meant by Jesuitism. For aught that appears, the identity asserted may be conceded without prejudice to the Church. The Society of Jesus is composed of Catholic priests, and we are not aware that these have any peculiar doctrines, either of faith or morals. Indeed, they could not have ; for if they were to have any, they would be obliged to leave the Order and the Church. The notion among some Protestants, that the Jesuits are a *sect* in the bosom of the Church, professing certain dogmas of faith or certain principles of morals different from those professed by other Catholics, is a ridiculous blunder. The Church enjoins the same faith and the same principles of morals upon all her children, and no person, or class of persons, would be suffered to teach in her communion, who should add to or take from them. The Jesuits are Catholics, neither more nor less, and it is fair to presume that in faith and principles of morals they agree with all Catholics, and profess what the Church teaches.

But that the Jesuits teach, or ever have taught, doctrines favorable to licentiousness or immorality is a matter to be proved, not taken for granted. What is the proof the Professor offers ? Here is all we can find : — "These three cardinal principles — of intention, mental reservation, and probability — cover the whole ground of Jesuitical atrocity." (p. 115.) The Professor labors long and hard to identify Catholicity and

Jesuitism. He must, therefore, concede that these three principles cover the whole of what he holds to be atrocious in Catholicity. Catholicity, then, is "conductive to licentiousness and immorality," because it contains the three principles of "intention, mental reservation, and probability." But what is the meaning the Professor attaches to these principles? Unhappily, he gives us no clear and explicit answer; for he writes with his head full of false assumptions.

"The detestable principles," he says, "of this graceless order [the Jesuits] may be found embodied in the recorded canons of general councils. That the end justifies the means, that the interests of the priesthood are superior to the claims of truth, justice, and humanity, is necessarily implied in the decree of the Council of Lateran, that no oaths are binding—that to keep them is perjury rather than fidelity—which conflict with the advantage of the Church. What fraud have the Jesuits ever recommended or committed, that can exceed in iniquity the bloody proceedings of the Council of Constance in reference to Huss? What spirit have they ever breathed more deeply imbued with cruelty and slaughter, than the edict of Lateran to kings and magistrates, to extirpate heretics from the face of the earth? The principle on which the sixteenth canon of the third Council of Lateran proceeds covers the doctrine of *mental reservations*. If the end justifies the means, if we can be perjured with impunity to protect the authority of the priesthood, a *good intention* will certainly sanctify any other lie, and a man may always be sure that he is free from sin, if he can only be sure of his allegiance to Rome and his antipathy to heretics. The doctrine of *probability* is in full accordance with the spirit of the Papacy, in substituting authority for evidence, and making the opinions of men the arbiters of faith. And yet these three cardinal principles of intention, mental reservation, and probability, which are so thoroughly Papal, cover the whole ground of Jesuitical atrocity."—pp. 114, 115.

It would seem from this, that the Professor understands by the principle of intention, that the moral character of the actor is determined by the intention with which he acts; by that of mental reservation, that no one can bind himself by oath to do that which conflicts with the advantage of the Church; and by that of probability, the substituting of authority for evidence, and making the opinions of men the arbiters of faith. If this is not his meaning, we are unable to divine what it is.

That Catholicity teaches that the moral character of the ac-

tor is determined by his intention, or, in other words, that a man is to be judged according to his intention, may be true ; but this must be morally wrong, or it cannot be adduced as a proof that the teaching of the Church is " conducive to licentiousness and immorality." That this is morally wrong, the Professor does not prove, or even attempt to prove. For ourselves, we are not now called upon to prove that it is right. It is for the Professor to prove that it is wrong. But we own, that, from our boyhood, we have always supposed it a dictate of reason that the man is to be praised or blamed according to his intention. If I really intend to do a man evil, my unintentional failure to do him evil does not exonerate me from guilt ; if I really intend to do him good, but, in attempting to do him good, unintentionally do him evil, I am not guilty. If I have killed a man in self-defence, the law excuses or justifies me ; and it does not hold me guilty of murder, unless the killing has been done with a felonious intent. He who takes the life of a fellow-being through private revenge is a murderer ; the public officer who does it in pursuance of a judicial sentence is no murderer, and does but a justifiable act. Whence the difference, if not in the difference of intention ? That no act, in relation to the actor, is blameworthy unless done from a malicious intention, or praiseworthy unless done from a virtuous intention, we have always supposed to be the teaching of reason, and we must have high authority to convince us that we have been wrong.

" But on this ground the Church erects her doctrine, that the end justifies the means." We cannot concede this ; first, *because the Church has no such doctrine* ; and second, because the principle does not imply it. The assertion, that the Church teaches, that any Catholic doctor teaches, or ever did teach, that the end justifies the means, is made without the faintest shadow of a reason, and the reverse is what she does teach, as every man knows who knows any thing of her teaching. The doctrine of intention objected to implies nothing of the sort. The Church teaches, indeed, that the act for which we are accountable is the act of the will ; but she teaches that no act is done with a good intention that is not referred to God as the ultimate end, and that *every one* of our acts is to be so referred. Now, in choosing the means, we as much *act* as we do in the choice of the end, and therefore must be, as to the means, bound by the same law which binds us as to the end ; and then we can no more choose unjust means than we can unjust ends,

and therefore can be allowed to seek even just ends only by just means.

The Professor says that "the Jesuit Casnedi maintains in a published work, that at the day of judgment God will say to many, 'Come, my beloved, you who have committed murder, blasphemed, &c., because you believed that in so doing you were right.' " But he takes good care not to give us a reference to the work itself, and we hazard nothing in saying that no Jesuit ever published such a sentence, unless it was to condemn it, as containing a Protestant heresy. That invincible ignorance, if really invincible, excuses from sin, is, no doubt, a doctrine of the Church ; for she teaches that no one can sin in not doing that which he has no power to do. No doubt, involuntary mistakes, if unavoidable, springing from no malice in the will, from no culpable neglect of ours, are excusable ; but no Catholic divine ever taught that invincible ignorance can extend to the great precepts of the natural law, to such as forbid murder, blasphemy, &c. ; for they are engraven on the heart of every man, and are evident to every man by the light of natural reason. The Professor has been misled, by relying on the authority of Pascal, and other writers of his stamp. He refers us to Pascal's *Provincial Letters* "for a popular exposition of the morality of the Jesuits." He might as well refer us to Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary* for a popular exposition of the morality of the Gospel. Pascal was a Jansenist, and Jansenists are heretics, not Catholics. The *Provincial Letters* are witty, but wicked, — a tissue of lies, forgeries, and misrepresentations, from beginning to end, as has been amply proved over and over again. If Mr. Thornwell is ignorant of this fact, he will have to search long before he will find a Catholic or a Jesuit doctor that will permit him to hold that his ignorance is excusable.*

* In ordinary times, what we have said in the text is all that would need to be said in reference to the Society of Jesus ; but now, when the Society is suffering a severe persecution, even in Catholic countries, we are unwilling to pass the subject over without bearing our testimony, feeble as it is, in favor of the children of St. Ignatius. We do this the more willingly, because we are conscious that we have ourselves frequently done them great injustice, both in our thoughts and in our words, for which we are heartily sorry, and pray them to forgive us. It is hard, when we hear a body of men widely and constantly decried, not to be more or less prejudiced against them ; and nothing is more natural than, when under the influence of this prejudice, to exaggerate beyond all rea-

1. The principle of mental reservation happens to be no Catholic doctrine. Protestants would, no doubt, be pleased to

reasonableness bounds the slight imperfections we may observe in here and there an individual member, and to generalize them into characteristics of the body itself. Few persons have been more prejudiced against the Society of Jesus than we ourselves. But having taken some pains to find a basis for the unfavorable judgment we had formed, we hardly know when or how, we confess that we have been entirely unsuccessful. There may have been individual Jesuits whose conduct we could not approve, but we are satisfied, after studying the history of the Order, that it needs no other defence than a simple statement of facts, and no other eulogium than the recital of its deeds.

Every body knows the popular meaning attached to *Jesuitical*. Taking the word in this meaning, there are no men so little *Jesuitical* as the Jesuits. Their whole history proves them to be remarkable for their simplicity of heart, singleness of purpose, and straightforwardness of conduct. No man can take up a work in defence of the Order, written by a member, without being fully convinced that the Jesuit is the antithesis of the character commonly ascribed to him. We have heard many charges, and grave charges, against him; but we have not heard one that we have not seen refuted. Jesuits are men, and, of course, suffer more or less the infirmities common to all men; but we should like to be shown a body of men, of equal numbers, placed in the trying circumstances in which they have been, who have shown less of human infirmity, or been more true to the motto, *Ad maiorem Dei Gloriam*. There is no field of science or art which they have not cultivated with success; no department of literature which they have not enriched with their contributions; scarcely a nation to which they have not preached the cross; and hardly a land which they have not sanctified with the blood of their martyrs.

Even the present persecution of the Society is to its glory. If the Jesuits had been political demagogues, — if they had been violent radicals, ready to sacrifice liberty to license, order to anarchy, religion to politics, heaven to earth, — our ears would not have been stunned with maddened outcries against them; the world would have owned them as her children, and the age would have delighted to honor them. We know it is pretended that they are the enemies of liberty and the friends of despotism, but it needs only a slight knowledge of facts to know that this is mere pretence. Liberty has more than once found her noblest champion in the Jesuits, and the hostility a year or two since manifested to them in France was because they demanded the freedom of education, a right guaranteed by the Charter itself. They may not be, in these days, foremost among those who stir up rebellions and revolutions; they may not regard the fearful events which have just transpired in Europe, or are now transpiring, as sure to bring back the golden age of the poets; they may hold their mission to be spiritual, rather than political, and believe it more important to convert individuals and nations to God than to one political creed or another; but if so, it does not follow that they are wrong, or that for this very reason they are not all the more worthy of our respect and confidence.

The Society of Jesus was instituted, not for political, but for religious purposes, and its members, by their profession, are devoted to preaching

find that the Church teaches that lying is sometimes justifiable, for such a doctrine is one they stand very much in need of ; but

the Gospel, hearing confessions, and educating youth, and that not for one country only, but for all countries. These ends are the same and of equal importance everywhere and under all forms of government. If the Jesuits were to adopt a political creed, and become its propagandists, how could they devote themselves alike to the ends of their institute under the monarchy of Europe and the democracy of America? What course would or could be proper for them, but to abstain from declaring themselves in favor of any particular form of government, and to content themselves with simply inculcating upon all citizens to obey the legitimate government of their country, whatever its form or constitution?

The charge against the Jesuits of being in favor of this or that form of government arises from their refusal to declare themselves in favor of one or another, from the fact that they have no political creed, and make it a point of duty to stand aloof from politics, and to confine themselves to the discharge of their spiritual functions. They obey the powers that be, and comport themselves as loyal subjects to the authority of the country, whether it be autocracy, as in Russia, constitutionalism, as in France and Great Britain, or republicanism, as in America. What more could we ask of them? If tyrants denounce them because they will not turn defenders of tyranny, if revolutionists denounce them because they will not join in the war against legitimate authority, whose fault is it? Are we to condemn the Jesuits because tyrants and revolutionists wrong them?

Wherever the Jesuits are permitted to establish themselves, they are a blessing. It is not easy to estimate the value to this country of their services as instructors of our youth. It would be difficult to find a substitute for them as educators. In every part of the country, they are, for the pure love of God, founding colleges, and training up our children in the way they should go. Is this nothing? These colleges are but of yesterday, yet have they already done great service,—as we ourselves can testify, who have had four sons for a long time in one of them, and who have peculiar reason to thank Almighty God for raising up and moving the good fathers to devote themselves to the important work of education. But as yet they have really done nothing, in comparison with what they will do. They now rank among the best in the country, and in a few years they must place education with us at least on a level with what it is in the most favored countries of the Old World. And can we count this small service?

Worldlings may despise the Jesuits, infidels and heretics may calumniate them; misguided Catholics, whose faith is but a dead faith, may distrust them; but the world needs them, our own country needs them, and though the Church is dependent on no religious order, they are not the least efficient of her servants. Protestants, in their estimation of the Jesuit, betray only their ignorance or their malice, or both. The character they ascribe to the Jesuit they will find in its perfection in their own ministers, and the best definition of *Jesuitical*, in the popular acceptance of the term, is a *Presbyterian minister*, the antithesis of a Jesuit. Mr. Thornwell illustrates and accepts, in the book before us, every element of what he calls Jesuitism. No man can have been brought up among Presbyterians without knowing that the principle, that the end

she teaches nothing of the sort. She does not command her children at all times and on all occasions to speak *all* the truth they may happen to know, but she does command them never to speak any thing but the truth ; and she teaches them, that, when they use words which by their natural force convey a false sense, they speak falsehood, whatever may have been their secret meaning, and that knowingly and intentionally to use language which is naturally calculated to deceive the hearer, to convey to him a false meaning, or a meaning different from that in the mind of him that uses it, is to lie, to sin against God. All who are acquainted with Catholic morality know that this is her teaching, and whoever asserts the contrary is guilty of the very offence he would fasten upon her, and has no excuse for his conduct. For if he is ignorant of her doctrine, he speaks rashly ; if he is not ignorant, he is guilty of a wilful falsehood.

2. The facts which the Professor alleges, granting them to be facts, do not prove the principle of *mental reservation*. We presume the Professor wishes to maintain that the Church teaches that it is lawful for her children to take oaths which conflict with her advantage, but that they must take them with the mental reservation, not to keep them ; and that if so taken, it is no sin to break them. This is what he needs in order to make out his case. But this he does not prove. Granting that he has rightly stated

justifies the means, is the one on which they generally act, whether they avow it or not. No one can read one of their books against the Church without perceiving that the principle of mental reservation, or, in plain terms, the right to lie for the purpose of advancing Protestantism, is a principle which they practically adopt, and hold in constant requisition ; and whoever will read a Presbyterian dogmatical work will see that to higher certainty than probability its author does not aspire, and that to substitute authority for evidence, and to make the opinions of men the arbiters of faith, is his boast. Nothing is more ridiculous than for a Presbyterian minister to accuse Jesuits of a want of principle, of candor, of honesty, or to charge them with fraud and cruelty. Who ever heard of a Presbyterian minister that was not, officially, the very impersonation of pride, cant, hypocrisy, bigotry, and cruelty ? If such a one there ever was, we may be sure that he did not live and die a Presbyterian. We know something of Presbyterianism ; it was our misfortune to have been brought up a Presbyterian. We know what are its secret covenants, the pledges it exacts of its adherents, and the measures it takes to prevent the least ray of light from penetrating their darkness. Take a Protestant's account of Catholicity or Jesuitism, change the name, and it is a faithful picture, as far as it goes, of proud, arrogant, bigoted, cruel, and persecuting Presbyterianism. There is not a charge brought against us by Presbyterians that we cannot retort.

the doctrine of the Council of Lateran, — he does not tell us which council, — all he proves is, that the Church teaches that no oath taken to her prejudice is binding ; but he does not prove that she teaches that the reason why it is not binding is because it was taken with a mental reservation not to keep it in case it conflicted with her advantage. For aught that appears, the reason why the Church declares that such oaths do not bind is because she holds them to be unlawful oaths, — oaths which no man has a right to take, and which therefore are void *ab initio*. The Professor will hardly maintain the morality of robbers and cutthroats, that a man who has taken an unlawful oath is bound to keep it. He will hardly pretend that he who should swear to assist in a plot for blowing up the Presbyterian Assembly when in session, for instance, would be bound to keep his oath, or to refrain from revealing the plot, simply because he had sworn not to do so. The whole sum and substance of the charge, then, is, that the Jesuits and the Church teach that unlawful oaths do not bind. Does this conflict with reason ? Is this “ conducive to licentiousness and immorality ” ? Is it immoral to teach that no man can bind himself to do wrong ?

But in this the Church teaches that “ the interests of the priesthood are superior to the claims of truth, justice, and humanity ; for she holds that all oaths which conflict with her advantage are unlawful.” The conclusion is not necessary, for it may be that her interests, her advantage, are identical with the claims of truth, justice, and humanity ; or that it is only by promoting her interests and seeking her advantage that it is possible to vindicate the claims of truth, justice, and humanity. If she be what she professes to be, this must be so ; and that she is what she professes to be the Professor must presume till he has proved the contrary. If she be the Church of God, any oath to her prejudice is an oath against God, and no man can be mad enough to say that an oath against God can bind, or that the claims of truth, justice, or humanity can be prejudiced by not keeping it. But the Professor cannot assume that she is not the Church of God, for that she is not is the very point he is to prove, and he cannot prove this by assuming it, and making the assumption the principle of his arguments to prove it. Such a procedure would simply beg the question. Granting, then, that the Church does teach that oaths to her prejudice are unlawful, and therefore do not bind, nothing proves that she is not right in so doing, and therefore nothing proves that in doing so she favors “ licen-

tiousness and immorality." To condemn the Church, on the ground the Professor assumes, would be to assert the doctrine opposite to hers; namely, unlawful oaths are to be kept, — that, if I have been foolish or wicked enough to swear to do wrong, I am bound in conscience to keep my oath and do the wrong, — a monstrous doctrine, which strikes at the foundation of all morals. It is strange what blunders Protestants commit, in trying to get an argument against the Church. It would seem as if it never occurred to them to examine the principle of the objections they urge. They seem to say, If the Church should favor licentiousness and immorality, then she would not be the Church of God; therefore she does favor licentiousness and immorality.

3. The Professor, evidently, is ignorant of the principle of *probability*, or probabilism, as understood by Catholic theologians. That principle, if he did but know it, is very nearly the contrary of what he supposes, and is little else than the well-known maxim of the common law, that, if there is a reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to its benefit. But the principle, as the Professor defines it, is not embraced by the Church, nor defended by a single Catholic divine. He says, the Church substitutes "authority for evidence, and makes the opinions of men the arbiters of faith"; but this, in principle, at least, is a mistake; for the Church teaches that God alone is the arbiter of faith, and that nothing but his word, declared to be his word by himself through his divinely appointed organ, can be of faith. His word divinely declared to be his word is the highest evidence reason can demand or receive; and if the Church is proved to reason to be his organ for declaring his word, reason has the highest evidence it can conceive for believing whatever she teaches as the word of God is infallibly true. She asserts that reason has the right to demand this evidence, and has no right to dispense with it. In principle, then, she denies the principle of probability as set forth by the Professor. If she is what she claims to be, she denies it in her practice, and cannot possibly do as alleged. That she is what she professes to be the Professor is bound, as we have already shown, to presume, till he makes the contrary appear; which he does not do.

The Professor identifies Jesuitism with Catholicity, and resolves all that is atrocious in Jesuitism into the three principles enumerated, and therefore all that is atrocious in Catholicity. But the first of these principles is a simple dictate of reason, and contains nothing atrocious. Then all that is atro-

cious in Catholicity, or all the atrocity that can be charged upon Catholicity, is resolvable into the other two principles, namely, mental reservation and probability. But these are not Catholic principles, and, however atrocious they may be, their atrocity cannot be charged to her. Therefore no atrocity can be charged to her, even according to the Professor's own argument. But to be "conducive to licentiousness and immorality" is undeniably atrocious. Therefore the Church is not conducive to them. So the Professor does not sustain his assertion, that "Papal infallibility is conducive to licentiousness and immorality." Assuredly, the Professor is ignorant of the laws of evidence.

The next proof offered against the infallibility of the Church is, that "it is the patron of superstition and will-worship." (p. 116.) This is a singular objection. How *infallibility* can patronize superstition and will-worship, that is, *well-worship*, conceding them to be wrong, is more than we are able to conceive. Infallibility can be the patron of nothing wrong, and the Professor, if he should prove his thesis, would prove that superstition and will-worship are right, not that the Church is fallible. Can he mean that the assertion of her infallibility is the patron of superstition and will-worship? But this he would be troubled to prove, even if he should prove the existence of superstition and will-worship in the Church; for they undeniably exist out of the Church, in communities which lay no claim to infallibility. Does he mean that the Church is not infallible, because she is the patron of superstition, &c.? Why, then, did he not say so? If this is his meaning, his argument is valid, if the fact be as alleged. But, unhappily for his cause, the fact is not as alleged, as we have proved in our Review for last January, in the concluding article of the series, entitled, *The Two Brothers; or Why are you a Protestant?* to which we refer him for a full answer to this objection. Catholics pay divine honors to God alone, as every one knows who knows any thing of Catholic worship. That we keep relics, pictures, and images, and pay them a relative honor as memorials of departed sanctity, we admit; that we venerate the Saints, especially the Ever-blessed Virgin, the Most Holy Mother of God, we also admit; but that this is superstition or will-worship we deny, and the Professor must prove, or not assert it.

The last proof of the fallibility of the Church which the Professor attempts to offer is, that she is not infallible, for "she is hostile to civil government." (p. 143.) His argument is, when reduced to form, — the church that claims and exercises temporal authority is hostile to civil government ; but the Roman Catholic Church claims and exercises temporal authority ; therefore she is hostile to civil government. The church that is hostile to civil government is fallible ; but the Roman Catholic Church is hostile to civil government ; therefore, the Roman Catholic Church is fallible, that is, not infallible.

We distinguish the major of the first syllogism. The church that claims and exercises supreme temporal authority is hostile to civil government, if she has received from Almighty God no grant of that temporal authority, we concede ; if she has received the grant, we deny. No church which possesses, by the Divine grant, temporal authority, can be hostile to civil government by claiming and exercising it, because she is herself, under God, the civil government. But the Roman Catholic Church, if she has received the grant, does thus possess the temporal authority. Therefore, if she claims and exercises that authority, she is not hostile to civil government.

We distinguish also the major of the second syllogism. The church that is hostile to all government in civil affairs is fallible, we concede ; for the necessity of government in civil affairs is clearly evinced from reason ; the church that is hostile only to distinct and independent civil government is fallible, we deny, for it may be that God has vested the government of civil as well as spiritual affairs in the same hands. The denial of civil government distinct from and independent of the Church is a proof of fallibility only on the supposition that such civil government exists by divine right. But if all government, civil as well as spiritual, is vested in the Church, it does not so exist. Therefore its denial is no proof of fallibility. Moreover, the minor of the second syllogism is not proved. The Roman Catholic Church, as we have seen, cannot be hostile to civil government, even if she claim and exercise the supreme temporal authority, if she has received it as a grant from God, the Supreme Ruler. But it is not proved that she claims or exercises it without such grant. Therefore it is not proved that she is hostile to civil government ; and therefore, again, it is not proved that she is fallible.

The Professor labors to prove, that, according to Catholicity, "the Pope is the vicar of the Omnipotent God, invested alike

with temporal power and ecclesiastical authority." (p. 147.) If so, the Pope is the vicar of God in both orders, and is invested with the supreme authority in both. Then he is by Divine appointment the temporal sovereign. But for the temporal sovereign to claim and exercise temporal authority is not to be hostile to the civil government, but to assert and maintain it.

But the claim of the Church "to secular authority merges the state in the Church. Kings and emperors, nations and communities, become merely the instruments and pliant tools of spiritual dominion." (p. 153.) What then, if the spiritual dominion be legitimate? All power is of God, and there is no legitimate authority not from him. Kings, emperors, nations, communities, have no right to exercise temporal authority, save as vicars of the Omnipotent God, and it is only for the reason that they are such that we are under any obligation to obey them. If Almighty God has made the Pope his sole vicar in both orders, obedience is due to him by all both in church and state, and then it is no objection to the Church that she exacts the submission of kings, emperors, nations, communities, for they can, in such case, have no authority not derived from God through the Pope. The Professor, if he grant that the Pope is the vicar of Almighty God in the temporal and in the spiritual order, cannot urge his objection, because in doing so he would resist the authority of the vicar of God, and therefore of God himself.

Again, if the Pope be the vicar of God in both orders, the claim and exercise of the supreme temporal dominion do not merge the state in the church, for then the Church is both church and state. The Church could merge the state in herself by claiming and exercising temporal power, only on condition that she had received no special grant of temporal power, and claimed to exercise it solely by virtue of her grant of spiritual authority. But if she teaches, as the Professor contends, that in the Pope she has been invested with temporal *as well as with spiritual authority*, she does not do this, that is, does not claim the temporal as incidental to the spiritual. Therefore, even granting that she claims the supreme temporal authority, she does not and cannot merge the state in the Church as a spiritual authority, which is the sense intended. This is evinced from the instance of the Papal states. The Pope in regard to them is supreme in both temporals and spirituals, but they exist as a state, as a civil government, as much so as Tuscany or Sardinia.

The Professor does not appear to understand the question he wishes to discuss. The spiritual order is undeniably superior to the temporal, and nothing can be legitimately concluded from the temporal to the prejudice of the spiritual. No man who has any knowledge of even natural morality can pretend that it is the prerogative of the temporal order to define or give law to the spiritual. It is not according to reason that the lower should rule the higher, the body the soul, for instance, or the state the Church. To object to the Church that she subjects the whole temporal order to the spiritual order, or that she makes the spiritual dominion supreme, is to make an objection which reason disavows, because it would be in principle the same as to deny the right of reason to rule the flesh, nay, the same as to deny reason itself. The Church, if she is God's Church, if she has received plenary spiritual authority as the vicar of the Omnipotent God, must needs be superior to the state, and the state can have no authority to do aught she declares to be sinful or morally wrong, and must be bound to do whatever she declares to be required by the moral law. To allege that she subjects kings, emperors, &c., to her dominion is, then, to allege nothing against her.

The Professor does not state the question properly. He begins with an assumption that he has no right to make. He assumes, that, if the Church claims any authority in the temporal order, she is a usurper, and therefore cannot be infallible. He takes it for granted, then, that, if he proves that she has claimed such authority, he has disproved her infallibility. But we demand the proof from reason, that she has no authority in temporals. Till he proves this, he cannot conclude, from the fact that she claims it, that she is a usurper, and therefore fallible. It is certain from reason, since all power is of God, and there is and can be no rightful authority to govern in any order not derived mediately or immediately from him, that he can make the Pope his sole vicar on earth in both orders, if such be his will and pleasure. If he does so, then it is also certain that the Pope has the right to exercise the supreme authority in both orders, and then that, so far from his temporal authority being usurped, all authority not derived from God through him is usurpation. What the Professor has to prove, then, in case he contends that the Church claims the supreme temporal authority, is, not that she claims it, but that she claims it without having received it from God. If she asserts that she has received it, — since the legal presumption is in her favor, and

the argument is not to prove, but to disprove, her infallibility, — he can prove that she has not received it only by proving that she has in the exercise of it violated some principle of natural justice.

Now, we are far from conceding that the Church has ever claimed or exercised temporal authority in the sense intended ; but pass over that. Let it be supposed for the present that she has. What is the evidence that she has ever violated any principle of natural justice ? You can arraign her only on the law of nature, before the bar of natural reason. Produce, then, the precept of the law of nature which she has violated or contradicted. We have looked carefully through all that the Professor has urged, and we can find nothing that is immoral or unjust. All his proofs are reduced to this, that she claims and exercises temporal authority. Grant all this, what then ? Where is your evidence that she has not rightfully claimed and exercised it ? You offer none, and only work yourself up into a violent passion against her, because she has claimed and exercised it. Where is your evidence that the exercise you fancy you have proved has been contrary to the law of nature ? You offer only two things ; first, what you call the Jesuit's oath, and, second, the prohibition of duelling by the Council of Trènt. The oath ascribed to the Jesuits is a forgery. The Jesuits have no such oath, for as Jesuits they take no oath at all. The Council of Trent condemns duelling, we grant ; but is it the condemnation of duelling, or duelling itself, that is contrary to the precepts of justice ? Which is easier to defend, — duelling, or the Church in condemning it ? And who is in the wrong, — the Church in condemning, or you in defending, the base, cowardly, and detestable practice of single combat ?

But the Church does more than condemn it. According to the statute of the Council of Trent, in its twenty-fifth session, “the temporal sovereign who permits a duel to take place in his dominions is punished not only with excommunication, but with the loss of the place in which the combat occurred. The duellists and their seconds are condemned in the same statute to perpetual infamy, the loss of their goods, and deprived, if they should fall, of Christian burial, while those who are merely spectators of the scene are sentenced to eternal malediction.” (p. 152.) Well, what then ? *What then ?* Why, this proves that the Church claims the right to exercise civil authority, nay, to inflict civil punishments ; for such are the forfeiture of goods, and the loss of the place where the combat occurs.

Yes, as you cite the statute, but not as it was passed by the Council of Trent.* But let that pass. If so, it is nothing to your purpose, unless the punishment prescribed is in itself unjust. Will you maintain that ?

“ In a conflict of power between princes and Popes, the first and highest duty of all the vassals of Rome is to maintain her honor and support her claims.” (p. 153.) Suppose a conflict of power between the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States and the civil authorities of the country, which party would the Professor, as a Presbyterian minister and member of that church, support ? The civil authorities ? Then he either condemns his church, or raises the temporal order above the spiritual, which he expressly repudiates. Would he side with his church, and maintain the independence of the spiritual order ? Then he would recognize and act on the principle he objects to us, and we retort his objection. Suppose a conflict between an infallible church and a fallible civil government, we demand which of the two ought to yield. “ But the Church is not infallible.” That is for you to prove. If she is infallible, she must be in the right, and then we are bound in reason to support her ; if she is not infallible, we deny that we are bound to support her at all, for then she is not God’s Church.

“ Hence the Jesuit in his secret oath renounces all allegiance to all earthly powers which have not been confirmed by the Holy See.” (*ib.*) The Jesuit has no secret oath, and renounces no allegiance to the civil government. The charge is false.

“ The Romish Church, too, sets her face like a flint against the subjection of her spiritual officers to the legal tribunals of the state.” (*ib.*) Well, what if she does ? Where is the proof that in this she is wrong ? She “ has positively prohibited the intolerable presumption of laymen, though kings and magistrates, of demanding oaths of allegiance from the lofty members of her hierarchy.” (*ib.*) *In case they hold nothing temporal of them*, conceded ; but what then ? Will the Professor be good enough to demonstrate the right of the temporal authority to demand from a minister of religion an oath of allegiance in spirituals.

La Fayette is reported to have said, that, “ if ever the liberties of this country should be destroyed, it would be by the

* Vide Conc. Trident. Sess. 25, cap. xix.

machinations of the Romish priests." (p. 154.) *Therefore* the Church is fallible! La Fayette is *reported*, by whom? When? Where? What if he did say so? Was La Fayette infallible? And does it follow that the thing must be so, because La Fayette thought so? If he did once think so, it is possible that he changed his mind, for it is *reported* that he became reconciled to the Church and died a Catholic, and it is well known that he was, when dying, exceedingly anxious for the services of a "Romish priest." He had probably had enough of French philosophism during his lifetime, without wishing to carry any with him into eternity.

"They are all of them [Catholic priests] sworn subjects of a *foreign* potentate." (*ib.*) Not true. The authority of the Church is Catholic, not national, and can be no more *foreign* here than at Rome.

"There are peculiar principles in the constitution and polity of Rome which render it an engine of tremendous power." (p. 159.) Who has more power than God? Because, if we admit the existence of God, we must admit his omnipotence, are we to be atheists? If the Church be not God's Church, she cannot possess the authority we claim for her, without danger, we concede; if she is his Church, and the Pope is his vicar, what have we to fear from her power more than we should have, if it were exerted immediately by God himself? We defend the Church as God's Church, and attempt no defence of her on the supposition that she is not his Church. Prove to us that he has not instituted her, and we will abandon her; but remember that proving that she has a tremendous power is no proof to us that he has not instituted her; for it belongs not to us to say how much or how little power it is proper for him to delegate to her. The claim of similar power for a human or man-made church, like the Presbyterian, would unquestionably be dangerous, and has proved itself so in the whole history of Protestantism. But that it is dangerous in a divinely commissioned church, we know, and so does every man of common sense, is not and cannot be true; for God himself becomes our surety for the right exercise of the power, and that is sufficient.

"The doctrine of auricular confession establishes a system of espionage which is absolutely fatal to personal independence, and from the intimate connection between priests and bishops, and bishops and the Pope, all the important secrets of the earth can be easily transmitted to the Vatican." This is ridiculously

absurd. No priest can communicate to any person living the secrets of the confessional, and he can no more do it to his bishop or to the Pope than he can to James H. Thornwell. He cannot speak, out of the confessional, of what has been told him in the confessional, even to the penitent himself. No instance of the secrets of the confessional having been betrayed has ever transpired. Even the vilest apostates have never been known to disclose what they had received under the seal of the confessional. The Catholic clergy do not record the confessions of their penitents in a book, making them a part of the records of the Church, as did the former Puritan ministers of New England, as we had occasion ourselves to know formerly from the inspection of the records of some of their churches, over which it was our misfortune to be settled as pastor.

As to the system of espionage, we all know that it was carried to its perfection in the Congregational churches of New England ; and it still existed in full vigor a few years ago in the Presbyterian churches in the Middle States, as we had personal means of knowing. In most Calvinistic churches, especially the Congregational, the Presbyterian, and the Methodist, the members are bound by a solemn covenant, a covenant frequently renewed, to *watch* over one another, which means, practically, that they shall be spies one upon another ; and who that has had the misfortune to be brought up a Presbyterian has not felt that he was under perpetual surveillance, that every member, it might be, of the particular church to which he belonged was on the look-out to catch him tripping ? We have ourselves had ample opportunities of learning the degree of personal independence allowed by Presbyterianism, and we never knew the meaning of personal independence till we became a Catholic. There is no comparison, in this matter of personal independence, between Catholicity and any form of Protestantism we are acquainted with, and that is saying much, if what is alleged concerning our frequent changes be not altogether untrue. Catholicity provides us all the helps we need in order to attain to Christian perfection ; she exhorts, she entreats us to avail ourselves of them, and to attain to that perfection ; but she throws the responsibility on our own individual consciences. Catholics, also, usually mind their own business, and attend rather to their own consciences than to those of their neighbours. Hence, you find among them very little hypocrisy. Their conduct is free, frank, natural, and, as far as we have had opportunities for observing, they generally wear their worst side

outward. It needs a close and intimate acquaintance with them to know, or even to suspect, their real piety and worth. This indicates any thing but the want of personal independence, and the presence of the system of espionage alleged. Indeed, the Professor in bringing this charge must have argued against us from what he knows to be true of his own sect ; but this is to pass from one genus to another, —not allowable in logic. Servility, slavishness, the want of personal independence, the fear to say that our souls are our own, though unquestionably characteristics of the Presbyterian, are no characteristics of the Catholic. There is a total difference between the mild and parental authority exercised by our clergy over us, and the harsh and severe tyranny notoriously exercised by Presbyterian ministers over their flocks ; and it would take much to make Catholics believe it possible for a people to stand in such awe and dread of a minister of religion as Presbyterians do of their ministers. Our children are delighted to see a priest come into the house ; we, when a boy, if we saw a minister coming, used to run and hide in the barn.

The Professor has mentioned several other points, but they involve no principle not already met and disposed of. The great question of the mutual relation of the temporal and spiritual powers we have not discussed, for it has not lain in our way. In these essays we have not been laboring to establish the claims of the Church, but to test the validity of the objections urged by the Professor. We have shown that he has offered nothing that disproves, or tends to disprove, her infallibility. This is all that was required of us. That the Church is hostile to civil government we deny, and could easily prove, if it were necessary. But the burden of proof is on the Professor, and we are not disposed to assume it for ourselves. The Church represents the spiritual order, and has exclusive jurisdiction under God, for her own children, of all questions which pertain to that order ; but as the Church, she has never enacted, or attempted to enact, civil laws. She asserts, undoubtedly, the independence, and if the independence, the supremacy of the spiritual order, because the spiritual order embraces every moral question, and the state is as much bound to obey the moral law as the individual ; but as long as the civil government seeks the public good, without violating any precept of that law, she leaves it, within its own province, free to adopt and carry out the economical or prudential policy it judges proper or expedient.

The Professor alludes to the struggles which have at times occurred between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, and takes it for granted that in these struggles the civil power was always in the right, and the Church in the wrong. It is singular how readily Protestants, when they wish to deny the infallibility of the Church, assume it for individuals and for civil government. But civil government is confessedly fallible. The simple fact of a conflict between the two powers is, therefore, no evidence that right is against the Church. Indeed, the conflict itself is a presumption that the state is in the wrong ; because the presumption is always in favor of the superior order. Do our Protestant friends ever reflect on the distrust which they manifest of their own pretended churches, when they assume that right must needs be, in every contest, on the side of the temporal authority ? Do they remark that they prove themselves thus to be either courtiers or infidels ? Even if the Church were only a human institution, it would not follow that she would not be in the right in warring against political tyrants. We certainly have no respect for Presbyterianism, and yet, if we should find the state, by virtue of its own authority, attempting to suppress it, we should side with Presbyterianism against the state ; for we hold the utter incompetency of the state in spirituals, and we no more concede its right to sit in judgment on Presbyterianism than we do its right to sit in judgment on Catholicity. The question is one which belongs to the spiritual authority, and the state, in its own right, has and can have nothing to do with it.

It perhaps has never occurred to the Professor that it might be profitable to investigate those struggles which afford him so much matter of virulent but foolish declamation against the Church. In fact, the Popes, in their contests with the civil powers, need no apology. Judged even as a human power, they were always in the right, on the side of justice and humanity, defending the cause of the oppressed, and putting forth their power only to vindicate the rights of conscience, to succour the weak, to console the afflicted, and to protect the friendless. We said all this, and even more, while yet in the ranks of Protestants, and far from dreaming that we should one day be a Catholic. We grant that the Pope has excommunicated princes and nobles, deposed kings and emperors, and absolved their subjects from their allegiance ; but in this he has only done his duty as the Spiritual Father of Christendom, and what was required by humanity as well as religion. These princes were

his spiritual subjects, amenable to his authority by the law of the Church which they acknowledged, and by the constitution of their own states. He was their legal judge, had the right to summon them before him, and to cut them off, if he saw proper, from the communion of the faithful, and excommunication of itself worked virtual deposition. In absolving subjects from their allegiance, he usurped no authority, for he was the legal judge in the case ; for whether the allegiance continued or had ceased presented a case of conscience, of which, as Sovereign Pontiff, he had supreme jurisdiction, and because he was by all parties the acknowledged umpire between princes and their subjects. But he never claimed the right to absolve from their allegiance the subjects of infidel princes, or of any princes not Catholic, or bound to be Catholic by the constitution of their states, as the kings and queens of Great Britain are bound, since 1688, to be Protestant.

But what, in fact, was the absolution granted, and in what cases has the Pope exercised, or claimed, the right to grant it ? Has the Pope ever claimed the right to absolve from their allegiance the subjects of a legitimate prince, who reigns justly, according to the laws and constitution of his state ? Never. In every such case he impresses upon his spiritual children the duty of obedience. But the obligation between prince and subject is reciprocal. If the subject is bound to obey the prince, the prince is bound to protect the subject. This is implied in the very nature of the social compact. The people are not for the prince, but the prince is for the people. The authority of the prince is not a personal franchise or right, but a trust, and he is bound to exercise it according to the conditions on which it is committed to him. Government exists, not for the good of the governors, but for the good of the governed. The true prince is the servant of his subjects. Government is instituted for the common good, and the moment it ceases to consult the common good, or the public good, it forfeits its rights. The tyrant, the oppressor, has and can have no right to reign, and therefore no right to exact obedience. His subjects cease to be subjects to him, and are free — in a lawful manner — to resist, and even depose him ; for resistance to tyrants, if the manner of the resistance be just, is obedience to God. When a prince becomes a tyrant, when he oppresses his subjects, and tramples on the rights of our common humanity, he breaks the compact between him and his subjects, and by so doing releases them from their allegiance. Hence our Congress of 1776,

after having proved George the Third to be a tyrant, conclude, — “Therefore these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; and they *are absolved from all allegiance* to the British crown.” Now suppose the subjects of a prince, feeling themselves aggrieved, oppressed, complain to the Holy Father, the judge recognized by both parties in the case, that their prince has broken the compact, violated his oath of office, and become a tyrant; suppose the Holy Father entertains the complaint, and summons both parties to plead before him, and, after a patient hearing of the cause, gives judgment against the prince, declares him to have forfeited his rights, and that his subjects are absolved from their allegiance, what would there be in all this to which reason could object? Well, this is precisely the kind of absolution the Popes have granted, and never have they deposed a prince or absolved his subjects, except in cases precisely similar to the one here supposed. He merely declares the law, and applies it to the facts of the case presented. The absolution itself simply gives a legal character to a fact which already exists. The necessity of some such authority as that which Protestants complain of in the Popes is widely and deeply felt in modern society, and various substitutes for it, such as a congress of nations, have been suggested or attempted, but without any favorable results. Having rejected the Pope as the natural and legal umpire between the prince and his subjects, we find ourselves reduced to the dilemma, either of passive obedience and non-resistance to tyrants, or of revolution, which denies the right of government, renders order impracticable, and resolves society into primitive chaos. To deny the right to resist the tyrant is to doom the people to hopeless slavery; to assert it, and yet leave to each individual the right to judge of the time, the means, and the mode of resistance, is disorder, no-governmentism, the worst form of despotism. In the “dark ages,” men were able to avoid either alternative. By recognizing the Pope as umpire, who, by his character and position, as head of the Church which embraced all nations, was naturally, not to say divinely, fitted to be impartial and just, they practically secured the right of resistance to tyranny, without undermining legitimate authority. It will be long before modern nations will be wise enough to recognize how much they have lost by what they call their progress.

For ourselves, we thank God that there was formerly a power on earth that was able to depose tyrants, and to step in

between the people and their oppressors. We are not among those who are afraid to glory in the boldness and energy of those great Popes who made crowned heads shake, and princes hold their breath. Our heart leaps with joy when we see St. Peter smite the oppressor of the Church or of his people to the earth, and if we have ever felt any regret, it has been at the slowness of the Holy Father to smite, or at his want of power to smite with more instant effect. Even when a Protestant, we learned to revere the calumniated Hildebrands, Innocents, and Bonifaces, those noble and saintly defenders of innocence, protectors of the helpless, and humblers of crowned tyrants and ruthless nobles. O, how slow even we Catholics are to do them justice ! How little do we reflect on the deep debt of gratitude we owe them ! O, dumb be the tongue that would rail against the Popes or apologize for their firm resistance to the usurpation of the temporal authorities ! Alas ! how often in the history of modern Europe have we seen them, under God, the last hope of the world, the only solace of the afflicted, the sole resource of the wronged and downtrodden ! Alas ! it is precisely because of their noble defence of religion and freedom, of their fidelity to God and to man, that they have been calumniated, and the world has been filled with the outcries of tyrants, and their minions and dupes, against them.

That the interposition of the Sovereign Pontiffs in temporal affairs often occasioned much disturbance, and even civil wars, we are not disposed to deny ; but on them who made the interposition necessary must rest the responsibility. In this world, it often happens that right cannot be peacefully asserted and maintained, and tyranny proves a curse, not only while it is unresisted, but even when resisted, and successfully resisted. We cannot permit a band of depredators to go unresisted, because we must disturb them by resisting them. Injustice, iniquity, can never be redressed, the tyrant can never be deposed and the legitimate sovereign restored, without a combat, and often a long and bloody one. Even our Lord himself told us to think not that he had come to send peace on the earth, but a sword rather. But shall we, therefore, make no efforts to right the wronged, to save justice and humanity from utter shipwreck ? Let no man who glories in the revolutionary principle, who boasts of being a lover of freedom and the progress of mankind, pretend it. We are no revolutionists ; we hold ourselves bound in conscience to obey the legal authority ; but we acknowledge no obligation to obey the

oppressor, and let the competent authority but declare him an oppressor and summon us to the battle-field, and we are ready to obey, to bind on our armour, rush in where blows fall thickest and fall heaviest, let the disturbance be what it may. We are, thank God, Roman Catholics, and therefore love freedom and justice, and dare not, when called upon, to shrink from defending them against any and every enemy, at any and every sacrifice.

The Professor contends that the Church is hostile to civil government ; we would respectfully ask him if he has reflected, that, without her, civil government becomes impracticable. How, without her as umpire between government and government, and between prince and subject, and without her as a spiritual authority to command the obedience of the subject and the justice of the prince, will he be able to secure the independence of nations, and wise and just government ? Will he learn from experience ? Let him, then, read modern history. The age in politics discards the Church. Protestantism for three hundred years has been the religion of nearly a third, and, in politics, of the whole of Europe. Three hundred years is a fair time for an experiment. Well, what is the result ? DESPOTISM on the one hand, and ANARCHY on the other. There is not, at this moment, a single well-organized civil government on the whole Eastern continent, and only our own on the Western. The government of Great Britain may seem to be an exception for the Old World, but it is a perfect oligarchy ; it fails to secure the common weal ; enriches the few and impoverishes the many ; and its very existence is threatened by a mob which the ever-increasing poverty of the industrial classes hourly augments, and grim want is rendering desperate. Our own government is sustained solely by the accidental advantages of the country, consisting chiefly in our vast quantities of unoccupied fertile lands, which absorb our rapidly increasing population, and form a sort of safety-valve for its superfluous energy. Strip us of these lands, or let them be filled up so that our expanding population should find its limit, and be compelled to recoil upon itself, our institutions would not stand a week.

Here in the present state of the world, hardly to be paralleled in universal history, — when old governments are either all fallen or tottering ready to fall ; when all authority is cast off, and law is despised ; when the streets of the most civilized cities run with the blood of citizens shed by citizens, and the lurid

light of burning cottage and castle gleams on the midnight sky ; when saintly prelates bearing the olive-branch of peace are shot down by infuriated ruffians ; when murder and rapine hardly seek concealment, and all civilization seems to be thrown back into the savagism of the forests,— here we may read the wisdom of those who discard the Church, and denounce her as hostile to civil government, — the wisdom of the doctrine which a scoffing and unbelieving age opposes to the truth which Almighty God has revealed, and to the lessons of universal experience. Alas ! how true it is, that God permits strong delusions to blind the impious and the licentious, that they may bring swift destruction upon themselves !

But it is time to bring our remarks to a close. We have examined the principal arguments which Mr. Thornwell has brought forward to prove the fallibility of the Church, and we leave our readers to judge for themselves whether we have not proved, that, in every instance, they are either unsound in principle or irrelevant, proving nothing but the Professor's own malice or ignorance. The Professor has made numerous assumptions, numerous bold assertions, but in no instance has he done better than simply to assume the point he was to prove. He has declaimed loudly against the Church, he has said many hard things against her, but he has harmed only himself and his brethren. We now take our leave of him. We have done all we proposed. We have vindicated the Catholic argument for the disputed books drawn from the infallibility of the Church, which is enough, without the testimonies of the Fathers, although we have even these. We regret that the task of answering the Professor had not been assumed by Dr. Lynch himself, who would have accomplished it so much better than we have done. Yet it was hardly fitting that he should have assumed it. He could not, with a proper respect for himself and his profession, have replied to such a vituperative performance as Mr. Thornwell's book. We were brought up a Presbyterian, and have been accustomed from our youth to the sort of stuff we have had to deal with, and therefore have been able to reply without feeling the degradation we should have felt, had we all our lifetime been accustomed to the courtesy and candor of Catholic controversialists.

ART. II. — *Legitimacy and Revolutionism, — Conservatism and Reform.*

WE have taken, in our political essays, unwearied pains to make ourselves understood, and to guard against being misapprehended ; but, through our own fault or that of our readers, our success has rarely corresponded to our efforts. On all sides, from all quarters, we are charged with being hostile to liberty and favorable to despotism, — the enemy of the people, and the friend of their oppressors. We could smile at this ridiculous charge, were it not that some honest souls are found who appear to believe it, and some moon-struck scribblers make it the occasion of exciting unjust prejudices against our friends, and of placing them, as well as ourselves, in a false position before the public. Injustice to us personally is of no moment, and demands of us no attention ; but when, owing to our peculiar position, it can hardly fail to work injustice to others, we are bound to notice and to repel it.

The age in which we live is an age of theoretical, and, to a great extent, of practical anarchy. Its ideas and movements are marked by impatience of restraint, denial of law, and contempt of authority. We have seen this, and have felt it our duty to protest against it, and to do what we could, in our limited sphere, to recall men to a sense of the necessity of government, and to the fact of their moral obligation to uphold the supremacy of law. This is our offence. Yet one would naturally suppose that people of ordinary intelligence, somewhat acquainted with our past history, might, without much difficulty, believe that in this our motive has been to serve the cause of freedom, not that of despotism. We, in fact, have done it, because liberty is impossible without order, order is impossible without government, and government in any worthy sense of the term is impossible without a settled conviction on the part of the people of its legitimacy, and of their obligation in conscience to obey it. Nothing deserving the name of government can be founded on the sense of the agreeable or of the useful. Governments, so called, which appeal to nothing higher, more catholic, and more stable, are mere creatures of passion or caprice, and must follow the lead of popular folly and excess, instead of restraining them, and directing the general activity to the public good. They are not governments, but mere instruments for the private gain or aggrandizement of

the adroit and scheming few who contrive to possess themselves of their management. It is philosophically and historically demonstrable, that the permanence and stability of government, and its wise and just administration for the common weal, — the only legitimate end of its institution, — are impracticable, unless the government is held to rest on the universal and unalterable sense of duty, under the protection of religion.

This truth, though, in fact, a very commonplace truth, our age overlooks, or, if it does not overlook, it rejects. Hence the danger with which liberty in our times is threatened. We have believed it, therefore, not improper to guard against this danger, and in order to do so, we have traced government back to its source, and to the foundation of its authority. We have found its origin, not in the people, but in God, from whom is all power ; and we have concluded from this its divine right, within its legitimate province, to our allegiance. It has, since it derives its authority from God, a divine right to command, and, if so, we must be bound in conscience to obey it. Then it rests, not on the sense of the agreeable or of the useful, to fluctuate as these fluctuate, but on the sense of duty, — and not merely duty to our country or to mankind, but duty to God, — a duty founded in the unalterable relations of man to his Maker. This raises political allegiance and obedience to the law to the rank of moral virtue, and declares their violation to be a sin against God, to whom we belong, all we have, and all we are. Hence, in its legitimate province, even civil government becomes sacred and inviolable ; and therefore we assert, on the one hand, our duty to obey it, and, on the other, deny the right of revolution, what La Fayette calls “the sacred right of insurrection.”

Here, in general terms, is the doctrine we have endeavoured to inculcate. That it is hostile to the political atheism now so rife, we concede. We are Christians, and do not understand the possibility of being Christians, and yet atheists in politics. We have but one set of principles, and these are determined by our religion. We cannot adopt one set of principles in our religion and a contradictory set in our politics, saying “Good Lord” in the one, and “Good Devil” in the other. We are too far behind the age for that. But that this doctrine is hostile to liberty or favorable to despotism, we do not concede, — nay, positively deny. In setting it forth, we have dwelt on that phase of it directly opposed to the dangerous tendencies of the age, because it was not necessary to guard against tendencies from which we have nothing to apprehend, and because we

presumed that our readers would of themselves see that it had another phase equally opposed to the opposite class of tendencies. But for the hundredth time in our short life we have learned that the writer who presumes any thing on the intelligence or discrimination of the bulk of readers presumes too much, and will assuredly be disappointed. The doctrine protects the government against radicals, rebels, and revolutionists ; but it protects, also, the people against tyrants and oppressors. The fears of our politicians on this last point, whether real or affected, do little credit to their sagacity. The monsters which affright them a little more light would enable them to see are as harmless as the charred stump or decaying log which the benighted traveller mistakes for bear or panther.

When we assert the doctrine of legitimacy, we are understood to assert passive obedience and non-resistance to tyrants ; but needs it any extraordinary intellectual power and cultivation to perceive that legitimacy, while it smites the rebel or the revolutionist, must equally smite the tyrant or usurper ? If the doctrine asserts the right of legitimate, it must deny the right of illegitimate government ; if it denies the right to disobey the legitimate authority, it must also deny the right of illegitimate authority to command ; if it disarms the subject before the legal authority, it must equally disarm the illegal authority before the subject. How, then, from the fact that we are forbidden to resist or to subvert legitimate government, the legal constitution of the state, conclude that we are forbidden to resist or to depose the tyrant ? Tyranny, oppression, is never legal, and therefore no tyrant or oppressor ever is or can be the legitimate sovereign. To resist him is not to resist the legitimate authority, and therefore demands for its justification no assertion of the revolutionary principle. How is it, then, that you do not see that the doctrine of legitimacy gives a legal right to resist whatever is illegal, and therefore lays a solid foundation for liberty ?

People, we know, are prejudiced against the doctrine which asserts the divine origin and right of government, but it is because they misapprehend the doctrine, and because they identify liberty with democracy. The doctrine, undoubtedly, does assert the sacredness, inviolability, and legitimacy of every actual political constitution, whatever its form, and that the monarchical or aristocratic order, where it is the established order, is as legitimate as the democratic. But, if liberty and democracy are one and the same thing, since the monarchical order is that which is actually the established order in most

states, liberty in most states is precluded, and the people are and must be slaves. Yet is it true that liberty and democracy are identical or convertible terms? Democracy, whose expression is universal suffrage, intrusts every citizen with a share in the administration of the government, which is and can be done by no other political order. But the elective franchise is a trust, not a right, and therefore to withhold it is not to withhold freedom. Liberty is in the possession and exercise of our natural rights. We have none of us any natural right to govern; for under the law of nature all men are equals, and no one has the right to exercise authority over others. The franchise is a municipal grant, and depends on the will of the political sovereign. Liberty, unless the question be between nation and nation, is not a predicate of the government, but of the subject, and of the subject not in his quality of a constituent element of the sovereignty, but in his quality of subject. As subject he may be free, without being intrusted with authority to govern, and therefore may be free under other forms of government than the democratic.

In fact, democratic politicians never attain to the conception of liberty. The basis of their theory of government is despotism. They make the right to govern a natural right, and differ from the confessedly despotic politicians only in claiming for every man what these claim for only one. They make government a personal right, incident to manhood, inalienable, and inamissible, — not a solemn trust which the trustee is bound to hold and exercise according to law, and for which he is accountable. Hence it is that democracy always sooner or later terminates in despotism or autocracy. We deny that government is ever a personal right, whether of the one, the few, or the many, and therefore deny that a man has a natural right to a share in the administration. He only has the right to whom the power is delegated by the competent authority, and he holds it, not as a personal right, but as a trust. Consequently, we do not concede that the establishment of the democratic *régime* is at all essential to the establishment or maintenance of liberty. He is free, enjoys his liberty, who is secured in the possession and enjoyment of all his natural rights; and this is done wherever the legitimate authority governs, and governs according to the principles of eternal justice. We are aware of no form of government that cannot so govern, or which cannot also govern otherwise, if it choose.

We are republicans, because republicanism is here the estab-

lished order, but we confess that we do not embrace, and never have embraced, as essential to liberty, or even as compatible with liberty, the popular democratic doctrine of the country. We beg leave to introduce here some remarks on *Democracy* which we wrote in 1837, and published in the first number of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1838.

"Democracy is sometimes asserted to be the sovereignty of the people. If this be a true account of it, it is indefensible. The sovereignty of the people is not a truth. Sovereignty is that which is highest, ultimate; which has not only the physical force to make itself obeyed, but the moral right to command whatever it pleases. The right to command involves the corresponding duty of obedience. What the sovereign may command, it is the duty of the subject to obey [to do].

"Are the people the highest? Are they ultimate? And are we bound in conscience to obey whatever it may be their good pleasure to ordain? If so, where is individual liberty? If so, the people, taken collectively, are the absolute master of every man taken individually. Every man, as a man, then, is an absolute slave. Whatever the people, in their collective capacity, may demand of him, he must feel himself bound in conscience to give. No matter how intolerable the burdens imposed, painful and needless the sacrifices required, he cannot refuse obedience without incurring the guilt of disloyalty; and he must submit in quiet, in silence, without even the moral right to feel that he is wronged.

"Now this, in theory at least, is absolutism. Whether it be a democracy, or any other form of government, if it be absolute, there is and there can be no individual liberty. Under a monarchy, the monarch is the state. '*L'État c'est moi*,' said Louis the Fourteenth, and he expressed the whole monarchical theory. The state being absolute, and the monarch being the state, the monarch has the right to command what he will, and exact obedience in the name of duty, loyalty. Hence absolutism, despotism. Under an aristocracy, the nobility are the state, and consequently, as the state is absolute, the nobility are also absolute. Whatever they command is binding. If they require the many to be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' to them, then 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' to them the many must feel it their duty to be. Here, for the many, is absolutism as much as under a monarchy. Every body sees this.

"Well, is it less so under a democracy, where the people, in their associated capacity, are held to be absolute? The people are the state, and the state is absolute; the people may therefore do whatever they please. Is not this freedom? Yes, for the state; but what is it for the individual? There are no kings, no nobili-

ties, it is true ; but the people may exercise all the power over the individual that kings or nobilities may ; and consequently every man, taken singly, is, under a democracy, if the state be absolute, as much the slave of the state, as under the most absolute monarchy or aristocracy.

“ But this is not the end of the chapter. Under a democratic form of government, all questions which come up for the decision of authority must be decided by a majority of voices. The sovereignty which is asserted for the people must, then, be transferred to the ruling majority. If the people are sovereign, then the majority are sovereign ; and if sovereign, the majority have, as Miss Martineau lays it down, the absolute right to govern. If the majority have the absolute right to govern, it is the absolute duty of the minority to obey. We who chance to be in the minority are then completely disfranchised. We are wholly at the mercy of the majority. We hold our property, our wives and children, and our lives even, at its sovereign will and pleasure. It may do by us and ours as it pleases. If it take it into its head to make a new and arbitrary division of property, however unjust it may seem, we shall not only be impotent to resist, but we shall not even have the right of the wretched to complain. Conscience will be no shield. The authority of the absolute sovereign extends to spiritual matters, as well as to temporal. The creed the majority is pleased to impose, the minority must in all meekness and submission receive ; and the form of religious worship the majority is good enough to prescribe, the minority must make it a matter of conscience to observe. Whatever has been done under the most absolute monarchy or the most lawless aristocracy may be reënacted under a pure democracy, and what is worse, legitimately too, if it be once laid down in principle that the majority has the absolute right to govern.

“ The majority will always have the physical power to coerce the minority into submission ; but this is a matter of no moment, in comparison with the doctrine which gives them the right to do it. We have very little fear of the physical force of numbers, when we can oppose to it the moral force of right. The doctrine in question deprives us of this moral force. By giving absolute sovereignty to the majority, it declares whatever the majority does is right, that the majority can do no wrong. It legitimates every possible act for which the sanction of a majority of voices can be obtained. Whatever the majority may exact it is just to give. Truth, justice, wisdom, virtue, can erect no barriers to stay its progress ; for these are the creations of its will, and may be made or unmade by its breath. Justice is obedience to its decrees, and injustice is resistance to its commands. Resistance is not crime before the civil tribunal only, but also *in foro conscientia*. Now this

is what we protest against. It is not the physical force of the majority that we dread, but the doctrine that legitimates each and every act the majority may choose to perform; and therefore teaches them to look for no standard of right and wrong beyond their own will.

"The effects of this doctrine, so far as believed and acted on, cannot be too earnestly deprecated. It creates a multitude of demagogues, pretending a world of love for the *dear* people, lauding the people's virtues, magnifying their sovereignty, and with mock humility professing their readiness ever to bow to the will of the majority. It tends to make public men lax in their morals, hypocritical in their conduct; and it paves the way for gross bribery and corruption. It generates a habit of appealing, on nearly all occasions, from truth and justice, wisdom and virtue, to the force of numbers, and virtually sinks the man in the brute. It destroys manliness of character, independence of thought and action, and makes one weak, vacillating, — a timeserver and a coward. It perverts inquiry from its legitimate objects, and asks, when it concerns a candidate for office, not, Who is the most honest, the most capable? but, Who will command the most votes? and when it concerns a measure of policy, not, What is just? What is for the public good? but, What can the majority be induced to support?

"Now, as men, as friends to good morals, we cannot assent to a doctrine which not only has this tendency, but which declares this tendency legitimate. That it does have this tendency needs not to be proved. Every body knows it, and not a few lament it. Not long since it was gravely argued by a leading politician, in a Fourth of July oration, that Massachusetts ought to give Mr. Van Buren her votes for the Presidency, because, if she did not, she would array herself against her sister States, and be compelled to stand alone, as the orator said with a sneer, 'in solitary grandeur.' In the access of his party fever, it did not occur to him that Massachusetts was in duty bound, whether her sister States were with her or against her, to oppose Mr. Van Buren, if she disliked him as a man, or distrusted his principles as a politician or a statesman. Many good reasons, doubtless, might have been alleged why Massachusetts ought to have voted for Mr. Van Buren, but the orator would have been puzzled to select one less conclusive, or more directly in the face and eyes of all sound morals, than the one he adduced. The man who deserves to be called a statesman never appeals to low or demoralizing motives, and he scorns to carry even a good measure by unworthy means. There is within every man, who can lay any claim to correct moral feeling, that which looks with contempt on the puny creature who makes the opinions of the majority his rule of action. He who wants the moral courage to stand up 'in solitary grandeur,' like Socrates in face of the Thirty Tyrants, and

demand that right be respected, that justice be done, is unfit to be called a statesman, or even a man. A man has no business with what the majority think, will, say, do, or will approve; if he will be a man, and maintain the rights and dignity of manhood, his sole business is to inquire what truth and justice, wisdom and virtue, demand at his hands, and to do it, whether the world be with him or against him, — to do it, whether he stand alone 'in solitary grandeur,' or be huzzaed by the crowd, loaded with honors, held up as one whom the young must aspire to imitate, or be sneered at as singular, branded as a 'seditious fellow,' or crucified between two thieves. Away, then, with your demoralizing and debasing notion of appealing to a majority of voices! Dare be a man, dare be yourself, to speak and act according to your own solemn convictions, and in obedience to the voice of God calling out to you from the depths of your own being. Professions of freedom, of love of liberty, of devotion to her cause, are mere wind, when there wants the power to live and to die in defence of what one's own heart tells him is just and true. A free government is a mockery, a solemn farce, where every man feels himself bound to consult and to conform to the opinions and will of an irresponsible majority. Free minds, free hearts, free souls, are the materials, and the only materials, out of which free governments are constructed. And is he free in mind, heart, soul, body, or limb, he who feels himself bound to the triumphal car of the majority, to be dragged whither its drivers please? Is he the man to speak out the lessons of truth and wisdom when most they are needed, to stand by the right when all are gone out of the way, to plead for the wronged and down-trodden when all are dumb, he who owns the absolute right of the majority to govern?

"Sovereignty is not in the will of the people, nor in the will of the majority. Every man feels that the people are not ultimate, are not the highest, that they do not make the right or the wrong, and that the people as a state, as well as the people as individuals, are under law, accountable to a higher authority than theirs. What is this Higher than the people? The king? Not he whom men dignify with the royal title. Every man, by the fact that he is a man, is an accountable being. Every man feels that he owes allegiance to some authority above him. The man whom men call a king is a man, and, inasmuch as he is a man, he must be an accountable being, must himself be under law, and therefore cannot be the highest, the ultimate, and of course not the true sovereign. His will is not in itself law. Then he is not in himself a sovereign. Whatever authority he may possess is derived, and that from which he derives his authority, and not he, in the last analysis, is the true sovereign. If he derive it from the people, then the people, not he, is the sovereign; if from God, then God, not he, is the sovereign.

Are the aristocracy the sovereign? If so, annihilate the aristocracy, and men will be loosed from all restraint, released from all obligation, and there will be for them neither right nor wrong. Nobody can admit that right and wrong owe their existence to the aristocracy. Moreover, the aristocracy are men, and, as men, they are in the same predicament with all other men. They are themselves under law, accountable, and therefore not sovereign in their own right. If we say they are above the people, they are placed there by some power which is also above them, and that, not they, is the sovereign.

“But if neither people, nor kings, nor aristocracy are sovereign, who or what is? What is the answer which every man, when he reflects as a moralist, gives to the question, Why ought I to do this or that particular thing? Does he say, Because the king commands it, — the aristocracy enjoin it, — the people ordain it, — the majority wills it? No. He says, if he be true to his higher convictions, Because it is right, because it is just. Every man feels that he has a right to do whatever is just, and that it is his duty to do it. Whatever he feels to be just he feels to be legitimate, to be law, to be morally obligatory. Whatever is unjust he feels to be illegitimate, to be without obligation, and to be that which it is not disloyalty to resist. The absolutist, he who contends for unqualified submission on the part of the people to the monarch, thunders, therefore, in the ears of the absolute monarch himself, that he is bound to be just; and the aristocrat assures his order that its highest nobility is derived from its obedience to justice; and does not the democrat, too, even while he proclaims the sovereignty of the people, tell this same sovereign people to be just? In all this, witness is borne to an authority above the individual, above kings, nobilities, and people, and to the fact, too, that the absolute sovereign is justice. Justice is, then, the sovereign, the sovereign of sovereigns, the king of kings, lord of lords, the supreme law of the people, and of the individual.

“This doctrine teaches that the people, as a state, are as much bound to be just as is the individual. By bounding the state by justice, we declare it limited, we deny its absolute sovereignty, and therefore save the individual from absolute slavery. The individual may on this ground arrest the action of the state, by alleging that it is proceeding unjustly; and the minority has a moral force with which to oppose the physical force of the majority. By this there is laid in the state the foundation of liberty; liberty is acknowledged as a right, whether it be possessed as a fact or not.

“A more formal refutation of the sovereignty of the people, or vindication of the sovereignty of justice, is not needed. In point of fact, there are none who mean to set up the sovereignty of the peo-

ple above the sovereignty of justice. All, we believe, when the question is presented as we have presented it, will and do admit that justice is supreme, though very few seem to have been aware of the consequences which result from such an admission. The sovereignty of justice, in all cases whatsoever, is what we understand by the doctrine of democracy. True democracy is not merely the denial of the absolute sovereignty of the king, and that of the nobility, and the assertion of that of the people; but it is properly the denial of the absolute sovereignty of the state, whatever the form of government adopted as the agent of the state, and the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of justice.

"Sovereignty may be taken either absolutely or relatively. When taken absolutely, as we have thus far taken it, and as it ought always to be taken, especially in a free government, it means, as we have defined it, the highest, that which is ultimate, which has the right to command what it will, and which to resist is crime. Thus defined, it is certain that neither people, nor kings, nor aristocracies, are sovereign, for they are all under law, and accountable to an authority which is not theirs, but which is above them and independent of them.

"When taken relatively, as it usually is by writers on government, it means the state, or the highest civil or political power of the state. The state, we have seen, is not absolute. It is not an independent sovereign. It is not, then, in strictness, a sovereign at all. Its enactments are not in and of themselves laws, and cannot be laws, unless they receive the signature of absolute justice. If that signature be withheld, they are null and void from the beginning. Nevertheless, social order, which is the indispensable condition of the very existence of the community, demands the creation of a government, and that the government should be clothed with the authority necessary for the maintenance of order. That portion of sovereignty necessary for this end, and, if you please, for the promotion of the common weal, justice delegates to the state. This portion of delegated sovereignty is what is commonly meant by sovereignty. This sovereignty is necessarily limited to certain specific objects, and can be no greater than is needed for those objects. If the state stretch its authority beyond those objects, it becomes a usurper, and the individual is not bound to obey, but may lawfully resist it, as he may lawfully resist any species of injustice, — taking care, however, that the manner of his resistance be neither unjust in itself, nor inconsistent with social order. For instance, the state assumes the authority to allow a man to be seized and held as property; the man may undoubtedly assert his liberty, his rights as a man, and endeavour to regain them; but he may not, in doing this, deny or infringe any of the just rights of him who may have deemed himself his master or owner." — pp. 37 – 45.

When we wrote this, we enjoyed the reputation of being one of the stanchest friends of liberty and the most ultra radicals in the country, — a fact which we commend to those of our former friends who are now so ready to represent us as having gone over to the side of despotism. We should not now call the doctrine of the extract Democracy, as we did when we wrote it, nor should we use certain locutions, to be detected here and there in the extract, dictated by an erroneous theology ; but the doctrine itself is our present doctrine, as clearly and as energetically expressed as we could now express it. It seems to us to contain an unanswerable refutation of the popular democratic principle, and a triumphant vindication of the sovereignty of justice, — therefore, of the divine origin and right of government ; for justice, in the sense the writer uses it, is identical with God, who alone is absolute, immutable, eternal, and sovereign Justice.

The purpose of the writer was evidently to obtain a solid foundation for individual freedom. If he, in order to do this, found and proved it necessary to assert the divine origin and right of government, to rise above the sovereignty of kings, of nobles, and even of the people, to the eternal and underived sovereignty of God, King of kings, and Lord of lords, how should we suspect ourselves of being hostile to liberty, when asserting the same doctrine in defence of the rights of government ? Having for years proved the doctrine to be favorable to liberty, how could we believe the public would be so unjust to us as to accuse us of favoring despotism, because we undertook to prove it equally favorable to civil government ? Why are we to be classed as hostile to freedom, because we defend in the interests of authority the doctrine which we have uniformly asserted as the only solid foundation of freedom ? Whether we are right or wrong in the doctrine itself, or in its application, would it be any remarkable stretch of charity to give us credit for believing ourselves no less favorable to liberty in bringing the doctrine out in defence of authority, than we were in bringing it out in defence of the rights of the subject ? Are liberty and authority necessarily incompatible one with the other ? Or is it a blunder to derive both from the same source, and to suppose that what establishes the legitimacy of authority must needs establish also the legitimacy of liberty ?

But is the doctrine of the divine origin and right of government hostile to liberty ? If government derives its existence and its right from God, it can have no power but such as God

delegates to it. But God is just, justice itself, and therefore can delegate to the government no power to do what is not just. Consequently, whenever a government exercises an unjust power, or its powers unjustly, it exceeds its delegated powers, and is a usurper, a tyrant, and as such forfeits its right to command. Its acts are lawless, because contrary to justice, and do not bind the subject, because he can be bound only by the law. If they do not bind, they are null, and the attempt to enforce obedience to them may be resisted. Is it difficult, then, to understand, that, while the doctrine asserts the obligation in conscience of obedience to legitimate authority, to the government as long as it does not command any thing unjust, it condemns all illegal authority, and deprives the government of its right to exact obedience the moment it ceases to be just? What is there in this hostile to liberty? Is my liberty abridged when I am required to obey justice? If so, be good enough to tell me whence I obtain the right to do wrong.

Modern politicians assert, in opposition to the sovereignty of God, the sovereignty of the people. The will of the people is with them the ultimate authority. Is it they or we who are the truest friends of liberty? Liberty cannot be conceived without justice, and wherever there is justice there is liberty. Liberty, then, must be secured just in proportion as we secure the reign of justice. This is done in proportion to the guaranties we have that the will which rules shall be a just will. Is there any one who will venture to institute a comparison between the will of the people and the will of God? No one? Then who can pretend that the doctrine which makes the will of the people the sovereign is as favorable to liberty as the doctrine which makes the will of God the sovereign? The will of God is always just, because the Divine will is never separable from the Divine reason; but the will of the people may be, and often is, unjust, for it is separable from that reason, the only fountain of justice. We make the government a government of law, because we found it on will and reason; these modern politicians make it one of mere will, for they have no assurance that the will of the people will always be informed by reason. By what right, then, do they who maintain the very essence of despotism charge us with being hostile to liberty? Wherefore should we not, as we do, denounce them as the enemies, nay, the assassins of liberty, — men who salute her, and at the same instant smite her under the fifth rib?

But, it is gravely argued, if you deny the popular origin and

right of government, you are a monarchist or an aristocrat. We deny the conclusion. If people would pay a little attention to what we actually say, before conjuring up their objections, they would, perhaps, reason less illogically. We raise no question between the sovereignty of kings and nobles and that of the people. What we deny is the *human* origin and right of government. We deny all undelegated sovereignty on earth, whether predicated of the king, the nobility, or the people. The question we are discussing lies a little deeper and a little farther back than our modern politicians are aware. They are political atheists, and recognize for the state no power above the people ; we are Christians, and hold that all power, that is, all legal authority, is from God ; therefore we deny that kings, nobilities, or the people have any authority in their own right, and maintain that the state itself, however constituted, has only a delegated authority, and no underived sovereignty. They place the people back of the state, and maintain that it derives all its powers from the people, and is therefore bound to do their will ; we tell them that the people themselves are not ultimate, — have no power to delegate, except the power which Almighty God delegates to them, and this power they, as trustees, are bound to exercise according to his will, and are, therefore, not free to exercise it according to their own. They are desirous mainly of getting rid of kings and nobles, and, to do so, they assert the sovereignty of the popular will ; we wish to get rid of despotism and to guard against all unjust government, and we assert the sovereignty of God over kings, nobles, and people, as well as over simple private consciences. Is this unintelligible ? Who, then, is the party hostile to liberty ?

But, reply these same politicians, we do not mean to deny the sovereignty of God ; we only mean that the authority he delegates is delegated to the people, and not to the king or the nobility. If by people you understand the people as the nation with its political faculties and organs, and not the people as mere isolated individuals, who disputes you ? Who denies that kings and nobilities hold their powers, if not from, at least for, the people, and forfeit them the moment they refuse to exercise them for the common good of the people ? What are you dreaming of ? Do you suppose all men have lost their senses because you have lost yours ? Who born and brought up under a republic, who acquainted with and embracing the teachings of Catholic theologians, is likely to hold the slavish

doctrine, that the people are for the government, not the government for the people? Do you suppose that the republican and Catholic advocate the divine right of kings, and passive obedience, — the invention of Protestant divines, set forth and defended by that pedantic Scotchman, the so-called English Solomon? Who that has meditated on the saying of our Blessed Lord, "Let him that would be greatest among you be your servant," can hold that a prince receives power, or has any right to power, but for the public good? We do not deny the responsibility of kings and nobles to the nation, or that the nation may, under certain circumstances, and observing certain forms, call them to an account of their stewardship. But if this removes your objections to our doctrine, it by no means removes ours to yours. We complain of you, not because you make princes responsible to the people, that is, to the nation, but because you leave the people irresponsible, and make them subject to no law but their own will. You simply transfer the despotism from the one or the few to the many, and deny liberty by resting in the arbitrary will of the people. You stop with the people, and, if you do not deny, you at least fail to assert, the sovereignty of God; you tell them their will is sovereign, without adding that they have only a delegated sovereignty, and are bound to exercise it in strict accordance with and obedience to the will of God. Here is your original sin. On your ground, no provision is made for liberty, none for resistance to tyranny, without resorting to the revolutionary principle, the pretended right to resist legitimate government, a contradiction in terms, and alike hostile to liberty and to authority. On our ground, the right to resist tyranny or oppression is secured without detriment to legitimate government; because the prince who transgresses his authority and betrays his trust forfeits his rights, and having lost his rights, he ceases to be sacred and inviolable.

But we are told, once more, that practically it can make no difference whether we say the will of God is sovereign, or the will of the people; for the will of the people is the true expression of the will of God, according to the maxim, *Vox populi, vox Dei*. We deny it. The will of God is eternal and immutable justice, which the will of the people is not. The people may and do often actually do wrong. We have no more confidence in the assertion, "The people can do no wrong," than we have in its brother fiction, "The king can do no wrong." The people must be taken either as individuals or

as the state. As individuals, they certainly are neither infallible nor impeccable. As the state, they are only the aggregate of individuals. And are we to be told, that from an aggregation of fallibles we can obtain infallibility? Show us a promise from Almighty God, made to the people in one capacity or the other, that he will preserve them from error and injustice, before you talk to us of their infallibility. The people in their collective capacity, that is, the state popularly constituted, never surpass the general average of the wisdom and virtue of the same people taken individually; and as this falls infinitely below infallibility, let us hear no more of the infallibility of the people. For very shame's sake, after denying, as most of you do, the possibility of an infallible Church immediately constituted and assisted by Infinite Wisdom, do not stultify yourselves by coming forward now to assert the infallibility of the people. If the people are infallible, what need of constitutions to protect minorities, and of contrivances for the security of individual liberty, which even we in our land of universal suffrage find to be indispensable?

But we return to our original position. All power is of God. By him kings reign and princes decree just things. Government is a sacred trust from him, to be exercised according to his will, for the public good. The government which he in his providence has instituted for a people, and which confines itself to its delegated powers, for the true end of government, is legitimate government, whatever its form, and cannot be resisted without sin. But the government which is arbitrarily imposed upon a people, or which betrays its trust, or usurps powers seriously to the injury of its subjects, is illegitimate, and has no claim to our allegiance. Such a government may be lawfully resisted, and sometimes to resist it becomes an imperative duty.

But who is to decide whether the actual government has transcended its powers, and whether the case has occurred when we are permitted or bound to resist it? This is a grave question, because, if the fact of illegitimacy be not established by some competent authority, they who resist run the hazard of resisting legitimate government, and of ruining both their own souls and their country. Evidently the individual is not to decide for himself by his own private judgment; for that would leave every one free to resist the government whenever he should choose, which would be whenever it should command any thing not to his liking. If he had the right thus to

resist, the government would have no right to coerce his obedience, and there would be an end of all government. Evidently, again, not the people, for we must take the people either as the state, or as outside of the state. Outside of the state they are simple individuals, and, as we have seen, have not, and cannot have, the right to decide. As the state, they have no faculties and no organs but the government which is to be judged, and therefore can neither form nor express a judgment. Who, then? Evidently the power whose function it is to declare the law of God. Since the government derives its authority from God, and is amenable to his law, evidently it can be tried only under that law, and before a court which has authority to declare it, and to pronounce judgment accordingly.

But what shall be done in case there be no such court of competent jurisdiction? We reject the supposition. Almighty God could never give a law without instituting a court to declare it, and to judge of its infractions. We, as Catholics, know what and where that court is, and therefore cannot be embarrassed by the question. If there are nations who have no such court, or who refuse to recognize the one Almighty God has established, that is their affair, not ours, and they, not we, are responsible for the embarrassments to which they are subjected. They, undoubtedly, are obliged either to assert passive obedience and non-resistance, or to deny the legitimacy of any government by asserting the right of revolution; that is, they have no alternative but anarchy or despotism, as their history proves. But this is not our fault. We are not aware that we are obliged to exclude God and his Church from our politics in order to accommodate ourselves to those who blaspheme the one and revile the other. We are not aware that we are obliged to renounce our reason, and reject the lessons of experience, because, if we admit them, they prove that Almighty God has made his Church essential to the maintenance of civil authority on the one hand, and of civil liberty on the other, — because they prove that the state can succeed no better than the individual, without religion. We have never supposed that a man could be a Christian and exclude God from the state, and we have no disposition to concede, or to undertake to prove, that he can be. If the Church is necessary as a teacher of piety and morals, she must be necessary to decide the moral questions which arise between prince and prince, and between prince and subject, and to maintain the contrary is only to contradict one's self. Politics are nothing but a branch of gen-

eral ethics, and ethics are simply practical theology. If there is any recognized authority in theology, that authority must have jurisdiction of every ethical question, that is, every question which involves considerations of right and wrong, in whatever department of life they may arise. You may fight against this as you please, but you cannot change the unalterable nature of things. It is useless as well as hard to kick against the pricks. The question of resistance, as we have shown in the preceding article, presents a case of conscience, a moral question, and as such belongs by its very nature to the spiritual order, and then necessarily falls under the jurisdiction of the legitimate representative of that order. All the great principles of politics and law are ethical, and treated as such by both Catholic and Protestant theologians. How, then, can we dispense with the agency of the Church in politics, any more than in private morals or in faith itself? And are we to forego civil government, are we to submit passively to tyrants, or to rush into anarchy, because the madness or blindness of others leaves them no other alternative? Must we reject or refrain from using the infallible means which we possess for determining what is the law of God, because others discard them and attempt to get on without them? Must we strip ourselves and run naked through the streets, because some of our brethren obstinately persist in being Adamites? Really, this were asking too much of us.

But let no one be frightened out of his propriety, for we really say no more for our Church than every sectarian claims for his sect, — no more in principle than was claimed last year by the Presbyterians, when they officially condemned the Mexican war, or by the Unitarians, when, as officially as was possible with their organization, or want of organization, they did the same. The Church, in the case we have supposed, decides only the morality or immorality of the act done or proposed to be done. And is there a Protestant who belongs to what is called a church who does not take his church as his moral teacher? When Philip of Hesse found his wife unsatisfactory to him, and wished to take unto himself another, did he not submit the question to Luther and the pastors of the new religion? What are your Protestant ministers, if not, in your estimation, among other things, teachers of morals? And in case of doubt, to whom would you apply for its resolution but to your church, such as it is? Do you say you would not? To whom, then? To your politicians? What! do you

regard politicians as safer moral guides than your pastors ? To the state ? So you hold the state more competent to decide questions of morals than your church ! But the state is the party accused ; would you suffer it to be judge in its own cause ? Then you are at its mercy, and are a slave. Trust your own judgment ? But you are a party interested, and what right have you to be judge in your own cause ?

The fact is, every man who admits religion at all must admit its jurisdiction over all moral questions, whether in their individual or in their social application, and therefore does and must defer in them to that authority which represents for him the spiritual order. The state has no commission as a teacher of morals or as a director of consciences, and unless you blend church and state, and absorb the spiritual in the temporal, you cannot claim authority for the state in any strictly moral question. The theory of our own institutions is the utter incompetency of the state in spirituals. But spirituals include necessarily every question of right and wrong, whether under the natural law or the revealed law, — a fact too often overlooked, and not sufficiently considered by some even of our nominally Catholic politicians and newspaper-writers and editors. If this be so, the legitimate province of the state is restricted to matters which pertain to human prudence and social economy. Within the limits of the law of God, that is, providing it violate no precept of the natural or revealed law, it is, as we have said in our reply to Mr. Thornwell, independent and free to pursue the policy which human wisdom and prudence suggest as best adapted to secure the public good. To give it a wider province would be to claim for it a portion at least of that very authority which Protestants make it an offence in us to claim even for the Church of God. We claim here no temporal authority for the Church, but we do claim, and shall, as long as we retain our reason, continue to claim for her, under God, supreme and exclusive jurisdiction over all questions which pertain to the spiritual order.

The conservative doctrine which we have contended for, and which does not happen to please some of our readers, follows necessarily from this doctrine of the divine origin and right of government. No one particular form of government exists by divine right for every people, but every form so exists for the particular nation of which it is the established order. The established order, the constitution of the state, which God in his providence has given to a particular people, which is

coeval with that people, has grown up with it, and is identified with its whole public life, is the legitimate order, the legal constitution, and therefore sacred and inviolable. If sacred and inviolable, it must be preserved, and no changes or innovations, under the name of progress or reform, that would abolish or essentially alter it, or that would in any degree impair its free, vigorous, and healthy action, can be tolerated.

This is the doctrine we have maintained, and this is asserted to be hostile to liberty and favorable to despotism. However this may be, the doctrine is not a recent doctrine with us, not one which we have embraced for the first time since our conversion to Catholicity. We held and publicly maintained it during that period of our life when we were regarded as a liberalist, and denounced by our countrymen as a radical, a leveller, and a disorganizer. Thus, in October, 1838, we oppose it to the mad proceedings of the Abolitionists, and maintain that it is a sufficient reason for condemning those proceedings, that they are unconstitutional and revolutionary.

“ We would acquit the Abolitionists, also, of all wish to change fundamentally the character of our institutions. They are not, at least the honest part of them, politicians ; but very simple-minded men and women, who crave excitement, and seek it in Abolition meetings, and in getting up Abolition societies and petitions, instead of seeking it in ball-rooms, theatres, or places of fashionable amusement or dissipation. Politics, properly speaking, they abominate, because politics would require them to think, and they wish only to feel. Doubtless some of them are moved by generous sympathies, and a real regard for the well-being of the Negro ; but the principal moving cause of their proceedings, after the craving for excitement, and perhaps notoriety, is the feeling that slavery is a national disgrace. Now this feeling, as we have shown, proceeds from a misconception of the real character of our institutions. This feeling can be justified only on the supposition that we are a consolidated republic. Its existence is therefore a proof, that, whatever be the conscious motives in the main of the Abolitionists, their proceedings strike against our Federal system.

“ Well, what if they do ? replies the Abolitionist. If Federalism, or the doctrine of State sovereignty, which you say is the American system of politics, prohibits us from laboring to free the slave, then down with it. Any system of government, any political relations, which prevent me from laboring to break the yoke of the oppressor and to set the captive free, is a wicked system, and ought to be destroyed. God disowns it, Christ disowns it, and man ought to disown it. If consolidation, if centralization, be the order that enables us to free the slave, then give us consolidation, give us

centralization. It is the true doctrine. It enables one to plead for the slave. The slave is crushed under his master's foot; the slave is dying; I see nothing but the slave; I hear nothing but the slave's cries for deliverance. Away with your paper barriers! away with your idle prating about State rights! clear the way! let me run to the slave! Any thing that frees the slave is right, is owned by God.

"We express here the sentiment and use very nearly the language of the Abolitionists. They have no respect for government as such. They, indeed, are fast adopting the ultra-radical doctrine, that all government is founded in usurpation, and is an evil which all true Christians must labor to abolish. They have, at least some of them, nominated Jesus Christ to be President of the United States; as much as to say, in the only practical sense to be given the nomination, that there shall be no President of the United States but an idea, and an idea without any visible embodiment; which is merely contending, in other words, that there shall be no visible government, no political institutions whatever. They have fixed their minds on a given object, and, finding that the political institutions of the country and the laws of the land are against them, they deny the legitimacy of all laws and of all political institutions. Let them carry their doctrines out, and it is easy to see that a most radical revolution in the institutions of the country must be the result.

"Now, we ask, has a revolution become necessary? Is it no longer possible to labor for the progress of Humanity in this country, without changing entirely the character of our political institutions? Must we change our Federal system, destroy the existing relations between the States and the Union and between the States themselves? Nay, must we destroy all outward, visible government, abolish all laws, and leave the community in the state in which the Jews were, when 'there was no king in Israel, and every man did that which was right in his own eyes'? We put these questions in soberness, and with a deep feeling of their magnitude. The Abolition ranks are full of insane dreamers, and fuller yet of men and women ready to undertake to realize any dream, however insane, and at any expense. We ask, therefore, these questions with solemnity, and with fearful forebodings for our country. We rarely fear, we rarely tremble at the prospect of evil to come. The habitual state of our own mind is that of serene trust in the future; and if in this respect we are thought to have a fault, it is in being too sanguine, in hoping too much. But we confess, the proceedings of the Abolitionists, coupled with their vague speculations and their crude notions, do fill us with lively alarm, and make us apprehend danger to our beloved country. We beg, in the name of God and of man, the Aboli-

tionists to pause, and if they love liberty, ask themselves what liberty has, in the long run, to gain by overthrowing the system of government we have established, by effecting a revolution in the very foundation of our Federal system.

"For ourselves, we have accepted with our whole heart the political system adopted by our fathers. . . . We take the American political system as our starting-point, as our primitive data, and we repulse whatever is repugnant to it, and accept, demand, whatever is essential to its preservation. We take our stand on the Idea of our institutions, and labor with all our soul to realize and develop it. As a lover of our race, as the devoted friend of liberty, of the progress of mankind, we feel that we must, in this country, be *conservative*, not *radical*. If we demand the elevation of labor and the laboring classes, we do it only in accordance with our institutions and for the purpose of preserving them, by removing all discrepancy between their spirit and the social habits and condition of the people on whom they are to act and to whose keeping they are intrusted. We demand reform only for the purpose of preserving American institutions in their real character; and we can tolerate no changes, no innovations, no alleged improvements, not introduced in strict accordance with the relations which do subsist between the States and the Union and between the States themselves. Here is our political creed. More power in the Federal government than was given it by the Convention which framed the Constitution would be dangerous to the States, and with less power the Federal government would not be able to subsist. We take it, then, as it is. The fact, that any given measure is necessary to preserve it as it is, is a sufficient reason for adopting that measure; the fact, that a given measure is opposed to it as it is, and has a tendency to increase or diminish its power, is a sufficient reason for rejecting that measure." — *The Boston Quarterly Review*, 1838, Vol. i. pp. 492 – 495.

The same doctrine we had inculcated in the *Review* for the previous July of the same year.

"Our government, in its measures and practical character, should conform as strictly as possible to the ideal or theory of our institutions. Nobody, we trust, is prepared for a revolution; nobody, we also trust, is bold enough to avow a wish to depart very widely from the fundamental principles of our institutions; and everybody will admit that the statesman should study to preserve those institutions in their simplicity and integrity, and should seek, in every law or measure he proposes, merely to bring out their practical worth, and secure the ends for which they were established. Their spirit should dictate every legislative enactment, every judicial decision, and every executive measure. Any law

not in harmony with their genius, any measure which would be likely to disturb the nicely adjusted balance of their respective powers, or that would give them, in their practical operation, a character essentially different from the one they were originally intended to have, should be discountenanced, and never for a single moment entertained.

"We would not be understood to be absolutely opposed to all innovations or changes, whatever their character. It is true, we can never consent to disturb the settled order of a state, without strong and urgent reasons ; but we can conceive of cases in which we should deem it our duty to demand a revolution. When a government has outlived its idea, and the institutions of a country no longer bear any relation to the prevailing habits, thoughts, and sentiments of the people, and have become a mere dead carcass, an encumbrance, an offence, we can call loudly for a revolution, and behold with comparative coolness its terrible doings. But such a case does not as yet present itself here. Our institutions are all young, full of life and the future. Here, we cannot be revolutionists. Here, we can tolerate no innovations, no changes, which touch fundamental laws. None are admissible but such as are needed to preserve our institutions in their original character, to bring out their concealed beauty, to clear the field for their free operation, and to give more directness and force to their legitimate activity. Every measure must be in harmony with them, grow, as it were, out of them, and be but a development of their fundamental laws." — Vol. i. pp. 334, 335.

Undoubtedly, we here recognize a case in which a revolution would be justifiable ; but not a case in which it would be lawful to subvert the constitution ; for the case supposed is one in which the constitution has already been subverted, — ceased to be living and operative. The doctrine is nowise different from our present doctrine on the subject, only what we called revolution then we should call by another name now. The movements of a people to depose the tyrant, to throw off the illegitimate and to restore the legitimate authority, are not a revolution in the sense in which we deny the right of revolution. It is essential to our idea of a revolution, that it should involve, in some respect, an effort or intention to subvert the legal authority of a state. If, for instance, it be conceded that Ireland is an integral part of the British empire, or rather, of the British state, an effort on the part of Irishmen to sever her from the British state, and erect her into an independent nation, would be revolutionary and unjustifiable. But if it be conceded that she is a separate state, that she has never

been merged in the British state, and has been bound to it only by a mutual compact, and if it be conceded or established that England has broken the compact or not complied with its conditions, a like effort at separation and independence would involve no revolutionary principle, and, if prudent or expedient, would be justifiable, even though it should lead to a fearful and protracted war between the two nations.

It is clear, however, from these extracts, that, as long ago as 1838, we were, in relation to our own country, decidedly conservative. Here is another extract from the same Review, for October, 1841, which proves that we, while still regarded as a radical, generalized it and extended it to all countries.

“In this matter of world-reforming, it is our misfortune to disagree with our radical brethren. The reforms which can be introduced into any one country are predetermined by its geographical position, the productions of its soil, and the genius of its people and of its existing institutions. Any reform which requires the introduction or the destruction of a fundamental element is precluded. All reforms must consist in, and be restricted to, clearing away anomalies and developing already admitted principles.” — Vol. IV. p. 532.

Here is the conservative doctrine stated as broadly and as distinctly as we state it now, and we could easily show that we entertained it at a much earlier date. Doubtless there are many things to be found in *The Boston Quarterly Review* not easily reconcilable with this doctrine; for we had not, at the time of conducting it, reduced all our ideas to a systematic and harmonious whole. Moreover, we wrote with less care than we do now; for we wrote more for the purpose of exciting thought than of establishing conclusions. But the discrepancies to be detected are in general more apparent than real; for we, unhappily, adopted the practice of using popular terms in an unpopular sense, which often gave us the appearance of advocating doctrines we by no means intended. Thus, we adopted the word *democracy*, but defined it in a sense of our own, very different from the popular sense. We did the same with many other terms. There was in this no intention to deceive. But we had a theory, — for in those times we were addicted to theorizing, — that the people used terms in a loose and vague sense, and that the business of the writer was to seize and define it, — to give in its precision what the people really mean by the term, if they could but explain their meaning to themselves. But we found by experience that we could not make

the people attend to our definitions, and that they would, in spite of them, continue to use the popular term in its popular sense, and that, if we wished to express another sense, or the same sense somewhat modified, we must select another term. The mistake we fell into is fallen into by many who are not so fortunate as to detect it. Some of our friends have tried to find fault with our views on liberty, when their own views were the same as ours. They use the word *liberty* in relations in which we avoid it ; but they, in using it, fail to convey their real meaning. The popular mind understands by liberty something very different from what they do. It is necessary to select terms with a view of denying what we do not mean, as well as of expressing what we do mean. Many of the inconsistencies we have been charged with have grown out of our former neglect of this rule, and not a few of the changes we are supposed to have undergone are really nothing but changes in our terminology, made for the purpose of getting our real meaning out to public apprehension. But this by the way. Versatile as we may have been, we have always had certain fixed principles, and what they were may be known by noting what we have cast off in our advance towards manhood, and what we have retained and still retain. The conservative principle is evidently one of these, and as we undeniably held it when nobody dreamed of charging us with hostility to liberty, we cannot see why our holding it now should be construed into proof that we are on the side of despotism.

But let us look at the doctrine itself. People hold it objectionable, because they suppose it commands us to preserve old abuses and forbids us to labor for the progress of civilization. But in this they assume two things : — 1. That the legitimate constitution of a state is, or may be, an abuse ; and, 2. That the progress of civilization is denied, if the right to subvert the constitution is denied.

The first involves a contradiction in terms. Nothing legal or legitimate is or can be an abuse. An abuse is a misuse of that which is legal. The abuse is always contrary to the constitution, or at least some departure from it ; and consequently conservatism, or the preservation of the constitution, instead of requiring us to conserve the abuse, imperatively commands us to redress it ; because, if not redressed, it may in time undermine and destroy the constitution itself.

The second is equally unfounded. The destruction of the constitution is the destruction of the state itself, its resolution

into anarchy or despotism, either of which is fatal to civilization. What should we think of the physician who should undertake to restore a man to health, or to increase his soundness and vigor, by destroying his constitution? What we should think of him is precisely what we ought to think of the statesman who seeks to advance civilization by subverting the constitution of the state. The progress of civilization is inconceivable without the progress of the state, and the progress of the state is inconceivable without the existence of the state. How, then, can the subversion, that is, the destruction, of the state tend to advance civilization? If you will listen either to common sense or to the lessons of experience, you will grant that revolutions tend only to throw men into barbarism and savagism. The passions they call forth are the lowest, fiercest, and most brutal of our nature, and your patriot so called, he who seeks to advance his country by destroying its constitution, is usually a tiger for his ferocity.

But it is said that the existing constitution is destroyed only in order to make way for a new and better organization of the state. When you have shown us an instance, in the whole history of the world, in which the destruction of an existing constitution of a state has been followed by the introduction and adoption of a new and better one, — better for the particular nation, we mean, — we will give up the point, acknowledge that we have been in this whole matter consummate fools, and become as mad revolutionists as the best of you. But such an instance cannot be found. How often must we tell you that a constitution cannot be made as one makes a wheelbarrow or a steam-engine, — that of the constitution we must say, as we say of the poet, “*Nascitur, non fit*”? It is generated, not constructed, and no human wisdom can give to a state its constitution. The experiment has often been tried, and has just as often failed. Shaftesbury and Locke tried it for the Carolinas. They failed. France tried it in her old revolution; she is trying it again. Her former experiment resulted in anarchy, military despotism, and the restoration; her present experiment in four short months has reached the military despotism. England has tried it, and sent out from her mills at home, along with her other manufactures, a constitution cut and dried for each of her colonies, and in what instance has the constitution not proved a curse to the colony for which it was made and on which it has been imposed? Who are these men who now come forward and ask us to credit them in spite

of philosophy, of common sense, uniform experience, and experiment? Surely they must be prodigies of modesty, or else count largely on our simplicity and credulity.

But we are referred to our own country, to the American Revolution. Be it so. In reply, we might refer to the Spanish American revolutions, as a case much more in point. But our own country is the case on which the modern revolutionists chiefly rely for their justification. We do not contest the right of the Anglo-American colonies to separate from the mother country; we are not the men to condemn the Congress of 1776; and we cheerfully concede the prosperity which has followed the separation. But what is called the American Revolution was no revolution in the sense in which we deny the right of revolution, and in it there was no subversion of the state, no destruction of the existing constitution, and no assertion of the right to destroy it. The colonies were held by compact to the crown of Great Britain. The tyranny of George the Third broke that compact, and absolved the colonies from their allegiance. Absolved from their allegiance to the crown, they were, *ipso facto*, sovereign states, and the war which followed was simply a war in defence of their independence as such states. No abuse of terms can convert such a war into a revolutionary war. Then there was no civil revolution. The internal state of the colonies was not dissolved, and there was no war on the constitution of the American states. They retained substantially the very political constitutions with which they commenced, and retain them up to this moment. We have never undergone a revolution in any sense like the European revolutions which have followed since the war of our independence. Slight alterations have from time to time been, wisely or unwisely, effected in the State constitutions, but none which have struck at essential principles.

Nor was the formation of our Federal Constitution any thing like what the French National Assembly are attempting. It was similar in its character to what the German Diet at Frankfort have just done, or are still engaged in doing. It was not making and giving a constitution to a people who had just overthrown an old government, destroyed the old constitution, and resolved the state into its original elements, but was the act of free, sovereign states, already constituted, and exercising all the faculties of sovereign states. Here are vast differences, which are too often overlooked, and which should prevent our conduct in throwing off the crown of Great Britain and forming

the Federal Union from being regarded as a precedent for those who would destroy an existing constitution for the purpose of reorganizing the state. We never did any thing of the sort, and from the fact that the result of what we did do has been great national prosperity it cannot be inferred that such will be the result of révolutions in the European states. Revolutionists both at home and abroad, especially abroad, do not sufficiently consider the wide difference between colonies already existing as bodies politic, exercising nearly all the functions of government, separating themselves politically, under the authority of their local governments, from the mother country, and setting up for themselves, and the insurrection of the mob against the existing constitution, destroying it, and attempting to replace it by one of their own making. We were children come to our majority, leaving our father's house to become heads of establishments of our own ; the revolutionists are parricides, who knock their aged parent in the head or cut his throat in order to possess themselves of the homestead.

But however this may be, it is clear that the doctrine we put forth is not favorable to despotism ; for despotism is as destructive of the legitimate constitution as revolutionism in favor of what is called Liberalism. Radicalism and despotism are only two phases of one and the same thing. Despotism is radicalism in place ; radicalism is despotism out of place. Both are unconstitutional, and to preserve the constitution requires us to oppose the one as much as the other. Liberty demands the supremacy of the law, and law is will regulated by reason, restrained by justice ; and to preserve law in this sense, we must resist every attempt, come it from what quarter it may, to substitute for it the government of arbitrary will.

Nobody denies the right to correct abuses. The doctrine we set forth not only concedes our right to correct abuses, but makes it, as we have seen, our duty to correct them. All that it forbids is our right to correct them by illegal, and therefore unjustifiable means. We must obey the law in correcting the abuses of the law, the constitution in repelling its enemies. This restriction is just, and good ends are never attainable by unjust means. Needs it be said again and again, that iniquity can never lead to justice, tyranny to liberty ? But observing this restriction, you may go as far as you please. The doctrine we contend for does not, indeed, allow you to change a legal monarchy into a democracy, nor a democracy, where it is the legal order, as with us, into a monarchy ; but it does

allow you to change the individuals intrusted with the administration of the government. Kings, as long as they reign justly, reign by divine right ; and in this sense, and in no other, we accept the doctrine of the divine right of kings ; but when they cease to reign justly, become tyrannical and oppressive, they forfeit their rights, and the authority reverts to the nation, to be exercised, however, in accordance with its fundamental constitution. The nation may depose the tyrant, even dispossess, for sufficient reasons, the reigning family, and call a new dynasty to the throne ; for no nation can be rightfully the property of a prince, or of a family, or bound to submit to eternal slavery. Thus far we go ; for we hold with the great Catholic authorities, that the king is not in reigning, but in reigning justly.

But we have said enough to vindicate our doctrine from the charge of being hostile to liberty and favorable to despotism. We yield to no man in our love of liberty, but we have always felt that just ends are more easily gained by just than by unjust means, and that the truth is much more effectually defended by arguments drawn from sound than from unsound principles. It is not that we are indifferent to liberty, but that we reject the grounds on which modern politicians defend it, and disapprove of the means by which they seek to secure it. We have shown that those grounds are untenable, and that those means are fitted only to defeat the end for which they are adopted. He who wants more than justice will give him what he cannot have without injustice to others. Our doctrine will satisfy no such man, and we should be satisfied with no doctrine that would. He who wishes for liberty without obedience to law wishes for what never has been and never can be. An authority which does not restrain, which is only an instrument to be used when it serves our purpose, and to be cast off the moment it can no longer serve it, is no legitimate authority, is not a government at all. If we have government, it must govern, and we must obey it, even when to obey it may be a restraint on our private feelings and passions, for it is only at this price that we can purchase immunity from the private feelings and passions of others. Nothing is, then, in reality more unwise than to cherish an impatience of restraint and a spirit of insubordination. The sooner we learn the difficult lesson of obedience, the better will it be for us. We cannot, if we would, have every thing our own way ; and perhaps it would not be to our advantage, if we could. Life has, and as long as the world

stands will have, its trials, and, however impatient we may be, there is and will be much which we can conquer only by learning to bear it. It is easy to stir up a revolution, to subvert a throne or a dynasty; but to reëstablish order, to readjust the relations of man with man, of prince with subject and subject with prince, so as to remove all evils and satisfy every wish, — this is labor, this is work, which no mortal man has ever yet been equal to. A man could lose paradise, bring sin, death, and all our woe into the world; only a God could repair the damage, and restore us to the heaven we had forfeited.

Our doctrine, just at this moment, may be unpopular, and we know it will put no money into our pocket, and bring us no applause; but this is not our fault, nor a reason why we should withhold it. Having never yet pandered to popular prejudices, or sought to derive profit from popular passions and fallacies, we shall not attempt to do it now. We love our country, perhaps, as much as some others who make much more parade of their patriotism; and we love liberty, it may be, as well, and are likely to serve it as effectually, as our young revolutionists in whom reason “sleeps and declamation roars.” We have, indeed, a tolerable pair of lungs, and if not a musical, at least a strong voice; we know and could use all the commonplaces of our young patriots and reformers, — nay, we think we could, if we were to try, beat them at their own trade, grave and staid as we have become; but we have no disposition to enter the lists with them. We have never seen any good come from the declamatory speeches and fiery patriotism of boys just escaped the ferule of the pedagogue, and who can give utterance to nothing but puerile rant about liberty and patriotism. We have never seen good come to a country whose counsellors were young men with downy chins, and we set it down as a rule, that the country in which they can take the lead, whatever else it is fitted for, is not fitted for the liberty which comes through popular institutions.

We can weep as well as our juniors over a nation robbed of its rights, on whose palpitating heart is planted the iron heel of the conqueror, and have the will, if not the power, to strike, if we can but see a vulnerable spot, or a chance that the blow will tell upon the tyrant. But, as a general thing, we have a great distaste for the valor that evaporates in words, though they be great and high-sounding words, well chosen, skilfully arranged, and admirably pronounced; and an equal distaste even for deeds which recoil upon the actor, and aggravate his sufferings,

already too afflicting to behold. We believe it wise to bide one's time, and to take counsel of prudence. In most cases, the sufferings of a people spring from moral causes beyond the reach of civil government, and they are rarely the best patriots who paint them in the most vivid colors, and rouse up popular indignation against the civil authorities. Much more effectual service could be rendered in a more quiet and peaceful way, by each one seeking, in his own immediate sphere, to remove the moral causes of the evils endured. St. Vincent of Paul was a far wiser and more successful patriot than the greatest of your popular orators, declaimers, and songsters. He, humble-minded priest, had no ambition to shine, no splendid scheme of world or state reform. He thought only of saving his own soul, by doing the work that lay next him; and he became the benefactor of his age and his country, and in his noble institutions of charity he still lives, and each year extends his influence and adds to the millions who are recipients of his bounty. O ye who would serve your country, relieve the suffering, solace the afflicted, and right the wronged, go imitate St. Vincent of Paul, and Heaven will own you and posterity revere you.

ART. III. — *Grantley Manor. A Tale.* By LADY GEORGIANA FULLERTON, Author of "Ellen Middleton." New York: Appleton & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 320.

THIS work has been well spoken of by the reviewers, and the public, we believe, has given it a favorable reception. It possesses more than ordinary interest, and bears the marks of genius and power. We have rarely read a novel written by a lady which indicated more ability or contained less that was extravagant or offensive. For inveterate novel-readers, who *will* read novels, at whatever risk to the strength of their characters or the salvation of their souls, we agree with our esteemed friend of the *New York Freeman's Journal*, that it is as unobjectionable as any that can be easily selected, and to those who *must* have their feelings harrowed up by fictitious woe it may even be commended.

Judging from the work before us, Lady Fullerton is a gifted and highly cultivated woman, endowed with fine powers of ob-

servation, and possessing very considerable knowledge of the human heart, and mastery over its passions. Her characters are drawn with freedom and delicacy, within the bounds of nature, and with a nearer approach to individuality, as in Margaret and old Mrs. Thornton, than is common save in authors of the very highest rank. She intersperses her work with many wise and just, if not profound and original, remarks, and hits off many of the petty vices, annoyances, and foibles of conventional and every-day life not unsuccessfully. In a purely literary point of view, we may object, however, a too visible effort at intense writing, a want of calmness and repose, and the attempt to give us a vivid impression of the exquisite beauty of her heroines by dissecting and limning it feature by feature, instead of leaving it to be depicted by the imagination of her readers from the effects it is seen to produce on those within the sphere of its influence, — the common faults of modern novelists, which prove, not their strength, but their weakness. There is, also, too much sighing, weeping, and shedding of floods of tears, as well as too much embracing, kissing of hands, foreheads, cheeks, &c., &c. The latter might have been left to the experience or the imagination of the reader, and the former should have been relieved. We are as loath to see literature as beauty in tears, which add to the charm in the one case no more than in the other. Give us the merry and joyous literature, not the sad and doleful.

But we have graver faults to find with *Grantley Manor*. If it had been written by an author not professedly of our religion, but by a fair-minded Protestant, wishing to diminish the prejudices against Catholicity, and to show that it may be very nearly as respectable as Anglicanism, Methodism, or Presbyterianism, we could not find it in our heart to criticize it with much severity or at any great length. We could pardon its insults to our holy religion for the sake of the obviously benevolent intentions of the author. Readers would, moreover, be on their guard, and its mistakes or misrepresentations would be comparatively harmless. But Lady Fullerton some time since conformed, we can hardly say was converted, to the Church, and it is evident from her book that she professes to be a Catholic. We have, then, the right, and, as Catholic reviewers, are bound, to test her work by the Catholic standard. Tried by that standard, it is, unquestionably, in many respects deficient, and in some highly offensive.

It may be alleged, that Lady Fullerton is a popular writer,

that she does not profess to write what is technically termed a Catholic novel, and we have, therefore, no right to exact of her a theological tract, ascetic or dogmatic. To the principle of this plea we do not object. We certainly do not complain that *Grantley Manor* is not more theological ; for, as our readers well know, we are far from being partial to novels which mingle a treatise on theology with a tale of profane love. We complain, not that her Ladyship has abstained from theology, but that she has not abstained, — not that she has *not* introduced religious topics, but that she *has* introduced them, and in a false light, so as to mislead her readers, unless they happen to be well instructed, and strictly on their guard. She brings religion upon the scene ; she makes Catholics and Protestants, as such, actors in her plot ; and it has obviously been a leading purpose with her to exhibit the Catholic spirit in its relations with Protestants, and to show the practical effects of Catholicity in forming the minds and hearts, and in prompting and directing the conduct, of those brought up under its influence. Religion is the atmosphere in which she breathes and moves ; it is the chief power on which she relies ; it is the mainspring of her dramatic action ; and on no recognized principles of criticism can she withdraw her work from the standard by which professedly Catholic works are to be judged. She not only introduces the Catholic religion, but she approves in her Catholic characters, from first to last, things which the Church abominates, and appears to commend them for things which even her catechism would teach her the Church positively forbids. Here, then, are sins, not of omission merely, as the plea in her defence assumes, but sins of commission, for which, as an author, she is answerable at the bar of Catholicity.

It may also be alleged, in extenuation, that we must not be severe upon slight errors and inaccuracies in popular works, — that we are not to expect from a popular author, like Lady Fullerton, the knowledge and accuracy of a doctor in theology, or an experienced master of novices. But we cannot accept the principle of this new plea. Errors and inaccuracies are less excusable in popular writers than in others, and if her Ladyship was not well enough instructed in her religion to be able to avoid them, she had no business to introduce it. Who compelled her to touch upon religious topics, or to write upon matters of which she knew nothing ? If she could not state her religion with accuracy and precision, what right had she to attempt to state it at all ? It is enough to have our holy

religion misrepresented and falsified by its enemies, without having it travestied by its professed friends. No doubt, the author thought she was breathing the living soul of Catholicity into her novel, and, while seeking to interest or amuse the public, she would be rendering a service to the cause of Catholic faith and piety. But she reckoned beyond her means. She was too recently from the ranks of heresy. Her Catholicity is evidently not genuine, and her book reminds us of the *Nibelungen-Lied*, the national epic of the Germans, — a pagan story, conceived in the true pagan spirit, and transmitted, body and soul, from pagan times, but dressed out, by some half-convert of the thirteenth century, in a Christian garb. The *Nibelungen* are genuine pagans, only they hear Mass and bless themselves after the Christian fashion. So is *Grantley Manor* a Protestant tale, conceived and executed in a Protestant spirit, and will find few admirers except among Protestants, and Catholics who, from breathing the atmosphere of heresy and the study of heretical literature, are themselves more than half Protestant. Its Catholics are amiable, cultivated, and respectable Puseyites, who happen to have been born and brought up under the *Roman* instead of the *Anglican* "Branch" of the Church.

The author appears to proceed on the assumption, not uncommon, as we have observed, with converts from Anglicanism, that we and Anglicans embrace a common Christianity; that up to a certain point they and we are of one and the same religion; that they are perfectly right, as far as they go; and that, with two or three additional dogmas from us, accepted purely as additions to their present creed, they would be thoroughly and unexceptionably orthodox. Thus, she makes her Catholic heroine tell her Protestant sister that they have certain prayers in common, — the Lord's Prayer, for instance, — which they may say together. Thus, too, she makes a respectable Puseyite gentleman the organ of her Catholic instructions and advice in the formation of character and the conduct of life. Ginevra, the Catholic sister, asks, in her hour of trial, her Protestant friends to pray for her, that her faith fail not, and is made to take, distinctly and gravely, the ground, that we sympathize with Protestants as Christians, and trust that God, by extraordinary interior inspirations, will supply their external doctrinal deficiencies. Now we need not say that all this is false, and, to a Catholic, exceedingly nauseous. Between us and Anglicans, or any Protestant sect, there is nothing in common but reason and nature, but our common humanity. The

notion, that there is a common Christianity, common to the Church and the sects, except in a very loose way of speaking, is a grave mistake. Christianity is a fact, and that fact is the Church. The Church is herself Christianity, and without her there is no Christianity. We do not come to the Church through Christianity, but we come to Christianity, if at all, through the Church. There is nothing distinctly Christian, in its Christian sense, which we and Anglicans, or any Protestant sect, can be said to believe in common ; for whoever denies any one dogma or proposition of faith denies, and must be held to deny, the whole. We cannot, either in our private or our public devotions, worship in common with those external to the Church ; for there is no common worship between them and us, no book of *common prayer* which they and we acknowledge ; and we are forbidden to hold communion with them *in sacris*. We cannot ask a heretic to pray for us, for he is an enemy to God ; and what greater affront can we offer to the Majesty of heaven than to despatch to his court his enemy to intercede for us ? Heretics are children of Satan, not children of God, and we may as well ask the father as the children to pray for us. Only think of a Catholic asking the Devil to pray God for him, that his faith fail not ! Certainly, we are bound to love those out of, as well as those in, the Church ; certainly, we must do them all the real service in our power, and never cease to pray for their temporal and spiritual welfare ; but we must never forget that they are not members of the household of faith, and that we can have no religious communion or fellowship with them.

Will you tell us that we have no right to judge the secrets of the heart, and to pronounce every one who is in a communion external to the Church an enemy of God ? Be it so, if you wish. But you have just as little right to judge the secrets of the heart and to pronounce one in such a communion the friend of God. Nay, if it comes to that, not so much. In regard to those in the Church, we must presume them to be friends of God, unless the contrary is established. But the case is the reverse in regard to those out of the Church. Out of the Church no one can ever be saved, and yet all who are not the enemies of God will be saved, as is certain. All, then, out of the Church are certainly the enemies of God. All who are in heretical or schismatical communions are, at least, presumptively out of the Church. Then, whatever extent you give, in your excessive liberality, to invincible ignorance, —

which you seem at times to make far more desirable than knowledge of the truth, — you are bound to presume all out of the visible communion of the Church, in communions external to her, to be, in fact, enemies of God, and to be treated as such, until the contrary is proved, which cannot be without a special revelation. Not one of us who are in the Church can know, without such revelation, whether we “deserve love or hatred,” and then, *a fortiori*, not that those out of the Church deserve love. The rashness, if any in the case, is not, then, in our presuming that those in communions alien to the Church are enemies of God, and in treating them as such, but in your presuming them without evidence to be the friends of God, with whom you are free to commune in sacred things. It is you who undertake to judge the secrets of the heart in such cases, not we.

We do not pretend to fathom the secret counsels of the Almighty, or to set bounds to his mercy ; and it is in the salvation of our brethren, not in their condemnation, that we take pleasure. But we cannot know beyond what we are taught. What extraordinary means Almighty God has in reserve for the salvation of those who fail to use the ordinary means, though living all their lifetime within sound of the Church’s voice, we cannot pretend to say ; for the fact that there are any such means is not revealed, and we are ignorant of our right to assume even their possibility, much more our right to presume on them for ourselves, or for our friends who apparently live and die in heretical or schismatical communions. We, as Catholics, are restricted to the ordinary means, to what God has revealed, and these are all the means that we know or can assert. How can we, then, hold out to Protestants the hope, that, though neglecting the ordinary means, Almighty God will in their behalf employ extraordinary means for their salvation, as if he owed them a reward for their perversity, or as if he loved them better than his own Catholic children, and will do altogether more for them ? This were uncharitable to them, and hardly just to ourselves.

Lady Fullerton has no doubt wished, in this her first publication since her reconciliation to the Church, to manifest her continued regard for her former friends, and to convince them that she is as amiable, as indulgent, and as friendly to them as she was before, — in a word, to prove to them, that, if she has become a Catholic, she has by no means become a bigot. All this may be very well, as it affects her Ladyship’s private

relations. We, certainly, have no wish to see a convert, the moment he has entered the Church, proving himself harsh and bitter towards his former associates, and insensible to their many amiable qualities as men and women, or to the many admirable human virtues which, in cases not a few, adorn their private and public life. But there are some things which may be left to be taken for granted, and an overweening anxiety to make our former friends believe in our continued regard for them may sometimes tend to awaken suspicions to the contrary. Where there is no consciousness of any decrease in our love and esteem, there is generally no effort to disprove it. Innocence is usually unconscious. Unquestionably, our conversion denies to us the right, and, if thorough, the wish, to hold religious communion with the sect we have abandoned ; but we should pay but an indifferent compliment to our recently received faith, if we should regard it as necessary to prove that it does not render us harsh and bigoted, that it does not sour our tempers, but leaves us as mild, as gentle, as amiable, and as tenderly alive to the interests and feelings of those with whom we formerly associated as ever we were. The truth is, the convert has, as a Catholic, a tender regard for all men which was inconceivable to him before his conversion ; for, prior to his conversion, he never had any proper disposition towards God or man, never understood the worth of the human soul, nor the ground of his obligation to love his neighbour as himself.

Lady Fullerton has also wished, and with the best intentions in the world, no doubt, to recommend her religion as well as herself to her former friends ; and in order to do this, she appears to have studied to show them that the religion she has embraced is really not inferior to the one she has abandoned ; that, in fact, it differs far less from it than they suppose ; and that even they might embrace it without any fundamental change in their belief or their practice. We do not believe this the wisest or the most honest way of recommending our religion ; for the differences between us and Protestants are not few or slight ; they are many, fundamental, essential. If our only purpose, or our legitimate purpose, were to be suffered to live quietly amongst Protestants, to be permitted to worship in our own way without having our religion calumniated or our throats cut, — or if the great body of Protestants really loved the Church, and were anxious to see their way clear to return as faithful children to her communion, — it certainly would

be our policy and our duty to represent the differences between us and Protestants to be as few and as unimportant as we possibly could without sacrificing truth. But neither is the fact. We can never be indifferent to the salvation of our Protestant friends and neighbours ; we cannot proceed on the supposition, that these heretical sects are always to remain, and that our principal study is to avert their wrath and to secure their friendly regard. What we are to seek is not peace with them as they are, but their reconciliation to the Church. On this point what we must labor for is clear, and we cannot conceal it from Protestants, if we would. They know, as well as we, that our Church is propagandist in her very nature, that she seeks by spiritual means the subjection of all to her authority, and that in religious matters she tolerates no rival. We but disarm and expose ourselves to their contempt, if we are foolish enough to pretend the contrary. The Church has been commissioned to teach all nations, to preach the Gospel to every creature, and she makes no secret of her constant intention and her untiring efforts to discharge with fidelity the high and solemn trust she has received. All the world knows this, and all the world would justly despise us, if we should seek to conceal or deny it. It is a thing not to be ashamed of, but to glory in.

Whatever may be the case with individual Protestants, the great body have no love for the Church, and would rather impede than clear the path for their return to her communion. They may be dissatisfied with their present position, but if so, it only embitters them against her. Their anxiety is not to return to her communion, but to remove farther and farther from it. Hence we see them almost universally rejecting the earlier forms of Protestantism, as not sufficiently removed from Catholicity ; and to prove to them that a proposition is Catholic, or coincident with what the Church teaches, is only to give them, in their estimation, a valid reason for not holding it. The more we show that a given form of Protestantism resembles Catholicity, the more do we prove to them that it is objectionable.

Our Puseyite friends, and some few of the converts from Puseyism, seem to us to mistake entirely the feeling of Protestants towards the Church. It is idle to suppose that Puseyism has penetrated far among them, or that it is, or is likely to be, a dominant tendency in the sects. The Puseyites have not in the remotest degree affected the state of the controversy be-

tween us and Protestants, save so far as themselves are concerned. Their views and dispositions are their own, not those of the Protestant community ; their concessions bind only the individuals who make them, and are not available to us in controversies with Protestantism in general. We are willing that converts from Puseyism should address themselves specially to their former friends, if they choose ; but they should be careful not to speak as if Puseyites were all the uncatholic world worth counting, and not to make concessions or assume positions in order to operate on them which can only embarrass us in our efforts to operate favorably upon others. Puseyism was, in its origin, only a sectarian movement in the bosom of Anglicanism, and is already disowned by the Establishment, and followed in the very place of its birth, if report be true, by a decided reaction in favor of Rationalism. The Anglican Establishment is farther removed from Catholicity at the present moment than it has been before for many years. Puseyism is virtually dead and buried, and there is for it no resurrection. The conversion of its principal originators has proved its insufficiency as a final movement, and placed the whole Protestant world on their guard against it as a provisional movement. There is little use in writing and publishing works fitted only to the dozen or two of mourners who still linger around its grave. We must consult and adapt ourselves to the main body of Protestants in their onward movement, if we would exert any wide or permanent influence in recalling them to the paths of salvation.

There is, however it may be with here and there an individual of a peculiar temperament, no use, as it regards Protestants in general, in attempting to make the differences between them and us appear small and unimportant ; for their wish is not to be as like, but as unlike, us as possible. Moreover, just in proportion as we diminish the apparent difference between them and us, and concede, that, in the affair of salvation, they are as well off as we, perhaps better off, — for we have and can have no hope of salvation save through the ordinary means, but they, if Lady Fullerton be right, may, failing the ordinary means, still hope to be saved by extraordinary means, — we give them reasons, not why they should become, but why they need not become, Catholics. We in this way work against their conversion, not for it ; and still more endanger, instead of securing, their salvation. In our communications with individuals, we are, undoubtedly, to adapt ourselves, as far as truth

will warrant, to the mental and moral state of the particular individual we are addressing ; but when we address the public at large, we must consult the mental and moral state of the great body of Protestants. There is only one argument that will weigh with serious Protestants, — nay, there is only one that ought to weigh with them, — namely, that they cannot be saved, unless they become Catholics. The sooner our popular writers learn this and conform to it, and give up their namby-pambyism, the better will it be for all parties. We greatly underrate the intelligence of Protestants, if we suppose that, in Protestant countries, where all the worldly motives are in their favor, they can be generally induced to embrace our religion, if they understand us to concede that they need not despair of salvation in their own. What, except salvation, have we to offer them ? We must show them that we wish their conversion, because, in our view at least, salvation is impossible in their religion, or they will treat, as well they may, all we say with contempt. It is idle to suppose that they can be won over by a little commonplace morality, pretty sentiments, or even solemn chants and magnificent old cathedrals, or by arguments which merely prove, that, after all, Catholics are not much worse than Protestants. It is a poor recommendation of Catholicity, that it is not inferior to Puseyism ; for if it be not infinitely superior to that, or to any other form of religion, it should be rejected as a gigantic imposition upon mankind.

But while we insist on these things as necessary to be observed by every Catholic who writes with a view to induce Protestants to embrace our holy religion, we by no means wish to see them in a popular novel. Every thing in its time and place. Nothing disgusts us more than to see the novelist put on the doctor's cap, or assume the tone and port of the preacher. We do not wish every one who writes, no matter to what department of literature his work may belong, to be perpetually dinging in the ears of Protestants that they are heretics, and cannot be saved unless they come into the Church. We ourselves conduct an avowedly polemical work, — a work expressly devoted to the exposition and defence of Catholic faith and morals, — and we are obliged to bring out the truth, however stern and offensive it may be, and to wage war with error, let it manifest itself on what side it will. But every work is not expected to have the same special purpose, or to pursue the same special method. Many things may be said with perfect propriety in a work like ours, that would,

though true, be wholly misplaced in a popular novel. Popular literature should cultivate all the courtesies and amenities of civilized life ; it should be neither polemical nor denunciatory ; it should abstain from theological controversy, and avoid the introduction of those topics which cannot be freely and honestly treated without exciting prejudice or stirring up bitter feelings. All we ask of it, under the religious point of view, is, that the author should write simply so as to utter nothing inconsistent with our holy religion, or which can leave an uncatholic impression upon his readers. We shall be satisfied with it, if, in regard to religion, it maintains the negative merit of not being in any respect irreligious.

It is plain enough from Lady Fullerton's work, that she wished, while avoiding all religious controversy, to write a novel which, besides interesting or delighting the public, should silently exert a pure moral and religious influence upon the hearts of her readers. In this she was right, and seized the true idea of what we may term the moral tale or the serious novel. But she does not appear to have duly considered on what conditions such a work can be produced, if produced at all. She erred in supposing that she could, compatibly with her design, introduce Protestants and Catholics as joint actors in her plot. Wherever the two are introduced, in their distinctive character, the author must either make his work directly or indirectly controversial, or else represent both as belonging to the same great religious family, distinguished from each other only by minor shades of difference. The former Lady Fullerton wished to avoid ; the latter, as a Catholic, she was not permitted to do. Yet it is what she has done, and hence the objectionable character of her work. She was unhappy in the adoption of her plot. Her plot was, indeed, very well contrived for a controversial novel, or for displaying the respective merits of Catholicity and Protestantism by contrasting the one with the other ; but not for such a novel as she wished to write. She should, with her general design, have introduced no persons of a different religion from her own. She should have laid her scene in a Catholic country, and introduced only Catholic characters. If she wished to secure Protestant readers, she might have done it by throwing into the shade those features of Catholicity which are peculiarly offensive to strangers, and bringing out in a strong light those great moral and religious traits of character which never fail to command universal admiration. What we mean is, that, while silently

assuming, throughout, her own religion, she should have taken care not to introduce it or her characters as distinctively Catholic. In this way she might have been truly Catholic, and yet have pleased her Protestant friends, as far as it was lawful to please them, without displeasing her Catholic friends. A Madonna from the studio of a Raphael has a peculiar merit for the faithful, yet it commands, though Catholic in its subject, its genius, its execution, and its associations, the admiration of cultivated Protestants. So in literature, which is only art under another form, if we have real genius, we may select a Catholic subject, treat it in a Catholic spirit, and place it in a Catholic light, without despairing, if that be our ambition, of readers beyond the pale of the Church. It is precisely that portion of our literature which has been written solely for Catholic readers, without any reference to dissenters, that is the most universally admired. Religion may and should pervade popular literature, and in its true form too ; but in its catholic, not in its distinctive character.

The difficulty with us moderns is, that we are ourselves too polemical. The circumstances in which we live force us to be constantly considering our religion, not in its own essential character of the one universal religion, but in its distinctive character, as the true religion opposed to false religions. Our religion is assailed everywhere by the false, and our minds are affected, nay, to a great extent formed, by the opposition we encounter, and the hostility in the midst of which we live. Our life is the life of the camp. Our very piety and devotion assume a polemical cast. We can hardly throw off our armour long enough to repeat a *Pater* or an *Ave*. The times are exceedingly unfavorable to the creation of such a literature as Lady Fullerton seems to contemplate, and of which she has given us so poor a specimen. But if our friends believe such a literature possible and desirable, if they will labor for its creation, they must enter more deeply into the spirit of their own religion, and study to forget that there are such people as Protestants, and such a religion as Protestantism, in the world. They will make no contributions to it, if they place before them a mixed audience of Catholics and Protestants, and endeavour to speak two languages at one and the same time. The man can be himself, give free play to his wit, his imagination, the deep and warm emotions of his soul, only at home, in the bosom of his own family, or surrounded by his intimate friends. The presence of a stranger is an intrusion, throws a

damp on his spirits, restrains his genius, — for genius is always shy, — checks the flow of his eloquence, the play of his wit or his fancy, and renders him grave, formal, and reserved. So is it with him who would be an author in polite or popular literature. He must speak his own mother tongue to those who have the same mother tongue. He must make himself at home, banish all strangers and heretics from his mind, and write out freely from his own full Catholic heart and well-stored mind, as if all the world were his friends, of his own household, of his own faith and religion.

There are other faults which, as Catholics, we must find with Lady Fullerton's novel. The heroines are two half-sisters, daughters of a Colonel Lesley, an English gentleman, — the elder by an English, and the younger by an Italian wife. They are brought up each by her maternal relations, the elder in England, and in the Protestant religion, the younger in Italy, and in the Catholic religion, and without ever seeing one another till the former is nineteen and the latter nearly seventeen. Of Margaret, the elder sister, we have nothing to say, although she is our favorite. Ginevra, the younger sister, appears to be the favorite of the author, and her character is drawn with great affection and elaborate finish. She is evidently designed as a model of female beauty and loveliness, and intended to display the author's conception of the practical effects of Catholic faith and piety. She is indeed beautiful, lovely, fascinating. But she secretly marries a heretic, a stranger with whom she has had but a brief acquaintance, without the consent or knowledge of her father, and against the known wishes of the family of the young man himself. It is true, her father is absent on his travels, and she does not know when he will return, and her old uncle in his dotage approves and urges the match. But this is no sufficient excuse. Her uncle has no authority to bestow her hand upon a heretic; she has no reason to think that her father has abandoned her, or become indifferent to her welfare; and it is plain, that, in consenting to the marriage, she only yields to a sincere, but inordinate, passion.

Now we do not like the morality which makes passion — love, if you will — an excuse for neglect of filial duty. We do not say that a child must in every conceivable case marry according to the will of the parent, and may in no case marry without or against parental authority; but no one under age can, if the father be living, rightfully marry without his consent, or

at any age without at least his consent being asked. Ginevra is under age ; she is not seventeen ; and has no right to dispose of herself, — certainly not without some efforts, at least, to obtain her father's consent or advice. Here we insist she was wrong, undutiful. We are not disposed to make light of genuine affection, of which there is in this world none to spare ; but we have no patience with the morality which makes love triumph over duty, or that does not withhold its approbation from all love that leads us to omit any serious duty of our age or state. Such love is not properly love. It is passion, sinful passion, to which religion forbids us to yield, and which it commands us to subdue. We do no service to our sons and daughters by representing to them passion as too strong for duty, and then excusing the neglect of duty in consideration of the strength and ardor of the passion. It is all moonshine to suppose that there is any unlawful passion which, by the aid of religion, we cannot overcome, if we choose ; and every passion is unlawful, however sincere and pure it may be in other respects, which in our actual relations we are not free to indulge, or which cannot be indulged without imprudence ; for prudence is one of the cardinal virtues.

Ginevra not only marries imprudently, secretly, without her father's knowledge or consent, but she marries a heretic, a man without principle, an enemy of her religion, — which no good Catholic can do. The Church abhors mixed marriages, and if she sometimes tolerates them in order to avoid a greater evil, she refuses them her benediction. She never ceases to admonish her children to avoid them. If Ginevra had been as pious as the author would have us believe, she never would, she never could, have listened for a single moment to the addresses of young Neville ; she never would and never could have opened her heart to love for one whom she must regard as a child of Satan, the enemy of her religion and her God. How can the heart that loves God above all things consent to form the closest of all unions, a union typical of the union of Christ and the Church, with one who she knows has no sympathy with her religion, no love of God in his heart, and who despises her own sweet and holy Mother ? It seems strange to us, or would, indeed, did we not know the perversity of the human heart, and the fatalism in regard to love widely believed, and generally taught by novels and romances. Lady Fullerton would have furnished a far better moral, if she had shown us her Catholic heroine resolutely suppressing any growing affection

she might have detected, stealing unawares into her own heart, for young Neville, coldly dismissing him, and refusing to hear a single word of love from his lips, on the simple ground that he was not of her religion.

Neville's father is represented to us as an intolerable bigot, because he swears to disinherit his only son, if ever he presumes to marry a Catholic; and the author contrives to make it appear that Catholics are cruelly treated, because Protestant fathers are opposed to their sons marrying Catholic wives. We have no patience with this. Has her Ladyship a Protestant husband, or is she in pursuit of one? Can our daughters find no Catholic young men worthy of their heart and of their hand? Then let them offer their virginity to God, and choose a celestial spouse; or, if they wish to remain in the world, let them remain there in a state of "single blessedness." If they have piety, this will be no hardship; and if they have it not, they are ill fitted to be wives and mothers. For ourselves, we honor old Neville; he acted like a sensible man and a prudent father. He was a Protestant; he believed Catholicity to be from the Devil, as we ourselves should believe, if we believed Protestantism to be from God; and so believing, he would not and could not consent to receive a Catholic as his daughter-in-law. He warned his son betimes, long before he ever saw Ginevra, forbade him ever to marry a Catholic, and told him what he would have to expect, if he did. We see no bigotry in this; we see only consistency,—only a correct principle, misapplied solely because the old man's religion was not the true one. Indeed, all her Ladyship's Protestants are excellent people; it is only her Catholics who are uncatholic, or act on uncatholic principles. We have no patience with this blaming of Protestants for their opposition to mixed marriages, when our own Church detests them, and does all she can in prudence to prevent them. Let us not blame Protestants for the few sound principles they have retained from the general shipwreck of their faith. We are not remarkably partial to Protestants, and not much accustomed to spare them; but we are not willing to blame them where they are not blamable, or to reject a sound principle because they may adhere to it.

But after these faults, what are the redeeming traits of Ginevra's character? Passing over her natural endowments, which have no moral or spiritual character, she has two merits,—she retains her love for her selfish and unprincipled hus-

band, notwithstanding his base and cruel treatment of her, and she refuses, at his infamous request, to apostatize entirely from the Church. The first is very well, but nothing very remarkable. We can find instances enough, and without going far either, of women, who make no great show in the world, who have borne in silence, not for a few months only, as was the case with the passionate Ginevra, but for long years, conduct far more cold, heartless, cruel, and brutal, than she received from Edmund Neville. All she suffered was purely sentimental, and, with firmness and strength of character, could have been made quite tolerable. She retained throughout — what is so precious to the wife — the love of her husband, who, in the language of the author, adored her, and it is not till the last moment before her trials end that she for an instant seriously doubts it. She is one day falsely informed that Neville is going to marry another. Then, indeed, she believes he has ceased to love her ; hope vanishes, and the terrible conviction flashes upon her, that he is lost to her for ever. Now comes her real trial. How does she bear it ? Does her religion sustain her ? Does she embrace the cross and piously bear it ? Not at all. No heathen could have been more completely overcome. She raves, she is beside herself, she becomes mad, works herself into a brain fever, and as good as gives up the ghost. All this is, no doubt, very natural ; but it betrays a weak, not a strong character, — a character abandoned to nature, not elevated and sustained by grace. How many women have borne all she bore, have endured far greater trials than hers, and that too without losing their senses, or working themselves into a brain-fever, the “*Deus ex machinâ*” of recent novelists ! Have we not seen women abused and abandoned to poverty and want by their husbands, women who know they are no longer beloved, who feel the terrible truth that they have no longer any hold on the affections of their husbands, who know that love is bestowed elsewhere, and who see with their own eyes the tenderness and caresses which are their due lavished upon others, and who nevertheless quietly and meekly discharge their duties as faithful and affectionate wives, and retain till death all the warmth, energy, and freshness of their young love ? We have seen it ; and without going out of the circle of our own personal acquaintance, we can bring instance after instance, from real life, of a wife’s affection for her husband withstanding far severer trials than those to which Ginevra was subjected, except for half an hour, for we apprehend that most women will

agree with us that the severest trial of a wife's affection is the certainty that she has lost her husband's.

The other merit named is nothing very extraordinary. Is it an extraordinary merit in a Catholic not to apostatize outright from the Church? You tell us that Ginevra had strong temptations, that she chose to lose the society of her husband, to have him deny her to be his wife, to see him conduct himself in the world as if unmarried, to find herself in a false position and subject to the most odious misconstructions, rather than give up her God, and deliberately damn her own soul. Be it so. Is there a Catholic man or woman deserving the name that would not do as much? Is not all Catholic history filled with martyrs, and all Catholic land hallowed by their blood? Is not martyrdom a thing of course in our Church? And is it characteristic of Catholics to hesitate between a life of comparative poverty and abandonment by those we love, and apostasy from their God? If martyrdom is too common among Catholics to attract much attention, as we know it is even in our own day, why make so much ado about Ginevra's refusing to apostatize from her religion to gratify the ambition and luxurious tastes of her base and selfish husband? Ginevra is no martyr, and shows nothing of the martyr spirit. She has not even to choose between her religion and her husband's love, for he still "adores" her, and she herself fears, that, if she changes her religion, she shall forfeit his love. She herself tells him, that, if she could change her religion from the motives he presents, he himself would despise her, which it is plain he would have done. She has not to choose between religion and poverty; for she is the daughter of a rich father who idolizes her, and the greatest poverty she can imagine to exist is wealth to the great majority of us. Moreover, even to the last moment, till the aforesaid brain-fever, which brings all to a happy termination, she still hopes that matters will take a favorable turn, that she shall recover her Neville, and have her rights as a wife acknowledged. Nay, she can at any moment, by confiding in her father, and ceasing to be a dissembler, have them acknowledged at once. And this it was her duty to do, both for Neville's sake and her own, and also for the sake of her father, whom she had wronged, and from whom she had no right to withhold the fact that she was married. It is idle, then, to call Ginevra a martyr for her religion. If she could have heard the still voice of duty rising above her excessive sentimentality, she could easily have extricated herself from her painful situation.

Her sufferings were only the just punishment of her secret marriage with a heretic.

The novel is said to be replete with genuine religious feeling ; but its piety is Puseyitish rather than Catholic, and smells strongly of Littlemore. It is such as serious, cultivated, and amiable people, outside of the Church, aiming to imitate Catholics, can attain to, — a tolerably well executed counterfeit, which may pass with those who are ignorant of the genuine coin. The sentiment, even when it is intended to be religious, is too human ; weakens, instead of strengthening ; and aggravates, instead of assuaging the pain. When we witness the sufferings of Ginevra, we assist at a tragedy ; we do not behold the Christian bearing his cross, and borne by it. Our human sympathies are excited, our hearts bleed for the tender floweret torn and tossed in the blast. We see the poor girl grow pale and pine day by day ; we are told that she is comforted and soothed by prayer ; we are told that she is patient and resigned ; but we feel, as we read, that, if things do not alter for the better very soon, she will assuredly grow mad or die. This indicates very little of that calm, serene, and sustaining piety which kisses affectionately the rod that smites, and says, " Let it be, my Father, as thou wilt ; thy will is mine." If we would give a true picture of Catholic piety, we must show it, not in our words, but in its effects on the character. Any body can talk piously ; but not every one can infuse piety into the creatures of their imagination.

But our readers will do us injustice, if they suppose that we object to Lady Fullerton's novel simply because her characters have certain weaknesses and defects, simply because they are not perfect. We have no great affection for the perfect characters of novelists, and have not had since we read *Caleb* by Hannah More, and its twin monster, *Dunallan*, by some author whose name we forget. As a young friend of ours pleasantly remarked of the Non-resistants, that she " did not like them, for they were too belligerent," so we say, we do not like these perfect characters, for they are too imperfect. It is said that no writing is so faulty as that which is faultless ; and certainly we find no characters more faulty than those intended by the novelist to be perfect. They are always cold, stiff, formal, dull, prosy, crotchety, unhappy themselves, and rendering perfectly miserable every body within the circle of their influence. The Lord deliver us from Methodism or Puritanism in novels, as well as in the Church and in society !

The novelist has the right to represent men and women as he finds them in real life, and the more faithful he is to reality, the more is he to be commended. It is a thousand times better that our youth should see life represented in literature as they must find it when they go forth into the world, than that they should amuse their fancy or exalt their imaginations with pictures of an ideal life, never realized, and never to be realized. There is enough of romance in the natural composition of every one, without its being augmented by the art of the novelist. Bring out, if you will, the romance of real life, show the poetic side, if you can, of ordinary characters, of every-day duties and events ; but leave the purely ideal world to the " prince of the air," to whom it belongs.

The novelist has not only the right to represent characters as he finds them in real life, but he has the right to enlist our sympathies for them, to make us love and esteem them, though they are marred by grave faults, even by vices and crimes. It is no objection to modern literature that it paints vicious and criminal characters, that it makes us acquainted with the deformities of social and individual life, the shocking depravities and loathsome corruptions of human nature. This does not of itself necessarily corrupt its readers or its admirers. Nay, it is well that these things should be known, that our youth should betimes learn how rotten is human nature, and how necessary it is that they should beware of trusting themselves to its depraved appetites and vicious propensities. Nor is it a fault of modern popular literature that it shows us in characters marred by a thousand faults something still pure and lovely, something which rightfully commands our love and esteem. In this world, we are not, save in the Saints, to look for perfection. The characters of all are a mixture of good and evil. None, or, at best, very few, under the human point of view, are totally depraved, destitute of every generous feeling, of every noble quality ; and even the best must mourn over their own shortcomings. We have no right to exclude any human being from our sympathy, or from our love. Alas ! who are we who demand perfection in others, and claim the right to exclude from our kindness and respect those who may have fallen ? Let us look into our own hearts, recall our own past lives, and see what we have been, and what we are. What have we whereof to boast, in the presence of this erring brother or this fallen sister ? Alas ! who that knows himself, the rottenness of his own heart, the baseness of his own conduct, and feels in

his conscience the load of guilt he has incurred, can look upon himself in any other light than as the very chief of sinners ? Our religion commands us, while we are inexorable in judging ourselves, to be lenient in judging others ; and as long as we feel it but reasonable, as we all do, that we should be loved and esteemed, notwithstanding our vices and crimes, how can we deem it just to withhold our love and esteem from others, who, after all, may be far less vicious, less criminal, in the sight of God, than ourselves ? The fault of modern literature is not here ; it is elsewhere, in the fact that it enlists our sympathies, our love and esteem, for characters because they are vicious and criminal. What it compels us to approve in them is the moral weakness, the lawless passion, the criminal strength of purpose, the successful vice, the triumphant crime. Read the writings of Goethe, Byron, Bulwer, Victor Hugo, De Balzac, George Sand, Ida of Hahn Hahn, and you are cheated into sympathizing with the illicit, the vicious, the criminal. Take away from their characters what is contrary to Christian morality, and nothing is left to love or admire. Their very excellence is made to consist in what is condemned by the laws of God and man. Here is the error ; here is their fatal poison ; here is that which makes their writings so immoral and so corrupting. They might have painted the same amount of depravity, uncovered the same festering wounds, and exposed the same abyss of corruption, and yet have exerted a healthful influence, an influence which would have tended to heal, instead of deepening and perpetuating the running sores of individuals and of society. All they needed to have done this was to have had a correct moral standard for themselves, and to have refrained from sympathizing with the corruption they represented.

Lady Fullerton, of course, does not sin to the extent — far, far from it — that these do ; and yet her own standard of morals is too low, and she herself sympathizes with things which, though natural and in some measure excusable, ought not to be approved. The character of Ginevra is, for the most part, true to nature ; her passionate love for Neville was in keeping with her character, and to be expected ; yet it was imprudent, and, under the circumstances, unjustifiable. It is of the author's apparent unconsciousness of this fact that we complain, not that she did not give Ginevra a more perfect character, and make her conduct herself differently. She not only does not disapprove, but she even approves, Ginevra's excessive passion and its unjustifiable indulgence, and would fain persuade

us that it was a virtue. True, she makes Ginevra suffer from her imprudence, neglect of filial duty, and disregard of the admonitions and wishes of the Church, but not as a merited chastisement. She points all our indignation at Neville, and bids us behold in Ginevra only a martyr to religion. Here her Ladyship is wrong, and shows her own defective moral sense. It is this we censure, not her not having made Ginevra a perfect character.

Other faults we could point out, but we have said enough for our purpose. As novels go, *Grantley Manor*, notwithstanding what we have urged against it, deserves, even under a moral point of view, a high rank ; and we have criticized it, not because it is worse, but because it is better, than the average. We have, however, in our remarks, looked beyond its particular merits or defects, to popular literature in general. We have wished to call the attention of our popular writers, among the laity, to a fact which they seem to us not to have duly considered, that they may err against religion when the topics they treat are not immediately religious. All principles, whether literary, political, or scientific, are related to the principles of theology. Almighty God has created and sustains and governs all things in order to the Church, his Immaculate Spouse. Nothing in the universe can be seen in its true light, in its real relations, save from her point of view. She, in the ontological order, is not subsequent to reason and nature, but they are subsequent to her ; and reason, if strong enough and clear-sighted enough to see truth in its unity and catholicity, would perceive, that, without the dogmas of the Catholic faith, it would cease to be reason. The Church is no accident in creation or Providence. As this lower world was made for man, so man was made for the Church, the crowning glory of the works of the Almighty. Every thing is related to her. All truth, in whatever order we find it, is from God, through her, and has its unity and complement in her alone. It is important that we remember this.

This being so, theology, as the schoolmen always maintained, is the science of sciences, and gives the law to every particular science, and therefore to every department of human thought. Consequently, every psychological or ontological, every literary or political error, is at bottom an error against faith, and, if pushed to its last consequences, would be found to deny some element of the Church's teaching. Here is the great fact which our popular writers seem to us to overlook. They seem to us

to write under the persuasion, that, if they are not professedly treating theological topics, they are in no danger of erring against religion ; that religion has nothing to do with their literary, political, or scientific principles ; that, if they adopt false principles under these heads, it is their own affair, and religion has no right to call them to an account for it. Literature, politics, science, they assume, are subject to human reason alone, exempt by their very nature from all ecclesiastical or theological supervision or control ; and if they assent to the several articles formally proposed by the Church as *de fide*, no fault can be found with them, whatever the views they advance, or the tendencies they follow. Hence it seldom occurs to them, when not writing professedly on religious topics, to compare the principles they adopt with the principles of their religion ; and hence it is not unfrequently we find them, in their literature, politics, and pretended sciences, undermining the very truths they assent to in their profession of faith.

It is true, that, though every error is at bottom an error against faith, or the truth taught by the Church, yet not every error is culpable or a heresy ; for no error is counted a heresy that is not immediately against some proposition of faith, and none is culpable that is free from malice. It is true, also, that the Church does not take official notice of errors which are only indirectly and remotely against faith. But no error is harmless. Errors, as Melchior Cano teaches us, which do not kill faith outright, may yet impair its soundness, render it weak and sickly, and hinder the free, healthy, and vigorous growth of Catholic piety. Even these indirect and remote errors against faith, which may coexist in the mind with a firm faith in the Christian mysteries, conceal the germs of heresy, which some acute, bold, and self-willed reasoner may one day develop and mature into a doctrine formally heretical, and which may prove the destruction of thousands, perhaps millions, of souls. All heresies take their rise in popular literature or science. No heresiarch sets out with the express and formal denial of the faith, for no man in the outset intends to be an heresiarch, — ever says to himself, Go to, now, let us found a heresy. His heresy is only the logical development of principles which he finds already incorporated into popular literature and science, already received as axioms by the popular mind, and held by persons of unquestioned orthodoxy. What lies barren, or apparently so, in other minds becomes fruitful in his, and ripens into doctrines directly and immediately against faith. He,

having more confidence in his own judgment than in the decision of the Church, or being too proud to acknowledge his errors, adheres to them after their condemnation by authority, and thus becomes an heresiarch.

It is, then, never a matter of slight importance what are the principles and views we entertain and set forth even in those provinces which our popular writers are apt to consider as remote from religion. It is precisely from this quarter that danger is to be specially apprehended ; for popular writers, treating subjects not immediately connected with faith, and borrowing their views, not from the special study of the subjects to which they respectively pertain, but from the loose and uncertain public sentiment of their time and place, are of all writers those who are the most liable to err, and their readers, who are rarely the best instructed or the most devout of the Catholic community, are precisely those who are of all readers the least able to detect their errors. The danger becomes especially greater in a Protestant country, where we breathe constantly the atmosphere of heresy, and form our literary and scientific tastes and habits by the study of heretical writings. In England and this country, whether we are converts, or whether we have been brought up Catholics, our literary education, as far as relates to our own language, is received under Protestant influences, and from Protestant literature. This literature, whether grave or light, whether immediately or only remotely connected with religion, is full of false principles. We unconsciously imbibe these principles ; they become the habits of our intellectual life ; and whenever we write, unless on topics immediately religious, or unless we have received a special theological education, and that a thorough one, we necessarily reproduce them, and give as Catholic literature only a copy, usually an exaggerated copy, of the Protestant. The less directly connected with religion, the more remote from theological subjects, the more popular in its character this imitative literature is, the more is its influence to be dreaded. Kirwan's Letters are comparatively harmless, for the Catholic reader is on his guard against them ; but not so with one of Bulwer's or Miss Bremer's novels, or a Catholic novel written on similar principles, in a like spirit ; for such a work is not read for its theology, is not presumed to be related to theology, the reader is not on his guard, and therefore receives its poison before suspecting it to be poisonous.

In treating such questions as those to which we in our Re-

view for the most part confine ourselves, it is easy to keep clear of any grave errors ; for we have nothing to do but to write what has been taught us. But in popular literature, the case is different ; because that is the expression of our own interior life, and necessitates the application of Catholic truth to matters remote from the direct and formal teaching of the Church, and where we must trust to our own discernment of principles and power of logical deduction. If we are but little accustomed, as is the case with most men, to discriminate, if we are but indifferent logicians, if we are mere poets, sentimentalizers, or declaimers, and if our interior life, save in what is directly and immediately connected with religion, is formed by the heretical, infidel, and Jacobinical literature of the age and country, we shall produce only a literature which, as Catholics, we must deprecate, and which can be influential only for evil.

No class of writers need to be so thoroughly instructed in Catholic faith and theology, none need so much meditation and to approach so frequently the sacraments, as they who would write popular novels, or conduct literary and political journals. A political journal, conducted by a Catholic, circulating almost exclusively among Catholics, and exerting a wide and deep influence by appeals to the weaknesses or the dominant sentiments and tendencies of its public, yet, in all save what is immediately and formally of faith, breathing the tone, adopting the style, and advocating the Jacobinical principles of the literature which has formed the general character of its editors, can do more than the whole anti-Catholic press combined to retard, under existing circumstances, the growth of Catholicity in this Protestant country. We have, and have had for a long time, more than one such journal exerting its baleful influence, to the grief of our Catholic pastors and of every Catholic who prizes his religion, as he should, above all other things, — not excepting even politics and patriotism ; for patriotism itself is a virtue only when it springs from religion and is subordinated and made subservient to religion.

Literature must always exert a bad influence when it is the product of half-educated authors, who make up in impudence what they lack in humility, in conceit what they lack in knowledge, and in vehemence what they lack in sober sense and religious feeling. Such authors only echo what is popular, and reinforce what is already objectionable in public opinion. They are unable to discriminate between the popular and the

true ; and uniformly take it for granted, that, if they write what their public approves, they write what is just and true in itself. This would do, if they were Jacobins or infidels, but will not do, if they are Catholics, and wish to exert no influence not favorable to their religion. Literature is a powerful agent in forming the popular mind, and it ought itself to be formed by pure, holy, and Catholic minds and hearts. It should aim to correct, not to exaggerate, popular errors and tendencies, — not to follow, but to form, public sentiment. To do this, it is a matter of great importance that the men and women who are to produce it should know their religion thoroughly, should, by prayer, meditation, and the frequenting of the sacraments, be thoroughly imbued with its spirit, and then draw from this religion their inspiration and their principles. He who wishes to do evil may go with the current, wafted down the stream by the breath of popular applause ; but he who would do good must be always prepared to stem the current, to make his way, as best he can, against wind and tide. The applause of the multitude is never for him who is laboring to serve his day and generation. The people, when he is dead, may erect a monument to his virtues and bedew his memory with their grateful tears ; but while he is living, they will not be with him ; they will distrust him, thwart him, denounce him, and leave him alone with his conscience and his God. He who is not prepared for trial, for popular opposition, the wrath of demagogues, and of foolish men believing themselves wise, imprudent men believing themselves prudent, timid men believing themselves brave, ignorant men claiming to be wise, and impious men affecting to be pious, is no man to labor in the department of popular literature ; and to be thus prepared, one must live above the world while in it, must have his conversation in heaven, his affections weaned from the earth, and his heart set only on hearing at the last day that welcome plaudit, “ Well done, good and faithful servant ! enter thou into the joy of thy Lord.”

ART. IV. — *A Lecture on the Pentateuch. — Its Contents,
— its Inspiration.*

"The Scripture cannot be broken." — John x. 35.

"All Scripture inspired of God." — 2 Tim. iii. 16.

"Understanding this first, that no prophecy of Scripture is made by private interpretation: for prophecy came not by the will of man at any time; but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost." — 2 Peter i. 20, 21.

WE have reached a period in the world's history, when the minds of men seem to be engaged in a general and violent conflict, either on the subject of the Divinity of the Scriptures, or of the manner of interpreting them. Nor would this conflict be any thing more than the natural effect of human reason, were the issue of the case to be left to its capricious opinions. But, fortunately, the medium by which the one and the other can be decided depends not on the researches of human sagacity, but rests altogether on the requirements of supernatural authority. The Scriptures themselves claiming the character of Divine origination, no other than a Divine tribunal can arraign in judgment the conceits of the mind concerning them, can check the onward and far-spread progress of doubt, and can impart what is indispensably necessary in a matter so momentous, perfect conviction and infallible certainty as to the character and signification of the inspired writings. Possessing as we do, in the pale of the ancient Church, that necessary tribunal, we can entertain no misgivings of the Divinity of their origin, nor can we be led astray in their interpretation. To us, as by an hereditary right, belongs the deposit of the Sacred Scriptures; and carefully has it been preserved and dearly approbated, at every epoch, and by every generation, — "all true Catholics *adoring*," in the language of Tertullian, "*the plenitude of the Bible*," or affirming, with Robert, king of Sicily, that "it should be esteemed infinitely more precious than the diadem that sparkles on the brow of majesty."

And yet we sometimes delight in refreshing our minds in the limpid fountains of evidence which never cease to flow from heavenly sources. Bathing in them, our souls come forth, not only filled with delightful and salutary influences, but likewise unsullied by any mental defilement, if, peradventure, in the midst of our contact with the skeptic and doubting world, any such should ever involuntarily have attached to them. With this view, I have proposed to throw together

some ideas on the "Law of the Law," the title given by the Jews to the books of Moses, or the PENTATEUCH. The subject naturally divides itself into two parts : first, the *contents* of the book, and, second, their *Divine inspiration*.

The name PENTATEUCH is derived from the heads or books into which the subject-matter has been divided, these being *five* in number. And every tyro in the Greek language has learned its derivation. On opening the sacred volume, you will at once perceive the titles and mark the collocation of these five books ; namely, *Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy*. The ordinary reader of the Bible, in casting his eyes upon this fivefold division, would naturally be led to suppose that this division was made by the author himself in the original manuscripts. But such is not the case ; the ancient Hebrews knew no such division, — which is mentioned, for the first time, by Josephus, in his famous "Antiquities." They designated the Pentateuch, as I observed just now, the "Law of the Law," or the "Book of the Law."

The Pentateuch is an authentic and inspired narrative of events connected with the establishment of religion, as they occurred from the era of the creation down to the death of the author, — an unbroken and magnificent chain, of which the links are important and remarkable facts, through which the Providence of God can be visibly traced, and in all of which the finger of Jehovah is manifestly discerned.

The most important portion of the Pentateuch is the history of the Mosaic legislation. What precedes this may be regarded as a mere introduction or exordium ; so intimately connected with it, however, that it is necessary to the whole, and therefore cannot be separated from it. Through it we are led, step by step, to the mighty drama to which it is meant to conduct us ; as through an introduction to some magnificent poem, or through the exordium to some sublime oration. We follow the graphic and inspired author from one scene to another, through varied fields and lonely solitudes, until at length, ere we are aware of the majesty that is to burst upon our vision, we find ourselves at the foot of the mountain clad with the awful glories of the Most High, quaking under his terrific thunder, and gleaming with the fearful flashes of his lightning, from the midst of which supernatural coruscations and uproar, the Decalogue is published to the people shuddering with awe in the valley below.

The Pentateuch may very naturally be divided into three

parts. The first comprises the history of what occurred in the world from the period of its creation down to the death of the patriarch Joseph. And this part forms what is entitled *Genesis*, from the circumstance of its treating of the birth of things. The Hebrews call it *Beresith*, from the word with which it opens. It comprehends the space of 2369 years. The second part contains the Mosaic legislation, which runs through *Exodus*, *Leviticus*, and *Numbers*. *Exodus* is so styled from the *going out* of the people of Israel from the land of Egypt ; it is denominated by the Hebrews *Veelle Semoth*, and occupies a term of 145 years. *Leviticus* derives its name from the Levites, because it treats of the offices and functions, rites and ceremonies, of the priests and Levites, and is called by the Hebrews, from the first word with which it begins, *Vaicra*. The name *Numbers* is derived from the contents of the book, namely, the numbering of the people ; it is denominated by the Hebrews *Vaiedabber*, and extends through a cycle of about thirty-nine years. The third part is but the repetition of certain laws already given, and the addition of some new precepts, exhortations, and motives for the observance of the law already promulgated ; hence its appellation, — *Deuteronomy*, and in Hebrew, *Elle Haddebarim*.

In the Pentateuch, there are four distinctive divisions of character, namely, history, religion, legislation, and poesy : history the most accurate and simply narrated ; religion which reveals to the favored race of Israel a system Divine and authentic, raising them far above the position of the nations by whom they were surrounded, and marking them and their posterity as the true adorers of the only living God ; legislation breathing a wisdom and adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of the people which proved the heavenly source from which it emanated, and the temporal blessings which it was intended to convey ; and a poesy as far superior in beauty and sublimity to the most admired strain of the pagan muse as the spirit of prophecy is above the genius of human thought, or the fountains of inspiration are more grand, more deep, more bright, than the springs of human imagination.

Its history is the most ancient, certain, and interesting to mankind. It is the production of the proto-author, and therefore stands alone in the midst of the early years, telling of events and men and scenes which, had it not been for his halloved style, must have been lost and buried and forgotten. No author whom he might cite preceded his era ; on the contrary,

during a long series of years, his was the only record, and a record which begins its date with the birth of creation, relates how man, the great parent of the human race, was formed, and in what manner the earth was peopled. Under the divine description of Moses, every thing speaks with a thrilling and marvellous interest, every thing bursts upon the reader with a fresh and glowing beauty and sublimity. Chaos seems in labor, the elements of matter coalesce, as it were, and assume a consistency, which, by the omnipotence that brought them out of nothing, grows into form and symmetry, and palpitates with existence. The waters are separated from the dry land ; the firmament is thrown like a pavilion over the earth ; light flashes from the womb of darkness ; the sun ascends his flaming throne, from which, as from an everlasting watch-tower in the heavens, he is destined to regulate the days, the hours, the years, as long as time shall endure. The deep is rolled into its vast and fathomless abysses, and its billows are chained within their prescribed boundaries, traced by the Eternal finger on the sands ; the waters are alive with fishes ; the fields and groves swarm with beasts and reptiles, and are resonant with the incessant songs of joyous birds. Eden is prepared, with its sweet and beautiful gardens, its limpid rivers and ever-blooming bowers, for the reception of the lord of the earth ; and man, made after God's own image, standing erect, looking to the heavens of which he is destined to become an inhabitant, walks in majesty and dominion among the inferior animals. This is the character of the historic record of the Pentateuch.

Nor does the smallest shadow of uncertainty rest upon its accuracy or veracity. Both are placed beyond the influence of doubt ; both stand upon the authority of unquestionable truth. For, independently of the inspiration of its author, on every detail the characters of exact authenticity are visibly impressed. All the personages introduced upon the scene are mentioned by name ; all the epochs are distinctly marked ; all the events are intimately woven together, — like a chain, of which one link cannot be removed without causing the whole to break and fall to pieces. From Adam down to Noe, there is no interruption ; both eras are inseparably united together by a tissue of epochs and characters and events. The first man whose raptured eye beheld the wonders of the new-formed universe, and the family which, after witnessing the bursting of the cataracts of heaven, was preserved to re-people the regenerated

earth, seem to join hands, through an interval of two thousand years, — such is the unity of this record. Then, again, commences another concatenation, not less closely linked nor less uninterrupted, stretching down to the epoch of Moses, the legislator of the Jewish people, and the formation of the twelve tribes, the origin of the Mosaic legislation, and the entrance of the people of God into the land of Canaan ; all which facts are incontestably authentic.

Nor can it be denied that these facts are, moreover, the most interesting to the human race. They teach us our own history, which, otherwise, would have been but a vague, and perhaps mythological, tradition, like that of the posterity of Confucius, or of the other pagan nations. We are made acquainted, with perfect accuracy and beyond all misgiving, with our wondrous origin, with the formation of the universe in which we are placed, with the common parent of our race, with the great catastrophe which overwhelmed in destruction nearly the whole of the human family, — a catastrophe to which the common tradition of all nations, the fictions of mythology, and the condition of the globe, — cut up into continent and island, vale and mountain, in all of which are discovered fossil and animal remains, which by no other theory could be accounted for, — render a striking and universal testimony. Compare the mythology of Deucalion with the history of Moses, and it will be evident that the former tradition is founded substantially upon the latter. The "*Deucalion unde homines nati, durum genus*," of Ovid, whence derived except from the event of the deluge as narrated by the inspired historian ? from whose pen we also learn the manner in which the shattered earth was repaired, the heads and founders of the nations that afterwards spread anew over the face of the world, the account of the patriarch of the Hebrew people, their journeys in the desert, their legislation, and the prodigies and miracles which attested and confirmed the Divinity of the whole. Such is the nature of the historic part of the Pentateuch ; — and could any thing be more interesting or more important to the human family ?

The religious division of the Pentateuch displays to the mind a character manifestly divine, whether in regard to dogma or to morals ; and of these two constituents all true religion, it will be confessed, is composed. These make known what man must believe in his relation to God, and how he must comport himself towards his fellow-beings. They consequently

afford a double position, on which, as a believing people, we are to stand, — one eternal, the other temporal; one, like Jacob's ladder, reaching to heaven, — the other, like Israel's tents, spread on earth, and covering under their magnificent and beautiful expansion all the charities which should bind brethren together. In effect, what sublime ideas of the Divinity are not conveyed by the author of the Pentateuch, — ideas worthy the majesty of the Supreme Creator, and which, by their light and glory, cast into impenetrable shade the most gorgeous conceits and fanciful apotheoses of the wisest and politest pagan theologians? Only compare them, as they are left on record, whether in the loftiest strains of epos or ode, or in the elegant description of history, or in the romantic feats and triumphs of mythology. What are the "cloud-compelling" Zeus of the Greeks, or the demigods and penates of the Romans, when contrasted with the God of Moses, — one, omnipotent, eternal, whose fiat struck out matter from nothing, — who spoke and all things were made, — whose providence governs all the events of human life, whose infinite wisdom sounds the depths of the heart, unfathomable by any other power, who, in a word, by excellence, and by nature, is? Nowhere, except in the Pentateuch, has any appellation been given to the Creator that conveys the smallest idea of grandeur and self-existence, when placed by the side of the name by which he characterizes himself, — *I AM WHO AM, Ego sum qui sum*; a name which reveals the nature of the Divinity as clearly as it is possible to descry it amid the deep shades of this sublunary world.

The God of Moses is not, like the imaginary deities of his contemporary philosophers, indifferent to the fate, present or future, of human kind, consigning over to the caprice of fortune or the fatality of destiny beings endowed with intellect and immortality. He is the Father and the Friend of his people, walks in invisible, but yet sensible, majesty, amongst them; dwells in their tents, selects and treats them as his own precious inheritance; adopts them as his children, and, as the eagle with outstretched wings covers and protects her tender brood, he fosters them under the shadow of his presence and providence, nourishes them with manna prepared for their use in the clouds of heaven, and refreshes them, in the midst of arid and weary solitudes, with streams of pellucid water, leaping, at the stroke of his prophet's wand, from the barren and desolate rock. That God, who walked and conversed with Adam among the virginal bowers of Eden, continued with his posterity, although

tainted by the original iniquity of their progenitor, and in process of time, the more admirably to prove his love for mankind, embodied in the person of his Eternal Son the Divinity and humanity, and gave evidence to heaven and earth that it was his "delight to be with the children of men."

It is true that the author of the Pentateuch, having to address his language and adapt his ideas to mortal men, is compelled to speak of God after a human manner, — to attribute to the Eternal affections and faculties which, rigorously speaking, cannot be applied to him; yet this is counteracted by the exact and spiritual notions which he, at due times, conveys of the Divinity, and thus admonishes us of the true signification which should be given to his metaphorical expressions.

From the teachings of pagan philosophy no information could be derived respecting the origin of the world or the creation of man. Over these and similar momentous facts, a gloomy, an impenetrable veil of ignorance was thrown, which no hand, save one directed and empowered from above, could draw from the scene. Poetry, imagination, superstition, had in vain attempted to display to the bewildered reason of man the source and power to which all things — and himself especially — should be traced back. The Pentateuch removes every vestige of uncertainty, and discloses, in plain but splendid verity, the history of the formation of man's being; and while it exhibits the mortal part moulded, by a plastic energy, out of the slime of the earth, it tells, in like manner, of the soul, — the breath of the Eternal Spirit, who breathed into the comely, but originally cold and lifeless body, and infused into its nostrils warmth and immortality. It convinces the reader of the exalted and heaven-born character of man, the masterpiece of Infinite Wisdom, who, ere the perfect work was undertaken, seemed to deliberate with himself how to impress upon it the image of his own Divinity. One only word was all that was required to produce the heavens and earth, with *their ornaments* and irrational inhabitants; but the production of the intellectual and godlike master of creation is represented, in these pages, as the premeditated effect of the omnipotence and wisdom of the Trinity, — "*Faciamus hominem*, Let us create man."

Not satisfied with making man acquainted with his Creator, and with imparting the most accurate ideas of the Divinity, the author of the Pentateuch teaches, also, the duties which man is bound to pay him. Essential duties, founded upon the

natural relation existing between the creature and the Creator, upon the absolute dependency of the former on the infinite majesty of the latter, and upon the necessity of expressing and testifying, by homage and sacrifice and prayer, a profound sense of gratitude for the favors bestowed on the human race. Those duties are contained in the Decalogue, and may be comprised in that one great commandment, placed by Moses at the head of all the others : — *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, and with all thy mind* : a golden precept, which, including the love of one's neighbour as one's self, was promulgated afterwards by Christ the Messiah, as the compend of the New Law, as well as the cardinal maxim of the Old, on which the Law depended and the Prophets. Of this sublime nature is the religion prescribed by the author of the Pentateuch, — so pure, so enlightened, and so perfect, that of it mere human philosophy never could have conceived the faintest notion.

The legislative character of the Pentateuch is not less admirable, in its theory and adaptation, than the one of which I have just treated.

In promulgating his code, every legislator has some particular end in view ; and to this all his legislation is meant to be directed. Among various people, various objects were proposed to be attained ; that of the Spartans, for instance, differed from that of the Athenians ; and hence, while Lycurgus gave laws for the purpose of forming robust and vigorous men, Solon's legislation had in view the refinement of the mind and the polish of life, by encouraging the arts and sciences. Both succeeded in their different objects. The Spartan was famed for his bodily strength and activity, the Athenian for his mental elegance and intellectual accomplishment. A Latin poet, Propertius, has sung of the former : —

“ Multa tuæ, Sparte, miramur jura palæstræ” :

We admire thee, Spartan, in thy manly games ;

while Horace has not forgotten to transmit to posterity this eulogy of the latter : —

“ Adjecere bonæ paulo plus artis Athenæ.”

Athens hath added to the fine arts more.

An infinitely more vital and lofty motive than either of the former inspired the legislation of Moses ; it was the preservation of the Hebrew people from idolatry, the conservation among them of the knowledge of the Most High, and the preparation, at a

long distance of time, for the coming of the Messiah. On these as its essential foundation is based the whole of the Mosaic code, and all the circumstantial enactments that grew out of that original code must be regarded and understood in reference to that threefold object which its author had in view. To examine them all in detail would require volumes. Volumes, indeed, there are, within the reach of every individual desirous of entering more thoroughly into the study of this question, in whose elaborate and erudite pages nothing is left untouched that might demonstrate the supreme wisdom of the minutest points of the Mosaic laws. Suffice it, on this occasion, to appeal to experience as a witness. The clearest proof of the wisdom of a legislator is the fact of his having fully and effectually attained the end which he proposed by the promulgation of his laws. That Moses has accomplished this, the history of the past and the experience of the present render evident to the mind of the ingenuous and reflecting inquirer. If we go back into the past, we then find, in the midst of the dismal darkness and lamentable superstitions that enveloped and debased the surrounding nations of the earth, the Jewish people enlightened by the knowledge, and elevated by the worship, of the true and only God. If we cast our eyes upon the present, do we not behold the same people, despite of all their vicissitudes and their calamities, adhering with unprecedented fidelity — though, unfortunately, laboring under a sad hallucination — to the worship of the God of their fathers? Nothing can alienate them from Him who brought them out of the land of Egypt and out of the house of bondage. Their fidelity to the Law is, indeed, a marvel, and there is no means of accounting for it, except the profound and enduring conviction of its divinity, which neither dispersion throughout the universe, nor despondency at their long and fruitless expectation of the Messiah, can eradicate from their hearts. This being the end of the Mosaic legislation, its wisdom, consequently, cannot be disputed.

The laws of the Pentateuch are moral, civil, and ceremonial. The first — for example, the Decalogue, and the other precepts depending on it — are founded on the law of nature; they may be said to be a ratification, in more distinct characters, of that law which, having, in the beginning, been written by the Creator on the human heart, was afterwards inscribed by the same Eternal Legislator on tablets of stone. Hence it is manifest that this part of the Pentateuch could never be abrogated, but

was, on the contrary, emphatically enforced, by the Divine Legislator of the Christian world. The second—the civil—were those issued by God's own will, and regard either the administration of the government, or the duties of individual citizens. The third—ceremonial—emanated, in like manner, from God's good pleasure, and refer to the regulation, practice, and external rites of Divine worship. What an immense field for commentary here expands before the mind! But want of time forbids me from even entering upon it, and I therefore hasten to the consideration of the poetic division of the Pentateuch.

In approaching this topic of my remarks, I only regret that I am not possessed of at least a portion of the eloquence of a Rollin, a La Harpe, or a Chateaubriand, to do some justice to its exalted merits. The beauty and sublimity of the poetry of Moses immeasurably surpass the most admired strains of Homer; and eminently entitle him to the honor of being the first of poets, as we have proved him to be the greatest of historians, legislators, and theologians. Innumerable passages might be culled from the pages of the Pentateuch in exemplification and proof of this assertion; I will, however, direct your attention but to a few. Read, for instance, the blessing of Jacob, in Genesis, chapter xxvii.; the prophecy of Balaam, in Numbers, chapter xxiv.; and the blessing of Moses, before his death, on the tribes of Israel, in the thirty-third chapter of Deuteronomy. I point especially to these three passages, (numberless others, and particularly the canticle after the crossing of the Red Sea, might also be quoted,) as, in my earlier years, I attempted to render them, as literally as possible, into versification:—

JACOB'S BLESSING.

The dew of heaven may God bestow,
The fatness of the earth be thine;
For thee may corn abundant grow,
And ever fruitful be the purple vine.

Thee let the people always serve,
And the tribes worship as their lord;
Thy brethren ne'er from thee shall swerve,
Thy mother's children shall obey thy word.

Cursed the man who curseth thee:
Let him who blesseth filled with blessings be.

BALAAM'S PROPHECY.

How beautiful, O Jacob, are
 Thy tabernacles bright !
 Thy tents, O Israel, how fair
 And lovely to the sight !

As gentle valleys, crowned with wood,
 As gardens near the river's tide,
 As tabernacles pitched of God,
 As cedars by the water's side.

Out of his bucket streams shall flow,
 His seed in waters deep be proved,
 Agag, his king, shall be laid low,
 And his proud kingdom be removed.

From Egypt God hath brought him out,
 Whose strength is like unto the power
 Of the rhinoceros ; — they shall rout
 The hostile nations, and devour ;

And break their bones, and pierce them through
 With arrows sharp and merciless :
 He, lying down, hath slept, as though
 A lion or a lioness,

Whom to arouse from sleep none durst :
 Who blesseth thee shall blessed be ;
 But reckoned, too, among the accursed
 Shall stand that man who curseth thee.

THE BLESSING OF MOSES ON THE TRIBES OF ISRAEL.

“ Let Reuben live, nor let him die, for he
 In number small and limited shall be.”

And this is Juda's blessing : — “ Lord, give ear
 To Juda's voice, and hearken to his prayer :
 Conduct him in unto his people. And
 He shall fight for him, and no foe shall stand
 Against His helping and resistless hand.”

He said to Levi, — “ To that man of heaven
 Be thy perfection and thy doctrine given,
 Who hath temptation's strongest power defied,
 And been at contradiction's waters tried ;
 Who to his father, mother, brethren, spake, —
 ‘ I do not know you ’ ; and could dare forsake
 Their children ; these thy covenant have observed,

And from thy holy word have never swerved,
Thy judgment, Jacob ; thy law, Israel ; — these
With burning incense shall thy wrath appease,
And on thine altars holocausts shall place.
Lord, bless his strength, nor from him turn thy face ;
Strike, strike the backs of his fierce enemies,
And let not them that hate him dare to rise."

To Benjamin he said, — " In him shall dwell,
With confidence, the one whom God loves well,
All day, as in the chamber of a bride,
And rest between his shoulders shall abide."

He said to Joseph, too, — " The land be given
Of the Lord's blessing, of the fruits of heaven,
And of the dew, and of the sea below
That lieth, and of all the fruits that grow
And ripen by the moon, or by the sun,
Whether the everlasting hills upon,
Or on the ancient mountain-tops brought forth ;
Be his the fulness and the fruits of earth.
His blessing, in the bush who burned, come down
On Joseph's head, and on the Nazarite's crown.
On him, among his brethren, is conferred
The beauty of the firstling of the herd :
His horns like horns of the rhinoceros are, —
With them shall he the nations push afar
E'en to the earth's remotest boundaries.
Manasse's thousands, Ephraim's hosts, are these."

To Zabulon, — " In thy going out," he said,
" O Zabulon ! and in thy tents, be glad,
Isaachar ! to the mountains they shall call
Thy people, and upon their tops shall all
Their sacrifices offer, and shall slay
Victims of justice, and, as milk, shall they
Suck the deep sea's abundance, and their hands
Shall search the hidden treasures of the sands."

He said to Gad, — " Gad in his breadth be blest,
For like a lion he hath taken his rest ;
He seized the arm and head, and from his high
Preëminence, as his, doth he descry
Laid up the teacher, justices to tell,
And deal out judgment unto Israel."

To Dan he said, — " A lion young is Dan ;
He shall flow plentifully from Basan."

To Nephthali he said : — “ To Nephthali
Abundance, as his portion, there shall be.
Him shall the Lord with richest favors bless ;
The ocean and the south shall he possess.”

He said to Aser, — “ Blest with children he,
And to his brethren acceptable be :
Dip he his foot in oil ; for it must bear
A shoe of iron and of brass ; as were
The days of youth, so shall thy old age be.
There is no God, save of the rightest ; He
Who sitteth mounted on the highest heaven
Thy helper is, by whom the clouds are driven
Hither and thither, subject to his breath :
His dwelling he hath made above ; beneath
Are stretched the everlasting arms ; to naught,
Driven before him, shall the foe be brought :
Under the wings of peace shall Israel,
Alone and happy in his safety, dwell.
A land of corn and wine to Jacob's view,
And skies all misty with perpetual dew.”

Having, thus far, dwelt on the contents of the Pentateuch, we now arrive at the second part of the subject, namely, *the divinity of its inspiration*. This character of divinity appears from the manner in which Moses invariably speaks, addressing himself to the people, not in his own name, but in the name of the Omnipotent. He breaks upon the nation like a messenger from on high ; his language is the language of Heaven's ambassador. He is commissioned by the Lord to write the laws promulgated by Divine authority. If the mission of Moses be derived from above, it necessarily follows that the Pentateuch is Divinely inspired. But the divinity of his mission is attested in a twofold manner, — by his miracles and his prophecies. Miracles in Egypt, in the passage of the Red Sea, and in the desert, all which prodigious occurrences manifestly transcended the ordinary laws of nature, and are related in a simple, grave, and unaffected style. He mentions dates, designates places, names persons. He displays them anew to the eyes of his readers who had been witnesses of them, or, at least, beheld around them the monuments erected to perpetuate their memory. Nor do all these marvels reflect honor upon his people. Some, on the contrary, are humiliating to their pride, and an everlasting stigma upon many of their posterity. Among

these may be specified the death of Dathan and Abiron, and the leprosy of Aaron and his sister. The Israelites gave credence to these facts, — they followed Moses to the desert on the strength of his prodigious achievements, submitted to the yoke of a heavy law, and clung to their leader with a fidelity little short of enthusiasm. Would this have been the case, had the narrative of Moses been a fiction? Would he not have been contradicted, and refuted, and abandoned? Would it have been possible for him to impose so flagrant and notorious a delusion on the common sense of an entire nation, and entail it upon all posterity? No, men believed the writings of Moses because they knew the veracity of them; the events were fresh, and had been witnessed by a whole nation. They were acknowledged to be miraculous, and consequently it follows that the divinity of Moses's mission and the inspiration of the Pentateuch are signalized and attested by his miracles.

It is, moreover, confirmed by his prophecies. The accomplishment of events, predicted years, and even centuries, previous to their coming to pass, can be the effect only of supernatural inspiration. The seer, who, fired with a heavenly enthusiasm, summons up from the deep womb of the future deeds and persons, and describes them with the accuracy of one before whose eye they are existing, cannot be less than an ambassador from the Eternal, before whom "a thousand years are but as yesterday." Now Moses did this: predicted the prosperity of Israel, if faithful to the worship of Jehovah, and his calamities, if recreant to his commandments, — that fertility should dwell in the soil, that abundance should cover the land, that peace should hover over the nation, as long as they would continue obedient to the Lord their God. But if they should fall into idolatry, he warned them that all these blessings should be withdrawn from them: they should become the prey of their enemies, their beautiful land should be seized upon by the rapacity of strangers, and they themselves carried away into ignominious captivity. That all these predictions have been verified, no one acquainted with the history of the Jews can deny. The skeptic cannot cite an epoch when Israel was rich or powerful, without being, at the same time, faithful to the Law; and never was he forgetful of it, never guilty of the crime of idolatry, without being visited with condign punishments on account of his prevarication. In the midst of the surrounding providences of Heaven, the people murmur; and Moses predicts, that, in chastisement of their ingratitude and

mutiny, not one among them, — with the exception of Caleb and Josue, — over the age of twenty years, should reach the promised land. What was the result? Those two individuals alone excepted, the six hundred thousand souls who were then living perished, according to the terrible pre-announcement of their fate, in the heart of the wilderness.

Again, Moses foretold that the succession in the Jewish priesthood should be confined to the family of Phinees. This, too, was faithfully realized. For that favored family alone held the pontifical censer in the days of David, as well as in those of the Macchabees, and the long and uninterrupted series of pontiffs which we discover in the holy writings is traced exclusively through the posterity of Phinees.

He predicted, that, in consequence of not always having displayed sufficient confidence, during their trials, in the protecting providence of Jehovah, neither himself nor his brother Aaron should reach the land of promise. And both were, in effect, doomed to forego the privilege of treading upon that blessed soil, in sight of whose fertile plains and smiling valleys they were gathered to their fathers.

But still another, and a more extraordinary, prediction did he make, — one which, in the minds of the remotest posterity, and of all the inhabitants of the world, was to be the unerring test of his inspiration and the Divinity of his mission. This was, that ALL NATIONS should, one day, be brought to the knowledge and worship of the true God, and should be blessed in the seed of Abraham. And thousands of years after this announcement, we cast our eyes around the globe, and are filled with amazement, and confirmed in our faith in the Divinity of the Pentateuch, at contemplating the event. The gods of the Gentiles have been forgotten, the temples reared to them in Egypt, and in other once gorgeous and potent regions, when idolatry swayed the earth, have mouldered away, while the God of Abraham is adored and served wherever the sun shines, by Christian and by Jew.

He declared, moreover, that, in the fulness of time, God would raise up, from among the Jewish race, a prophet like himself, and a legislator supreme, whom all men were commanded to hear and believe, under the penalty of drawing upon themselves the wrath of Heaven. This wonderful personage was, indeed, to appear amid circumstances less terrific than those that accompanied the mission of Moses, but with credentials from the same Divine authority, — nay, with a person of

itself Divine, inasmuch as he was to be the Son of God and the Redeemer of mankind. Hear the words in which the author of the Pentateuch foretells, in the name of the Eternal, the advent of that Saviour : — “ I will raise them up a prophet out of the midst of their brethren like to thee : and I will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I shall command him.” — Deuteron. xviii. 18. Has that prophet been “ raised up ” ? The world has witnessed his coming. In Judea, as foretold, he made his appearance ; born of a virgin of Nazareth, he came forth from its shady valleys into the city of Jerusalem, and proclaimed his law ; — not, indeed, enveloped in dark clouds, and speaking amid the clangor of trumpets and the peals of thunder, but clothed in simplicity and meekness, like a brother among brethren, — vindicating his character as “ the prophet ” by innumerable miracles, discharging the functions which brought him into the world, and accomplishing to the letter the prediction of Moses.

Christians contemplate the fulfilment of the prophecy in the august and Divine person of Jesus of Nazareth. The Jews combine with Christians in its ultimate fulfilment, if not, according to their idea, in HIM, certainly, at some indefinite period, in their expected Messiah. Their incredulity, however, in the true “ prophet ” has not gone unavenged. The woes that have befallen their race, exiled from the Holy City, and scattered, without an altar, a priesthood, or a sacrifice, to the four quarters of the globe, prove the denunciation of the Messiah to be realized in their regard : — “ *Ego ultor existam*, I will be their avenger.”

Independently of these external characters of Divinity impressed upon the mission and writings of Moses, there are others of an intrinsic nature, which demonstrate the spirit of God by which he was directed. Impostors are not in the habit of giving very sublime ideas of the Deity, or of enforcing men’s mutual and necessary duties towards one another, or of vindicating the majesty and sanctity of truth. Moses, on the contrary, labors to inculcate, on every occasion, the loftiest notions of the magnificence and greatness of Jehovah ; has published the wisest laws touching our relations with our fellow-men ; and produced the most solemn, unequivocal, and convincing evidences of the veracity of his doctrines. To this end has he instituted the pomp and splendor of the Jewish ceremonial, which incomparably surpasses the inventions of other wise men, and sealed all the elements of his system by laws infinitely

wiser and purer than those of Zeleucus, Solon, or Lycurgus, — laws breathing a spirit of philosophy so sublime and excellent as never to have been emulated, much less equalled, in the most polished and enlightened subsequent epochs of time. From the miracles, therefore, and the prophecies of Moses, as well as from his virtues, disinterestedness, and veracity, his character as an inspired writer is unquestionable. Consequently, the Pentateuch is a divine book.

I am not ignorant of the objections which infidel philosophy has brought against the inspiration of the Pentateuch. I know that criticism has contested its authenticity and integrity ; that astronomy, history, and geology have essayed to contravene its epochs and its data ; that chemistry has taxed with absurdity the natural events it records, and ethics have condemned as cruel, unjust, and imprudent the legislation it decrees. But, on the other hand, I likewise know that all these difficulties have been thoroughly investigated, and entirely removed, by the aid of sound and enlightened philosophy. It would, indeed, be a truly instructive and eminently interesting study for every Christian, to apply the principles of such philosophy to all the perplexing questions which are deemed paradoxical by the superficial criticism of the impious philosopher, — the creation, the fall of man in the garden of Eden, the deluge, the history of the kings of Egypt, the passage of the Red Sea, the miracles in the desert, the story of Balaam, and the right of the Israelites to take possession of the land of Canaan. On these subjects a series of important lectures might be written to great advantage ; the matter, you perceive, from the mere heads, is copious, nay, inexhaustible, and I shall readily be excused from so much as touching upon it on the present occasion, when your attention, patient though I always have found it, has already been sufficiently taxed. A few moments more may, perhaps, be allowed me, to lay before you a last and irrefragable argument in vindication of the Divinity of the Pentateuch. It is this : — All Scripture has been written, not merely with the assistance, but under the immediate inspiration, of the Holy Ghost ; but the Pentateuch constitutes a part of the Scripture. This proposition has never been disputed by the Christian or Jew ; it is denied only by the skeptic, who eschews all revelation, or by the Manichæan, who pretended that the Ancient Testament was the production of the Evil Principle, or by the Albigenses, the lineal descendants of the followers of Manes, who, though they be lauded by the declamation of the enemies

of Rome as true evangelical Christians, yet rejected the Pentateuch, and the Old Testament, with the exception of the few isolated passages which Christ or the Apostles have quoted from them.

The usual arguments which are employed to demonstrate the inspiration of the Old Testament in general serve still more directly and more forcibly to prove that of the Pentateuch in particular, which is supported by the unvarying and perpetual tradition of the Jewish people ; and not only by the orthodox Hebrews, but likewise by all sects, — Samaritans, Hellenist Jews, and others, unanimously admit and hold to the inspiration of these writings of Moses. The Church, too, which was made by Christ the depositary of all truth, whether written or traditional, has ever esteemed inspired, and venerated and handed down as such, the books of the Pentateuch. Of this there is a bright and perpetual chain of evidences in the canons of the General Councils, in the writings of the Fathers, and in the discipline of the Church ordaining the public reading of those books, to confirm the faith of her children, by opening to them the primitive fountains of inspiration and Divine revelation. From those unerring sources the early apologists of the Christian religion were accustomed to draw their strongest arguments, — and, in a word, their authority was never questioned or disputed by the Catholic or the heterodox.

These books, then, being of heavenly origin, — their contents being Divinely inspired, — it is evident that our souls should love to drink of their living waters. The Church has never wished to close them against us. But, that they may produce the beneficial effect contemplated by her, she places the interpreting as well as the keeping of them in the custody of her pastors. By their vigilant care, the flock is led to these blessed springs, which are opened and dispensed judiciously and usefully, according to the wants and circumstances of all. This wise control must be approved of by every rightly thinking mind, — especially as in the Ancient Testament there are chapters which are as obscure to the untaught and superficial intellect as they are unsuitable to the inexperience and dispositions of the youthful heart. Hence the necessity of notes and commentaries, — hence the prudential conditions which are required in the general perusal of the Scriptures, both Old and New ; and hence, in fine, the carrying out of the maxim which St. Peter has left recorded in the text quoted at the beginning of this lecture : — “ Understanding this first, *that no prophecy of Scripture is made by private interpretation.*”

ART. V. — *The Dublin Review*. No. XLVI. Art. VI.
London : Richardson & Son. 1848.

PRESUMING, from the fact that two numbers of the *Dublin Review* have appeared without containing the remainder of its promised reply to us, that it is disposed, silently, to drop the controversy on *doctrinal developments*, we shall offer no formal answer to its last article on the subject, but content ourselves with a few statements and explanations which may serve to set in a clear and distinct light the principal points we have denied, and the doctrine we have opposed to them. With this, we shall take our leave of the controversy, till something new comes up to demand our attention or our animadversion.

The controversy which appears to have scandalized the recently converted editor of *The Catholic Herald*, — formerly one of the best Catholic journals in the country, — which has, no doubt, been painful to all our readers, and which can have had no attractions for ourselves, has not been one of our own seeking or provoking. It was occasioned by the publication of Mr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. The manifest favor with which some of our friends received it, and the use which our adversaries might make, and, in England and this country, were actually making of it, the high character of its author, the time and occasion of its publication, and the purpose for which it was presumed to have been written and published, combined to render it a work of more than ordinary importance ; the analogy of its peculiar theory with the popular doctrine of progress now so generally held by the sects naturally gave it many attractions for such Catholics as are strongly infected with the spirit of the age, and sigh to bring the literature of the Church into harmony with that of the world ; and its evident abandonment of the ground hitherto occupied by our theologians in their controversies with Protestants, and assumption of a new and doubtful ground, which gives the opponents of Catholicity an immense advantage over us, made our adversaries anxious to represent it, and to have it treated, as a work of authority on the real, if not avowed, sentiments of modern Rome. Was it likely, said they, that Mr. Newman, a man of various, rare, and profound erudition, of an acute, subtile, and highly cultivated intellect, — confessedly one of the master minds of the age, pious, humble, conscientious, — should, in a work apparently intend-

ed to be his *compte rendu* of the reasons of his conversion, write in ignorance or in contempt of the real sentiments of the Church, into whose communion he had evidently made up his mind to seek admission? Indeed, the reasonable presumptions in the case were strong in favor of the view our adversaries wished to take of the doctrine of the Essay. How, then, was the evil it might do, and actually was doing, to be counteracted, but by subjecting it to the test of well-known and settled principles of Catholic theology, exposing to the public its general unsoundness, and showing clearly that its theory is not Catholic, and cannot be entertained by Catholics? As all others seemed to shrink from the disagreeable task of doing this, we, with great reluctance, attempted it, and should, as Catholic reviewers, have been remiss in our duty, if we had not. Let not, then, those who regret the controversy censure us, who have only sought to resist a novelty, and to maintain the purity of Catholic doctrine; let them blame, if they must blame somebody, those who made the controversy necessary. We take no blame to ourselves.

What we have done would not have been called for, if neither those without nor some of those within had been disposed to regard Mr. Newman's Essay as a Catholic work. This we said in the outset, and we have all along conceded that it was never intended to be such a work, or a work from which Catholic teaching could be gathered. The author does not profess to be a Catholic, to write as a Catholic, or to present Catholic doctrine. He writes, not from the Catholic point of view, but professedly from the point of view of private reason, — as a man standing outside of the Church, and exercising his private reason on the phenomena exhibited by Christianity, regarded solely as a fact in the world's history. He does not profess to take his theory from Catholic theology, he does not attempt to support it by Catholic authority, or to propose it to be held by any one after he has come to the Church. It is solely the view which private reason takes of the phenomena in the case, and for those who, as yet, can use only "reason in things of faith." The general design of the author is to show that reason, taking Christianity as a fact in the world's history, which it must do, and exercising itself fairly and candidly on the phenomena presented by its history, must, on the principles of the inductive philosophy, come to the conclusion that the Roman Catholic Church of to-day is the true historical development, continuation, or representative of the Church of the

Apostles, and therefore, in her communion, if anywhere, genuine Christianity is to be sought and found. But his Oxford friends, though prepared to admit that this conclusion seems warranted by the general historical phenomena in the case, yet contend that there are certain special phenomena which are, after all, irreconcilable with it. The special theory is designed to be an explanation of these special phenomena, and to show that they do not militate against the conclusion warranted by the general phenomena presented, confessedly in favor of communion with Rome. It is a theory, therefore, specially intended for and adapted to these Oxford friends, Puseyites, or Tractarians, as they are denominated, that is, specially intended to prepare the members of the school within the bosom of Anglicanism, which the author had founded, to follow him into the Roman Catholic Church, into which he had resolved to enter.

Christianity is a fact in the world's history. This fact is to be met and accounted for in some way, and all the general phenomena exhibited by it, all the general reasons and presumptions in the case, prove that it is divine, and point us to the Roman Catholic Church as its true historical representation. But there are persons out of the Catholic communion who, while they admit this, find, nevertheless, certain variations and discrepancies of doctrine, discipline, and worship in the history of that Church, which, in their view, are insuperable obstacles to entering her communion. Here is the special difficulty to be solved. Now, grant the fact of the variations and discrepancies ; but suppose the Church, suppose her to be placed in the world, suppose her to be placed there to be active, to exert a controlling influence, and to subject to herself the minds and hearts of men, individuals and nations, religion and politics, science and art, public and private life ; suppose her designed to do this, with a divine energy indeed, but after a human mode, in accordance with the present constitution of human nature, and without altering or changing any of its essential laws ; — suppose this, and these variations and discrepancies are but the necessary incidents of the process she must institute and carry on, are only what we should naturally have anticipated, only what we must suppose the Founder, if we suppose him to have been divine, must have contemplated and provided for, and therefore, instead of being objections to entering the communion of Rome, they are really only so many arguments in favor of her being the true Christian communion.

Here is the special argument of the book, and, if allowable, it is certainly an argument not to be treated as of slight importance. Supposing it to be admissible, it is not only ingenious, not only profound, but is really a discovery of great value, — one of the most important contributions to polemical theology that can be conceived. It not only solves the objections of our adversaries, but converts their very objections into conclusive arguments against them, — vanquishes them on their own ground and with their own weapons. But whether admissible or not, it would have been no special affair of ours, if it had been regarded only as the argument of a man outside of the Church, addressed to his companions ; for then it would have been solely a matter between him and them, to be disposed of by themselves without our interference. But when the argument, as was the fact, is charged upon us as one which Catholics use or intend to use, or when it is assumed by some Catholics themselves as one we may use, the aspect of the case changes, and we are compelled to inquire, whether it be or be not compatible with Catholicity ; for we cannot use an argument for Catholicity which involves the denial of Catholicity. Neither Mr. Newman nor his friends deny or wish to deny this. Mr. Newman did not feel himself bound to teach Catholic theology, but he did understand very well that his theory would be inadmissible for the purpose he urged it, if it was incompatible with that theology, and hence he refers to Moehler, De Maistre, and some other recent Continental writers, — men, by the way, of no high authority, — who he supposes have asserted it, or something similar to it. Is the theory, then, which supplies this new argument compatible with Catholic teaching ? This question forces itself upon us, and, under the circumstances, we are as much bound to entertain and answer it as we should have been, if the *Essay on Development* had been the work of a Catholic doctor.

It is evident that the argument presupposes not merely the fact of developments, — Mr. Newman's name for the variations and discrepancies alleged, — but their necessity in the nature of the case. Hence, in his *Essay*, he spends his principal force in proving this necessity. Two questions, then, arise : — 1. Have there actually occurred the variations and discrepancies of *doctrine*, — for we waive discipline and worship, — as alleged by Protestants and conceded by Mr. Newman ? 2. Is the assertion of the necessity *a priori* of developments, that is, variations and discrepancies of doctrine, compatible with Cath-

olic faith and theology? Unless both of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the author is not at liberty to suggest his theory, his argument is fallacious, and can only mislead those who are without, — give them, at best, only a spurious Catholicity. We have answered both questions in the negative; we have denied the fact of the developments or variations alleged, as not historically proved or provable, as not acknowledged by approved Catholic doctors, and as contradicted by the Church, who uniformly through her Councils and Sovereign Pontiffs asserts the invariability of the faith; and we have denied the second, because it contradicts the assertion of the invariability of doctrine, because it is in opposition to the ground hitherto uniformly assumed by our divines in their controversies with Protestants, and because it makes Christian doctrine, not the revealed truth, but simply a human view of it, thus reducing, by Mr. Newman's own confession, Christian doctrine to the level of heresy and human philosophy. No answer has been given, nobody, as far as we have seen, has attempted to give an answer, to these reasons, and, till answered, they are undeniably conclusive.

But in denying both the fact and the necessity of development, what is it we have denied? *Development* is a word of vague and uncertain import. It may be the predicate of many subjects, — true of some, false of others; and it may be used, and by Mr. Newman and his friends actually is used, in several very different senses. We have not denied it of every thing pertaining to Christianity; we have denied it only of Christian doctrine, that is, of the material object of faith, and we have not denied it even of this in every possible sense. We have not denied or thought of denying the power of the Church to make new definitions of the faith, new explications of doctrine, as occasion demands, nor, in the sense of raising to the rank of formal faith what has heretofore been only material faith, have we denied, nor could we without asserting a condemned proposition deny, her power to establish even new articles of faith. What we have denied is the power of the Church to *found* or institute new articles of faith, or to define as of faith any thing which has not always been *materially* of faith, and the denial of which has not always been, at least, material heresy, although not always, for all persons, culpable heresy. This we have done on the ground that the Church does not make the law, does not create the obligation to believe, but simply declares it. What we have asserted is, that the material object

of faith is all the *revelata* deposited by our Lord through his Apostles with the Church, and nothing else ; and what we have denied is, simply, that any thing can be defined of faith, or become of faith, not *formally* included in the number of those *revelata*, that is, not in the *depositum*. We have denied what we understand Mr. Newman and his friends to maintain, that doctrines not included in the *depositum*, not originally revealed, but springing up from the pious feeling or meditation of the faithful, or from the speculations of human reason about revealed truths, may be defined *de fide*, although previously to being defined they are mere speculations, opinions, pious thoughts or feelings.

The Dublin Review reasons against us as if we denied that any thing can be defined of faith which has not always been *formally* of faith, or which it was not always formal heresy to deny ; and objects, that our doctrine denies that the Church can, for instance, rule the pious belief of the Immaculate Conception of the Ever-blessed Virgin, entertained now by all the faithful, to be of faith ; but it has no right to do this. All we say is, the Church can define to be of faith nothing which has not been materially of faith from the beginning ; for she is infallible, and nothing is materially of faith which is not of Divine revelation and handed down to us as such from the Apostles. The only question with regard to the pious belief of the Immaculate Conception, in our view of the case, is, whether it is or is not an Apostolic tradition, and included in the *depositum* ? If it is, the Church can define it to be of faith ; if it is not an Apostolic tradition, she cannot. Which is the fact we know not, and cannot know till the Church herself informs us. This she will do when she judges it necessary or proper, and that is enough for us. In the mean time, we take the belief as we find it, and hope we are behind none of our brethren in cherishing it in the sense and within the limits permitted. We are too young a Catholic to take it upon us to instruct the Church, to tell her what we do or do not wish her to do. We are satisfied to await her commands, and, in the mean time, to pray, as she permits us, — *Regina sine labe concepta, ora pro nobis !*

But things may be immediately or mediately, explicitly or implicitly, formally or only virtually, revealed, and *The Dublin Review* reasons against us as if we maintained that nothing can be of faith which is not immediately and explicitly revealed. This is not correct. We have maintained no such doctrine. We have simply denied that what is only *virtually* revealed, as

the property in the essence, is of faith or can be of faith, because it is easy to conceive that Almighty God could reveal the one without revealing the other, and one may deny the property without intending to deny the essence. Hence, with the generality of our theologians, we have denied that mere theological conclusions are of faith, and must do so, or else deny all distinction between faith and the science of theology. Theological conclusions are discursively obtained from premises, one of which is certain by the supernatural light of faith, the other by the natural light of reason. It is a principle of logic, that the conclusion always follows the weaker premise, —

“Pejorem sequitur semper conclusio partem.”

Consequently, these conclusions follow the premise from reason and are simply truths of reason, not revealed truths; therefore neither are nor can be of faith, — for they want the formal reason of faith, — *prima veritas revelans*.

Yet among theological conclusions, commonly so called, we may distinguish between those in regard to which the premise from reason is causative, and those in regard to which it is merely applicative or interpretative. The latter we have conceded may be of faith, which is as much as we can gather from Vasquez, Suarez, and others who are supposed to maintain the contrary opinion. But even the admission, that the first class of theological conclusions, theological conclusions strictly taken, are of faith, concedes nothing in favor of the development we have denied. If such conclusions are not of faith, then, certainly, no developments; but if they are of faith, it does not necessarily follow that there are developments. We lose, indeed, an argument against developments, but our friends obtain no argument for them. The number of such conclusions is limited by the nature of the case, and they all may have been known by the Apostles and explicitly handed over to their successors. If they are of faith, or, in the language of the developmentists, can be “ruled of faith,” it is some evidence that they were so, — that there is no one of which we can say that it was unknown in the age immediately succeeding the Apostolic, or which, for the simple reason that it is such conclusion, can be said to have been formally defined to be of faith by the Church.

But we are supposed to maintain that the whole faith has always been explicit, and that the Church can declare nothing to be of faith which has not been explicitly believed from the

beginning by all the faithful. But this statement is too strong. A large portion of the faith is never explicitly believed by all persons, and even with many who are not ranked with the simple, much of it is believed only implicitly. Also dogmatic facts and things which had not yet happened in the time of the Apostles are to be excepted. It is of faith that Christ died for me, because I am included in all men, and that Christ died for all men is explicitly revealed. But that he died for me could not have been explicitly believed before I was born. Hence, in the application of the faith to new facts which come up in the Church's history, there is, as Suarez maintains, a growth of faith, in the sense of some things becoming explicit which were at first only implicit. But, save what is included in these exceptions, we have maintained that the whole faith has been from the first explicitly held, believed, and taught by the Church.

The Dublin Review concedes this to be true as far as regards the *deposit* of faith ; but it maintains that the *deposit* did not include the whole faith, or, in other words, the Apostles did not hand over to their successors the whole material object of faith which they themselves had received. It will search long before it finds any respectable authority for so singular an opinion. The Apostles were commanded to teach all things whatsoever our Lord had committed to them, and we are not at liberty to believe that they proved recreant to their trust. We must have the express testimony of the Church herself, before we can permit ourselves to believe that the deposit of faith was incomplete, and left by the Apostles to be completed by development. If it is conceded that what was handed over as the faith by the Apostles to their successors has always been explicitly held, believed, and taught by the Church, all is conceded, we apprehend, that is objected to only.

We have, as Catholics, something more to maintain than the infallibility of the Church in defining propositions of faith, or judicially declaring the faith on obscure or disputed points, that is, her authority and infallibility as judge in controversies of faith. We must also maintain her fidelity to her solemn trust to teach all things whatsoever have been committed to her. To be unfaithful or to fail here would be as incompatible with her indefectibility as it would be to err in deciding a matter of faith or morals. She cannot wrap up in a napkin the treasure she has received, and bury it in the earth ; for she has re-

ceived it not merely to preserve, but to use for her Master's glory. Her office is to teach, and to teach the whole ; and how in the world could she transmit the whole faith down to us, if she should neglect to teach certain portions of it ? Where would remain that portion of the faith not taught ? How could she be said to retain it ? Where would she find it, nay, how could she find it, without a new revelation, when needed to condemn new errors and heresies ? She must teach the whole, or not preserve the whole, and there is no *implicit* teaching. Whatever is taught is and must be explicitly taught.

But we do not maintain, as is evident from what we have said, that the whole faith is explicitly taught to every one of the faithful ; nor, indeed, that the whole is explicitly known by every one even of the pastors of the Church. There may be a point on which this pastor is imperfectly instructed, or even misinformed ; another on which that pastor is not fully or rightly instructed ; but there can be no one on which all the pastors, or the pastors taken as a body, are at any time imperfectly instructed or misinstructed. Otherwise, the infallibility of the *Ecclesia dispersa* could not be asserted. It may often happen, too, that in particular localities, owing to causes which it is not necessary here to specify, the tradition of faith on certain points may, for a time, become obscure, or even lost, but it never can become so for the whole Church, or the Church as one teaching body, — especially for the Church of Rome, mistress and mother of all the churches. Thus, the African churches seem, in the time of St. Cyprian, to have lost the tradition of the validity of baptism conferred by a heretic. But the Church retained it, not implicitly only, but explicitly, as we know from St. Stephen. In this way are to be explained most of the phenomena relied on by the developmentists. The facts in the case prove always, that, though unknown in this particular locality or by this particular individual, misapprehended here or by this one, the truth is never unknown or misapprehended in the Church as a whole, and therefore the Church, in order to make it known or to present it truly, has not to develop and elaborate it, — has only to define anew what she has always held and proposed.

Again, in contending that the whole faith has always been *explicitly* held, believed, and taught, we do not contend that every point has always been *distinctly* held, believed, and taught. Faith may be explicit, and yet not distinct ; that is, the

whole faith may be immediately apprehended by the mind, and explicitly known to be faith, without its several propositions being distinguished, or apprehended in their distinction from and relation to each other. Hence the definitions which the Church makes *contra errores insurgentes*, though they do not render explicit the faith which was before implicit, may often render distinct what before was indistinct. Implicit faith is faith which, though implied in what is immediately apprehended, is not itself thus apprehended ; but indistinct faith is immediately apprehended, is the immediate object of mental apprehension, as truly so as that which is distinct ; but it is not distinguished from other propositions also immediately apprehended. When we stand on the beach and listen to the roar of the ocean, we actually hear the sound of each particular wave which goes to make up the total sound ; but we do not distinguish the sound of each from the sound of the others. So is it with the faith. Heresies and errors which arise from time to time draw the attention of the Church to particular points, and, in proposing the truth against them, the Church renders the faith more distinct and definite on those points than it was before, and, no doubt, the faithful can more clearly and *distinctly* apprehend it afterwards than they did or could previously. It is thus that faith gains, in process of time, as St. Vincent of Lerins says, in evidence, clearness, and distinctness, and to this gain heresies and errors, no doubt, contribute. Development of the faith in this sense we do not deny.

But even here we must be on our guard lest we go too far. The obscurity and indistinctness cleared up or removed by the new explications or definitions which the Church from time to time makes through her Sovereign Pontiffs and General Councils must not be lightly assumed to have existed from the beginning, nor can we always affirm that the faith on the points defined had never, previously to the definition, been clearly and distinctly apprehended. The obscurity and indistinctness may have been occasioned by errors which have arisen on matters not immediately pertaining to faith, and darkened the minds of many, rendered the faith, which was before clear, obscure, which was before distinct, confused, and the definition only restores the faith to its former clearness and distinctness. Thus, Pallavicini tells us that "all the Holy Council of Trent proposed to itself was to restore the faith which had become obscure by error to its pristine splendor," and the Holy Council

itself says as much. Indeed, we have met with no instance, in our theological reading, of a new definition by the Church, which was demanded for any other reason than to remove error and obscurity on points which had once been clearly and distinctly apprehended.

It seems to us that there is at the present time among many, from whom we should expect better things, a disposition to underrate the attainments in sacred science of the early Fathers; that the popular doctrine of progress has affected too many minds that should have been proof against it, and able to detect its falsity. The early Fathers were not the weak and ignorant creatures we moderns are too apt to fancy them. They were, even humanly speaking, the great men of their times, and their times were remarkable for great and even excessive intellectual cultivation. They lived, too, near the sources; they had been instructed by Apostles, or Apostolic men; and no man can read the fragments of their works which time has spared without feeling how much clearer, more vivid, and more loving were their views of Divine truth than are ours. We are, till we recall the wonders of grace, astonished at the grandeur, at the breadth and depth, of their views, the richness, variety, and precision of their statements. We feel how little we are in comparison with them, and that we become great simply in learning even a small portion of what they knew.

Undoubtedly, we may detect in the ante-Nicene Fathers expressions not safe or proper to be used after the Arian and other controversies arose; but this is no evidence that their views were inexact and their apprehension of the Divine mysteries was imperfect. Their language, at the time they used it, and in relation to the persons to whom they addressed it, may have been the best fitted to instruct and edify, on the topics they were treating, of any they could have chosen. Every age, as well as every nation, has its own language, which, though perfectly adapted to its own wants, becomes inappropriate and liable to mislead when transported to another. *Consubstantial* was an unsafe word when the Sabellian controversy raged; it became the appropriate symbol of the faith when the Arian controversy came up. It becomes again, not unsafe, but inadequate, now, when we have, as the rising error, the old Eutychian heresy, under a novel form, and are obliged to defend, not the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father, but the radical distinction between the human and the Divine.

The novel heresy concedes that "the Son is consubstantial to the Father," but adds, "and so are all men." There can be no doubt of the faith of the Church on this point, but we should look in vain in the symbol for a precise and formal condemnation of this blasphemous heresy, or the exact and formal statement of its precise contradictory. Hence it is that the Church has often to vary her expressions and to adopt novel terms to condemn novel errors; but who from this concludes that she opposes to the error a novel faith, or that she only imperfectly apprehended her own faith before the error appeared?

It may often happen, also, that learned and saintly men may continue to use the terms to which they have been accustomed a long time after, by the rise of novel errors, they have ceased to be accurate, and that, too, without any impeachment of the completeness, soundness, or exactness of their knowledge of the sacred mysteries. Such men are, in general, more engaged in the practice of truth than in the detection of errors of which they have not heard, and it may well happen that an error has stolen in unawares, has spread, and exerted no little influence, before they are fully apprised of its existence, or judge it worthy of attention. The great theologians of the Church, the learned and heroic souls, whom after ages are to venerate as saints, to whom it belongs in the providence of God to defeat Satan and his legions, and to triumph over error, are seldom the first to detect the approach of the error, and to sound the alarm. Men of smaller minds, less learning, less piety, less charity it may be, are the ones to do this, and they may be these, not because they better know the faith, but simply because they have had more familiarity with error, and live habitually nearer its confines. We could easily illustrate what we assert by examples which have come under our observation, but it is unnecessary.

Considerations like these are amply sufficient to account for the inaccuracies of language charged against some few of the ante-Nicene Fathers, and which are adduced as proofs that the sacred mysteries, during the ante-Nicene period, were only imperfectly developed and only imperfectly apprehended. The notion, that the faith, save in the respects we have expressly excepted, is better understood by us moderns than it was by the Christians of the martyr-age, — those Christians who lived so near the time when our Lord himself tabernacled among men in the flesh, who had such rich abundance of grace, who were so firm in their faith, so fervent in their piety, so heroic

in their constancy, who bore the Cross in triumph over Pagan art, philosophy, refinement, and superstition, and planted it on the Capitol of the world, — seems to us a gross insult to the memory of the Saints, and to proceed from an overweening conceit of ourselves, and base ingratitude to those to whom, under God, we owe it that we are not now ruthless barbarians, quaffing the blood of our enemies in honor of Wodin or Thor. Far more to the purpose, than to propagate such a notion, would it be for us to study to know our faith as well as they knew it, and to ask them to pray God for us, that we may have the grace at least to try to imitate their heroic virtues. They who rate highest the sacred science possessed by the Fathers will show the most gratitude and come nearest to the truth.

That the Apostles could not have communicated the whole faith explicitly to their successors without these successors being specially inspired to receive it, as is pretended by the developmentists, is a position which cannot be seriously defended for a moment by any one who does not confound faith with the *Gnosis* of the Alexandrians, or with the theological science of the Schoolmen. The Apostles had the whole clearly and distinctly in their own minds, and could far more easily and in a much shorter time communicate it to their hearers, than our modern professors of theology can to their seminarians. It was far less labor for their pupils to receive it, and treasure it up in their memories, than it is for us learn it now, when we have to spend far more time and thought in refuting error, in examining false systems, and meeting the objections of adversaries, than in learning the faith itself, — what is not to be believed, than in learning what is to be believed. This is sufficient ; for we have never pretended that the faith, as the contradictory of error, was as well known in the beginning as it is now, or that the Apostles instructed their successors how to refute all the objections which the craft, the ingenuity, or the malice of men might raise through all coming time against their faith. Yet even here, in what is not faith, but theology, perhaps, were we to inquire, or if we had the means of inquiring, we should find that we have made, save as to method, but small progress since the Apostolic age. But does any body pretend that the answers of theology to objections, or the solutions of difficulties and illustrations of obscure points offered by theologians, are inspired ? Do the developmentists ask us to prove that these are not and cannot be “ ruled ” of faith ?

These remarks are all we wish to add to what we have before said. It would not be difficult to account for the error of our English friends, if that entered into our purpose. They have neglected to draw a sharp line of distinction between faith and theology, and seem to us to confound what the ancients called the *Gnosis*, or Science of God, built up by speculation and meditation on the foundation of faith, with faith itself. In this science there may have been, for aught we know, developments, and certain it is that most of the errors and heresies which disturbed the Church for centuries originated in the attempt to construct it, and to know more of God than he has chosen to reveal. But of this we have had nothing to say. Whether, in the way the Christian Alexandrians attempted to complete their science of God, any advance was or was not made, we leave without the expression of an opinion; for all that was developed or added in this way is evidently distinguishable from faith. It was never, as Moehler, in his essay on *The Unity of the Church*, tells us, included in the symbol, and by it the Christian perfects, not Christianity, but himself.*

* "It is, then, true to say that the Christian seeks not to perfect Christianity, but by Christianity to perfect himself; he who will do the one must renounce the other." — *De l'Unité de l'Eglise*, Bruxelles, 1839, chap. 4, p. 121. We cite the French translation of this work, for we have been unable to procure it in the original German. This, we believe, was the first work published by the learned author of *Symbolism*. It is not regarded as orthodox, which is the reason, perhaps, why *The Dublin Review* does not cite it; but it is clear to us that it is the work which has contributed more than any other to the theory of development; and it should be read by every one who would understand Mr. Newman's Essay. It is precisely the work, half speculative and half mystical, to captivate an erudite and philosophical mind *in transitu* from Protestantism to Catholicity. Yet even in this work, in which the author goes decidedly for development, and seems to hold it essential to the perfect Christian, he takes care not to confound the developed with the revealed truth, or the perfection effected by the developments with the perfection of Christianity itself. He nowhere holds, with Mr. Newman, that development is necessary to complete the faith, to fill up its gaps, or to provide us with additional dogmas; but contents himself with representing it as necessary to complete the *life* of the Christian, or to realise subjectively the complete life of faith, — a doctrine to which we do not object, for it means, in plain English, only the practical application of faith to our entire life, or the conformity of our entire life to the faith. Under the strange disguises in which our German friends delight, we often find only an old and familiar acquaintance, and sometimes an old and valued friend. We have cited this work of Moehler as good authority for us against the

But, in conclusion, we will say, in justice to Mr. Newman and his friends, that the whole responsibility of this unsound and uncatholic theory, as we hold it, does not belong to them. It has for some time been floating about in the minds, and showing now and then a feature of itself in the writings, of some Catholics, for several years ; and we had observed decided tendencies towards it in more than one quarter, and had even expressed ourselves in our Review against it, before the appearance of Mr. Newman's Essay. It was this tendency to the theory already existing in many minds, no doubt, that prevented a general reclamation against the Essay on Development, and, we may add, which made it peculiarly dangerous. If we have made the Essay the occasion of discussing the theory of development, it has been solely because in it the theory has for the first time assumed a definite shape, a tangible form, in which it could be seized and handled. Yet the fact that it was already floating about in Catholic quarters, or that some Catholics were indicating a tendency towards it, must be taken as no slight excuse for our Oxford friends ; and since this fact already existed, it was well that Mr. Newman published his Essay. It has brought the matter to a head, and placed the theory fairly before the Catholic public. We have given our views of it, and the grounds on which we justify them. It is for the proper authorities to decide who is right, who is wrong. We have no fears that the decision will be against ourselves ; but, if it is, we have nothing to do but to retract, to give up error for truth, to say we have been wrong and are sorry for it ; which is no great hardship.

ART. VI. — *Vie de Saint Dominique*, par le Révérend Père Frère Henri-Dominique Lacordaire, de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs. 2^{me} Edition. Paris. 1841.

WE have introduced this most interesting and instructive biography, not so much with the design of reviewing it, as to enable us to attempt what we have long wished that abler hands would have achieved, — to give a plain, though brief and

theory of development ; but it cannot, from its acknowledged unsoundness, be cited as authority against us.

unexaggerated, history of the Albigenses and the Albigensian wars, in which St. Dominic figured prominently, and with admirable success, though not in the manner that is but too frequently supposed. It is the popular belief, at least in this country, that Dominic acted as a sort of leader or generalissimo in those bloody scenes, and even some Catholics appear to think that his conduct in this matter requires an apology. The fact, however, is, that there never was a man more emphatically a man of peace, and a herald of the Gospel of peace, than the blessed St. Dominic. His name is never mentioned by contemporary historians in connection with the Albigensian wars, except as a teacher of the ignorant, a consoler of the afflicted, and a model of sanctity for all. We shall, indeed, find him on terms of affectionate intimacy with Simon de Montfort, the chief of the crusaders, and wielding an influence over the knights and men-at-arms, and we shall have occasion in this article to refer directly to the history of his mission ; but in no instance shall we find him saying, doing, or suggesting any thing that could dim the effulgence of his name, or employing his influence in a manner to sully the spotless purity of his soul.

The Albigensian wars date their origin from the latter part of the twelfth century. The twelfth century had dawned gloriously. The banner of Christianity was waving in triumph over the Holy Sepulchre, and the Greek Church seemed more than ever on the point of reconciliation with the Latin. The Turks, vanquished on every side, and threatened in their very capital, halted in their ruthless and tempestuous incursions into Europe, and retreated to the defence of their own firesides. But bright though its dawn, the eve of this century was gloomy enough. The crescent had supplanted the cross on the minarets of Jerusalem, and the knights of Christendom had fallen before the sabres of the Mussulmans. The ungrateful and treacherous Greeks, in consequence of their insulting treatment of the Catholics, were farther than ever removed from the centre of unity. Worse than all, there prevailed among Churchmen a great degree of immorality, and all the efforts of the Popes to revive the spirit of piety and to restore ecclesiastical discipline were powerless against the rushing tide of simony, worldliness, and avarice. We need not be surprised, then, if upon the wave of so many abuses and crying sins there should appear another and yet more terrible evil, because less

likely to be cured, that of heresy. In the language of Father Lacordaire :—

“ One day, about the year 1160, Peter Waldo, a wealthy citizen of Lyons, saw a man struck dead by lightning at his side. This event made such an impression upon him, that he distributed all his goods to the poor, and consecrated himself entirely to the service of God. As ecclesiastical reform was then the universal demand, he had no difficulty in fancying that he was commissioned from above to bring it about, and he gathered around him a little band whom he persuaded to join him in embracing an apostolical life. How little do the projects of really great men differ from those of men who are but the disturbers of public tranquillity ! If Peter Waldo had possessed a greater degree of virtue and more genius, he might have been a St. Dominic or a St. Francis. But, unhappily, he fell a victim to a temptation that in every age has caused the ruin of men otherwise intelligent. He believed it impossible to save the Church by means of the Church. He asserted that the True Spouse of Jesus Christ had failed in the time of Constantine, who allowed the Church to come into possession of temporal goods ; that the Church of Rome was the harlot of the Apocalypse, the mother and mistress of every error ; that all prelates were Scribes, and all religious were Pharisees ; that the Pope and bishops were all homicides ; that it was unlawful for the clergy to accept of tithes or glebes ; that to endow churches and convents was mortal sin ; that it was the duty of all clergymen, of whatever rank, to gain their livelihood by their hands, as did the Apostles ; and finally, that he, Peter Waldo, was the one destined by the Almighty to reestablish, on its primitive footing, the genuine society or assembly of the children of God.” — pp. 7, 8.

Under favor of the same circumstances that protected and gave stability to the heresy of the Waldenses, so called from this Peter Waldo, sprang up by its side in the south of France another heresy, that of the Albigenses, the history of whose origin and progressive march through Europe is invested with a peculiar interest to us, because a very numerous body of our fellow-citizens, respectable alike for their affluence, their learning, and their social virtues, claim these same Albigenses as their spiritual progenitors. We shall begin by tracing out the origin and progress of the sect.

Near the commencement of the third century of our era, was born, upon the estate of a rich widow, a certain slave. As he advanced to manhood, he developed a figure of remarkable symmetry and beauty, and gave evidence of genius and wit.

His mistress, captivated, we presume, more by his beauty than his talents, after presenting him with his freedom, adopted him as her son. She provided liberally for his education, selected for his teachers the most celebrated philosophers, caused him to be instructed in all the sciences, mysteries, and magic arts of Persian lore ; and then died, leaving him the sole inheritor of all her wealth. Among the books that constituted a portion of his inheritance were the works of a famous heretic, filled with extravagant and revolting theories, chiefly derived from the ancient Gnostics. This was food well suited to the cravings of his appetite, and he seized and devoured it with a greediness that increased in the ratio of the quantity consumed. To assist digestion, he occasionally appeared in public as a religious teacher ; and being gifted with a pleasing address and a melodious voice, he attracted crowds of eager listeners. Some of his auditors were pagans, but a large number were Christians, who had degenerated from the pure faith of their fathers. He claimed to be a new apostle, nay, the very Paraclete, announced and promised by the Son of God. The very boldness of his pretensions gave him an influence over the spirits of men, and they regarded him with reverence, as a being commissioned from above, and attributed to him the power to heal disease and infirmity. The fame of his exploits reached the palace of the king of Persia, and he commanded him to heal his son, who was suffering under a malady pronounced incurable by his physicians. The impostor promised to heal the patient by the potency of his prayers. However, the prince died under the treatment, and the pretended apostle was thrown into prison. He escaped, proclaimed anew his pernicious doctrines, was retaken and flayed alive. Such was the life and such the death of Manes, the founder of the sect of the Manichæans.

As it will aid us somewhat in analyzing the subsequent conduct of the partisans of the sect we are about to encounter, we shall here briefly enumerate the leading points of belief of the ancient Manichæans.

1. They inculcated the existence of two Gods, one good and one evil, each independent of, and each laboring to destroy, the other. One was the author of good, the other of evil. The soul was the work of the Good Principle, and was, therefore, essentially good, and could do no wrong. The body, on the contrary, was the work of the Evil Demon, for the deeds of which, therefore, the soul was not accountable. This was no new doctrine, but had been taught by the *Gnostics*, or

knowing ones, in the Apostolic age, and before them by Zoroaster.*

2. They inferred, that, as the body was the work of the Evil Principle, marriage was unlawful, though every excess of passion was exempt from guilt.

3. They denied, for the same reason, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and consequently all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, and treated as idolatrous most of the pious practices of Christians.

4. They rejected the Old Testament, as the work of the Devil.

5. They were formed into a fraternity composed of different degrees, nearly corresponding with the degrees of modern Freemasonry. There were *novices*, *auditors*, the *initiated* or *elect*, and *grand-masters*. They were bound to the strictest secrecy, so much so as to hold it for a maxim to *swear truly or falsely, but never to divulge the secret*. Thus were they the fathers and models of secret societies.

6. Their political principles were comprised in two words, — LIBERTY and EQUALITY; that is, with their views, licentiousness and contempt of superior authority.†

After the death of Manes, his followers daily multiplied, and continued zealously to propagate his impious doctrines, and added to them another, which, in the course of time, took precedence of all the rest, and in after ages constituted the characteristic feature of the sect, — namely, revenge for the death of their founder. He had been put to death by a king. His punishment had been that of a slave, — he was flayed alive. His doctrine had been condemned and successfully resisted by the Church. Hence his followers pledged themselves by the most terrible oaths to wage a bitter and interminable war against kings and governments, against all distinctions of rank, and, above all, against religion and its ministers. As religion was the basis of all order, and the ligature that bound men together, and cemented and strengthened the civil, social, and political compact, they concentrated all their efforts to impair its influence, and to destroy its institutions.

They proceeded adroitly. They began by familiarizing their victims with sneers against religion and with opprobrious epithets. They were the first that styled the Church the Scar-

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Vol. II. p. 273.

† *Ibid.* Also, Henrion, *L'Histoire Ecclesiastique*.

let Woman of the Apocalypse. From them their modern descendants have borrowed that expression. They also called it a den of thieves. The bells of churches they were pleased to denominate bugles of the Devil,* as their imitators and offspring of more recent times bestowed upon organs the quaint appellation of "Devil's bagpipes." St. Augustine, who in his youth had adopted their doctrines and knew them thoroughly, says, that they took an oath of secrecy, and received for a maxim, "*Jura, perjura, secretum prodere noli* ; Swear true, swear false, but never divulge the secret." They adopted signs and passwords, and saluted with the cabalistic expression, "Have you seen the light ?" and other similar phrases. On shaking hands, they could recognize an adept from one not initiated. In their places of assembling were to be seen mysterious emblems and enigmatic pictures ; most frequently representations of the sun, moon, and stars. St. Augustine says, that, when they prayed, they turned toward the sun by day, and toward the moon by night.† Among their mysteries was a frightful one called Bema. At a certain season every year they assembled around a mortuary catafalque, elevated on five steps, and covered with significant decorations. They rendered homage to the man supposed to rest under this catafalque. That man was Manes. It was his horrible death they celebrated, and it was on this occasion that they annually renewed their vow of extermination and death to kings and priests. The season devoted to these abominable orgies was the same that Christians consecrate to the death and resurrection of Christ. Few of these matters, however, were revealed, except to those in the highest grades, or the initiated. The ostensible object and character of the sect, that which met the public eye or attracted general attention, was that of a pious and charitable brotherhood. They professed great virtue and purity of life, and were ever ready to aid with money or protection the distressed members of their society, or their surviving widows and orphans.‡

For centuries the Manichæans went on multiplying and spreading the poison of their sentiments over every portion of the Christian world. Popes, princes, and magistrates knew of its presence, — they could perceive its effects by the devastation and misery it produced, — they knew well that the virus

* Sismondi, *Hist. des François*, Vol. VI.

† Hurter, Vol. II. p. 293.

‡ Henrion.

was at work and rapidly approaching the very heart of Christian Europe, —but they endeavoured in vain to detect it, and they knew not how or where to apply the antidote. The members of the sect concealed themselves with such art that it was almost impossible to find them. They assisted at mass and at the Church offices promiscuously with Catholics. They even received communion with the faithful, though they disbelieved the real presence; and if for any cause they were suspected and interrogated, they answered like Catholics. This was their spirit from the beginning,* and is particularly mentioned by St. Augustine and St. Leo. Peter of Sicily, and after him Cedrenus, speak of the same trait in the Paulicians, who were a branch of the Manichæan sect. When closely questioned, they disguised their true sentiments by artful equivocations. When at length they had become sufficiently numerous and formidable, they were less guarded, and in some places openly arrayed themselves against their princes and took up arms; in consequence of which Imperial laws were enacted in the ninth century, which condemned them to imprisonment and death.†

One thousand years of the Christian era had elapsed when the Manichæans appeared for the first time in France (A. D. 1017). The heresy was introduced by an Italian woman, who, by her fascinations and charms, (in which women are said to be preëminent,) succeeded in inveigling two canons of Orleans, who enjoyed a high reputation for learning and sanctity. From them the contagion spread, and as corruption of manners most commonly engenders extinction of faith, so, as men's morals were in that region at a low ebb, a large number of the clergy were infected before any remedy could be applied. The new apostates, like the fox in the fable, were anxious to involve as many as possible in the same dilemma with themselves. Accordingly, they devised a thousand ways to propagate their views. They tripped with mincing steps into private houses, proffering religious instruction to the inmates, assuming a sanctified countenance and a drawling accent, and wearing, we might almost add at a venture, black coats and starched cravats. They patted little children on the head, and spoke kindly to them, and would ask if they stood in need of raiment or of playthings. They insinuated themselves, both men and women, into the chambers of the sick, and inquired

* Sismondi, Vol. V.

† Bossuet, *Varia*, Tom. I.

tenderly after the health of the patients. They announced to all, that truth, and goodness, and peace of mind were to be found only in their community. They wrote an abundance of little tracts in which were contained their least offensive doctrines, and threw them into people's windows and doors, and scattered them by the way-side and in the fields. On the envelopes of these tracts it was announced that they had been composed in heaven, and had been brought thence by angels, in corroboration of which assurance the finder was invited to apply them to his nose, and snuff the celestial odor they distilled. They were strongly scented with musk. Many persons, among whom were some weak-minded ecclesiastics, allowed themselves to be taken in these snares, whilst others more clear-headed publicly exposed their impostures.*

At length, in 1022, a person of great repute, and of sound erudition, named Aréfaste, a sincere and fervent Catholic, determined to discover what these new professors really taught, and for this purpose insinuated himself into their confidence, pretending to seek instruction. He was after a while admitted to a seat in their assemblies, where they appeared to be constantly occupied in quoting and expounding the Sacred Writings. They exhorted him to be converted, to forsake the ways of darkness and to walk in the light. Aréfaste listened with a modesty and attention that delighted his preceptors. So soon as they felt sure of him, they expatiated freely upon the most sacred mysteries of Christianity, and treated them as the ravings of enthusiasts. They, at last, condescended to inform him that the heavens and the earth, by their very nature eternal, had neither cause nor beginning; that Christ was never born of a virgin, and had never suffered for men, but that a demon was crucified in his form; that he had never risen from the dead; that baptism was of no efficacy whatever; and, finally, that good works were useless, and the most violent excesses of passion innocuous. By night they assembled in a retired place, and, torch in hand, they recited after the manner of a litany the names of evil spirits, till one of them, either by jugglery or magic, actually appeared. Then, having extinguished their torches, unutterable abominations followed. At certain meetings, or rather Saturnalia, they burned an infant eight days old, the fruit of these infamous excesses. The ashes were collected and honored with religious veneration. It was used

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. p. 284.

in the reception of novices, and was given to the dying by way of viaticum.

Aréfaste, having carefully informed himself of these impious orgies, and of the principal individuals who practised them, communicated his discoveries to the king (Robert II.), who immediately hastened to the spot. The day after his arrival he ordered the arrest of all the persons accused. Aréfaste was seized with the rest, that they might not suspect him of being the informer. A council of bishops was forthwith convened, and the prisoners were brought before it. At first, they equivocated as usual, and professed to believe like Catholics ; but, confronted with Aréfaste, and seeing no way of escape, they made a virtue of necessity, and boldly avowed the sentiments with which they stood charged ; they derided the most sacred truths of Christianity, justified the revolting practices alleged against them, and set at open defiance the king and his laws. The people were exasperated to such a degree, that they could with difficulty be restrained from tearing the prisoners piecemeal ; the latter were immediately sentenced and led forth to execution, and, in accordance with the laws then in force, paid with their lives the forfeit of their crimes.*

The vigorous measures adopted by King Robert effectually purged his domains of these dangerous sectarians, and forced them to seek refuge in other regions. By careful concealment of the worst features of their sect, they succeeded, at length, in establishing themselves in the neighbouring provinces. Thus was formed the germ of the sect which, under various names, became so notorious in the south of France, where the effeminacy and neglect of luxurious magistrates afforded them opportunities and means to acquire strength, and in the course of time to inundate the entire land with blood and threaten the safety and stability of both church and state.†

‡ This country was peculiarly adapted to the propagation and rank growth of Manichæism. It was in the twelfth century, in a commercial point of view the most flourishing, and in a literary one the most civilized, part of Western Europe. The soil was rich, and its produce exuberant, and amidst the corn-fields and vineyards arose many rich cities and many stately castles. It was there that the spirit of chivalry first laid aside its terrors and appeared as the inseparable associate of art and literature, of courtesy and love. The language of Provence

* Bossuet, *Variæ*. Henrion, Tom. IV.

† Henrion.

was already the language of the learned and polite. A literature rich in ballads, in war-songs, in satire, and, above all, in amatory poetry, amused the leisure of the knights and ladies whose gorgeous mansions adorned the banks of the Rhone and Garonne. But, alas ! with civilization had come also freedom of thought and irreligion. Elsewhere, unbelievers and scoffers were regarded with execration, and dared not avow their sentiments. Not so in the rich and luxurious regions of Provence and Languedoc. The people lived in habits of courteous and lucrative intercourse with the Moorish kingdoms of Spain, from which they imbibed many skeptical notions. They gave also a welcome reception to teachers and mathematicians, who, in the schools of Cordova and Granada had become versed in all the learning and theological impieties of the Arabians. The Greek, too, still preserving, in the midst of his political degradation, the inquisitive spirit of his fathers, brought to the marts of Narbonne and Toulouse, together with the drugs and silks of remote climes, their bold and subtle theories. The Paulician theology, which was a modified Manichæism, spread rapidly among them and fastened deeply its roots. Religion lost all authority with all classes, from the great feudal princes down to the cultivators of the soil, and the clergy were regarded with contempt.* The troubadours, inebriated with their subtle theories, went from chateau to chateau, enlivening social reunions with jests upon things the most sacred, caricaturing priests, and relating scandalous tales of bishops, monks, and nuns ; by which means they engendered, at first, indifference, then aversion, to religion and to its ministers. The common people were pleased with the new doctrines, for they flattered their pride, and placed them on a level with the most aristocratic ; the higher ranks were enraptured, for they saw in the diffusion of these theories the perspective of a libertine life, wine and women, tilts and tournaments, luxury and pleasure.

It was in the year 1181 that the new sectaries became formidable in the south of France under the name of Albigenses, so called from the town of Albi, which was one of their strongholds. Protestants are fond of claiming the Albigenses as their progenitors, and amuse themselves with poetic and sentimental effusions upon the faithful few concealed in the verdant plains of Provence, in the passes of the Pyrenees, and

* *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1840.

in the valleys of Piedmont, that had not yet bowed the knee to Baal. But that these their boasted ancestors held to many of the distinguishing principles of the Manichæan sect is as certain as any fact recorded in history. Every candid Protestant writer admits it. Macaulay, in the *Edinburgh Review*, just cited, expressly declares it, and Sismondi, in his *History of the French* (Vol. VI.), states it as a fact. They themselves, when brought to the test, boldly confessed it. At the council of Lombez, though in many things they equivocated, as usual, yet in others they spoke plainly, and declared that they rejected the Old Testament altogether; that sacraments administered by wicked men were invalid, but that all good men, that is, men of their sect, whether ordained or not, could lawfully administer them; that judicial oaths were unlawful; also marriage and infant baptism. Father Renier, a Dominican, who wrote in 1250, and who had been for seventeen years a member of the sect, but, like another St. Augustine, was converted to Catholic truth, positively asserts that they were Manichæans, and clearly traces their descent from the Manichæans of Bulgaria. Many others, educated among them, give similar testimony; as, indeed, do all the Catholic authors of those times, who have treated at all on the subject. It is to be presumed that they must be hard pushed for ancestry, especially "the churches of the English communion," as Dr. Jarvis facetiously styles the Protestant Episcopal Church, who adopt a decayed, cast-off ancestry like this, and that for no conceivable reason but because they agree with them in abusing the Church and calling the Pope hard names.*

After sixteen years of forbearance and fruitless efforts to restrain the excesses of the Albigenses by the arts of persuasion, in 1181 recourse was had to arms. This measure became absolutely necessary in consequence of their daily and cruel depredations. Allied with the Cotteraux, a famous band of brigands and assassins, the terror of the country, and patronized by many powerful lords and knights, they ravaged the neighbourhood and committed frightful excesses. "I have witnessed," says a contemporary writer, — Stephen, abbot of St. Geneviève at Paris, — "on every road where I passed, the smoking ruins of churches consumed by them, and the habitations of men converted into the dens of wild beasts."

Raymond V., Count of Toulouse, demanded of the king

* Bossuet, *Varia*.

of France an armed force to protect the Catholics, and to bring the offenders to terms. A numerous army was marched to the field, which was completely victorious. The consequence was, that many of the rebels returned to their allegiance, and externally, at least, embraced the Catholic faith. A temporary tranquillity ensued. But it was only temporary.* In less than ten years the Albigenses were found stronger and more turbulent than ever, and in close alliance with the Waldenses, or Poor Men of Lyons, a sect that at first widely differed from them, but which in process of time adopted many of their peculiar principles. They had at the commencement of the thirteenth century, A. D. 1206, become the more formidable that they had for leader Raymond, Count of Toulouse, son of that Raymond who, a few years before, had so vigorously opposed them, and for patrons and supporters most of the nobility of the country.†

Raymond governed one of the most important provinces in Europe. It was a central region, communicating directly with France, with Italy, and with Spain. The provinces yet untainted were separated by this infected district.‡ The yeomen of fifty towns and of countless boroughs followed the standard of Raymond VI. One hundred and ten governors of castles acknowledged him as liege lord, and a multitude of noblemen always attended him. The court of his father had been accounted one of the most brilliant of Europe. The lady fair, the gallant knight, and the merry troubadour sang of love and of deeds of daring, and the whole year was an uninterrupted succession of holidays. His son, Raymond VI., was in his early youth confided to tutors of the Manichæan sect, and he imbibed their principles. When, therefore, in 1194, he succeeded to his father, he protected the Albigenses, and offered a large reward in money to every Christian knight that should apostatize.§ He followed out his principles by repudiating his wives as often as they ceased to charm him.|| Moreover, he had so little respect for religion and the laws of the Church, that he hired mountebanks to mock and caricature the priests while they were officiating at the altar. The very bishop of

* Henrion, Tom. V. p. 169.

† Henrion, Tom. V. p. 229.

‡ *Edinburgh Review*, *ubi supra*.

§ Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. III. p. 334.

|| Which example was scrupulously followed by one of his most distinguished imitators, Henry VIII., the father of "the Church by law established in England."

the diocese was obliged, whenever he went abroad, to take an escort of armed men for the security of his person.* The Divine Office was no longer chanted in public. Weeds and tufted grass grew up among the steps and flags around the churches, and the moss and ivy crept over their walls. Many churches were converted into forts and garrisons, and, while song and revelry arose from these sanctuaries, their towers and battlements resounded with the clash of arms and the shouts and imprecations of men in battle.

If ever there was a time for prompt and energetic action to stem the torrent of irreligion, and to save the world from anarchy and barbarism, it was then. The Church was the only power on earth that could interfere with any chance of success. So far back as in 1179, in the Eleventh General Council, the errors of the Albigenses had been condemned. The twenty-seventh canon is most severe against them. It smites them with anathema, deprives them of the right of ecclesiastical sepulture, condemns all who favor or patronize them, and finally exhorts Christians to take arms against them. This proceeding on the part of the Church seems to us harsh, and sets for ever at rest one point, and that is, that the Church, as such, in general council assembled, did countenance and advise the punishment and suppression of the Albigensian heretics. Protestant writers contend that this treatment of the Albigenses proceeded from religious bigotry, and was levelled against a peaceful, innocent, and virtuous community of Christians, whose only crime was a desire to serve God according to the dictates of their conscience. Mosheim says, that the Roman Pontiffs urged a most sanguinary war against them for merely teaching otherwise than the Church taught, and for calling in question the power and prerogatives of the Popes. Now this is not true, as is evident from all the proceedings instituted against them, and from the very words of the canon which condemned them. Had the Albigenses been content with simply holding a false doctrine, and with teaching and professing it among themselves, — had they not waged open war against the religion of the whole world, and sought to bring its authority, the only conservative authority known, into contempt, — had they not despised the laws of the land, and its civil rulers, and committed excesses that threatened the subversion of all law and order, of religion and of government, no war would have

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. III. p. 335.

been waged against them. The Church has often condemned heresies, but no instance can be shown wherein she has levelled her anathemas against the persons of heretics, unless the public weal, and the conservation of ecclesiastical or political institutions, or both, manifestly and peremptorily demanded it. We have, we think, already said enough to show that in this case they did demand it. The question was simply this : — Shall the Church stand and see herself ravelled out into threads, and held up to public scorn as a jest and a by-word, her ministers insulted and despised, her temples burned and razed to the ground, her institutions attacked on every side, her very existence menaced, though vainly, by a band of sworn and ruthless enemies, combining the subtlety of Manichæans with the ferocity of Moors, and lift no hand to save herself and you from one common ruin ? Or shall she buckle on her panoply, and, with the means with which God has endowed her, stand upon her defence ? The very words of the canon show that its object was not so much to convert them as to put an end to their cruelties. “ With regard to those heretics,” it says, meaning the Albigenses and other kindred sects, “ who practise such atrocities towards Christians as not to spare even churches and monasteries, nay, nor widows, nor orphans, but ruthlessly exterminate and slay, regarding neither age, nor sex, nor infirmity, we decree, &c. ; . . . and we enjoin upon all Christians to withstand such crimes, and, arms in hand, to protect their brethren.” * Even the French infidel Guizot does not regard the Albigensian wars as wars of religion, but styles them “ a contest between feudal France on the one hand and municipal France on the other,” — “ a struggle of the feudalism of the North against the attempt at democratic organization of the South ” ; in other words, an attempt of the existing powers to suppress the rebellion of a strong and dangerous faction. † The Church, however, saw farther than this, and with reason.

Scarcely had Innocent III. ascended the pontifical throne, than he spoke (A. D. 1200) in tones of alarm of the progress of these turbulent sectaries. He compared them to scorpions whose sting was mortal, to foxes and firebrands carrying burning and desolation into the harvest-field, and to the locusts of the prophet Joel, hidden in the dust, but devouring all before them. Deeply afflicted at the perversion of so many of his flock, fore-

* Palma, *Prælect. Hist. Eccl.*, Tom. III., P. I., p. 120.

† *History of Civilization*, p. 248.

seeing the perils that menaced religion on all sides, Innocent, who never executed any project by halves, was resolved to put forth all his energies and influence to suppress the evil, or, at least, to check its further progress. To this end, he called upon the faithful to amend their lives, to remove every occasion of scandal, and to set an example worthy of imitation ; and he called upon the clergy to sound the silver trumpet of truth, that the walls of Jericho might be made to crumble.*

When these measures of persuasion failed, then, and not till then, Innocent felt called upon to urge the application of other means. He decreed that all who obstinately adhered to the sentiments and practices of the modern Manichæans should be excommunicated from the Church, and deprived of all ecclesiastical fiefs and revenues. He recommended to princes to banish them from their territories, and, if necessary, to take up arms against them. In the year 1203, Peter de Castelnau and Rodolphe, both of the Order of Citéaux, arrived at Toulouse, as the Pope's legates. They were men of fervent piety and prudent zeal, who had consecrated their lives to the conversion of these heretics. But, though willing to endure and to labor, they suffered such incredible hardships, and encountered such unexpected and insuperable difficulties in the prosecution of their mission, that they became fairly discouraged. The unfavorable report they made to the Sovereign Pontiff, and the sad picture they presented of the decline of discipline and the prevalence of brigandage and anarchy, determined Innocent to call upon the king of France in the most energetic terms to awake from his stupor and provide for the safety of his kingdom and of the Church. "The time has arrived," said he, "when the temporal and spiritual should unite for mutual protection, and they who would shake off the yoke of Christian obedience should be restrained by the secular arm. A solemn obligation rests upon you, therefore, to use the power that God has intrusted to you ; and if you cannot in person march against these evil-doers, you are bound to empower some suitable person to act in your stead."

Nevertheless, all was in vain. Neither the arts of persuasion, nor armed battalions, were able to convert or to quell the proud, licentious, and rebellious Albigenses. The legates, wearied out and disgusted with a mission so perilous and fruitless, were on the point of throwing up their commission, when,

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. p. 305.

in the month of July, 1206, the Bishop of Osma, a Spaniard, encountered them at Montpellier, on his return from a visit to Rome.* He was accompanied by an humble priest, of medium height, limbs delicately moulded, of handsome features, smiling countenance, rosy complexion, and beard and hair of light auburn. His voice was rich, manly, and sweetly toned. His step was modest, yet firm and graceful, and his temper was uniformly gay and cheerful. His character was as remarkable as his personal appearance. He was swift as the lightning of heaven in forming a resolution, and firm as a rock of jasper in its execution. When all others hesitated, he quailed not, and he appeared always confident of success. His conversation invariably charmed and edified, whatever the rank or condition of his auditor. It always turned upon religion, and was garnished with eloquent and touching citations from the Sacred Writings. In the pulpit he was majestic, animated, and resistless. His discourses were like the progress of a storm, and they ended with a rainbow and a serene and unclouded heaven. To those who asked him whence he drew such sublime materials for his sermons he replied, *From the book of charity.*† Yet he was full of humility, and practised the most rigid self-denial. He shunned the notice of men, and was pained by their applause. And this was the man raised up by the Eternal for the deliverance of his people; this was the man destined to achieve what cardinals, legates, bishops, and learned priests had in vain attempted, — what men in steel, knights in armour, and bristling battalions had failed to accomplish. This was the man — this youthful, modest, humble Levite — who was destined to hold aloft the lamp of truth, to sound its silver trumpet, to rejoice in its triumphs, and to compass the Manichæan Jericho with a chosen band of spirits like his own. Who was this favored champion of the Most High? It was St. Dominic. The band he gathered around him were Dominicans, an Order celebrated throughout the world, and justly called one of “the columns of the Church.”

Such was the man that the holy Bishop of Osma had selected as his companion, and with whom he entered the once lovely provinces of the Pyrenees, now desolate and dreary, blighted and scorched by fire and sword and heresy. Two venerable fathers, legates of Innocent III., furrowed with ungrateful and

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. p. 348.

† Hurter, *Tableau des Institutions*, Tom. III.

unsuccessful toil, downcast and disheartened, present themselves to the saintly bishop, inform him of their determination to resign their commission, and crave his counsel and advice. The bishop was sorely perplexed, and knew not how or what to reply, and appealed to Dominic, who with characteristic promptness took up the word, and thus addressed the legates : — “You missionaries have made a great mistake in your mode of conducting the mission. You ride about on horses, and employ beasts of burden to convey your baggage and provisions. You thereby give an advantage to the enemies of religion. ‘Look,’ they say, ‘see those horsemen coming up the road ! how finely they ride ! They are coming a-horseback to proclaim the Gospel of one who always went afoot. As to the poor, they cannot stop to notice them, for they would have to dismount.’ No, sirs, you will never have success in this way ; but, if you would prosper, you must lay aside all pomps and luxuries, and unarmed, on foot, and without shoes, proceed to your task like veritable apostles.” This was bold, plain language to be addressed to Papal legates, but it was received in the spirit in which it was given. The advice of the youthful canon* was literally followed. The bishop resolved to join them, and set the example by sending immediately home his servants and horses. The others did the same, and all set forth on foot, without shoes, and rather in the garb of mendicant pilgrims than of Papal missionaries. The good bishop was soon after (1207) taken ill and died. St. Dominic, however, remained, and prosecuted the work so happily begun. He went through all the towns and villages, praying, singing, and exhorting to peace and reconciliation and love, and always remained longest where he found the most hardships and the greatest dangers, esteeming himself but too happy in being instrumental in the salvation of souls, or in laying down his life in the cause. It was at this time that he instituted the celebrated devotion of the Rosary, which consisted in the recitation for a certain number of times of the sublimest of prayers in honor of the Mysteries of Redemption, and as a reparation for the blasphemies and insults that had been heaped upon them by the sectaries. This devotion was not only an eloquent appeal to Heaven, but was also a most instructive and intelligible book in which the great truths of Christianity were made plain to every capacity, from the lord of the castle to the humble peasant.

* He was canon and subprior of the cathedral church of Oama.

The devotion and humility of the gifted missionary, the ardor and perseverance with which he pursued his sacred calling, the zeal and patience with which he catechized and instructed both parents and children, his calmness in the hour of peril, and the eagerness with which he sought persecution and martyrdom, so won upon the respect and confidence of the people, that an infinite number, among whom were some that had been his most violent enemies, were convinced of their errors, were seized with compunction for their crimes, and threw themselves with enthusiasm into the bosom of the Church. Having received special faculties and instructions for the prosecution of his undertaking, he received the penitents with tears of joy, and welcomed them to their father's house. The most stubborn and refractory he sometimes accused to the secular authorities. This last proceeding has called forth unmitigated condemnation from their children and successors of later days, and St. Dominic has been called the father and founder of the Inquisition, in its odious sense, as an execrable and murderous tribunal. The truth is, St. Dominic never established any sort of special ecclesiastical tribunal. He merely exercised the power* of entering a complaint in the civil courts against disturbers of the peace and enemies of the common weal. Such, surely, were the Albigenses, if outlaws, brigands, church-burners, blood-thirsty adventurers, and secret plotters against the state may and ought to be so denominated.

Though, among the simple-hearted and sincere, the labors of St. Dominic were crowned with brilliant and unlooked-for success, yet, on the other hand, they served only to arouse the fury and vengeance of the proud and licentious chiefs, and of their unprincipled followers. The cry of priestcraft was raised, and ran like wildfire. Banners of liberty, so called, rolled in blood and baptized in fire, were unfolded in every village, and multitudes gathered around them. Men were appealed to, if they would consent to be priest-ridden. "Away with the priests! to the gallows with the priests!" From words and shouts and execrations they proceeded to corresponding actions. They patrolled the whole country in armed bands of from five to eight thousand men. Churches were again attacked and burned, and priests and religious were seized and put to death, and in many cases flayed alive. Peter de Cas-

* A power often exercised by priests similarly situated, and recognized by the then existing laws of Europe.

telnaud, the legate of Innocent III., was assassinated (1208) in open day by a servant of the Count of Toulouse, and another ruffian, and was placed by the Church on the catalogue of her martyrs. These events, but especially the murder of the legate, caused a universal shudder, and set all Christendom in flames. The Count of Toulouse and his followers were excommunicated anew, and all the places they occupied, and the cities that gave them refuge or protection, placed under interdict. The king of France awoke at last from his stupor and inactivity, and an army was set on foot, to punish, and, if necessary, to extirpate, the authors of these crimes.* The same indulgences were promised that had been granted to the Crusaders in Palestine. An immense army was rapidly equipped, and was commanded by the most illustrious barons, lords, and knights of France, among whom were Otho, Duke of Bourgogne, who had commanded the army of the Crusaders at the Holy Sepulchre, the valiant Peter de Courtenay, the celebrated and devoted Simon de Montfort, and a multitude of others, no less distinguished by their bravery and feats of arms than by their rank and influence.†

Fifty thousand combatants assembled at the point of rendezvous, wearing the red cross on their breast. The chiefs met, and chose Simon de Montfort commander of the expedition. In 1209, the army marched, and immediately entered the unfortunate countries infected with the Albigensian heresy. Victory attended the crusaders on every side. Cities and posts were invested and carried by assault. The war was continued on both sides for a long series of years, with a ferocity and thirst for blood that has ever characterized civil wars, and all the horrors and cruelties of a fierce and protracted warfare filled the land with devastation and misery, and inundated it with blood. Success, however, attended the crusaders, and the Albigensian Manichæans, more brilliant in tilts and tournaments and letters than in the battle-field, were either swept from the earth, or forced to conceal themselves in its remotest corners, there to remain unknown and unhonored until again brought into notice by the political and religious commotions of the sixteenth century, like certain monsters of the deep, who pursue unknown tracks in the depths of the ocean, and never

* Alban Butler, *St. Dominic*. Sismondi, *Histoire des Français*. Henrion, liv. 39.

† Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. liv. 13.

show their heads above the waves except in time of storms and tempests.

We are far from being an advocate for war, and as followers of the Prince of peace we would use our feeble influence, to the extent of our ability, in dissuading men from this terrible alternative. Still less do we advocate, or attempt to justify, the employment of the sword for the advancement of the truth, never sanctioned or permitted by the Church, believing that the truth hath power sufficient in herself, being "more piercing than any two-edged sword, and reaching unto the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow" (Heb. iv. 12); and believing, too, that to force men's consciences is only to transform them into knaves and hypocrites. But still, with Father Lacordaire, we repudiate the principles of the non-resistants; we hold that there may exist a state of society where forbearance on the part of even Christian people ceases to be a virtue, and cheerfully adopt the following from the eloquent Dominican:—

"War is an act by which a nation resists injustice at the expense of its own blood. Wherever there is injustice, there is legitimate cause for war. . . . *Religion*, indeed, *teaches* us what is right, but war *defends* the right. The one is God's word, the other is his arm. *Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God of hosts*; that is, God of justice, the God who commissions the strong man to succour the feeble, who overthrows haughty dynasties, raises up a Cyrus against Babylon, breaks down the gates of brass, and changes the executioner into the soldier, and the soldier into the victim. But war, like things the most sacred, may be abused, and degenerate into a measure of oppression. Hence, to judge of its merits in any given case, we must know its object. A war of emancipation is holy, a war of oppression is accursed.

"Up to the period of the Crusades, almost the only motive to war among Christian nations was the defence of their country and of their respective governments. The soldier died on the frontiers of his country, — and that word *country* was the war-cry that inspired him with courage and with strength on the battle-field. But when Gregory VII. had awakened in men's minds the idea of a Christian republic, the horizon of brotherhood and that of self-devotion were both equally enlarged. Europe, bound together by a common faith, held that every oppressed people professing the same faith, whoever might be the oppressor, had a just claim to her aid and protection, and could lawfully take up arms for themselves. It was then that chivalry was born; and war became, not only a Christian, but a monastic employment, and the outposts of the West were guarded and hedged about by the hair-cloth and the bucklers of

whole battalions of monks. Every Christian man felt that he was a minister of justice against tyranny, and, being the workmanship of Him whose ears are ever open to the supplications of his children, that it was his duty to fly promptly at the first cry of distress. As a sportsman stands all armed at the foot of a tree, listening to the sounds borne upon the breeze, so did Europe in those days, her lance at rest and her foot in the stirrup, listen attentively to the cries of the oppressed. Whether the oppression proceeded from the throne or from the tower of a castle, whether it were necessary to cross the sea or merely to mount a charger, neither weather, nor place, nor danger, nor rank could impede the achievement of their object. No one talked of profit or of loss. Blood is shed freely, or it is not shed at all. Conscience rewards men in this world, and God in the next.

"Among the weaker powers which the chivalry of Christendom had sworn to protect, there was one more sacred than all the others, — it was the Church. The Church, having neither soldiers nor ramparts to defend her, had ever been at the mercy of her oppressors. Whenever a sovereign had the will to injure her, he could do it. But chivalry no sooner appeared than it proclaimed itself the champion of the City of God; at first, because the City of God was feeble, and then, because the security of its freedom was the cause of man. Being oppressed, the Church had a right to claim the protection of the knight; being a Divine institution for the purpose of perpetuating the work of terrestrial freedom and of eternal salvation, the Church was the mother, the spouse, and the sister of every one who had gentle blood or a good sword. I do not believe that there exists a man incapable of appreciating the sentiments that I have advanced. It is the glory of our age, amid all its misfortunes, to have discovered that there are interests more elevated and more universal than the interests of family or of nation. The sympathy of nations overleaps once more their boundaries, and the voice of the oppressed finds again an echo in the world. Where is the Frenchman that would not accompany with aspirations for success, if not in person, an army marching to the succour of the Pole? Where is the Frenchman, unbeliever though he may be, who does not place upon the list of crimes of which that ill-fated country has been the victim, the violence offered to religion, the exile of its priests and bishops, the spoliation of its monasteries, the desecration of its churches, and the violence done to the consciences of its people? If the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of an Archbishop of Cologne created in modern Europe so great an excitement, what must have been the state of public feeling in the thirteenth century, when it was known that a Papal legate had been most treacherously and cruelly assassinated?" — pp. 63 – 67.

But the assassination of the legate was not the only crime of

the Albigenses, nor was it by any means the only cause of the crusade that was marshalled against them. Monasteries, as we have seen, were laid in ruins, churches were pillaged and transformed into garrisons, bishops were ejected from their sees or kept in a constant state of anxiety and alarm, priests were cruelly scourged and many were flayed alive. Religion was despised, and its most sacred rites were made matter for ridicule and caricature. Bands of marauders and assassins patrolled the country, leaving devastation and blood in their path. When, therefore, it was known that to all these insults and cruelties was superadded that of the murder of a Papal ambassador, and that the murderer was publicly protected and befriended by Raymond, Count of Toulouse, the acknowledged patron, protector, and head of these modern Manichæans, is it surprising that all Christendom should instantly have been in flames, and, shaking off her lethargy, harnessed herself for battle, and rushed forth to the succour of her oppressed brethren. The cup of injury and insult had been filling for ages. It had now overflowed and threatened to deluge the world. Forbearance was no longer a virtue, but a crime. The cause of God, the cause of humanity even, demanded retribution. The day had come, and the retribution was paid in blood.

But neither St. Dominic nor any of his companions had any hand or part either in proposing or in prosecuting the long and sanguinary wars which followed. In fact, the outbreak of the war placed St. Dominic in a most embarrassing position, which, however, served only to show forth all the fervor of his piety and all the grandeur of his genius. Two paths lay before him, of equal danger; the one, to abandon his mission, the other, to enlist all his influence on the side of the crusaders. In the one case he would have turned his back upon the cause of God, and in the other he would have divested his mission of its peaceful and apostolic character. But he was equal to the emergency, and he did neither. He did not fly from the danger, but rushed into its very midst, and established himself at Toulouse, the head-quarters and stronghold of heresy, imitating therein the example of the Apostles St. Peter and St. Paul, of whom the one chose Antioch and the other Corinth for the field of his toils, and both died in Rome, the queen city of paganism. On the other hand, though war raged furiously on every side, not a flush of passion mantled his cheek, not a cloud of angry feeling obscured the peaceful serenity of his countenance. Amid the armed chivalry of France, he ap-

peared only as a messenger of peace, and a herald of grace and reconciliation. It is a remarkable fact, that no contemporary historian ever mentions his name in connection with the Albigensian wars. He is never present either at councils, or at conferences, or at sieges, or at triumphal celebrations. Once only is he mentioned in connection with a battle, and then he is at prayer in a neighbouring church. This silence is the more expressive, since the historians of that period belonged to different parties and schools ; some being ecclesiastics, and some laics ; some friends, and others enemies of the crusades. Had St. Dominic taken the part in these wars attributed to him by some modern writers, it is impossible that the historians of the time should have been mute thereupon, as if by common consent. All contemporary writers assure us that St. Dominic and his companions occupied themselves in works of mercy, and that they prosecuted their sublime mission with no other arms than their crucifix and rosary, reprovng and restraining the crimes and excesses of the crusaders as energetically as they did those of their enemies.

It is a great mistake to regard the Albigenses and the Albigensian wars through modern optics. If we would see them in their true light, we must consider them as occurring in the thirteenth century, and not in the nineteenth. In the thirteenth century, man's temporal happiness even was so closely interwoven with the faith of the Church, that, the moment the latter was weakened, the former fell into threads. Political Europe was in a state of transition from barbarism to civilization. It was divided and subdivided into innumerable petty principalities, mostly independent of each other, but dependent for their very existence upon the pleasure of the Roman Pontiffs. This dependance they had voluntarily chosen ; nay, in many cases they humbly and earnestly besought it. Having embraced Christianity, they naturally threw themselves upon Christianity for the preservation of their civil rights and liberties. What was to deter a powerful baron from seizing by force the castle and dependencies of one less potent than himself ? What was to prevent constant recurrence of civil wars, of daily murders, of public pillage ? There was nothing but religion. But religion could not make its voice heard, nor its authority respected, except by its ministers. When, therefore, religion was attacked, its doctrines assailed, its institutions menaced, its ministers insulted or assassinated, all the sovereigns and princes and feudal lords of Europe might well

tremble, for religion was the ligature that bound them, the cement that gave them cohesion. Each blow, therefore, aimed at the Church made every castle in Christendom shake as though riven by an earthquake, and struck upon their walls like the crash of a thunderbolt. If, then, it be true that the enemies of the Church were necessarily enemies of the state, and as such to be punished and suppressed, what are we to think of the Albigenses, who were a leagued band of traitors and unprincipled ruffians, aiming at the subversion of all government, of all restraint, and of all religion ?

In conclusion, we cannot forbear to recommend the eloquent Life of St. Dominic by Father Lacordaire to our readers generally, as eminently interesting and instructive. Its author is well known, and has been for some time held to be one of the most eloquent preachers living. This work appears to have been compiled with great care, and is admirably adapted to the men of this age who have a prejudice against any thing ascetic. We commend it to those Protestants who always couple St. Dominic in their minds with the Spanish Inquisition, and take the Spanish Inquisition to have been all that the imagination and malice of apostates, heretics, and infidels have painted it. They may learn to love and reverence one whom they ignorantly and rashly denounce as a monster of cruelty. There is nothing in the life of St. Dominic for which a Catholic can blush, and we cannot better end than by saying, "St. Dominic, pray for us !"

ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The Saints and Servants of God.* — 1. *The Life of St. Philip Neri, Apostle of Rome, and Founder of the Congregation of the Oratory.* Vol. I. 2. *The Lives of St. Thomas of Villanova, Archbishop of Valencia, and Augustinian Friar; and of St. Francis Solano, Apostle of Peru, of the Order of St. Francis.* 3. *The Life of St. Alphonso Maria de Liguori, Bishop of St. Agatha of the Golfs, and Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer.* Vol. I. 4. *The Life of the Blessed Sebastian of Apparizio, Franciscan Lay-Brother, of the Province of The Holy Gospel in Mexico.* 5. *The Life of St. Ignatius Loyola, Founder of The Jesuits.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. London: Richardson & Son. 1847 and 1848. 8vo.

THESE are five volumes of the series of *Lives of Modern Saints* now in the course of publication by Messrs. Richardson and Son, England, and Messrs. Dunigan & Brother in this country, under the editorship of the Rev. F. W. Faber, of St. Wilfrid's. They are not, we believe, all the volumes which have been issued, but they are all which we have

received. We cannot too highly recommend the series, or too cordially thank Mr. Faber and his associates for the service they are rendering the Catholic public in England and this country. The Lives of the Saints show us Christianity applied, in its practical power and sweetness, and constitute the most profitable species of reading for both old and young, and at the same time are even more attractive to a well-disposed mind than the most high-wrought romances of the day.

The several Lives before us are translations from the Italian, French, and Spanish, and have different degrees of literary merit. The Life of St. Philip Neri is from the Italian of Father Bacci. It is an authentic Life of that great Saint, but might have been much better written. In literary merit, it is far below the other volumes of the series. The Life of St. Thomas of Villanova is from the French of Father Claude Maimbourg, and is admirably written, with spirit, grace, elegance, and unction. The Life of St. Ignatius is from the Italian of Father Francesco Mariani, a Jesuit, and is executed in a manner not unworthy of the Founder of the Society of Jesus. The Life of St. Alphonsus de Liguori is a fine specimen of hagiography.

The Life of St. Alphonsus is preceded by an *Essay on Beatification and Canonization*, which is full of interest, and marked by a noble and thorough-going Catholic spirit. It is by Mr. Faber himself, who, for the most part, follows Benedict the Fourteenth; but he gives some paragraphs of his own, which prove that he is, however it may be with some other recent converts, Catholic to the core. We detect here and there, indeed, traces of the Oxford School, which we would willingly miss, and now and then come across a "line of argument" the precise value of which we are unable to determine; in one or two instances we meet opinions which, though entertained by, here and there, a theologian, yet of questionable soundness, are assumed as undoubted and indisputable truth; but the spirit and unction which pervade it make it, upon the whole, one of the most thorough-going Catholic essays we remember to have seen in the English language.

We commend to our readers especially the Life of the Blessed Sebastian of Apparizio; a poor Franciscan lay-brother, showing to what sanctity a man may attain even in the world, while engaged in secular affairs. The Blessed Sebastian practised heroic virtue long before he became a religious. It is a Life, also, to remind people of a truth which we in this age are exceedingly prone to forget, namely, that heroic virtue can be practised by those in humble, every-day life, as well as by those who are distinguished for their rank, their wealth, or their learning,—the truth which lies at the foundation of all genuine socialism.

There are some verbal criticisms on these volumes which we would suggest, had we room. The translators have, indeed, a good command of their mother tongue, and their several styles deserve great praise; but they are somewhat careless, and adopt not unfrequently forms of expression which are incorrect and inelegant, and admit neologisms which are unpardonable. *Neither*—or, instead of *neither*—*nor*, is of constant recurrence, and it is *being* done, as "the book is *being* written," the "house is *being* built," &c., meets us at every turn; locutions which are un-English, uncalled for, and borrowed from the newspapers, those general corrupters of language as well as of morals. To write English grammatically is no merit; but to write it ungrammatically is a great demerit,—especially in Oxford scholars. However, we highly prize these volumes. They are supplying a want in English

literature which all intelligent Catholics have long felt, and Mr. Faber and his friends are rendering us a service which cannot fail to secure the blessing of Heaven.

2. — Messrs. Dunigan & Brother have sent us *Clara*, and *The Madonna*. By CANON SCHMID. Nos. IV. & V. of their *Popular Library of Instruction and Amusement, illustrated by Chapman*.
3. — We have received from the same publishers Vols. III., IV., V., & VI. of Lingard's *History of England*.
4. — *Shandy M'Guire, or Tricks upon Travellers*. By PAUL PEPPER-GRASS, Esq. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848. Part I. 16mo. pp. 168.
5. — *Modern French Literature*. By L. RAYMOND DE VERICOUR. Revised, with Notes alluding particularly to Writers prominent in the late Political Events in Paris. By W. S. CHASE, A. M. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 444.
6. — *The Catholic Bride, or Moral Letters addressed to Julia, Daughter of Count Salario della Margarita, on the Occasion of her Marriage with Count Eduardo Demorri di Castelmagno*. From the Italian. By C. C. PISE, D. D. Baltimore: John Murphy. 1848. 16mo. pp. 189.
7. — *A Doctrinal Catechism*. By the Rev. STEPHEN KEENAN. First American Edition. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848. 18mo. pp. 395.

* * This number closes the second volume of the New Series of our Review, and we return our cordial thanks to the Catholic public for the liberal support which they have extended to it. It has, indeed, not proved acceptable to political demagogues, to namby-pambies, latitudinarians, and radicals; but we have reason to believe that it has met the approbation of the bishops and clergy generally, as well as of the intelligent laity. Many who were startled, in the outset, at the bold, manly, and uncompromising course which we marked out for ourselves, are now among its warmest friends, and there is, so far as we are aware, no serious opposition to it from any Catholic quarter. We have aimed to make it Catholic, and have always consulted those best qualified to instruct and direct us, and, if it has any merit, it belongs solely to them. Its faults, errors, defects, are our own, and we alone must be held responsible for them.

But though the Review has been warmly received and liberally supported, yet, as it appeals to no ephemeral interests, avails itself of no popular passion or sentiment, it, probably, is less liberally supported than its friends generally suppose, and we are sure, that, if aware of this fact, they would willingly exert themselves to extend its circulation. We are sure the Catholic public would not willingly see it, our only Catholic Quarterly in the country, discontinued. We know it has warm and powerful friends in all sections of the Union, and we appeal to them with full confidence to exert themselves in our behalf, and to enable us to start our next volume with an increased list of subscribers. It was at the request of a large number of distinguished American prelates that we undertook, after our conversion, to conduct a Catholic Review. We have done all we could to make the Review worthy of patronage, and we appeal to the reverend clergy, who have been such staunch friends to us from the first, to continue to us their support, — hoping to be able, as we acquire experience, and as the list of our contributors increases, to make it more genuinely Catholic, and less unworthy of their disinterested patronage.

